Offshore
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EndGame Macro
Excellent. Two of my favorites follows @GeorgeGammon and @m3_melody https://t.co/QHoF2Em89q
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Excellent. Two of my favorites follows @GeorgeGammon and @m3_melody https://t.co/QHoF2Em89q
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Offshore
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App Economy Insights
🍿 Netflix + Warner Bros. 📊
The $83B deal visualized:
• What Netflix is buying
• The bid vs. Paramount
• Who wins & who loses
• Balance sheet madness
• Vertical vs. horizontal merger👇
https://t.co/dGBendVe7H
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🍿 Netflix + Warner Bros. 📊
The $83B deal visualized:
• What Netflix is buying
• The bid vs. Paramount
• Who wins & who loses
• Balance sheet madness
• Vertical vs. horizontal merger👇
https://t.co/dGBendVe7H
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Offshore
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Fiscal.ai
Future share cannibal?
Crocs has now reduced its total shares outstanding by 10.4% over the last 12 months.
Current Buyback Yield: 13.9%
$CROX https://t.co/TYQXGpAtYe
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Future share cannibal?
Crocs has now reduced its total shares outstanding by 10.4% over the last 12 months.
Current Buyback Yield: 13.9%
$CROX https://t.co/TYQXGpAtYe
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Offshore
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Clark Square Capital
RT @AstutexAi: The Curious Case of Vera Bradley: Influencer Stock Pumper, the Fund 1 Partial Exit, and the Pre-Sale Signals
I don’t typically address issues like this, as they’re outside my competence and I don’t bet on such outcomes, but this situation is a bit special. So here’s what happened recently with Vera Bradley. I’ll also attach a link to Gemini Deep Research in the first comment in case you want to dive into more details.
1) The company extended its poison pill for 1 year on October 10th
2) It amended the JPM credit agreement, pledging IP to unlock asset sales on October 27th
3) It listed its HQ for sale/leaseback - 1-year lease only (!) - on October 28th
4) Ivan Brockman from PJT was appointed to the board on November 17th
So sale preparations were going at full speed, but then comes the fun part (not so fun actually if you held through these days like me 😵💫):
5) Felix Prehn, a finfluencer, pumps the stock, which had technically started to improve earlier (entered Stage 2 on October 27th). Volume shoots up, shorts cover, some merger arbitragers and quants step in betting on a buyout, and the stock flies
6) Fund 1 decides to sell into this event and unloads all physical shares (10%), leaving exposure only through swaps (6.7%). they previously claimed an additional 10% exposure through swaps
7) Fund 1 files its updated ownership on November 20th, leaving a lot of speculators disappointed, stock crashes 18%
8) Now the hot air is coming out and distributing into the market with very few buyers before earnings on Thursday - the same pattern as CTKB, which Felix Prehn pumped earlier (November 14th)
But what is actually going on with the business itself? Two things worth mentioning:
1) The company is aggressively liquidating old inventory in the off-price channel - Costco, TJX, Marshalls, and even Dollar General. That means margins might be weaker than expected, but this is totally fine. Any potential buyer wouldn’t want to deal with inventory that’s similar in size to the deal value, so company prioritizes cash over margin
2) Several new products are doing very well - the Anthro collab, 100 Handbag, all Star Patchwork products, Peanuts collection and Aristocats (101 Dalmatians not so much, so cats win this time 🐱) mostly sold out. There might be an issue with artificially limiting availability to create online hype, but I’m not sure you’d want to do that before a sale
I still think $VRA is worth at least $5 per share, and at $2 it’s a steal. I own shares, so wish me luck🫡
Also big thanks to @ClarkSquareCap for valuable insights - he’s the man and a must-follow!
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RT @AstutexAi: The Curious Case of Vera Bradley: Influencer Stock Pumper, the Fund 1 Partial Exit, and the Pre-Sale Signals
I don’t typically address issues like this, as they’re outside my competence and I don’t bet on such outcomes, but this situation is a bit special. So here’s what happened recently with Vera Bradley. I’ll also attach a link to Gemini Deep Research in the first comment in case you want to dive into more details.
