The Spirit of May 28th site is hosting 6 short position papers on the George Floyd rebellion.
Authors were asked to isolate (1) takeaways (2) current limits (3) ideal 2022 scenarios.
https://www.sm28.org/articles/among-friends-reflections-after-the-george-floyd-uprising/
Authors were asked to isolate (1) takeaways (2) current limits (3) ideal 2022 scenarios.
https://www.sm28.org/articles/among-friends-reflections-after-the-george-floyd-uprising/
www.sm28.org
The Spirit of May 28 is one faction of the Party of George Floyd – the composition that announced itself in the 2020 uprising. With the flames that engulfed the Third Precinct of Minneapolis on May 28, 2020 as our starting point, SM28 seeks to bring together…
Forwarded from Strike Force
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Video of military forces being routed in Kazakhstan.
Lots of footage of security forces surrendering coming out of Kazakhstan.
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Many of the captured security forces in Kazakhstan seem to have been surrounded by cars en route to cities and don’t seem to have much will to resist.
Seattle Police put out misinformation on their scanner as part of a campaign that would fuel a strain of paranoia that proved fatal.
https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/politics/seattle-police-improperly-faked-radio-chatter-about-proud-boys-as-chop-formed-in-2020-investigation-finds/
https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/politics/seattle-police-improperly-faked-radio-chatter-about-proud-boys-as-chop-formed-in-2020-investigation-finds/
The Seattle Times
Seattle police faked radio chatter about Proud Boys as CHOP formed in 2020, investigation finds
At a crucial moment during 2020’s racial justice protests, Seattle police exchanged a detailed series of fake radio transmissions about a nonexistent group of menacing right-wing extremists.
Forwarded from Strike Force
Analysis from: https://t.me/BO_AK_reborn
"Wahhabis, looters, mambets"? Who and what in Almaty?
In the whirlpool of events we are still trying to analyze something, not to dissolve in the information noise.
Perhaps the most interesting question for us is: what groups and forces are involved in the events in Almaty, where the scenario of confrontation is the most radical and violent at the moment? It is impossible to answer unequivocally right now.
Everything is mixed up in the media-rumor: "militant nationalist squads", "aggressive youths beating up journalists", "drunken marauders from the outskirts", "protesters"... and it's all in one mess. We don't know the disposition of forces among non-state actors of Kazakhstani events. But we are running the risk to suppose, that some people were going out to street marches, some people were taking away the vodka from the broken show-windows, and probably the third or probably the first were in arsenal of KNB.
Journalist Maksim Kurnikov said some very interesting things on Ekho Moskvy's morning broadcast. He reminded that the scheme "to take weapons from gun stores and then attack security forces" is not new in Kazakhstan.
Exactly the same thing happened) in the city of Aktobe in June 2016: several dozen young men, divided into groups, took weapons from two gun stores, seized vehicles and attacked a part of the National Guard, where they were defeated. The authorities of Kazakhstan have been much muddled about the case: their claims of an "Islamist connection" are still not very clear what is the basis for this.
Kurnikov also spoke of paramilitary guards at illegal oil refineries in western Kazakhstan, made up of local villagers, disparagingly called "mambets" (a la collective farmers) by Kazakhstani townsfolk. These groups have also at times had armed confrontations with police officers.
What does all this tell us? Of course, President Tokayev's words about "terrorist groups carefully trained abroad" are pure propaganda and most likely a gross lie. That armed cells capable of seizing security institutions and arsenals suddenly materialized from a motley crowd also sounds unlikely.
That said, we have no evidence of Islamist and/or nationalist involvement in the Almaty events. However, as we can see, organized groups capable of active armed resistance exist in Kazakhstani society in principle.
It is likely that those people who engaged in direct confrontation with the security forces were partly representatives of such groups and partly spontaneous self-organized protesters. The analogy with the 2014 Maidan, where the self-defense also gathered both literally "on the move" in the crowd and with the participation of radical organized groups that had arrived.
These are definitely not identical values to the dudes with vodka at the battered storefronts, although they could be overlapping sets.
P/S: about the "protesters' attacks on journalists." You'd be surprised, but the same thing happens in Paris somewhere. Journalists are certainly doing important work. But by filming the faces of people who oppose the authorities, they voluntarily or involuntarily collect evidence for the punishers. So there is no need to be offended by broken cameras.
Disclamer: we do not condemn, but support active opposition to the authorities of Kazakhstan, as well as any other states. The right to revolt against tyranny is a condition of people's freedom.
