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Moon Dev
HIP-3 Liquidations have been added to the moon dev hyperliquid data layer
you literally can not get this info anywhere else. https://t.co/52Npj6r5EL
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HIP-3 Liquidations have been added to the moon dev hyperliquid data layer
you literally can not get this info anywhere else. https://t.co/52Npj6r5EL
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God of Prompt
RT @alex_prompter: Employers are 3.1x more likely to hire AI-ready talent than retrain you.
That's according to Deloitte's 2025 research.
Jan 22, I'm breaking down exactly which AI skills matter in 2026 (and which are already dead).
Free. 3,000+ seats. AI Skills'2026.
Join for free ๐ https://t.co/H3p5CD8bK3
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RT @alex_prompter: Employers are 3.1x more likely to hire AI-ready talent than retrain you.
That's according to Deloitte's 2025 research.
Jan 22, I'm breaking down exactly which AI skills matter in 2026 (and which are already dead).
Free. 3,000+ seats. AI Skills'2026.
Join for free ๐ https://t.co/H3p5CD8bK3
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Startup Archive
Ben Horowitz: Running your company without a board after youโve raised money is a dangerous idea
Jack Altman asks a16z co-founder Ben Horowitz how important boards are for startups. Some venture capital firms pitch it as a selling point that they donโt take a board seat and leave the founders alone. Others believe they can add a lot of value by taking a board seat.
Ben responds:
โFirst of all, boards are important for founders. The idea that youโre going to run without a board after youโve given equity to employees and sold equity to people who are not you is the most dangerous fโing idea in the world.โ
He explains:
โIf you know anything about securities laws, the only protection you have as CEO from going to jail or getting personally sued is that you run material ideas through the board. Thatโs a massive protection. If you want to give a 2% grant to this person in the company, you have to realize youโre a fiduciary to the rest of the company that youโre diluting . . . If you run that by the board, itโs all good โ youโre completely protected, no problem. If you just make that on your own and somebody wants to sue you, theyโre going to win. You really have very little defense at that point. The idea that youโre not going to have a board is a bad idea. Once you start not owning the company 100%, you have got to have a board. Thatโs just how it goes.โ
Video source: @a16z @jaltma (2026)
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Ben Horowitz: Running your company without a board after youโve raised money is a dangerous idea
Jack Altman asks a16z co-founder Ben Horowitz how important boards are for startups. Some venture capital firms pitch it as a selling point that they donโt take a board seat and leave the founders alone. Others believe they can add a lot of value by taking a board seat.
Ben responds:
โFirst of all, boards are important for founders. The idea that youโre going to run without a board after youโve given equity to employees and sold equity to people who are not you is the most dangerous fโing idea in the world.โ
He explains:
โIf you know anything about securities laws, the only protection you have as CEO from going to jail or getting personally sued is that you run material ideas through the board. Thatโs a massive protection. If you want to give a 2% grant to this person in the company, you have to realize youโre a fiduciary to the rest of the company that youโre diluting . . . If you run that by the board, itโs all good โ youโre completely protected, no problem. If you just make that on your own and somebody wants to sue you, theyโre going to win. You really have very little defense at that point. The idea that youโre not going to have a board is a bad idea. Once you start not owning the company 100%, you have got to have a board. Thatโs just how it goes.โ
Video source: @a16z @jaltma (2026)
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Dimitry Nakhla | Babylon Capitalยฎ
Chris Hohn is a legend & this post by @aakashgupta is beautifully written ๐
My favorite line:
โHe did it by becoming the opposite of what made him famous.โ
That line hits hard because it captures the rarest trait in investing: humility.
Most people double down on their identity when things go wrong. The great ones evolve โ they adapt, simplify, and rebuild their process around what actually works.
In markets, reinvention after failure isnโt a weakness โ it can be the source of the next decade of exceptional results.
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Chris Hohn is a legend & this post by @aakashgupta is beautifully written ๐
My favorite line:
โHe did it by becoming the opposite of what made him famous.โ
That line hits hard because it captures the rarest trait in investing: humility.
Most people double down on their identity when things go wrong. The great ones evolve โ they adapt, simplify, and rebuild their process around what actually works.
In markets, reinvention after failure isnโt a weakness โ it can be the source of the next decade of exceptional results.
Hohnโs story is wild.
In 2008, he lost 43% and watched his fund collapse from $19 billion to under $5 billion. Investors fled. He publicly swore off activism after getting humiliated in a railroad proxy fight.
17 years later, he just posted the largest single-year hedge fund profit in history.
Hereโs what happened in between:
From 2003 to 2007, Chris Hohn was the golden boy of activist investing. He ran TCI like a wrecking ball. Bought 1% of ABN Amro and sent a scathing letter demanding breakup. Triggered a $100 billion bidding war at the peak of the market. Forced out the CEO of Deutsche Bรถrse after killing their London Stock Exchange bid. German politicians called him a โlocust.โ He didnโt care. Assets soared 30-fold in five years.
Then 2008 hit.
TCI lost 43%. His CSX railroad battle turned into a public disaster when the stock dropped 50% after he won four board seats. He declared defeat, sold his shares, and told the press he was done with activism. By 2012, assets had collapsed to $4.9 billion. Most of his team quit.
What most people donโt know is what Hohn did next.
He looked at his portfolio and realized heโd been playing the wrong game. Special situations. Distressed plays. Banks. Heโd strayed from concentration into complexity.
So he rebuilt TCI around a single thesis: own monopolies.
Not โcompanies with moats.โ Actual monopolies. His test: can they price above inflation? If competition can compress margins, he walks. Airlines grow 5% annually and make no money. Airports grow 5% annually and print cash. He wants the airports.
