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EndGame Macro
If you boil David’s point, it’s essentially this…people are suddenly terrified of Japanese long term yields now, after they’ve already exploded higher… but they weren’t terrified when those same bonds were yielding basically nothing. And that, to him, is backwards.
He’s reminding everyone that the real moment of danger was years ago when Japan’s 40 year bond yielded 0.04%. At that level, the price of the bond was insanely inflated. There was no income, no cushion, and almost unlimited downside if yields ever normalized. That was the setup that should’ve made people nervous.
Why Today Isn’t the Scary Part
Fast forward to now and the 20, 30, and 40 year JGBs are all yielding around 3–4% levels Japan hasn’t seen in decades. And getting from 0% to 3–4% absolutely wrecked anyone who bought at the bottom. The damage already happened. The losses have already been absorbed. The repricing is largely behind us.
So when people look at today’s high yields and say now it’s dangerous, he’s calling that out. High yields don’t mean just in time to panic. They mean the market has already burned through the risky part. Today’s yields actually offer something…income, cushion, and a much better entry point than anything you saw in the last fifteen years.
You should’ve been afraid when yields were microscopic and valuations were insane, not now after the crash has already happened. If anything, this is closer to the point where future returns start looking more attractive, not less.
He’s not giving advice, he’s just reversing the emotional logic. The real bubble was then. The fear is now. And he thinks that’s the wrong way around.
tweet
If you boil David’s point, it’s essentially this…people are suddenly terrified of Japanese long term yields now, after they’ve already exploded higher… but they weren’t terrified when those same bonds were yielding basically nothing. And that, to him, is backwards.
He’s reminding everyone that the real moment of danger was years ago when Japan’s 40 year bond yielded 0.04%. At that level, the price of the bond was insanely inflated. There was no income, no cushion, and almost unlimited downside if yields ever normalized. That was the setup that should’ve made people nervous.
Why Today Isn’t the Scary Part
Fast forward to now and the 20, 30, and 40 year JGBs are all yielding around 3–4% levels Japan hasn’t seen in decades. And getting from 0% to 3–4% absolutely wrecked anyone who bought at the bottom. The damage already happened. The losses have already been absorbed. The repricing is largely behind us.
So when people look at today’s high yields and say now it’s dangerous, he’s calling that out. High yields don’t mean just in time to panic. They mean the market has already burned through the risky part. Today’s yields actually offer something…income, cushion, and a much better entry point than anything you saw in the last fifteen years.
You should’ve been afraid when yields were microscopic and valuations were insane, not now after the crash has already happened. If anything, this is closer to the point where future returns start looking more attractive, not less.
He’s not giving advice, he’s just reversing the emotional logic. The real bubble was then. The fear is now. And he thinks that’s the wrong way around.
These yields reflect enormous damage. The idea that now is the time to be afraid is bizarre.
June of 2016 0.041 bp. That’s 1/25 of one percent and now people are worried that’s when you should’ve been worried now you should be greedy and that’s not advice. https://t.co/dCtR9hs9E0 tweet
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EndGame Macro
The Fed Isn’t Reporting the Present It’s Preparing for What’s Coming
If you read Bowman’s statement straight through, it sounds like the usual banks are sound, capital is strong, everything’s fine update. But once you slow it down, the message underneath is very different. She’s not talking to Congress about how great the banking system is, she’s preparing them for a shift. The language she uses such as “tailoring,” “reducing burden,” “avoiding unnecessary constraints,” “empowering banks to compete” shows you exactly where her head is. Regulators only talk like this when they think the economy is going to need more credit, more flexibility, and fewer barriers. You don’t emphasize easing rules unless you think the current framework is too tight for the environment you’re heading into.
