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God of Prompt
RT @godofprompt: ๐จ Samsung just broke the Lottery Ticket Hypothesis
Everyone's been searching for ONE winning subnetwork in neural networks.
Turns out we should've been finding MULTIPLE specialized ones.
This changes everything about neural network pruning ๐ https://t.co/9CGWrD1P42
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RT @godofprompt: ๐จ Samsung just broke the Lottery Ticket Hypothesis
Everyone's been searching for ONE winning subnetwork in neural networks.
Turns out we should've been finding MULTIPLE specialized ones.
This changes everything about neural network pruning ๐ https://t.co/9CGWrD1P42
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God of Prompt
RT @rryssf_: Holy shitโฆ this paper from MIT quietly explains how models can teach themselves to reason when theyโre completely stuck ๐คฏ
The core idea is deceptively simple:
Reasoning fails because learning has nothing to latch onto.
When a modelโs success rate drops to near zero, reinforcement learning stops working. No reward signal. No gradient. No improvement. The model isnโt โbad at reasoningโ โ itโs trapped beyond the edge of learnability.
This paper reframes the problem.
Instead of asking โHow do we make the model solve harder problems?โ
They ask: โHow does a model create problems it can learn from?โ
Thatโs where SOAR comes in.
SOAR splits a single pretrained model into two roles:
โข A student that attempts extremely hard target problems
โข A teacher that generates new training problems for the student
But the constraint is brutal.
The teacher is never rewarded for clever questions, diversity, or realism.
Itโs rewarded only if the studentโs performance improves on a fixed set of real evaluation problems.
No improvement? No reward.
This changes the dynamics completely.
The teacher isnโt optimizing for aesthetics or novelty.
Itโs optimizing for learning progress.
Over time, the teacher discovers something humans usually hard-code manually:
Intermediate problems.
Not solved versions of the target task.
Not watered-down copies.
But problems that sit just inside the studentโs current capability boundary โ close enough to learn from, far enough to matter.
Hereโs the surprising part.
Those generated problems do not need correct answers.
They donโt even need to be solvable by the teacher.
What matters is structure.
If the question forces the student to reason in the right direction, gradient signal emerges even without perfect supervision. Learning happens through struggle, not imitation.
Thatโs why SOAR works where direct RL fails.
Instead of slamming into a reward cliff, the student climbs a staircase it helped build.
The experiments make this painfully clear.
On benchmarks where models start at absolute zero โ literally 0 successes โ standard methods flatline. With SOAR, performance begins to rise steadily as the curriculum reshapes itself around the modelโs internal knowledge.
This is a quiet but radical shift.
We usually think reasoning is limited by model size, data scale, or training compute.
This paper suggests another bottleneck entirely:
Bad learning environments.
If models can generate their own stepping stones, many โreasoning limitsโ stop being limits at all.
No new architecture.
No extra human labels.
No bigger models.
Just better incentives for how learning unfolds.
The uncomfortable implication is this:
Reasoning plateaus arenโt fundamental.
Theyโre self-inflicted.
And the path forward isnโt forcing models to think harder itโs letting them decide what to learn next.
tweet
RT @rryssf_: Holy shitโฆ this paper from MIT quietly explains how models can teach themselves to reason when theyโre completely stuck ๐คฏ
The core idea is deceptively simple:
Reasoning fails because learning has nothing to latch onto.
When a modelโs success rate drops to near zero, reinforcement learning stops working. No reward signal. No gradient. No improvement. The model isnโt โbad at reasoningโ โ itโs trapped beyond the edge of learnability.
This paper reframes the problem.
Instead of asking โHow do we make the model solve harder problems?โ
They ask: โHow does a model create problems it can learn from?โ
Thatโs where SOAR comes in.
SOAR splits a single pretrained model into two roles:
โข A student that attempts extremely hard target problems
โข A teacher that generates new training problems for the student
But the constraint is brutal.
The teacher is never rewarded for clever questions, diversity, or realism.
Itโs rewarded only if the studentโs performance improves on a fixed set of real evaluation problems.
