U.S. Military Training Document Says Socialists Represent "Terrorist" Ideology

https://theintercept.com/2021/06/22/socialists-counterterrorism-political-terrorists-navy-antifa/

In the US context it’s going to take a lot more than guns to have any sort of successful insurgency but that more is not better military tech, that more is social. Guns and their application have in fact been a hinderance, see Seattle and Atlanta last summer as examples. Of course it’s also not just guns, but the culture around them that adds to this, but it is also true that the escalation to certain arenas of arms away from low intensity and logistics based conflict does enter a realm where the state has the advantage.

Of course in the US guns and cars are important elements to consider and certainly aren’t something that should never be deployed. The capacity for armed self defense is a need for many. This of course should come with proper training, but not create specialized security. Of course more often than not neo-nazis are shooting each other, but that doesn’t mean they won’t attack people in the street or in their homes. And it’s not just neo-nazis who are armed, but more common reactionaries too.

Belarus: “When We Rise”

https://cwc.im/WhenWeRise

Anarchists who participated in the 2020 revolt in Belarus discuss its strengths and weaknesses—and why the regime and its liberal opposition were able to prevent it from toppling the dictatorship.

An invaluable analysis from the front lines.

If you want to know what infiltration of activist spaces can look like in the contemporary, here’s a good example of it.

https://theintercept.com/2018/12/30/tigerswan-infiltrator-dakota-access-pipeline-standing-rock/

The judge sided with the Federal prosecutors + applied a domestic terrorism enhancement to Jessica’s case. The enhancement originated in the Bush era Patriot Act, which expanded the definition of terrorism to cover “domestic"actions...

https://itsgoingdown.org/water-protector-sentenced-to-8-years-in-federal-prison-for-actions-to-stop-the-dakota-access-pipeline/

FM 34-2-1 Reconnaissance and Surveillance and Intelligence Support to Counterreconnaissance
Published 19 June 1991

"Throughout history, military leaders have recognized the importance of R&S (reconnaissance and surveillance). Gaining and maintaining contact with the enemy is essential to win the battle. Our own military history contains many examples where our knowledge of the enemy, or lack of knowledge, directly led to victory or defeat.

The role of R&S has not changed on the modern battlefield; if anything, it has become even more important. Battles at combat training centers prove that a good R&S effort is critical to successful attacks. On the other hand, a poor R&S effort almost guarantees defeat for the commander[...]

The message is clear: Success on the battlefield begins with R&S and R&S begins with the intelligence officer..."

Source: Radical Defense (link)

#intelligence #sabotage #link #document #book #tactics #strategy #security

This is how the US Military thinks conventional insurgencies work. Take it with a grain of salt if course, but for groups that have gone clandestine and are looking to influence local politics this could be a trajectory. Maybe you can make your own similar chart renaming some of the projectualities?

Corporate Counterinsurgency Against Line 3 Pipeline Resistance

https://theintercept.com/2021/07/07/intercepted-line-3-pipeline-minnesota/

Confidence Courage Connection Trust: A proposal for security culture

“This proposal for security culture is based on reframing — on shifting our focus from fear to confidence, from risk-aversion to courage, from isolation to connection, and from suspicion to trust.

It makes sense to feel fear – the state is very powerful, repression is common, and it has the power to crush us and all our projects. But I don’t want to stay in that fear, and with accurate information and good plans we can begin to transform fear into confidence, knowing we have security practices that are up to the risk we face. In fact, without transforming fear, it’s hard to imagine how we could manage to take action at all in face of the power of our enemies.

I don’t want to be risk-averse. I want to decide on my actions based on effectiveness, appropriateness, my analysis, and my ethics. Good security culture lays the groundwork for us to show courage in our tactics collectively, since we know we can handle the risk. When we don’t transform risk-aversion, we self-police and stay narrowly in the space for symbolic opposition that is provided to us.

Repression functions by isolating people. I don’t want to contribute to  isolation through the things I do to keep myself and my friends safe. I want a security culture rooted in deepening our connection with each other. When we don’t transform isolation, organizing can feel no different than work and we don’t build the kinds of relationships that truly transform us, such that we can begin to feel the world we wish to create.

I don’t want to feel suspicion when I meet people, that’s toxic and erodes the spaces of struggle we create. Rather than feel suspicious of someone, I want to ask myself “what would it take for me to trust this person?” I want to go towards people and try to transform suspicion into trust.”

https://north-shore.info/2019/11/05/confidence-courage-connection-trust-a-proposal-for-security-culture/

security culture should be proactive and goal oriented. a sort of harm reduction. best defense is a good offense etc.

The anarchists targeted by Pegasus

https://freedomnews.org.uk/2021/07/23/the-anarchists-targeted-by-pegasus/