The Push for More Credit Flow
One of the clearest tells is her focus on mortgages. She basically says banks have been pulling back because capital treatment makes mortgages unattractive, and that this may be holding back access to credit. The Fed doesn’t bring this up unless they’re worried that housing, one of the biggest drivers of household wealth and economic momentum, is too frozen. By talking openly about recalibrating mortgage rules so banks can step back into that space, she’s signaling the Fed wants more participation from banks, not less. She does something similar with Treasuries, criticizing leverage rules that discourage banks from holding government debt. That’s a polite way of saying that the United States is issuing a mountain of bonds, and regulators don’t want capital rules getting in the way of banks absorbing them.
Loosening the Rulebook Without Saying It
She spends an unusual amount of time arguing that current rules were written for the big banks and shouldn’t be pushed onto smaller lenders. When a Vice Chair repeatedly calls rules “outdated,” “burdensome,” and “misaligned with reality,” that’s not a philosophical point. It’s groundwork for dialing them back. Her promise that this year’s regulatory review will lead to substantive change, something she notes did not happen in previous reviews is a quiet way of telling Congress that meaningful rollbacks are coming. And they’re not coming because the system is overheating. They’re coming because the Fed wants to make sure smaller banks are able to lend into a softer economy instead of getting smothered by G-SIB era rules.
The Digital and Political Subtext
The stablecoin and digital assets section is also revealing. She doesn’t frame these things as threats. She frames them as technologies banks need to be able to compete with. That’s a strategic move. It suggests the Fed isn’t trying to wall off traditional banking from new payment structures, they’re trying to bring those structures under the Fed’s umbrella before the next major shift in financial rails happens. At the same time, she goes out of her way to distance supervision from reputational risk and political pressure. That’s not about finance. That’s about protecting the Fed from becoming a political weapon as the economy slows. She’s trying to depoliticize the supervisory process before it gets dragged into the fights she can already see coming.
My Read
When you put it all together, the testimony reads less like a report on what has happened and more like preparation for what the Fed expects to happen next. They want banks willing to lend. They want smaller lenders freed up. They want mortgages flowing again. They want banks comfortable holding Treasuries. And they want fewer regulatory chokepoints that could make a slowdown worse. A regulator doesn’t talk like this in a booming economy. They talk like this when they see softness ahead and want to get the plumbing ready before the pressure hits. In my opinion Bowman is laying the groundwork for a more flexible, credit friendly regime because she knows the economy will need it.
Now available: Testimony by Vice Chair for Supervision Bowman on supervision an[...]
The Fed Isn’t Reporting the Present It’s Preparing for What’s Coming
If you read Bowman’s statement straight through, it sounds like the usual banks are sound, capital is strong, everything’s fine update. But once you slow it down, the message underneath is very different. She’s not talking to Congress about how great the banking system is, she’s preparing them for a shift. The language she uses such as “tailoring,” “reducing burden,” “avoiding unnecessary constraints,” “empowering banks to compete” shows you exactly where her head is. Regulators only talk like this when they think the economy is going to need more credit, more flexibility, and fewer barriers. You don’t emphasize easing rules unless you think the current framework is too tight for the environment you’re heading into.
The Push for More Credit Flow
One of the clearest tells is her focus on mortgages. She basically says banks have been pulling back because capital treatment makes mortgages unattractive, and that this may be holding back access to credit. The Fed doesn’t bring this up unless they’re worried that housing, one of the biggest drivers of household wealth and economic momentum, is too frozen. By talking openly about recalibrating mortgage rules so banks can step back into that space, she’s signaling the Fed wants more participation from banks, not less. She does something similar with Treasuries, criticizing leverage rules that discourage banks from holding government debt. That’s a polite way of saying that the United States is issuing a mountain of bonds, and regulators don’t want capital rules getting in the way of banks absorbing them.
Loosening the Rulebook Without Saying It
She spends an unusual amount of time arguing that current rules were written for the big banks and shouldn’t be pushed onto smaller lenders. When a Vice Chair repeatedly calls rules “outdated,” “burdensome,” and “misaligned with reality,” that’s not a philosophical point. It’s groundwork for dialing them back. Her promise that this year’s regulatory review will lead to substantive change, something she notes did not happen in previous reviews is a quiet way of telling Congress that meaningful rollbacks are coming. And they’re not coming because the system is overheating. They’re coming because the Fed wants to make sure smaller banks are able to lend into a softer economy instead of getting smothered by G-SIB era rules.
