Offshore
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The Few Bets That Matter
Growing up is the most beautiful campaign the Duffer Brothers could give us.
The ending doesn't matter. The journey did.
Thank you. https://t.co/Qxkz1krbCD
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Growing up is the most beautiful campaign the Duffer Brothers could give us.
The ending doesn't matter. The journey did.
Thank you. https://t.co/Qxkz1krbCD
tweet
Offshore
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Fiscal.ai
The 10 worst performing stocks in the S&P 500 in 2025:
1. The Trade Desk $TTD (-67.5%)
2. Fiserv $FISV (-67.2%)
3. Alexandria Real Estate $ARE (-49.1%)
4. Deckers Brands $DECK (-47.4%)
5. Gartner $IT (-46.5%)
6. Lululemon $LULU (-44%)
7. Dow Inc. $DOW (-39.3%)
8. LyondellBasell $LYB (-38%)
9. Molina Healthcare $MOH (-36.5%)
10. Factset $FDS (-34.6%)
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The 10 worst performing stocks in the S&P 500 in 2025:
1. The Trade Desk $TTD (-67.5%)
2. Fiserv $FISV (-67.2%)
3. Alexandria Real Estate $ARE (-49.1%)
4. Deckers Brands $DECK (-47.4%)
5. Gartner $IT (-46.5%)
6. Lululemon $LULU (-44%)
7. Dow Inc. $DOW (-39.3%)
8. LyondellBasell $LYB (-38%)
9. Molina Healthcare $MOH (-36.5%)
10. Factset $FDS (-34.6%)
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Offshore
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memenodes
me in 2010 instead of claiming BTC for free https://t.co/xAsMv7uCl2
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me in 2010 instead of claiming BTC for free https://t.co/xAsMv7uCl2
Bitcoin Price on New Year's Day:
2010: free
2011: $0.3
2012: $5
2013: $13
2014: $770
2015: $314
2016: $434
2017: $1,019
2018: $15,321
2019: $3,794
2020: $7,193
2021: $29,352
2022: $47,025
2023: $16,630
2024: $42,660
2025: $93,500
2026: $87,500 tweet
memenodes
the strongest hoe in history vs the strongest hoe of today
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the strongest hoe in history vs the strongest hoe of today
damn i got competition now tweet
X (formerly Twitter)
Sophie Rain (@sophieraiin) on X
damn i got competition now
Offshore
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EndGame Macro
Where We Are in the Historical Cycle
As I read up more on the long rhythms of human societies, I see the quote
“Hard times create strong men, strong men create good times, good times create weak men, and weak men create hard times”
as a compressed historical insight. Stripped of its modern internet life, it echoes an older observation made by thinkers like Ibn Khaldun and Polybius where civilizations move in cycles, not straight lines. They harden under pressure, flourish under order, loosen under comfort, and fracture under excess. The phrasing is blunt, but the pattern repeats across centuries.
That is why the quote aligns so closely with the Strauss & Howe framework laid out in The Fourth Turning. Their argument isn’t mystical or predictive so much as observational. Anglo-American history unfolds in recurring long cycles of roughly 80 to 100 years, about the span of a human life. Each saeculum contains four turnings, comparable to seasons with a High, an Awakening, an Unraveling, and a Crisis. Each turning shapes a generation, and each generation, once in power, reshapes the society that follows.
Hard times In The Fourth Turning
The Fourth Turning, the Crisis corresponds to the quote’s opening line where hard times create strong men. This is winter in the cycle, when accumulated contradictions finally break open. Institutions that once seemed permanent reveal their fragility. Survival becomes the organizing principle.
History offers familiar examples
• the American Revolution
• the Civil War
• the Great Depression followed by World War II
In each case, society entered a dark night of the soul. Collective action replaced individual expression. Sacrifice became unavoidable. People coming of age in these periods were forged by necessity, not ideology. Their strength was not bravado, but competence, discipline, and a willingness to subordinate the self to survival.