Translated with www.DeepL.com/Translator (free version)
"Wahhabis, looters, mambets"? Who and what in Almaty?
In the whirlpool of events we are still trying to analyze something, not to dissolve in the information noise.
Perhaps the most interesting question for us is: what groups and forces are involved in the events in Almaty, where the scenario of confrontation is the most radical and violent at the moment? It is impossible to answer unequivocally right now.
Everything is mixed up in the media-rumor: "militant nationalist squads", "aggressive youths beating up journalists", "drunken marauders from the outskirts", "protesters"... and it's all in one mess. We don't know the disposition of forces among non-state actors of Kazakhstani events. But we are running the risk to suppose, that some people were going out to street marches, some people were taking away the vodka from the broken show-windows, and probably the third or probably the first were in arsenal of KNB.
Journalist Maksim Kurnikov said some very interesting things on Ekho Moskvy's morning broadcast. He reminded that the scheme "to take weapons from gun stores and then attack security forces" is not new in Kazakhstan.
Exactly the same thing happened) in the city of Aktobe in June 2016: several dozen young men, divided into groups, took weapons from two gun stores, seized vehicles and attacked a part of the National Guard, where they were defeated. The authorities of Kazakhstan have been much muddled about the case: their claims of an "Islamist connection" are still not very clear what is the basis for this.
Kurnikov also spoke of paramilitary guards at illegal oil refineries in western Kazakhstan, made up of local villagers, disparagingly called "mambets" (a la collective farmers) by Kazakhstani townsfolk. These groups have also at times had armed confrontations with police officers.
What does all this tell us? Of course, President Tokayev's words about "terrorist groups carefully trained abroad" are pure propaganda and most likely a gross lie. That armed cells capable of seizing security institutions and arsenals suddenly materialized from a motley crowd also sounds unlikely.
That said, we have no evidence of Islamist and/or nationalist involvement in the Almaty events. However, as we can see, organized groups capable of active armed resistance exist in Kazakhstani society in principle.
It is likely that those people who engaged in direct confrontation with the security forces were partly representatives of such groups and partly spontaneous self-organized protesters. The analogy with the 2014 Maidan, where the self-defense also gathered both literally "on the move" in the crowd and with the participation of radical organized groups that had arrived.
These are definitely not identical values to the dudes with vodka at the battered storefronts, although they could be overlapping sets.
P/S: about the "protesters' attacks on journalists." You'd be surprised, but the same thing happens in Paris somewhere. Journalists are certainly doing important work. But by filming the faces of people who oppose the authorities, they voluntarily or involuntarily collect evidence for the punishers. So there is no need to be offended by broken cameras.
Disclamer: we do not condemn, but support active opposition to the authorities of Kazakhstan, as well as any other states. The right to revolt against tyranny is a condition of people's freedom.
Translated with www.DeepL.com/Translator (free version)
Telegram
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Forwarded from Strike Force
more from https://t.me/BO_AK_reborn re Kazakhstan 🇰🇿
Tokayev's Carrot and Stick
Totalitarian rap is an abstract carrot and a very concrete stick...
Let's continue to highlight the important details of the picture of what is happening in Kazakhstan. Note, that as soon as the revolt went down, the repressive bodies got violent. That is there was not "pacification" at all, but rampant punitive measures. If on the 8th of January, when the public assemblies had dispersed and the authorities suppressed the main pockets of armed resistance in Almaty, the Ministry of Interior was announcing about 4 thousand detained, then today this figure has increased more than twice and approached 10 000 (!).
This is very similar to the situation in Belarus, where the Ministry of Internal Affairs/KGB bent on terrorism reached its climax immediately after the collapse of the protest wave. Regularity, though. Regimes act according to the principle "Woe to the vanquished! You can't expect from them any peacemaking in case of victory.
Many have noticed that when he agreed with CSTO interventionists about deployment of troops, Tokayev has immediately toughened his rhetoric: instead of the previous compromise tone, there were curses on the heads of "terrorists" and orders to shoot without warning.
Now the president of Kazakhstan alternates between threats and blackmail. It's interesting, that Tokayev is actively exploiting the theme of social justice: phrases about the unscrupulously rich at the background of general poverty. It goes without saying that this is merely manipulation, and that the president is not interested in social equality. But such "leftist" phraseology shows us the social essence of Kazakhstani protest - the uprising of the deprived and powerless against their exploiters and oppressors. Even if the rebels expressed it weakly conceptually. If the country was risen on the background of radical religious ecstasy (as on it now seekers of "Islamist trace" try to show), Tokayev would be singing something about importance of following the way of prophet...