1) The company extended its poison pill for 1 year on October 10th
2) It amended the JPM credit agreement, pledging IP to unlock asset sales on October 27th
3) It listed its HQ for sale/leaseback - 1-year lease only (!) - on October 28th
4) Ivan Brockman from PJT was appointed to the board on November 17th
So sale preparations were going at full speed, but then comes the fun part (not so fun actually if you held through these days like me 😵💫):
5) Felix Prehn, a finfluencer, pumps the stock, which had technically started to improve earlier (entered Stage 2 on October 27th). Volume shoots up, shorts cover, some merger arbitragers and quants step in betting on a buyout, and the stock flies
6) Fund 1 decides to sell into this event and unloads all physical shares (10%), leaving exposure only through swaps (6.7%). they previously claimed an additional 10% exposure through swaps
7) Fund 1 files its updated ownership on November 20th, leaving a lot of speculators disappointed, stock crashes 18%
8) Now the hot air is coming out and distributing into the market with very few buyers before earnings on Thursday - the same pattern as CTKB, which Felix Prehn pumped earlier (November 14th)
But what is actually going on with the business itself? Two things worth mentioning:
1) The company is aggressively liquidating old inventory in the off-price channel - Costco, TJX, Marshalls, and even Dollar General. That means margins might be weaker than expected, but this is totally fine. Any potential buyer wouldn’t want to deal with inventory that’s similar in size to the deal value, so company prioritizes cash over margin
2) Several new products are doing very well - the Anthro collab, 100 Handbag, all Star Patchwork products, Peanuts collection and Aristocats (101 Dalmatians not so much, so cats win this time 🐱) mostly sold out. There might be an issue with artificially limiting availability to create online hype, but I’m not sure you’d want to do that before a sale
I still think $VRA is worth at least $5 per share, and at $2 it’s a steal. I own shares, so wish me luck🫡
Also big thanks to @ClarkSquareCap for valuable insights - he’s the man and a must-follow!
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Offshore
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EndGame Macro
Lower Rates Don’t Matter If Confidence Collapses First
What this chart actually shows is how sensitive the system is to small rate moves once you account for who bought homes recently and how thin their margins are.
A drop from 6.3% to 6.0% sounds tiny. But mechanically, it flips millions more mortgages into refinance territory because closing costs, points, and break evens eat most of the savings unless you clear a certain threshold. That’s why the bar jumps from 3.5 million to 5.8 million almost overnight. It’s a cliff, not a slope.
But cliffs work both ways…you don’t get the upside unless everything else in the background is stable.
The Real Fragility Is That Most New Buyers Built This on Hope, Not Cushion
The majority of mortgages originated over the last three years were extremely tight deals…
High home prices.
High interest rates.
Little equity.
Rising cost of ownership.
Those buyers didn’t buy because the math worked on day one; they bought because they believed they’d date the rate and refinance later. That logic only works if the economy cooperates. It needs falling rates, stable jobs, and stable home prices happening at the same time.
What happens if unemployment is rising?
What happens if home values flatten or dip?
What happens if lenders tighten standards exactly when people need flexibility?
Suddenly the refinance escape hatch becomes a brick wall.
When the Economy Slows, the Housing Math Breaks First
Look at any past easing cycle. When the Fed starts cutting in a sustained way, unemployment doesn’t stabilize, it usually keeps rising for 12–18 months. The cuts don’t cause the job losses; they respond to them. And markets always forget that yields fall because the economy is weakening, not strengthening.
That’s why lower mortgage rates are not automatically bullish. If the 10 year is falling because growth is softening, earnings are weakening, and layoffs are accelerating, then the lower rate is actually a distress signal. Banks see that too. Which is why, in every downturn, they tighten LTV ratios, demand more equity, raise overlays, and get more conservative.
So even if rates drop enough to make refinancing look attractive, the most vulnerable homeowners often can’t pass underwriting and the people who can qualify may not feel psychologically safe enough to take on new debt.