Good times: The High
From that crucible emerges the High, where strong men create good times. This is spring a period of rebuilding, confidence, and institutional trust. The generation hardened by crisis now occupies leadership and designs systems meant to prevent a return to chaos.
Post World War II America is the clearest example…
• rapid growth
• expanding middle class prosperity
• faith in shared rules and institutions
These good times are built on memory. The architects of the High remember what failure looks like and construct guardrails accordingly. Yet success carries a hidden cost. As stability endures, the lived memory of hardship fades among the young.
Forgetting And Fragmentation
That forgetting marks the Awakening, when comfort allows societies to turn inward. Institutions built for order are challenged in the name of authenticity and justice. Some of this challenge is necessary. Some of it erodes shared discipline.
By the Unraveling, trust collapses. Individualism hardens into cynicism. Short term incentives replace long term stewardship. This is weakness at a societal level because coordination breaks down and problems are deferred.
Where We Are Now
Seen this way, the quote is less a moral judgment than a description of collective memory. Each turning solves the problem of the last while creating the conditions for the next…
• Crisis restores unity
• Unity breeds order
• Order invites rebellion
• Rebellion dissolves cohesion
From a Strauss & Howe perspective, we are firmly in the Crisis phase of the Fourth Turning. It began with the 2008 financial collapse and has been reinforced by pandemics, polarization, and rising geopolitical strain. As we move through 2026, we are deep in the winter of this cycle and past the initial shock, but not yet at resolution.
History shows that Crises end at an inflection point, when necessity forces unity and rebuilding. Hard times expose what no longer works and shape the generation that decides what comes next, if those lessons hold once stability returns. tweet
Where We Are in the Historical Cycle
As I read up more on the long rhythms of human societies, I see the quote
“Hard times create strong men, strong men create good times, good times create weak men, and weak men create hard times”
as a compressed historical insight. Stripped of its modern internet life, it echoes an older observation made by thinkers like Ibn Khaldun and Polybius where civilizations move in cycles, not straight lines. They harden under pressure, flourish under order, loosen under comfort, and fracture under excess. The phrasing is blunt, but the pattern repeats across centuries.
That is why the quote aligns so closely with the Strauss & Howe framework laid out in The Fourth Turning. Their argument isn’t mystical or predictive so much as observational. Anglo-American history unfolds in recurring long cycles of roughly 80 to 100 years, about the span of a human life. Each saeculum contains four turnings, comparable to seasons with a High, an Awakening, an Unraveling, and a Crisis. Each turning shapes a generation, and each generation, once in power, reshapes the society that follows.
Hard times In The Fourth Turning
The Fourth Turning, the Crisis corresponds to the quote’s opening line where hard times create strong men. This is winter in the cycle, when accumulated contradictions finally break open. Institutions that once seemed permanent reveal their fragility. Survival becomes the organizing principle.
History offers familiar examples
• the American Revolution
• the Civil War
• the Great Depression followed by World War II
In each case, society entered a dark night of the soul. Collective action replaced individual expression. Sacrifice became unavoidable. People coming of age in these periods were forged by necessity, not ideology. Their strength was not bravado, but competence, discipline, and a willingness to subordinate the self to survival.
Good times: The High
From that crucible emerges the High, where strong men create good times. This is spring a period of rebuilding, confidence, and institutional trust. The generation hardened by crisis now occupies leadership and designs systems meant to prevent a return to chaos.
Post World War II America is the clearest example…
• rapid growth
• expanding middle class prosperity
• faith in shared rules and institutions
These good times are built on memory. The architects of the High remember what failure looks like and construct guardrails accordingly. Yet success carries a hidden cost. As stability endures, the lived memory of hardship fades among the young.
Forgetting And Fragmentation
That forgetting marks the Awakening, when comfort allows societies to turn inward. Institutions built for order are challenged in the name of authenticity and justice. Some of this challenge is necessary. Some of it erodes shared discipline.