The Digital and Political Subtext
The stablecoin and digital assets section is also revealing. She doesn’t frame these things as threats. She frames them as technologies banks need to be able to compete with. That’s a strategic move. It suggests the Fed isn’t trying to wall off traditional banking from new payment structures, they’re trying to bring those structures under the Fed’s umbrella before the next major shift in financial rails happens. At the same time, she goes out of her way to distance supervision from reputational risk and political pressure. That’s not about finance. That’s about protecting the Fed from becoming a political weapon as the economy slows. She’s trying to depoliticize the supervisory process before it gets dragged into the fights she can already see coming.
My Read
When you put it all together, the testimony reads less like a report on what has happened and more like preparation for what the Fed expects to happen next. They want banks willing to lend. They want smaller lenders freed up. They want mortgages flowing again. They want banks comfortable holding Treasuries. And they want fewer regulatory chokepoints that could make a slowdown worse. A regulator doesn’t talk like this in a booming economy. They talk like this when they see softness ahead and want to get the plumbing ready before the pressure hits. In my opinion Bowman is laying the groundwork for a more flexible, credit friendly regime because she knows the economy will need it.
Now available: Testimony by Vice Chair for Supervision Bowman on supervision an[...]
Offshore
EndGame Macro The Fed Isn’t Reporting the Present It’s Preparing for What’s Coming If you read Bowman’s statement straight through, it sounds like the usual banks are sound, capital is strong, everything’s fine update. But once you slow it down, the message…
d regulation: https://t.co/7NdIa0EZDX
Watch testimony live tomorrow, 12/2, at 10:00 a.m. - Federal Reserve tweet
Watch testimony live tomorrow, 12/2, at 10:00 a.m. - Federal Reserve tweet
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EndGame Macro
What the Supervision and Regulation Report Really Reveals Beneath the Calm Tone
If you read past the opening tone and pay attention to what they feel compelled to explain, the report is not describing a system that’s cruising. It’s describing a system the Fed is quietly preparing for a slower, more fragile stretch ahead.
Where the Cracks Show Up
The big contradiction is that the Fed keeps insisting banks are well positioned while also walking through a list of stress points that are all in the places most sensitive to a late cycle slowdown. Office delinquencies at large banks are hovering near 10%, commercial real estate delinquencies are roughly double their decade average, and consumer credit delinquencies, especially credit cards and auto loans are still above their 10 year norms even after a slight pullback. The report frames all of this as contained, but the details say these issues aren’t going away. They’re spreading, and they’re landing on the borrowers who feel higher rates most directly.
Loan growth is positive, but the composition is telling. A meaningful portion of the growth is in loans to nonbank financials, private credit funds and other leveraged lenders who themselves loan to riskier borrowers. That’s not a sign of a booming real economy. It’s a sign banks are reaching further out on the risk spectrum because the best borrowers are sitting out at these rates. On top of that, some big banks are leaning more on short term wholesale funding, which is cheap when markets are calm but evaporates quickly when conditions tighten. The report never calls this a problem, but it highlights it for a reason.
The Regulatory Shift Hiding in Plain Sight
The clearest foreshadowing is in the policy adjustments. The Fed is easing the leverage ratio for large banks so it acts more like a backstop instead of the binding constraint, a polite way of saying they want banks to have more balance sheet room to hold Treasuries. They’re lowering the community bank leverage ratio from 9% to 8% and giving smaller banks more time to fix shortfalls. They’re streamlining supervisory expectations, narrowing what examiners can pressure banks over, and reducing the complexity of performance ratings. These aren’t cosmetic adjustments. They’re pressure releases.
You don’t loosen capital rules, widen flexibility, and make supervision less rigid when you’re worried about overheating. You do that when you expect credit demand to weaken and you want banks to stay willing and able to lend even as the economy cools. You do it when heavy Treasury issuance needs willing buyers. And you do it when community banks, the ones most exposed to small businesses, farms, and local real estate are staring at borrowers who are already feeling stretched.