Housing isn’t math first. It’s confidence first.
A Slow Grind Is Much More Likely Than a Smooth Landing
Let’s combine everything…Rising consumer delinquencies, Record corporate bankruptcies, over 1.17 million layoffs in 2025, a housing market where nearly 20% of homeowners are locked into 6% and higher mortgages, cost of living surge that raised the all in cost of homeownership dramatically.
Pair that with Home Depot’s recent outlook of flat comps, weak big ticket spending, and a recovery that doesn’t start until after rates fall and the economy resets and the picture becomes clearer.
History shows that demand doesn’t come back until people feel secure, and you don’t get that feeling in a rising unemployment environment.
So the real point I am making is this…
Lower rates can unlock refinancing. But they can’t unlock confidence. And without confidence, the housing market doesn’t actually turn, it just breathes a little easier while the real economy works through its pain.
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Lower Rates Don’t Matter If Confidence Collapses First
What this chart actually shows is how sensitive the system is to small rate moves once you account for who bought homes recently and how thin their margins are.
A drop from 6.3% to 6.0% sounds tiny. But mechanically, it flips millions more mortgages into refinance territory because closing costs, points, and break evens eat most of the savings unless you clear a certain threshold. That’s why the bar jumps from 3.5 million to 5.8 million almost overnight. It’s a cliff, not a slope.
But cliffs work both ways…you don’t get the upside unless everything else in the background is stable.
The Real Fragility Is That Most New Buyers Built This on Hope, Not Cushion
The majority of mortgages originated over the last three years were extremely tight deals…
High home prices.
High interest rates.
Little equity.
Rising cost of ownership.
Those buyers didn’t buy because the math worked on day one; they bought because they believed they’d date the rate and refinance later. That logic only works if the economy cooperates. It needs falling rates, stable jobs, and stable home prices happening at the same time.
What happens if unemployment is rising?
What happens if home values flatten or dip?
What happens if lenders tighten standards exactly when people need flexibility?
Suddenly the refinance escape hatch becomes a brick wall.
When the Economy Slows, the Housing Math Breaks First
Look at any past easing cycle. When the Fed starts cutting in a sustained way, unemployment doesn’t stabilize, it usually keeps rising for 12–18 months. The cuts don’t cause the job losses; they respond to them. And markets always forget that yields fall because the economy is weakening, not strengthening.
That’s why lower mortgage rates are not automatically bullish. If the 10 year is falling because growth is softening, earnings are weakening, and layoffs are accelerating, then the lower rate is actually a distress signal. Banks see that too. Which is why, in every downturn, they tighten LTV ratios, demand more equity, raise overlays, and get more conservative.
So even if rates drop enough to make refinancing look attractive, the most vulnerable homeowners often can’t pass underwriting and the people who can qualify may not feel psychologically safe enough to take on new debt.
Housing isn’t math first. It’s confidence first.
A Slow Grind Is Much More Likely Than a Smooth Landing
Let’s combine everything…Rising consumer delinquencies, Record corporate bankruptcies, over 1.17 million layoffs in 2025, a housing market where nearly 20% of homeowners are locked into 6% and higher mortgages, cost of living surge that raised the all in cost of homeownership dramatically.
Pair that with Home Depot’s recent outlook of flat comps, weak big ticket spending, and a recovery that doesn’t start until after rates fall and the economy resets and the picture becomes clearer.
History shows that demand doesn’t come back until people feel secure, and you don’t get that feeling in a rising unemployment environment.
So the real point I am making is this…
Lower rates can unlock refinancing. But they can’t unlock confidence. And without confidence, the housing market doesn’t actually turn, it just breathes a little easier while the real economy works through its pain.
A mortgage rate of 6% vs. 6.25% probably does little to move the needle for a prospective home buyer.
But the number of homeowners “in the money” to refinance jumps 25% between a rate of 6.2% and 6.3%. https://t.co/qlLO8WMoB4 tweet