By the Unraveling, trust collapses. Individualism hardens into cynicism. Short term incentives replace long term stewardship. This is weakness at a societal level because coordination breaks down and problems are deferred.
Where We Are Now
Seen this way, the quote is less a moral judgment than a description of collective memory. Each turning solves the problem of the last while creating the conditions for the next…
• Crisis restores unity
• Unity breeds order
• Order invites rebellion
• Rebellion dissolves cohesion
From a Strauss & Howe perspective, we are firmly in the Crisis phase of the Fourth Turning. It began with the 2008 financial collapse and has been reinforced by pandemics, polarization, and rising geopolitical strain. As we move through 2026, we are deep in the winter of this cycle and past the initial shock, but not yet at resolution.
History shows that Crises end at an inflection point, when necessity forces unity and rebuilding. Hard times expose what no longer works and shape the generation that decides what comes next, if those lessons hold once stability returns. tweet
Offshore
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EndGame Macro
Debt Gets Dangerous When Growth Slows
What gets lost in the headline numbers is where the pressure actually shows up. Yes, spending is running near $7 trillion and revenues are closer to $5.4 trillion, but the real strain isn’t the deficit in isolation. It’s the fact that the government now has to roll a massive amount of debt as the economy drifts toward deflation, not inflation.
A huge chunk of pandemic era debt was financed near zero. That debt is maturing into a world where growth is slowing, prices are softening, and real borrowing costs are rising even if nominal rates eventually fall. Even if deficits stopped growing tomorrow, interest expense would still climb in real terms because deflation makes fixed debt heavier, not lighter.
That’s the quiet shift people underestimate.
Why Markets Aren’t Panicking…Yet
• The Treasury doesn’t need to repay $9 trillion, it needs to refinance it. That’s normal for a sovereign.
• But refinancing at 4% instead of 0.5% is far more painful in a low growth, deflationary environment.
• And because so much debt sits at the short end, the system becomes more sensitive to real rates, liquidity, and timing, exactly the things deflation tightens.
So far, the Fed is trying to keep the plumbing working, making sure repo markets function, reserves stay ample, and auctions clear smoothly without openly admitting it’s cushioning a deflationary debt rollover problem. That distinction matters for credibility.
Markets sense this tension. That’s why you see pressure in long term yields and equity valuations without outright panic.
What The Fed Is Really Boxed Into
The Fed doesn’t need to save the government. But it does need to prevent deflation from turning the bond market into a destabilizing force.
That leaves them threading a narrow path:
• Cutting rates too slowly risks letting real rates rise and choking refinancing as growth fades.
• Cutting too aggressively risks signaling fiscal dominance, even if inflation is no longer the threat.
• Restarting large scale QE too openly risks undermining confidence, even as deflation quietly demands it.
So instead, you get incremental moves:
quiet balance sheet adjustments, bill purchases framed as reserve management, liquidity backstops ready but not loudly advertised.
The Bugger Risk People Aren’t Pricing
The danger isn’t default.
It’s deflation turning debt service into a self reinforcing drag.
If long term yields stay elevated in real terms:
• borrowing crowds out private investment,
• asset prices grind lower,
• nominal growth weakens further,
• and deficits stay large even without new stimulus.
That’s how fiscal stress shows up in a deflationary system…slowly, through markets, not suddenly through headlines.
The long term plan, whether stated or not, is simple and uncomfortable:
manage it, roll it, suppress real rates, and hope time does the heavy lifting.
The question isn’t whether it works tomorrow. It’s how much friction builds before deflation forces the next intervention.
tweet
Debt Gets Dangerous When Growth Slows
What gets lost in the headline numbers is where the pressure actually shows up. Yes, spending is running near $7 trillion and revenues are closer to $5.4 trillion, but the real strain isn’t the deficit in isolation. It’s the fact that the government now has to roll a massive amount of debt as the economy drifts toward deflation, not inflation.