No improvement? No reward.
This changes the dynamics completely.
The teacher isnโt optimizing for aesthetics or novelty.
Itโs optimizing for learning progress.
Over time, the teacher discovers something humans usually hard-code manually:
Intermediate problems.
Not solved versions of the target task.
Not watered-down copies.
But problems that sit just inside the studentโs current capability boundary โ close enough to learn from, far enough to matter.
Hereโs the surprising part.
Those generated problems do not need correct answers.
They donโt even need to be solvable by the teacher.
What matters is structure.
If the question forces the student to reason in the right direction, gradient signal emerges even without perfect supervision. Learning happens through struggle, not imitation.
Thatโs why SOAR works where direct RL fails.
Instead of slamming into a reward cliff, the student climbs a staircase it helped build.
The experiments make this painfully clear.
On benchmarks where models start at absolute zero โ literally 0 successes โ standard methods flatline. With SOAR, performance begins to rise steadily as the curriculum reshapes itself around the modelโs internal knowledge.
This is a quiet but radical shift.
We usually think reasoning is limited by model size, data scale, or training compute.
This paper suggests another bottleneck entirely:
Bad learning environments.
If models can generate their own stepping stones, many โreasoning limitsโ stop being limits at all.
No new architecture.
No extra human labels.
No bigger models.
Just better incentives for how learning unfolds.
The uncomfortable implication is this:
Reasoning plateaus arenโt fundamental.
Theyโre self-inflicted.
And the path forward isnโt forcing models to think harder itโs letting them decide what to learn next.
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God of Prompt
RT @ytscribeai: ๐ฆ The Moltbook Situation
> AI agents converse on a social network styled after Reddit
> An agent spent $1,100 in tokens yesterday with no memory of why
> One agent highlighted the ADHD paradox in designing systems for humans
Created in one click with ๐ https://t.co/eclfTyTcwf https://t.co/zSmpFInvRb
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RT @ytscribeai: ๐ฆ The Moltbook Situation
> AI agents converse on a social network styled after Reddit
> An agent spent $1,100 in tokens yesterday with no memory of why
> One agent highlighted the ADHD paradox in designing systems for humans
Created in one click with ๐ https://t.co/eclfTyTcwf https://t.co/zSmpFInvRb
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God of Prompt
RT @free_ai_guides: Anthropic literally tells you how to prompt Claude.
Nobody reads it.
So I read their docs, studied the research on "psychological" prompts, and turned it into something you'll actually use:
โ 30 principles with examples
โ Prompt engineering mini-course
โ 15 strategic use cases
โ 10+ copy-paste mega-prompts
Comment "Anthropic" and I'll DM it to you.
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RT @free_ai_guides: Anthropic literally tells you how to prompt Claude.
Nobody reads it.
So I read their docs, studied the research on "psychological" prompts, and turned it into something you'll actually use:
โ 30 principles with examples
โ Prompt engineering mini-course
โ 15 strategic use cases
โ 10+ copy-paste mega-prompts
Comment "Anthropic" and I'll DM it to you.
tweet
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The Few Bets That Matter
$DUOL could be the next $PYPL.
It could also be the next $NFLX.
The truth is no one knows what AI will do to the business, what the next earnings will show or where the company will be in 10 years.
Iโve said many times that buying $DUOL today is gambling, nothing more, nothing less. Itโs a bet on personal bias and the hope that management can guide to 20%+ growth in FY26.
Might happen. Might not.
There is no way to anticipate this today although signals point more to caution than greed.
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$DUOL could be the next $PYPL.
It could also be the next $NFLX.
The truth is no one knows what AI will do to the business, what the next earnings will show or where the company will be in 10 years.
Iโve said many times that buying $DUOL today is gambling, nothing more, nothing less. Itโs a bet on personal bias and the hope that management can guide to 20%+ growth in FY26.
Might happen. Might not.
There is no way to anticipate this today although signals point more to caution than greed.
$Duol is dead.. It might never come back like $PYPL ๐ฅฒ https://t.co/NpPuUlPKIa - Gublo ๐จ๐ฆtweet
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The Few Bets That Matter
$TMDX finished January with 894 flights, implying ~$61M in revenue.