The Real Message Behind the Language
The report’s tone says all is well, but its actions say that they need more give in the system. The Fed knows the pressure points: commercial real estate valuations that haven’t fully reset, consumers who are leaning on high cost credit, nonbanks taking a larger share of lending, and a Treasury market that needs ongoing absorption. By easing rules now, they’re clearing the runway before conditions deteriorate and not after.
My Read
The Fed isn’t trying to hide stress. It’s trying to get ahead of it. The rule changes, the shifts in supervisory philosophy, the lighter touch on capital…all of that is preparation. They’re making sure the system bends rather than breaks if growth rolls over. The contradictions in the report aren’t mistakes. They’re the quiet acknowledgment that the next phase of the economy may require more flexibility than the last one.
The Federal Reserve's Supervision and Regulation Report is now available and provides information about the Fed’s supervisory and regulatory policies and actions, as well as current banking conditions. Learn more: https://t.co/aPzCjfQObZ - Federal Reserve tweet
What the Supervision and Regulation Report Really Reveals Beneath the Calm Tone
If you read past the opening tone and pay attention to what they feel compelled to explain, the report is not describing a system that’s cruising. It’s describing a system the Fed is quietly preparing for a slower, more fragile stretch ahead.
Where the Cracks Show Up
The big contradiction is that the Fed keeps insisting banks are well positioned while also walking through a list of stress points that are all in the places most sensitive to a late cycle slowdown. Office delinquencies at large banks are hovering near 10%, commercial real estate delinquencies are roughly double their decade average, and consumer credit delinquencies, especially credit cards and auto loans are still above their 10 year norms even after a slight pullback. The report frames all of this as contained, but the details say these issues aren’t going away. They’re spreading, and they’re landing on the borrowers who feel higher rates most directly.
Loan growth is positive, but the composition is telling. A meaningful portion of the growth is in loans to nonbank financials, private credit funds and other leveraged lenders who themselves loan to riskier borrowers. That’s not a sign of a booming real economy. It’s a sign banks are reaching further out on the risk spectrum because the best borrowers are sitting out at these rates. On top of that, some big banks are leaning more on short term wholesale funding, which is cheap when markets are calm but evaporates quickly when conditions tighten. The report never calls this a problem, but it highlights it for a reason.
The Regulatory Shift Hiding in Plain Sight
The clearest foreshadowing is in the policy adjustments. The Fed is easing the leverage ratio for large banks so it acts more like a backstop instead of the binding constraint, a polite way of saying they want banks to have more balance sheet room to hold Treasuries. They’re lowering the community bank leverage ratio from 9% to 8% and giving smaller banks more time to fix shortfalls. They’re streamlining supervisory expectations, narrowing what examiners can pressure banks over, and reducing the complexity of performance ratings. These aren’t cosmetic adjustments. They’re pressure releases.
You don’t loosen capital rules, widen flexibility, and make supervision less rigid when you’re worried about overheating. You do that when you expect credit demand to weaken and you want banks to stay willing and able to lend even as the economy cools. You do it when heavy Treasury issuance needs willing buyers. And you do it when community banks, the ones most exposed to small businesses, farms, and local real estate are staring at borrowers who are already feeling stretched.
The Real Message Behind the Language
The report’s tone says all is well, but its actions say that they need more give in the system. The Fed knows the pressure points: commercial real estate valuations that haven’t fully reset, consumers who are leaning on high cost credit, nonbanks taking a larger share of lending, and a Treasury market that needs ongoing absorption. By easing rules now, they’re clearing the runway before conditions deteriorate and not after.
My Read
The Fed isn’t trying to hide stress. It’s trying to get ahead of it. The rule changes, the shifts in supervisory philosophy, the lighter touch on capital…all of that is preparation. They’re making sure the system bends rather than breaks if growth rolls over. The contradictions in the report aren’t mistakes. They’re the quiet acknowledgment that the next phase of the economy may require more flexibility than the last one.