A huge chunk of pandemic era debt was financed near zero. That debt is maturing into a world where growth is slowing, prices are softening, and real borrowing costs are rising even if nominal rates eventually fall. Even if deficits stopped growing tomorrow, interest expense would still climb in real terms because deflation makes fixed debt heavier, not lighter.
That’s the quiet shift people underestimate.
Why Markets Aren’t Panicking…Yet
• The Treasury doesn’t need to repay $9 trillion, it needs to refinance it. That’s normal for a sovereign.
• But refinancing at 4% instead of 0.5% is far more painful in a low growth, deflationary environment.
• And because so much debt sits at the short end, the system becomes more sensitive to real rates, liquidity, and timing, exactly the things deflation tightens.
So far, the Fed is trying to keep the plumbing working, making sure repo markets function, reserves stay ample, and auctions clear smoothly without openly admitting it’s cushioning a deflationary debt rollover problem. That distinction matters for credibility.
Markets sense this tension. That’s why you see pressure in long term yields and equity valuations without outright panic.
What The Fed Is Really Boxed Into
The Fed doesn’t need to save the government. But it does need to prevent deflation from turning the bond market into a destabilizing force.
That leaves them threading a narrow path:
• Cutting rates too slowly risks letting real rates rise and choking refinancing as growth fades.
• Cutting too aggressively risks signaling fiscal dominance, even if inflation is no longer the threat.
• Restarting large scale QE too openly risks undermining confidence, even as deflation quietly demands it.
So instead, you get incremental moves:
quiet balance sheet adjustments, bill purchases framed as reserve management, liquidity backstops ready but not loudly advertised.
The Bugger Risk People Aren’t Pricing
The danger isn’t default.
It’s deflation turning debt service into a self reinforcing drag.
If long term yields stay elevated in real terms:
• borrowing crowds out private investment,
• asset prices grind lower,
• nominal growth weakens further,
• and deficits stay large even without new stimulus.
That’s how fiscal stress shows up in a deflationary system…slowly, through markets, not suddenly through headlines.
The long term plan, whether stated or not, is simple and uncomfortable:
manage it, roll it, suppress real rates, and hope time does the heavy lifting.
The question isn’t whether it works tomorrow. It’s how much friction builds before deflation forces the next intervention.
The federal government is facing a massive spending problem:
Government spending is up to $7.0 trillion over the last 12 months, near the highest in history.
This is only below the ~$7.8 trillion on a 12-month rolling period seen during the 2020 Pandemic and 2021 recovery.
By comparison, before 2020, federal spending was running between $3.5 trillion and $4.5 trillion for 10 years.
Meanwhile, government revenue is up to a record $5.4 trillion over the last 12 months, rising nearly +$1.0 trillion since 2023.
Overall, the gap between federal spending and revenue has persisted for 23 consecutive years.
What’s the long-term plan here? tweet
Offshore
Photo
EndGame Macro
Debt Gets Dangerous When Growth Slows
What gets lost in the headline numbers is where the pressure actually shows up. Yes, spending is running near $7 trillion and revenues are closer to $5.4 trillion, but the real strain isn’t the deficit in isolation. It’s the fact that the government now has to roll a massive amount of debt as the economy drifts toward deflation, not inflation.
A huge chunk of pandemic era debt was financed near zero. That debt is maturing into a world where growth is slowing, prices are softening, and real borrowing costs are rising even if nominal rates eventually fall. Even if deficits stopped growing tomorrow, interest expense would still climb in real terms because deflation makes fixed debt heavier, not lighter.
That’s the quiet shift people underestimate.
Why Markets Aren’t Panicking…Yet
• The Treasury doesn’t need to repay $9 trillion, it needs to refinance it. That’s normal for a sovereign.
• But refinancing at 4% instead of 0.5% is far more painful in a low growth, deflationary environment.
• And because so much debt sits at the short end, the system becomes more sensitive to real rates, liquidity, and timing, exactly the things deflation tightens.