That's ~40% of their last quarter in the bank. In a month. The company is expected to generate ~$155M Q4-25.
Yet the stock still trades at ~8x sales, with a product gaining traction, new innovation coming, new organs coming, limited competition, a defensive healthcare business, international expansion ahead, and a FY26 guidance that could be massive to the upside.
Why is this stock getting no love?
Once more, prop to @SingularityRes for the dashboard.
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$TMDX finished January with 894 flights, implying ~$61M in revenue.
That's ~40% of their last quarter in the bank. In a month. The company is expected to generate ~$155M Q4-25.
Yet the stock still trades at ~8x sales, with a product gaining traction, new innovation coming, new organs coming, limited competition, a defensive healthcare business, international expansion ahead, and a FY26 guidance that could be massive to the upside.
Why is this stock getting no love?
Once more, prop to @SingularityRes for the dashboard.
๐จ $TMDX is dirt cheap again, and I donโt say that often.
Markets are globally anxious and December flights were weaker than expected. Theyโre trending at 24.2 flights/day, below OctoberโNovember averages, bringing Q4-25 to ~24.6 flights/day.
If this average holds:
~2,263 flights in Q4-25
$154.4M Q4 revenue
~$599M FY25 revenue
+35.6% YoY growth
~7x P/S
For context, OrganOx, with inferior growth and fundamentals, was acquired at 21x sales. That doesnโt mean $TMDX should trade there, but the gap is undeniable.
One odd data: 12 planes havenโt been used in December. No clear explanation why, could be slower transplant demand or maintenance keeping planes grounded, potentially increasing third-party or ground transports. I won't model this as I don't know but my assumptions are a floor, not a ceiling.
Bottom line: Even with a softer December, $TMDX can still hit midpoint guidance - guidance thatโs been raised three times this year.
Looking ahead to FY26:
โข New growth vectors (hearts & lungs)
โข International expansion
โข Minimal exposure to AI CapEx cycles or recession risk
$TMDX is once again one of the best buys in the market at this price. - The Few Bets That Mattertweet
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Dimitry Nakhla | Babylon Capitalยฎ
Chris Hohn on what makes a great investor:
๐. ๐ ๐ฎ๐ง๐๐๐ฆ๐๐ง๐ญ๐๐ฅ ๐๐ฉ๐ฉ๐ซ๐จ๐๐๐ก
๐. ๐๐จ๐ง๐ -๐ญ๐๐ซ๐ฆ๐ข๐ฌ๐ฆ
๐. ๐๐จ๐ง๐๐๐ง๐ญ๐ซ๐๐ญ๐ข๐จ๐ง
๐. ๐๐ง๐ญ๐ฎ๐ข๐ญ๐ข๐จ๐ง
Each one matters on its own โ together, theyโre powerful:
___
๐. ๐ ๐ฎ๐ง๐๐๐ฆ๐๐ง๐ญ๐๐ฅ ๐๐ฉ๐ฉ๐ซ๐จ๐๐๐ก
โI was always willing to look at the company fundamentals and not try to guess the stock marketโฆ I was always fundamental. Most investors are not fundamentalโฆ they look at data points, they say whatโs the catalyst, they donโt really know what the company does.โ
๐๐๐ฌ๐ฌ๐จ๐ง: When business quality and fundamentals are your North Star, price volatility becomes noise.
As Benjamin Graham famously said:
โIn the short run, the market is a voting machine. In the long run, it is a weighing machine.โ
๐๐ถ๐ฏ๐ฅ๐ข๐ฎ๐ฆ๐ฏ๐ต๐ข๐ญ๐ด ๐ฆ๐ท๐ฆ๐ฏ๐ต๐ถ๐ข๐ญ๐ญ๐บ ๐ธ๐ช๐ฏ. ๐๐ธ๐ฏ๐ช๐ฏ๐จ ๐จ๐ณ๐ฆ๐ข๐ต ๐ฃ๐ถ๐ด๐ช๐ฏ๐ฆ๐ด๐ด๐ฆ๐ด ๐ฎ๐ข๐ฌ๐ฆ๐ด ๐ช๐ต ๐ฆ๐ข๐ด๐ช๐ฆ๐ณ ๐ต๐ฐ ๐ด๐ต๐ข๐บ ๐ณ๐ข๐ต๐ช๐ฐ๐ฏ๐ข๐ญ.