The Federal Reserve's Supervision and Regulation Report is now available and provides information about the Fed’s supervisory and regulatory policies and actions, as well as current banking conditions. Learn more: https://t.co/aPzCjfQObZ - Federal Reserve tweet
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EndGame Macro
Why MicroStrategy’s Biggest Move Isn’t Buying Bitcoin…It’s Buying Time
When a company that has spent years branding itself as a levered Bitcoin bet suddenly carves out a $1.44B cash reserve, it’s a risk management alarm.
MicroStrategy’s whole equity story has been that they’re a quasi Bitcoin ETF with operating cash flow attached. That works when BTC is ripping and capital markets are friendly. It works less well when..
• the stock is down 55% in two months,
• Bitcoin is dumping hard, and
• funding costs are much higher than in the zero rate era that birthed the strategy.
In that environment, the worst possible outcome for them is a forced seller scenario…needing dollars to service debt, meet operating needs, or roll maturities precisely when Bitcoin is puking and the equity window is shut. A USD reserve is the firebreak that’s supposed to make sure that day never comes.
So underneath all the navigate market volatility language, the message is simple…they want enough dry powder to cover interest, near term maturities, and basic corporate needs without touching the Bitcoin stack or tapping markets at distressed prices. Everything else is secondary.
Why do it now?
Timing is the tell. You don’t suddenly decide you need a $1.44B buffer at the top of a bull market with easy credit. You do it when:
• volatility has reminded you how quickly mark to market equity can evaporate;
• your stock is already in a drawdown big enough to scare new lenders; and
• you’re looking ahead at debt timelines, regulatory noise, and a macro backdrop where liquidity can vanish faster than your board can schedule an emergency meeting.
In other words, they’re looking at the same tape everyone else is, but from the inside. They see what BTC drawdowns do to their collateral cushion. They see how much of their optionality actually depends on capital markets staying open and friendly. They see the gap between the meme of being long volatility and the reality of having fixed cash obligations in a world of wild asset prices.
A USD reserve is how you quietly admit all of that without saying, “We mispriced tail risk.” You frame it as prudence, “navigating volatility,” “flexibility around guidance,” but the logic is defensive…lock in liquidity while you still can, at terms that aren’t punitive, so you’re not negotiating from your knees later.
Strip it down to the core motive
You can spin other reasons around the edges, maybe they want the option to buy back stock if it gets completely obliterated; maybe they want dry powder to buy Bitcoin on capitulation lows; maybe they’re prepping for regulatory or tax changes. Those are all plausible second order benefits.
But they’re all built on the same first order need…guarantee the company can meet its dollar obligations through a nasty cycle without being forced to dump core assets or beg the market for capital at terrible prices.
That’s the ONLY real reason you ever pre fund yourself to this scale. It’s not about getting cute with market timing. It’s about making sure you live long enough to be right.
tweet
Why MicroStrategy’s Biggest Move Isn’t Buying Bitcoin…It’s Buying Time
When a company that has spent years branding itself as a levered Bitcoin bet suddenly carves out a $1.44B cash reserve, it’s a risk management alarm.
MicroStrategy’s whole equity story has been that they’re a quasi Bitcoin ETF with operating cash flow attached. That works when BTC is ripping and capital markets are friendly. It works less well when..
• the stock is down 55% in two months,
• Bitcoin is dumping hard, and
• funding costs are much higher than in the zero rate era that birthed the strategy.
In that environment, the worst possible outcome for them is a forced seller scenario…needing dollars to service debt, meet operating needs, or roll maturities precisely when Bitcoin is puking and the equity window is shut. A USD reserve is the firebreak that’s supposed to make sure that day never comes.
So underneath all the navigate market volatility language, the message is simple…they want enough dry powder to cover interest, near term maturities, and basic corporate needs without touching the Bitcoin stack or tapping markets at distressed prices. Everything else is secondary.
Why do it now?