We fix that the Kazakh uprising is not just a "revolt of the poor for cheap gas with some democratic demands", it is a revolt against inequality as such. There is reason to hope that Tokayev's "carrots," his populist speeches, will not bribe the people of Kazakhstan, just shot on the barricades and thrown into prisons by an authoritarian regime.
Tokayev's Carrot and Stick
Totalitarian rap is an abstract carrot and a very concrete stick...
Let's continue to highlight the important details of the picture of what is happening in Kazakhstan. Note, that as soon as the revolt went down, the repressive bodies got violent. That is there was not "pacification" at all, but rampant punitive measures. If on the 8th of January, when the public assemblies had dispersed and the authorities suppressed the main pockets of armed resistance in Almaty, the Ministry of Interior was announcing about 4 thousand detained, then today this figure has increased more than twice and approached 10 000 (!).
This is very similar to the situation in Belarus, where the Ministry of Internal Affairs/KGB bent on terrorism reached its climax immediately after the collapse of the protest wave. Regularity, though. Regimes act according to the principle "Woe to the vanquished! You can't expect from them any peacemaking in case of victory.
Many have noticed that when he agreed with CSTO interventionists about deployment of troops, Tokayev has immediately toughened his rhetoric: instead of the previous compromise tone, there were curses on the heads of "terrorists" and orders to shoot without warning.
Now the president of Kazakhstan alternates between threats and blackmail. It's interesting, that Tokayev is actively exploiting the theme of social justice: phrases about the unscrupulously rich at the background of general poverty. It goes without saying that this is merely manipulation, and that the president is not interested in social equality. But such "leftist" phraseology shows us the social essence of Kazakhstani protest - the uprising of the deprived and powerless against their exploiters and oppressors. Even if the rebels expressed it weakly conceptually. If the country was risen on the background of radical religious ecstasy (as on it now seekers of "Islamist trace" try to show), Tokayev would be singing something about importance of following the way of prophet...
We fix that the Kazakh uprising is not just a "revolt of the poor for cheap gas with some democratic demands", it is a revolt against inequality as such. There is reason to hope that Tokayev's "carrots," his populist speeches, will not bribe the people of Kazakhstan, just shot on the barricades and thrown into prisons by an authoritarian regime.
Telegram
Боец Анархист
Освобождение через восстание!
Резерв: https://t.me/BO_AK_rezerv
Контакт: @BO_AK_feedback_bot + bo-ak@riseup.net
Онион-сайт - http://boakor7dmr63zguccltp6nki56ou4oppirhyllfck7yd3sifywinhkyd.onion
Как открывать .онион сайты - https://boak.noblogs.org/#DN
Резерв: https://t.me/BO_AK_rezerv
Контакт: @BO_AK_feedback_bot + bo-ak@riseup.net
Онион-сайт - http://boakor7dmr63zguccltp6nki56ou4oppirhyllfck7yd3sifywinhkyd.onion
Как открывать .онион сайты - https://boak.noblogs.org/#DN
LOOKS CAN BE DECEIVING AND DECEIVING LOOKS CAN DRAW HEAT
Throughout the 2010s US “Operators” were routinely outed in Yemen due to their full beards often grown as facial concealment. Yemen being a place where men typically sport mustaches the operators’ beard made them extremely noticeable. This is one kind example of where concealment can I fact actually draw adversarial attention.
In 2020 activists in Seattle found the location of Mayor Jenny Durkan’s house precisely because it was the only house blurred out on google maps to the protected status she obtained after pissing off some bratva.
Police UCs (under covers) and wannabe operators grey manning at protests often dress overly nondescript which in combination with sunglasses and specific facial hair that gives them what activists call “cop face” often alerts protestors etc to their presence.
(continued)
Throughout the 2010s US “Operators” were routinely outed in Yemen due to their full beards often grown as facial concealment. Yemen being a place where men typically sport mustaches the operators’ beard made them extremely noticeable. This is one kind example of where concealment can I fact actually draw adversarial attention.
In 2020 activists in Seattle found the location of Mayor Jenny Durkan’s house precisely because it was the only house blurred out on google maps to the protected status she obtained after pissing off some bratva.
Police UCs (under covers) and wannabe operators grey manning at protests often dress overly nondescript which in combination with sunglasses and specific facial hair that gives them what activists call “cop face” often alerts protestors etc to their presence.
(continued)