Quiver Quantitative
The national debt has now risen by $2.1 trillion in 2025.
Here’s how that compares to past years:
2024: $2.2 trillion
2023: $2.5 trillion
2022: $1.7 trillion
2021: $1.5 trillion
2020: $4.3 trillion
2019: $1.1 trillion
2018: $1.3 trillion
2017: $557 billion
2016: $975 billion
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The national debt has now risen by $2.1 trillion in 2025.
Here’s how that compares to past years:
2024: $2.2 trillion
2023: $2.5 trillion
2022: $1.7 trillion
2021: $1.5 trillion
2020: $4.3 trillion
2019: $1.1 trillion
2018: $1.3 trillion
2017: $557 billion
2016: $975 billion
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Offshore
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EndGame Macro
Reading Between the Lines of the S&P Global PMI
The composite PMI is still above 50, so technically the economy is expanding. The headline number is 53.0, down from 54.2, and both services and manufacturing remain on the growth side of the line.
But once you slow down and read past the headline, the story changes. Momentum is fading and the expansion is becoming thinner and more fragile.
Where the recessionary signals show up
The biggest red flag is demand. New business growth is now the weakest in 20 months, and goods orders fell for the first time in a year. New orders are the forward looking part of the economy, and they’re clearly rolling over.
Services matter most in the U.S., and that’s where the slowdown is most uncomfortable. Service sector sales growth has dropped sharply, near levels last seen in weaker patches of 2023. When services lose momentum, there’s not much else left to carry the economy.
Manufacturing shows a classic late cycle contradiction. Output is still rising, but sales are not. The report itself flags this as potentially unsustainable production unless demand rebounds. That’s a polite way of saying inventories are being built into weakening orders, which usually gets resolved by cutting production and jobs later.
Hiring behavior confirms the caution. Employment growth has slowed to a marginal pace, with service sector hiring close to stalling. Companies aren’t panicking, but they’re clearly pulling back. That’s exactly what you see when firms are unsure about demand six months out.
Inventories add another layer. Unsold stock has built up 7x in the last eight months, while factories cut back on purchasing inputs for the first time since spring. Inventory accumulation paired with falling orders is a setup for future retrenchment.
Why the headline looks better than the reality
A PMI above 50 doesn’t mean strong growth. It just means more firms reported growth than contraction. A reading of 53 can coexist with an economy that’s slowing quickly, especially when the direction of travel is down.
The GDP translation at roughly 2.5% annualized also deserves skepticism. That estimate is backward looking and can be flattered by output that hasn’t yet adjusted to weaker sales. The report itself warns that growth has slowed for two straight months and may soften further into 2026.
Another subtle distortion comes from supply chains. Longer supplier delivery times help lift the manufacturing PMI mechanically, but in this case they’re linked to import disruptions and tariffs, not healthy demand. That can prop up the index even as margins and volumes deteriorate.
The inflation contradiction
One of the most important tensions in the report is prices rising while demand cools. Input costs are climbing at the fastest pace since late 2022, and selling prices are jumping at rates not seen since mid 2022. Firms consistently blame tariffs and labor costs.
That’s cost push inflation landing on a slowing economy. Manufacturers are struggling to pass costs through, while service providers are raising prices more aggressively. That combination squeezes margins and accelerates hiring restraint.
My View
The economy is still expanding, but the expansion is losing balance. Demand is thinning, especially in services. Hiring is defensive. Inventories are building against weaker orders. Confidence is slipping below long run norms. And inflation pressures are coming from costs and policy, not from excess demand.
That mix tends to resolve in one direction where companies protect margins by slowing hiring, cutting investment, and eventually pulling back more aggressively if demand doesn’t recover. The PMI may still read growth, but the internals are telling you the U.S. economy is becoming far more sensitive to shocks.
tweet
Reading Between the Lines of the S&P Global PMI
The composite PMI is still above 50, so technically the economy is expanding. The headline number is 53.0, down from 54.2, and both services and manufacturing remain on the growth side of the line.
But once you slow down and read past the headline, the story changes. Momentum is fading and the expansion is becoming thinner and more fragile.
Where the recessionary signals show up
The biggest red flag is demand. New business growth is now the weakest in 20 months, and goods orders fell for the first time in a year. New orders are the forward looking part of the economy, and they’re clearly rolling over.
Services matter most in the U.S., and that’s where the slowdown is most uncomfortable. Service sector sales growth has dropped sharply, near levels last seen in weaker patches of 2023. When services lose momentum, there’s not much else left to carry the economy.
Manufacturing shows a classic late cycle contradiction. Output is still rising, but sales are not. The report itself flags this as potentially unsustainable production unless demand rebounds. That’s a polite way of saying inventories are being built into weakening orders, which usually gets resolved by cutting production and jobs later.
