It’s a conspiracy theory!
“They’re building a secret army to tyrannise the people…”
Oh wait…
https://www.newsweek.com/exclusive-inside-militarys-secret-undercover-army-1591881
“They’re building a secret army to tyrannise the people…”
Oh wait…
https://www.newsweek.com/exclusive-inside-militarys-secret-undercover-army-1591881
Newsweek
Exclusive: Inside the Military's Secret Undercover Army
Thousands of soldiers, civilians and contractors operate under false names, on the ground and in cyberspace. A Newsweek investigation of the ever-growing and unregulated world of "signature reduction."
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Forwarded from Charles Malet × Unbound Today
Cheshire Police announced on Thursday that they had arrested a woman for offences under s19 of the Public Order Act 1986 and s179 of the Online Safety Act (OSA) 2023. They then tweeted that “It’s a stark reminder of the dangers of posting information on social media platforms without checking the accuracy. It also acts as a warning that we are all accountable for our actions, whether that be online or in person.”
The phrase upon which this arrest hangs is "without checking the accuracy" and how, exactly, such a judgement may be arrived at. Section 179 OSA 2023 says a person commits an offence is committed if a message sent "conveys information that the person knows to be false" and that "the person intended the message, or the information in it, to cause non-trivial psychological or physical harm to a likely audience". First of all, with regard to a social media post, "it is not necessary for the purposes of subsection (1)(c) that the person intended to cause harm to any one of them in particular (or to all of them)", so we are immediately in the zone of imagined harm, rather than actual or intended harm.
With regard to a "false communication offence", the most significant part comes in s180, which states that "A recognised news publisher cannot commit an offence under section 179." Yes, you really did read that correctly. The BBC, for example, may send a message they know to be false, with the specific intent to cause "non-trivial psychological harm". In other words, state-sponsored propaganda is legitimised in statute by OSA 2023.
Back to Cheshire, it is inferred by police that the message or messages sent, with false information, were sent in the knowledge that the information was false and that the reasons for doing so were both to cause psychological harm and to stir up racial hatred. There is a considerable gulf between "checking the accuracy" of a message and sending one which "conveys information that the person knows to be false". It is not clear whether the alleged offence here is the genesis of an incorrect story, or the promulgation of one, but the critical detail should be whether the suspect believed the information to be true, or not.
The onus is on police to demonstrate intent, by means of an investigation, which would involve an interview. Transmitting information, which subsequently turns out to be false, cannot automatically be presumed to be loaded with the intent to either stir up racial hatred, or to cause psychological harm. However, there is increasing precedent in this area, seen most obviously in the case of Sam Melia, where CPS gave a description of the magnitude of his intent, based on very peripheral and circumstantial evidence. Sending messages which turn out to be inaccurate may be considered reckless, but recklessness is not one of the elements which may make up an offence under s179 OSA 2023.
What, one wonders, would have happened if such a message had been sent, suggesting that the suspect in the Southport killings had been white British, with white British parents?
The phrase upon which this arrest hangs is "without checking the accuracy" and how, exactly, such a judgement may be arrived at. Section 179 OSA 2023 says a person commits an offence is committed if a message sent "conveys information that the person knows to be false" and that "the person intended the message, or the information in it, to cause non-trivial psychological or physical harm to a likely audience". First of all, with regard to a social media post, "it is not necessary for the purposes of subsection (1)(c) that the person intended to cause harm to any one of them in particular (or to all of them)", so we are immediately in the zone of imagined harm, rather than actual or intended harm.
With regard to a "false communication offence", the most significant part comes in s180, which states that "A recognised news publisher cannot commit an offence under section 179." Yes, you really did read that correctly. The BBC, for example, may send a message they know to be false, with the specific intent to cause "non-trivial psychological harm". In other words, state-sponsored propaganda is legitimised in statute by OSA 2023.
Back to Cheshire, it is inferred by police that the message or messages sent, with false information, were sent in the knowledge that the information was false and that the reasons for doing so were both to cause psychological harm and to stir up racial hatred. There is a considerable gulf between "checking the accuracy" of a message and sending one which "conveys information that the person knows to be false". It is not clear whether the alleged offence here is the genesis of an incorrect story, or the promulgation of one, but the critical detail should be whether the suspect believed the information to be true, or not.
The onus is on police to demonstrate intent, by means of an investigation, which would involve an interview. Transmitting information, which subsequently turns out to be false, cannot automatically be presumed to be loaded with the intent to either stir up racial hatred, or to cause psychological harm. However, there is increasing precedent in this area, seen most obviously in the case of Sam Melia, where CPS gave a description of the magnitude of his intent, based on very peripheral and circumstantial evidence. Sending messages which turn out to be inaccurate may be considered reckless, but recklessness is not one of the elements which may make up an offence under s179 OSA 2023.
What, one wonders, would have happened if such a message had been sent, suggesting that the suspect in the Southport killings had been white British, with white British parents?
Armchair Rioters and Criminal Observers.
You can’t get anymore 1984 dystopia than that!
You can’t get anymore 1984 dystopia than that!
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Forwarded from The Conspiracy Hole (mingming the merciful)
Media is too big
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You Will Never Look At Elon Musk The Same Way Again
StrangerThanFiction
StrangerThanFiction
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Forwarded from J Wilderness
RE: UK situation and discussions around arrests relating to online communications:
UK Online Safety Act commenced 2019, full implementation expected 2026. The sticking point being Section 122 which would demand service providers scan online communications (bypassing, or banning encryption). Essentially the powers that be need to manufacture consent and legal precedent for mass online surveillance in order to achieve the goal.
In February 2024, the European Court of Human Rights ruled, in an unrelated case, that requiring degraded end-to-end encryption "cannot be regarded as necessary in a democratic society" and was incompatible with Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights.
https://www.theregister.com/2023/10/27/online_safety_act_charles
https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Online_Safety_Act_2023
UK Online Safety Act commenced 2019, full implementation expected 2026. The sticking point being Section 122 which would demand service providers scan online communications (bypassing, or banning encryption). Essentially the powers that be need to manufacture consent and legal precedent for mass online surveillance in order to achieve the goal.
In February 2024, the European Court of Human Rights ruled, in an unrelated case, that requiring degraded end-to-end encryption "cannot be regarded as necessary in a democratic society" and was incompatible with Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights.
https://www.theregister.com/2023/10/27/online_safety_act_charles
https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Online_Safety_Act_2023
The Register
King Charles III signs off on UK Online Safety Act, with unenforceable spying clause
It's now up to Ofcom to sort out this messy legislation
The_Void
Everything is going according to plan. The Agenda 2030 pieces are falling into place. #Reminder In psychological warfare, a strategy of tension effectively transforms societal fear into a tool for political manipulation. By fostering insecurity and exploiting…
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Strategy of Tension
Operation Gladio | BBC
NATO and the CIA, in collaboration with several European intelligence agencies, organised Operation Gladio, a secret state-sponsored terror network operating in Europe.
Operation Gladio in The_Void.
@thevoiduk
Operation Gladio | BBC
NATO and the CIA, in collaboration with several European intelligence agencies, organised Operation Gladio, a secret state-sponsored terror network operating in Europe.
Operation Gladio in The_Void.
@thevoiduk
Forwarded from Oracle Films
In case you had any doubt where the totalitarian "solutions" to events of the past few weeks in the UK were trickling down from...
The United Nations is a plague on humanity. And it's high time it was exposed.
The United Nations is a plague on humanity. And it's high time it was exposed.
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