So far, the Fed is trying to keep the plumbing working, making sure repo markets function, reserves stay ample, and auctions clear smoothly without openly admitting it’s cushioning a deflationary debt rollover problem. That distinction matters for credibility.
Markets sense this tension. That’s why you see pressure in long term yields and equity valuations without outright panic.
What The Fed Is Really Boxed Into
The Fed doesn’t need to save the government. But it does need to prevent deflation from turning the bond market into a destabilizing force.
That leaves them threading a narrow path:
• Cutting rates too slowly risks letting real rates rise and choking refinancing as growth fades.
• Cutting too aggressively risks signaling fiscal dominance, even if inflation is no longer the threat.
• Restarting large scale QE too openly risks undermining confidence, even as deflation quietly demands it.
So instead, you get incremental moves:
quiet balance sheet adjustments, bill purchases framed as reserve management, liquidity backstops ready but not loudly advertised.
The Bigger Risk People Aren’t Pricing
The danger isn’t default.
It’s deflation turning debt service into a self reinforcing drag.
If long term yields stay elevated in real terms:
• borrowing crowds out private investment,
• asset prices grind lower,
• nominal growth weakens further,
• and deficits stay large even without new stimulus.
That’s how fiscal stress shows up in a deflationary system…slowly, through markets, not suddenly through headlines.
The long term plan, whether stated or not, is simple and uncomfortable:
manage it, roll it, suppress real rates, and hope time does the heavy lifting.
The question isn’t whether it works tomorrow. It’s how much friction builds before deflation forces the next intervention.
tweet
Debt Gets Dangerous When Growth Slows
What gets lost in the headline numbers is where the pressure actually shows up. Yes, spending is running near $7 trillion and revenues are closer to $5.4 trillion, but the real strain isn’t the deficit in isolation. It’s the fact that the government now has to roll a massive amount of debt as the economy drifts toward deflation, not inflation.
A huge chunk of pandemic era debt was financed near zero. That debt is maturing into a world where growth is slowing, prices are softening, and real borrowing costs are rising even if nominal rates eventually fall. Even if deficits stopped growing tomorrow, interest expense would still climb in real terms because deflation makes fixed debt heavier, not lighter.
That’s the quiet shift people underestimate.
Why Markets Aren’t Panicking…Yet
• The Treasury doesn’t need to repay $9 trillion, it needs to refinance it. That’s normal for a sovereign.
• But refinancing at 4% instead of 0.5% is far more painful in a low growth, deflationary environment.
• And because so much debt sits at the short end, the system becomes more sensitive to real rates, liquidity, and timing, exactly the things deflation tightens.
So far, the Fed is trying to keep the plumbing working, making sure repo markets function, reserves stay ample, and auctions clear smoothly without openly admitting it’s cushioning a deflationary debt rollover problem. That distinction matters for credibility.
Markets sense this tension. That’s why you see pressure in long term yields and equity valuations without outright panic.
What The Fed Is Really Boxed Into
The Fed doesn’t need to save the government. But it does need to prevent deflation from turning the bond market into a destabilizing force.
That leaves them threading a narrow path:
• Cutting rates too slowly risks letting real rates rise and choking refinancing as growth fades.
• Cutting too aggressively risks signaling fiscal dominance, even if inflation is no longer the threat.
• Restarting large scale QE too openly risks undermining confidence, even as deflation quietly demands it.
So instead, you get incremental moves:
quiet balance sheet adjustments, bill purchases framed as reserve management, liquidity backstops ready but not loudly advertised.
The Bigger Risk People Aren’t Pricing
The danger isn’t default.
It’s deflation turning debt service into a self reinforcing drag.
If long term yields stay elevated in real terms:
• borrowing crowds out private investment,
• asset prices grind lower,
• nominal growth weakens further,
• and deficits stay large even without new stimulus.
That’s how fiscal stress shows up in a deflationary system…slowly, through markets, not suddenly through headlines.