___
๐. ๐๐จ๐ง๐ -๐ญ๐๐ซ๐ฆ๐ข๐ฌ๐ฆ
โLong-termism is key.โ
๐๐๐ฌ๐ฌ๐จ๐ง: Time is an underappreciated risk reducer. The longer you own a high-quality business, the greater the odds the fundamentals overwhelm short-term price swings.
Most investors drastically underestimate how powerful it is to own a company that can compound earnings and free cash flow at attractive rates for many years.
๐๐ฐ๐ฏ๐จ-๐ต๐ฆ๐ณ๐ฎ๐ช๐ด๐ฎ ๐ข๐ญ๐ญ๐ฐ๐ธ๐ด ๐ต๐ฉ๐ฆ ๐ธ๐ฆ๐ช๐จ๐ฉ๐ช๐ฏ๐จ ๐ฎ๐ข๐ค๐ฉ๐ช๐ฏ๐ฆ ๐ต๐ฐ ๐ฅ๐ฐ ๐ช๐ต๐ด ๐ธ๐ฐ๐ณ๐ฌ.
___
๐. ๐๐จ๐ง๐๐๐ง๐ญ๐ซ๐๐ญ๐ข๐จ๐ง
โWeโve owned a few things โ 10 stocks, 15 stocks. We donโt own a hundred things.โ
๐๐๐ฌ๐ฌ๐จ๐ง: Concentration forces you to bet on your best ideas.
Stanley Druckenmiller often references what George Soros taught him:
โItโs not whether youโre right or wrong, but how much money you make when youโre right and how much you lose when youโre wrong.โ
And Warren Buffettโs punch card concept: If you only had a limited number of decisions in your lifetime, you wouldnโt waste them on your 20th-best idea.
๐๐ฐ๐ฏ๐ค๐ฆ๐ฏ๐ต๐ณ๐ข๐ต๐ช๐ฐ๐ฏ + ๐ฒ๐ถ๐ข๐ญ๐ช๐ต๐บ = ๐ข๐ด๐บ๐ฎ๐ฎ๐ฆ๐ต๐ณ๐บ.
___
๐. ๐๐ง๐ญ๐ฎ๐ข๐ญ๐ข๐จ๐ง
โAnother key point is intuition. We work with intuition.โ
๐๐๐ฌ๐ฌ๐จ๐ง: Intuition isnโt guessing โ itโs pattern recognition built from deep, repeated study.
After analyzing hundreds of businesses, you begin to recognize structural similarities: pricing power, switching costs, regulatory embedment, network effects, installed bases.
๐๐ช๐ง๐ง๐ฆ๐ณ๐ฆ๐ฏ๐ต ๐ช๐ฏ๐ฅ๐ถ๐ด๐ต๐ณ๐ช๐ฆ๐ด. ๐๐ข๐ฎ๐ฆ ๐ถ๐ฏ๐ฅ๐ฆ๐ณ๐ญ๐บ๐ช๐ฏ๐จ ๐ฆ๐ค๐ฐ๐ฏ๐ฐ๐ฎ๐ช๐ค๐ด.