Hiring behavior confirms the caution. Employment growth has slowed to a marginal pace, with service sector hiring close to stalling. Companies aren’t panicking, but they’re clearly pulling back. That’s exactly what you see when firms are unsure about demand six months out.
Inventories add another layer. Unsold stock has built up 7x in the last eight months, while factories cut back on purchasing inputs for the first time since spring. Inventory accumulation paired with falling orders is a setup for future retrenchment.
Why the headline looks better than the reality
A PMI above 50 doesn’t mean strong growth. It just means more firms reported growth than contraction. A reading of 53 can coexist with an economy that’s slowing quickly, especially when the direction of travel is down.
The GDP translation at roughly 2.5% annualized also deserves skepticism. That estimate is backward looking and can be flattered by output that hasn’t yet adjusted to weaker sales. The report itself warns that growth has slowed for two straight months and may soften further into 2026.
Another subtle distortion comes from supply chains. Longer supplier delivery times help lift the manufacturing PMI mechanically, but in this case they’re linked to import disruptions and tariffs, not healthy demand. That can prop up the index even as margins and volumes deteriorate.
The inflation contradiction
One of the most important tensions in the report is prices rising while demand cools. Input costs are climbing at the fastest pace since late 2022, and selling prices are jumping at rates not seen since mid 2022. Firms consistently blame tariffs and labor costs.
That’s cost push inflation landing on a slowing economy. Manufacturers are struggling to pass costs through, while service providers are raising prices more aggressively. That combination squeezes margins and accelerates hiring restraint.
My View
The economy is still expanding, but the expansion is losing balance. Demand is thinning, especially in services. Hiring is defensive. Inventories are building against weaker orders. Confidence is slipping below long run norms. And inflation pressures are coming from costs and policy, not from excess demand.
That mix tends to resolve in one direction where companies protect margins by slowing hiring, cutting investment, and eventually pulling back more aggressively if demand doesn’t recover. The PMI may still read growth, but the internals are telling you the U.S. economy is becoming far more sensitive to shocks.
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Offshore
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The Few Bets That Matter
$LULU is one to watch closely.
🔹New CEO after two years of misreading customer demand.
🔹Growth is accelerating outside the West.
🔹New products that should fit demand by H1-26.
🔹Lowest multiples in history.
🔹Market loves sportswear lately.
Setup is getting interesting. https://t.co/kZbhXiJupX
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$LULU is one to watch closely.
🔹New CEO after two years of misreading customer demand.
🔹Growth is accelerating outside the West.
🔹New products that should fit demand by H1-26.
🔹Lowest multiples in history.
🔹Market loves sportswear lately.
Setup is getting interesting. https://t.co/kZbhXiJupX
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Offshore
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Clark Square Capital
RT @joinyellowbrick: $VRA was pitched by @ClarkSquareCap and @AstutexAi recently https://t.co/5ldrXQN1ib
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RT @joinyellowbrick: $VRA was pitched by @ClarkSquareCap and @AstutexAi recently https://t.co/5ldrXQN1ib
Alright, Vera Bradley $VRA has my attention. A couple of directors bought over 1% of the company in the open market https://t.co/9My7lWQFqp tweet
Offshore
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EndGame Macro
What This Housing Map Says About Where We Are
The October 2025 housing map has national prices up just 1.1% year over year, with clear pockets of decline across the West, parts of Texas, and Florida and it looks a lot like where housing sat right before the GFC showed up in the national data.
In late 2006 and early 2007, home prices were still barely positive at the national level. On paper, housing looked fine. But underneath, the hottest markets like California, Arizona, Nevada, Florida had already turned. The national average didn’t break until later, but the leaders were already rolling over. That’s exactly what this map is showing now with localized cooling in the same types of regions that tend to lead housing cycles.
Housing almost never breaks all at once. It cracks region by region, then slowly becomes a national story.
How housing and labor lined up last time
What made 2006–2007 so deceptive was the labor market. Unemployment was low and stable, hovering around 4.4–4.6%, just like today. There was no panic. But subtle changes were already underway where job growth slowed, hours softened, and confidence quietly eroded.
By mid to late 2007, unemployment started drifting higher, crossing 5% by year end. Once it began accelerating, it didn’t stop until it reached 10% in 2009. The sequence mattered because housing weakened first, labor followed with a lag. And once unemployment rose meaningfully, housing shifted from softening to forced selling, which ultimately drove prices down until the national bottom in 2011–2012.
Where we are now and why this already looks late
Today rhymes with that period, even if it isn’t identical.