The result is a 10-stock portfolio where GE Aerospace represents 23% of a $50 billion fund. Five holdings account for 73%. Portfolio turnover sits at 21%. Average holding period rivals some marriages.
Griffinโs $16 billion record in 2022 came from running hundreds of strategies across thousands of positions with 2,900 employees. Hohnโs $18.9 billion came from sitting in credit rating agencies and aerospace duopolies for a decade with a team of 8.
Same destination. Opposite paths.
Citadel wins by being everywhere during chaos. TCI wins by being nowhere except inside tollbooths.
The real lesson here: Hohn turned a 43% drawdown and near-total investor exodus into the highest annual profit any hedge fund has ever generated. He did it by becoming the opposite of what made him famous. Less activism, more patience. Fewer stocks, longer holds. No banks, no airlines, just monopolies that can raise prices faster than inflation.
Sometimes the real alpha comes from nearly losing everything. - Aakash Guptatweet
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Dimitry Nakhla | Babylon Capitalยฎ
RT @DimitryNakhla: The reason $CSU is being sold (multiple compression due to AI fears & potential uncertainty surrounding its moat, among other things) ๐๐ค๐ช๐ก๐ ๐๐ฃ๐ ๐ช๐ฅ ๐๐๐๐ฃ๐ ๐ฉ๐๐ ๐๐ญ๐๐๐ฉ ๐ง๐๐๐จ๐ค๐ฃ ๐๐ฉ๐จ ๐๐๐ฅ๐๐ฉ๐๐ก ๐๐ก๐ก๐ค๐๐๐ฉ๐๐ค๐ฃ ๐๐ฃ๐๐๐ฃ๐ ๐๐๐ฉ๐จ ๐๐๐ฉ๐ฉ๐๐ง ๐๐๐๐๐ฃ
๐๐ก๐ ๐ข๐ซ๐จ๐ง๐ฒ: ๐ญ๐ก๐ ๐ฌ๐จ๐๐ญ๐ฐ๐๐ซ๐ ๐ซ๐-๐ซ๐๐ญ๐ข๐ง๐ ๐ฐ๐โ๐ซ๐ ๐ฌ๐๐๐ข๐ง๐ ๐ญ๐จ๐๐๐ฒ (๐ฉ๐๐ซ๐ญ๐ฅ๐ฒ ๐๐ซ๐ข๐ฏ๐๐ง ๐๐ฒ ๐๐ ๐๐ข๐ฌ๐ซ๐ฎ๐ฉ๐ญ๐ข๐จ๐ง ๐๐๐๐ซ๐ฌ) ๐ฆ๐๐ฒ ๐๐๐ญ๐ฎ๐๐ฅ๐ฅ๐ฒ ๐ข๐ฆ๐ฉ๐ซ๐จ๐ฏ๐ $๐๐๐โ๐ฌ ๐จ๐ฉ๐ฉ๐จ๐ซ๐ญ๐ฎ๐ง๐ข๐ญ๐ฒ ๐ฌ๐๐ญ
When public multiples compress, private-market deal pricing often follows โ creating better entry points and potentially higher IRRs for $CSUโs next wave of acquisitions
So yes, one of the common critiques many investors will cite is that $CSU returns on capital have been trending down over the last few years
Yet, given this set up, perhaps it will trend higher over the next few years
At 2,845, $CSU looks like an interesting contrarian opportunity amid peak fear
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RT @DimitryNakhla: The reason $CSU is being sold (multiple compression due to AI fears & potential uncertainty surrounding its moat, among other things) ๐๐ค๐ช๐ก๐ ๐๐ฃ๐ ๐ช๐ฅ ๐๐๐๐ฃ๐ ๐ฉ๐๐ ๐๐ญ๐๐๐ฉ ๐ง๐๐๐จ๐ค๐ฃ ๐๐ฉ๐จ ๐๐๐ฅ๐๐ฉ๐๐ก ๐๐ก๐ก๐ค๐๐๐ฉ๐๐ค๐ฃ ๐๐ฃ๐๐๐ฃ๐ ๐๐๐ฉ๐จ ๐๐๐ฉ๐ฉ๐๐ง ๐๐๐๐๐ฃ
๐๐ก๐ ๐ข๐ซ๐จ๐ง๐ฒ: ๐ญ๐ก๐ ๐ฌ๐จ๐๐ญ๐ฐ๐๐ซ๐ ๐ซ๐-๐ซ๐๐ญ๐ข๐ง๐ ๐ฐ๐โ๐ซ๐ ๐ฌ๐๐๐ข๐ง๐ ๐ญ๐จ๐๐๐ฒ (๐ฉ๐๐ซ๐ญ๐ฅ๐ฒ ๐๐ซ๐ข๐ฏ๐๐ง ๐๐ฒ ๐๐ ๐๐ข๐ฌ๐ซ๐ฎ๐ฉ๐ญ๐ข๐จ๐ง ๐๐๐๐ซ๐ฌ) ๐ฆ๐๐ฒ ๐๐๐ญ๐ฎ๐๐ฅ๐ฅ๐ฒ ๐ข๐ฆ๐ฉ๐ซ๐จ๐ฏ๐ $๐๐๐โ๐ฌ ๐จ๐ฉ๐ฉ๐จ๐ซ๐ญ๐ฎ๐ง๐ข๐ญ๐ฒ ๐ฌ๐๐ญ
When public multiples compress, private-market deal pricing often follows โ creating better entry points and potentially higher IRRs for $CSUโs next wave of acquisitions
So yes, one of the common critiques many investors will cite is that $CSU returns on capital have been trending down over the last few years
Yet, given this set up, perhaps it will trend higher over the next few years
At 2,845, $CSU looks like an interesting contrarian opportunity amid peak fear
tweet