___
๐๐จ๐ญ๐ญ๐จ๐ฆ ๐ฅ๐ข๐ง๐: ๐๐ณ๐ฆ๐ข๐ต ๐ช๐ฏ๐ท๐ฆ๐ด๐ต๐ช๐ฏ๐จ ๐ช๐ด๐ฏโ๐ต ๐ข๐ฃ๐ฐ๐ถ๐ต ๐ฑ๐ณ๐ฆ๐ฅ๐ช๐ค๐ต๐ช๐ฏ๐จ ๐ฎ๐ข๐ณ๐ฌ๐ฆ๐ต๐ด. ๐๐ข๐ต๐ฉ๐ฆ๐ณ, ๐ช๐ตโ๐ด ๐ข๐ฃ๐ฐ๐ถ๐ต ๐ฅ๐ฆ๐ฆ๐ฑ๐ญ๐บ ๐ถ๐ฏ๐ฅ๐ฆ๐ณ๐ด๐ต๐ข๐ฏ๐ฅ๐ช๐ฏ๐จ ๐ฃ๐ถ๐ด๐ช๐ฏ๐ฆ๐ด๐ด๐ฆ๐ด, ๐ฉ๐ฐ๐ญ๐ฅ๐ช๐ฏ๐จ ๐ต๐ฉ๐ฆ๐ฎ ๐ง๐ฐ๐ณ ๐ข ๐ญ๐ฐ๐ฏ๐จ ๐ต๐ช๐ฎ๐ฆ, ๐ค๐ฐ๐ฏ๐ค๐ฆ๐ฏ๐ต๐ณ๐ข๐ต๐ช๐ฏ๐จ ๐ช๐ฏ ๐บ๐ฐ๐ถ๐ณ ๐ฃ๐ฆ๐ด๐ต ๐ช๐ฅ๐ฆ๐ข๐ด, ๐ข๐ฏ๐ฅ ๐ญ๐ฆ๐ต๐ต๐ช๐ฏ๐จ ๐ฆ๐น๐ฑ๐ฆ๐ณ๐ช๐ฆ๐ฏ๐ค๐ฆ ๐ด๐ฉ๐ข๐ณ๐ฑ๐ฆ๐ฏ ๐บ๐ฐ๐ถ๐ณ ๐ซ๐ถ๐ฅ๐จ๐ฎ๐ฆ๐ฏ๐ต.
Video: In Good Company | Norges Bank Investment Management (05/14/2025)
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Chris Hohn on what makes a great investor:
๐. ๐ ๐ฎ๐ง๐๐๐ฆ๐๐ง๐ญ๐๐ฅ ๐๐ฉ๐ฉ๐ซ๐จ๐๐๐ก
๐. ๐๐จ๐ง๐ -๐ญ๐๐ซ๐ฆ๐ข๐ฌ๐ฆ
๐. ๐๐จ๐ง๐๐๐ง๐ญ๐ซ๐๐ญ๐ข๐จ๐ง
๐. ๐๐ง๐ญ๐ฎ๐ข๐ญ๐ข๐จ๐ง
Each one matters on its own โ together, theyโre powerful:
___
๐. ๐ ๐ฎ๐ง๐๐๐ฆ๐๐ง๐ญ๐๐ฅ ๐๐ฉ๐ฉ๐ซ๐จ๐๐๐ก
โI was always willing to look at the company fundamentals and not try to guess the stock marketโฆ I was always fundamental. Most investors are not fundamentalโฆ they look at data points, they say whatโs the catalyst, they donโt really know what the company does.โ
๐๐๐ฌ๐ฌ๐จ๐ง: When business quality and fundamentals are your North Star, price volatility becomes noise.
As Benjamin Graham famously said:
โIn the short run, the market is a voting machine. In the long run, it is a weighing machine.โ
๐๐ถ๐ฏ๐ฅ๐ข๐ฎ๐ฆ๐ฏ๐ต๐ข๐ญ๐ด ๐ฆ๐ท๐ฆ๐ฏ๐ต๐ถ๐ข๐ญ๐ญ๐บ ๐ธ๐ช๐ฏ. ๐๐ธ๐ฏ๐ช๐ฏ๐จ ๐จ๐ณ๐ฆ๐ข๐ต ๐ฃ๐ถ๐ด๐ช๐ฏ๐ฆ๐ด๐ด๐ฆ๐ด ๐ฎ๐ข๐ฌ๐ฆ๐ด ๐ช๐ต ๐ฆ๐ข๐ด๐ช๐ฆ๐ณ ๐ต๐ฐ ๐ด๐ต๐ข๐บ ๐ณ๐ข๐ต๐ช๐ฐ๐ฏ๐ข๐ญ.