We already have…
• Low but rising unemployment (now 4.6%, up from the low 4s earlier this year)
• Housing prices barely positive nationally
• Clear regional leaders cooling first
• The Fed already cutting rates three times in 2025
That last point matters. In 2007, the Fed waited much longer to ease. This time, it’s already cutting, not as a precaution, but as a response to stress that’s already visible. Layer in a $9–10T government refinancing wall, $1.5–1.8T of CRE maturities, rising delinquencies across consumers, and job cuts north of 1.17 million, and it’s hard to frame this as anything but a late cycle environment that’s already in motion.
Mortgage underwriting is cleaner than the subprime era, which lowers the odds of an immediate foreclosure cascade. But that doesn’t make housing safe. It just means the adjustment is likely to be slower, more uneven, and heavily dependent on what happens to jobs.
My Read
Housing looks stuck, not strong. Prices are holding up just enough to keep the national number positive, but momentum is gone. If the labor market holds together, this can resolve the boring way with flat prices while inflation slowly does the work.
But if unemployment continues rising the way it did in 2007, even gradually, the standoff breaks. Housing doesn’t fall because prices feel high. It falls when people have to sell.
Right now, we’re in the same chapter as late 2006…the warning phase. Not the collapse. But the part where leaders have already turned, policy is reacting, and the outcome hinges almost entirely on whether labor follows housing down the path it’s already started.
tweet
What This Housing Map Says About Where We Are
The October 2025 housing map has national prices up just 1.1% year over year, with clear pockets of decline across the West, parts of Texas, and Florida and it looks a lot like where housing sat right before the GFC showed up in the national data.
In late 2006 and early 2007, home prices were still barely positive at the national level. On paper, housing looked fine. But underneath, the hottest markets like California, Arizona, Nevada, Florida had already turned. The national average didn’t break until later, but the leaders were already rolling over. That’s exactly what this map is showing now with localized cooling in the same types of regions that tend to lead housing cycles.
Housing almost never breaks all at once. It cracks region by region, then slowly becomes a national story.
How housing and labor lined up last time
What made 2006–2007 so deceptive was the labor market. Unemployment was low and stable, hovering around 4.4–4.6%, just like today. There was no panic. But subtle changes were already underway where job growth slowed, hours softened, and confidence quietly eroded.
By mid to late 2007, unemployment started drifting higher, crossing 5% by year end. Once it began accelerating, it didn’t stop until it reached 10% in 2009. The sequence mattered because housing weakened first, labor followed with a lag. And once unemployment rose meaningfully, housing shifted from softening to forced selling, which ultimately drove prices down until the national bottom in 2011–2012.
Where we are now and why this already looks late
Today rhymes with that period, even if it isn’t identical.
We already have…
• Low but rising unemployment (now 4.6%, up from the low 4s earlier this year)
• Housing prices barely positive nationally
• Clear regional leaders cooling first
• The Fed already cutting rates three times in 2025
That last point matters. In 2007, the Fed waited much longer to ease. This time, it’s already cutting, not as a precaution, but as a response to stress that’s already visible. Layer in a $9–10T government refinancing wall, $1.5–1.8T of CRE maturities, rising delinquencies across consumers, and job cuts north of 1.17 million, and it’s hard to frame this as anything but a late cycle environment that’s already in motion.
Mortgage underwriting is cleaner than the subprime era, which lowers the odds of an immediate foreclosure cascade. But that doesn’t make housing safe. It just means the adjustment is likely to be slower, more uneven, and heavily dependent on what happens to jobs.
My Read
Housing looks stuck, not strong. Prices are holding up just enough to keep the national number positive, but momentum is gone. If the labor market holds together, this can resolve the boring way with flat prices while inflation slowly does the work.
But if unemployment continues rising the way it did in 2007, even gradually, the standoff breaks. Housing doesn’t fall because prices feel high. It falls when people have to sell.
Right now, we’re in the same chapter as late 2006…the warning phase. Not the collapse. But the part where leaders have already turned, policy is reacting, and the outcome hinges almost entirely on whether labor follows housing down the path it’s already started.
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Offshore
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Fiscal.ai
Snap has 477 million Daily Active Users.
In October, Snap began charging users for extra storage beyond 5GB.
Plans start at $1.99/mo.
Will this help Snap finally become profitable?
$SNAP https://t.co/Mtr8NnQy52
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Snap has 477 million Daily Active Users.
In October, Snap began charging users for extra storage beyond 5GB.
Plans start at $1.99/mo.
Will this help Snap finally become profitable?