The long term plan, whether stated or not, is simple and uncomfortable:
manage it, roll it, suppress real rates, and hope time does the heavy lifting.
The question isn’t whether it works tomorrow. It’s how much friction builds before deflation forces the next intervention.
The federal government is facing a massive spending problem:
Government spending is up to $7.0 trillion over the last 12 months, near the highest in history.
This is only below the ~$7.8 trillion on a 12-month rolling period seen during the 2020 Pandemic and 2021 recovery.
By comparison, before 2020, federal spending was running between $3.5 trillion and $4.5 trillion for 10 years.
Meanwhile, government revenue is up to a record $5.4 trillion over the last 12 months, rising nearly +$1.0 trillion since 2023.
Overall, the gap between federal spending and revenue has persisted for 23 consecutive years.
What’s the long-term plan here? tweet
Offshore
Photo
EndGame Macro
https://t.co/MW3ndTYvaM
tweet
https://t.co/MW3ndTYvaM
🚨Crypto disconnected from US tech stock prices, does it signal a correction?
Historically, Bitcoin and the Nasdaq moved together, responding to the same macro drivers such as liquidity, real rates, and overall risk appetite.
This time, crypto appears to be pricing higher-for-longer borrowing costs and tighter liquidity than in the pre-2022 or 2020 era.
The gap will eventually close.
Will Bitcoin and other crypto rebound first, or will the Nasdaq be the one to fall?
What's your bet? tweet
Offshore
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EndGame Macro
Why Housing Is Stuck And When It Finally Unsticks
This isn’t just a story about high mortgage rates or expensive homes. It’s a story about what happens when the housing math breaks.
That blue line…housing payments as a share of income sitting near 39% is a historically extreme. And the orange line…home sales collapsing tells you how the system is coping: by freezing. When affordability snaps, markets usually adjust through price. This time, they adjusted through volume instead. People didn’t sell. Buyers stepped back. The market didn’t clear, it stalled.
Why Prices Didn’t Fall The Way People Expected
The missing piece is behavior.
A huge share of homeowners locked in 2–3% mortgages during 2020–2021. Those homeowners aren’t forced sellers. So when rates jumped, the normal release valve with more listings never opened. Selling meant giving up cheap financing and doubling your payment just to stand still.
So supply stayed tight even as demand weakened. Prices stayed sticky even as affordability collapsed. That’s how you end up with a market where nothing happens, not because things are healthy, but because everyone is trapped.
Why Lower Rates Alone Won’t Fix This
There’s a popular belief that once rates come down, housing will magically heal. History doesn’t really support that.
Lower rates help at the margin, but in a locked market they tend to revive demand before supply responds. That keeps prices elevated. Meanwhile, taxes, insurance, and maintenance costs don’t come down just because mortgage rates do.
Affordability doesn’t normalize until prices adjust, not just payments. And price adjustment usually doesn’t happen voluntarily.
The Uncomfortable Role Of The Labor Market
This is the part people don’t like to say out loud.
In a market this frozen, you don’t get meaningful price relief without pressure and pressure usually comes from the labor market. When unemployment rises, people are forced to move, investors step back, listings increase, and prices finally start competing for buyers instead of the other way around.
That’s not theory. It’s how past resets worked like in the early 1980s and post 2008 where both followed this script. Housing doesn’t reset because people want to sell. It resets because some people have to.
When Affordability Actually Returns To Normal
Historically, peaks like this don’t unwind quickly.
In the early 1980s, affordability normalized over roughly 5–7 years as rates fell and recession forced adjustment. After the mid 2008 housing bubble, it took about 4–6 years from the peak for affordability to fully reset, driven largely by price declines during a deep recession.
This cycle is different in mechanics but not in outcome. The lock in effect slows the process, but it doesn’t prevent it. Once job losses rise and inventory finally loosens, prices do the heavy lifting.