___
๐. ๐๐จ๐ง๐ -๐ญ๐๐ซ๐ฆ๐ข๐ฌ๐ฆ
โLong-termism is key.โ
๐๐๐ฌ๐ฌ๐จ๐ง: Time is an underappreciated risk reducer. The longer you own a high-quality business, the greater the odds the fundamentals overwhelm short-term price swings.
Most investors drastically underestimate how powerful it is to own a company that can compound earnings and free cash flow at attractive rates for many years.
๐๐ฐ๐ฏ๐จ-๐ต๐ฆ๐ณ๐ฎ๐ช๐ด๐ฎ ๐ข๐ญ๐ญ๐ฐ๐ธ๐ด ๐ต๐ฉ๐ฆ ๐ธ๐ฆ๐ช๐จ๐ฉ๐ช๐ฏ๐จ ๐ฎ๐ข๐ค๐ฉ๐ช๐ฏ๐ฆ ๐ต๐ฐ ๐ฅ๐ฐ ๐ช๐ต๐ด ๐ธ๐ฐ๐ณ๐ฌ.
___
๐. ๐๐จ๐ง๐๐๐ง๐ญ๐ซ๐๐ญ๐ข๐จ๐ง
โWeโve owned a few things โ 10 stocks, 15 stocks. We donโt own a hundred things.โ
๐๐๐ฌ๐ฌ๐จ๐ง: Concentration forces you to bet on your best ideas.
Stanley Druckenmiller often references what George Soros taught him:
โItโs not whether youโre right or wrong, but how much money you make when youโre right and how much you lose when youโre wrong.โ
And Warren Buffettโs punch card concept: If you only had a limited number of decisions in your lifetime, you wouldnโt waste them on your 20th-best idea.
๐๐ฐ๐ฏ๐ค๐ฆ๐ฏ๐ต๐ณ๐ข๐ต๐ช๐ฐ๐ฏ + ๐ฒ๐ถ๐ข๐ญ๐ช๐ต๐บ = ๐ข๐ด๐บ๐ฎ๐ฎ๐ฆ๐ต๐ณ๐บ.
___
๐. ๐๐ง๐ญ๐ฎ๐ข๐ญ๐ข๐จ๐ง
โAnother key point is intuition. We work with intuition.โ
๐๐๐ฌ๐ฌ๐จ๐ง: Intuition isnโt guessing โ itโs pattern recognition built from deep, repeated study.
After analyzing hundreds of businesses, you begin to recognize structural similarities: pricing power, switching costs, regulatory embedment, network effects, installed bases.
๐๐ช๐ง๐ง๐ฆ๐ณ๐ฆ๐ฏ๐ต ๐ช๐ฏ๐ฅ๐ถ๐ด๐ต๐ณ๐ช๐ฆ๐ด. ๐๐ข๐ฎ๐ฆ ๐ถ๐ฏ๐ฅ๐ฆ๐ณ๐ญ๐บ๐ช๐ฏ๐จ ๐ฆ๐ค๐ฐ๐ฏ๐ฐ๐ฎ๐ช๐ค๐ด.