$SNAP https://t.co/Mtr8NnQy52
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Offshore
Photo
EndGame Macro
Young workers are the most marginal hires, so when employers get cautious, they’re the first to feel it through fewer hours, fewer shifts, and fewer entry level openings. This isn’t a one off spike like COVID, it’s a steady climb, which usually shows up when businesses are quietly pulling back before they announce layoffs. The broader risk isn’t just economic, it’s social. High youth unemployment tends to drag on household formation, delay consumption, increase reliance on family support or debt, and over time it feeds frustration and disengagement. Historically, when youth unemployment rises meaningfully, the headline labor market almost always follows with a lag. This chart confirms we’re already late cycle where firms are managing risk by freezing the pipeline of new workers.
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Young workers are the most marginal hires, so when employers get cautious, they’re the first to feel it through fewer hours, fewer shifts, and fewer entry level openings. This isn’t a one off spike like COVID, it’s a steady climb, which usually shows up when businesses are quietly pulling back before they announce layoffs. The broader risk isn’t just economic, it’s social. High youth unemployment tends to drag on household formation, delay consumption, increase reliance on family support or debt, and over time it feeds frustration and disengagement. Historically, when youth unemployment rises meaningfully, the headline labor market almost always follows with a lag. This chart confirms we’re already late cycle where firms are managing risk by freezing the pipeline of new workers.
Youth Unemployment Rate highest since August 2020
#MacroEdge https://t.co/qG0YvS0KVP tweet
AkhenOsiris
$HOOD $COIN
Mizuho maintained its Outperform rating and $172 price target on Robinhood shares, citing strong growth in the company’s prediction markets segment.
Robinhood is on track for a $300 million run-rate for prediction markets in the fourth quarter, with 2.5 billion in October contracts, prompting Mizuho to raise its 2026-2027 revenue estimates by 6-7%.
According to Mizuho’s survey data, Robinhood users are more inclined to fund prediction markets portfolios with fresh money compared to Coinbase users, with approximately 50% of Robinhood users using new funds versus about 37% for Coinbase.
This funding advantage is partially offset by an expected lower allocation to prediction markets in Robinhood users’ portfolios compared to Coinbase users, with projections showing about 13% allocation for Robinhood versus 15% for Coinbase users approximately one year from now.
Mizuho expects Robinhood to see a larger percentage revenue benefit from prediction markets compared to Coinbase, based on the combination of these user behavior patterns.
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$HOOD $COIN
Mizuho maintained its Outperform rating and $172 price target on Robinhood shares, citing strong growth in the company’s prediction markets segment.
Robinhood is on track for a $300 million run-rate for prediction markets in the fourth quarter, with 2.5 billion in October contracts, prompting Mizuho to raise its 2026-2027 revenue estimates by 6-7%.
According to Mizuho’s survey data, Robinhood users are more inclined to fund prediction markets portfolios with fresh money compared to Coinbase users, with approximately 50% of Robinhood users using new funds versus about 37% for Coinbase.
This funding advantage is partially offset by an expected lower allocation to prediction markets in Robinhood users’ portfolios compared to Coinbase users, with projections showing about 13% allocation for Robinhood versus 15% for Coinbase users approximately one year from now.
Mizuho expects Robinhood to see a larger percentage revenue benefit from prediction markets compared to Coinbase, based on the combination of these user behavior patterns.
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AkhenOsiris
$FLUT $DKNG
Citizens:
DraftKings (Outperform, $44 PT) and FanDuel (Outperform, $311 PT) are set to launch their respective prediction market platforms in the near term. A source indicated to us both platforms were set to launch last Friday, but third-party dependencies delayed the launch. As we examine the value chain for both companies, neither has exposure to "illegal" entities in the eyes of Arizona, with CME Group not providing sports contracts in states with legal sports betting. We believe both of these companies took the "cleanest" way possible to avoid friction with states and, on the surface, should not be impacted by the decision out of Arizona. We would even argue DraftKings' acquisition of Railbird solves this issue by providing flexibility in a sense whereby it can tailor its offering around fluid changes in regulations over time."
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$FLUT $DKNG
Citizens:
DraftKings (Outperform, $44 PT) and FanDuel (Outperform, $311 PT) are set to launch their respective prediction market platforms in the near term. A source indicated to us both platforms were set to launch last Friday, but third-party dependencies delayed the launch. As we examine the value chain for both companies, neither has exposure to "illegal" entities in the eyes of Arizona, with CME Group not providing sports contracts in states with legal sports betting. We believe both of these companies took the "cleanest" way possible to avoid friction with states and, on the surface, should not be impacted by the decision out of Arizona. We would even argue DraftKings' acquisition of Railbird solves this issue by providing flexibility in a sense whereby it can tailor its offering around fluid changes in regulations over time."
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