Based on those precedents, a realistic window for affordability to return to its long term equilibrium, roughly 25–30% of income is probably around 2029 to 2031, with 2029–2030 the most likely landing zone if a recession materializes and rates continue easing.
Earlier than that would require either a sharp, fast downturn or a sudden surge in supply. Later than that would imply a prolonged stagnation where prices refuse to fall and the economy muddles through.
My View
This is a housing logjam. Affordability broke. Supply didn’t respond. So the market froze.
History suggests the logjam eventually clears but not gently, and not just because rates drift lower. It clears when pressure builds elsewhere in the economy and forces movement.
And based on how these cycles have played out before, that clearing process points to the end of this decade, not the next rate cut as the point where housing finally feels normal again.
*Credit to @nickgerli1 for his awesome charts.
tweet
Why Housing Is Stuck And When It Finally Unsticks
This isn’t just a story about high mortgage rates or expensive homes. It’s a story about what happens when the housing math breaks.
That blue line…housing payments as a share of income sitting near 39% is a historically extreme. And the orange line…home sales collapsing tells you how the system is coping: by freezing. When affordability snaps, markets usually adjust through price. This time, they adjusted through volume instead. People didn’t sell. Buyers stepped back. The market didn’t clear, it stalled.
Why Prices Didn’t Fall The Way People Expected
The missing piece is behavior.
A huge share of homeowners locked in 2–3% mortgages during 2020–2021. Those homeowners aren’t forced sellers. So when rates jumped, the normal release valve with more listings never opened. Selling meant giving up cheap financing and doubling your payment just to stand still.
So supply stayed tight even as demand weakened. Prices stayed sticky even as affordability collapsed. That’s how you end up with a market where nothing happens, not because things are healthy, but because everyone is trapped.
Why Lower Rates Alone Won’t Fix This
There’s a popular belief that once rates come down, housing will magically heal. History doesn’t really support that.
Lower rates help at the margin, but in a locked market they tend to revive demand before supply responds. That keeps prices elevated. Meanwhile, taxes, insurance, and maintenance costs don’t come down just because mortgage rates do.
Affordability doesn’t normalize until prices adjust, not just payments. And price adjustment usually doesn’t happen voluntarily.
The Uncomfortable Role Of The Labor Market
This is the part people don’t like to say out loud.
In a market this frozen, you don’t get meaningful price relief without pressure and pressure usually comes from the labor market. When unemployment rises, people are forced to move, investors step back, listings increase, and prices finally start competing for buyers instead of the other way around.
That’s not theory. It’s how past resets worked like in the early 1980s and post 2008 where both followed this script. Housing doesn’t reset because people want to sell. It resets because some people have to.
When Affordability Actually Returns To Normal
Historically, peaks like this don’t unwind quickly.
In the early 1980s, affordability normalized over roughly 5–7 years as rates fell and recession forced adjustment. After the mid 2008 housing bubble, it took about 4–6 years from the peak for affordability to fully reset, driven largely by price declines during a deep recession.
This cycle is different in mechanics but not in outcome. The lock in effect slows the process, but it doesn’t prevent it. Once job losses rise and inventory finally loosens, prices do the heavy lifting.
Based on those precedents, a realistic window for affordability to return to its long term equilibrium, roughly 25–30% of income is probably around 2029 to 2031, with 2029–2030 the most likely landing zone if a recession materializes and rates continue easing.
Earlier than that would require either a sharp, fast downturn or a sudden surge in supply. Later than that would imply a prolonged stagnation where prices refuse to fall and the economy muddles through.
My View
This is a housing logjam. Affordability broke. Supply didn’t respond. So the market froze.
History suggests the logjam eventually clears but not gently, and not just because rates drift lower. It clears when pressure builds elsewhere in the economy and forces movement.
And based on how these cycles have played out before, that clearing process points to the end of this decade, not the next rate cut as the point where housing finally feels normal again.
*Credit to @nickgerli1 for his awesome charts.
tweet