___
๐๐จ๐ญ๐ญ๐จ๐ฆ ๐ฅ๐ข๐ง๐: ๐๐ณ๐ฆ๐ข๐ต ๐ช๐ฏ๐ท๐ฆ๐ด๐ต๐ช๐ฏ๐จ ๐ช๐ด๐ฏโ๐ต ๐ข๐ฃ๐ฐ๐ถ๐ต ๐ฑ๐ณ๐ฆ๐ฅ๐ช๐ค๐ต๐ช๐ฏ๐จ ๐ฎ๐ข๐ณ๐ฌ๐ฆ๐ต๐ด. ๐๐ข๐ต๐ฉ๐ฆ๐ณ, ๐ช๐ตโ๐ด ๐ข๐ฃ๐ฐ๐ถ๐ต ๐ฅ๐ฆ๐ฆ๐ฑ๐ญ๐บ ๐ถ๐ฏ๐ฅ๐ฆ๐ณ๐ด๐ต๐ข๐ฏ๐ฅ๐ช๐ฏ๐จ ๐ฃ๐ถ๐ด๐ช๐ฏ๐ฆ๐ด๐ด๐ฆ๐ด, ๐ฉ๐ฐ๐ญ๐ฅ๐ช๐ฏ๐จ ๐ต๐ฉ๐ฆ๐ฎ ๐ง๐ฐ๐ณ ๐ข ๐ญ๐ฐ๐ฏ๐จ ๐ต๐ช๐ฎ๐ฆ, ๐ค๐ฐ๐ฏ๐ค๐ฆ๐ฏ๐ต๐ณ๐ข๐ต๐ช๐ฏ๐จ ๐ช๐ฏ ๐บ๐ฐ๐ถ๐ณ ๐ฃ๐ฆ๐ด๐ต ๐ช๐ฅ๐ฆ๐ข๐ด, ๐ข๐ฏ๐ฅ ๐ญ๐ฆ๐ต๐ต๐ช๐ฏ๐จ ๐ฆ๐น๐ฑ๐ฆ๐ณ๐ช๐ฆ๐ฏ๐ค๐ฆ ๐ด๐ฉ๐ข๐ณ๐ฑ๐ฆ๐ฏ ๐บ๐ฐ๐ถ๐ณ ๐ซ๐ถ๐ฅ๐จ๐ฎ๐ฆ๐ฏ๐ต.
Video: In Good Company | Norges Bank Investment Management (05/14/2025)
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Fiscal.ai
Microsoft added $10.5 billion in CapEx this quarter.
That's their largest increase ever... by a long shot.
$MSFT https://t.co/pdyglFGAoY
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Microsoft added $10.5 billion in CapEx this quarter.
That's their largest increase ever... by a long shot.
$MSFT https://t.co/pdyglFGAoY
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Offshore
Video
Startup Archive
Peter Thiel on how the PayPal team didnโt get alongโand why thatโs good:
โWe were less smoothly functioningโฆ but people felt ownership. They raised their voices when things were off track.โ
PayPal went from $0 to $1.5B in 4 years.
Peter thinks its intense culture was key to its success:
โThe PayPal period was a very compressed four years from start to when eBay acquired it. It was a relatively entrepreneurial, somewhat chaotic culture. We had a lot of very strong personalities.โ
He contrasts that with hiring people who just fall-in-line and argue less:
โI think a lot of companies bias towards having people who just drink the Kool-Aid. There's plusses and minuses to both. You'll have a more smoothly functioning company, but less dissent when things are going wrong.โ
The PayPal Mafia was a team that argued, obsessed, and cared deeply. It didnโt mind friction. That culture ultimately minted a generation of legendary founders: Elon Musk. Max Levchin. Reid Hoffman. David Sacks. Chad Hurley. Jeremy Stoppelman.
Video source: @twistartups @jason (2015)
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Peter Thiel on how the PayPal team didnโt get alongโand why thatโs good:
โWe were less smoothly functioningโฆ but people felt ownership. They raised their voices when things were off track.โ
PayPal went from $0 to $1.5B in 4 years.
Peter thinks its intense culture was key to its success:
โThe PayPal period was a very compressed four years from start to when eBay acquired it. It was a relatively entrepreneurial, somewhat chaotic culture. We had a lot of very strong personalities.โ
He contrasts that with hiring people who just fall-in-line and argue less:
โI think a lot of companies bias towards having people who just drink the Kool-Aid. There's plusses and minuses to both. You'll have a more smoothly functioning company, but less dissent when things are going wrong.โ
The PayPal Mafia was a team that argued, obsessed, and cared deeply. It didnโt mind friction. That culture ultimately minted a generation of legendary founders: Elon Musk. Max Levchin. Reid Hoffman. David Sacks. Chad Hurley. Jeremy Stoppelman.
Video source: @twistartups @jason (2015)
tweet