Timing is the tell. You don’t suddenly decide you need a $1.44B buffer at the top of a bull market with easy credit. You do it when:
• volatility has reminded you how quickly mark to market equity can evaporate;
• your stock is already in a drawdown big enough to scare new lenders; and
• you’re looking ahead at debt timelines, regulatory noise, and a macro backdrop where liquidity can vanish faster than your board can schedule an emergency meeting.
In other words, they’re looking at the same tape everyone else is, but from the inside. They see what BTC drawdowns do to their collateral cushion. They see how much of their optionality actually depends on capital markets staying open and friendly. They see the gap between the meme of being long volatility and the reality of having fixed cash obligations in a world of wild asset prices.
A USD reserve is how you quietly admit all of that without saying, “We mispriced tail risk.” You frame it as prudence, “navigating volatility,” “flexibility around guidance,” but the logic is defensive…lock in liquidity while you still can, at terms that aren’t punitive, so you’re not negotiating from your knees later.
Strip it down to the core motive
You can spin other reasons around the edges, maybe they want the option to buy back stock if it gets completely obliterated; maybe they want dry powder to buy Bitcoin on capitulation lows; maybe they’re prepping for regulatory or tax changes. Those are all plausible second order benefits.
But they’re all built on the same first order need…guarantee the company can meet its dollar obligations through a nasty cycle without being forced to dump core assets or beg the market for capital at terrible prices.
That’s the ONLY real reason you ever pre fund yourself to this scale. It’s not about getting cute with market timing. It’s about making sure you live long enough to be right.
A bitcoin reserve company is forced to set up a USD reserve
Ahhhh the irony https://t.co/MAbAJWp6nE tweet
Offshore
Photo
EndGame Macro
Why MicroStrategy’s Biggest Move Isn’t Buying Bitcoin…It’s Buying Time
When a company that has spent years branding itself as a levered Bitcoin bet suddenly carves out a $1.44B cash reserve, it’s a risk management alarm.
MicroStrategy’s whole equity story has been that they’re a quasi Bitcoin ETF with operating cash flow attached. That works when BTC is ripping and capital markets are friendly. It works less well when..
• the stock is down 55% in two months,
• Bitcoin is dumping hard, and
• funding costs are much higher than in the zero rate era that birthed the strategy.
In that environment, the worst possible outcome for them is a forced seller scenario…needing dollars to service debt, meet operating needs, or roll maturities precisely when Bitcoin is puking and the equity window is shut. A USD reserve is the firebreak that’s supposed to make sure that day never comes.
So underneath all the navigate market volatility language, the message is simple…they want enough dry powder to cover interest, near term maturities, and basic corporate needs without touching the Bitcoin stack or tapping markets at distressed prices. Everything else is secondary.
Why do it now?
Timing is the tell. You don’t suddenly decide you need a $1.44B buffer at the top of a bull market with easy credit. You do it when:
• volatility has reminded you how quickly mark to market equity can evaporate;
• your stock is already in a drawdown big enough to scare new lenders; and
• you’re looking ahead at debt timelines, regulatory noise, and a macro backdrop where liquidity can vanish faster than your board can schedule an emergency meeting.
In other words, they’re looking at the same tape everyone else is, but from the inside. They see what BTC drawdowns do to their collateral cushion. They see how much of their optionality actually depends on capital markets staying open and friendly. They see the gap between the meme of being long volatility and the reality of having fixed cash obligations in a world of wild asset prices.
A USD reserve is how you quietly admit all of that without saying, “We mispriced tail risk.” You frame it as prudence, “navigating volatility,” “flexibility around guidance,” but the logic is defensive…lock in liquidity while you still can, at terms that aren’t punitive, so you’re not negotiating from your knees later.
Strip it down to the core motive
You can spin other reasons around the edges, maybe they want the option to buy back stock if it gets completely obliterated; maybe they want dry powder to buy Bitcoin on capitulation lows; maybe they’re prepping for regulatory or tax changes. Those are all plausible second order benefits.
But they’re all built on the same first order need…guarantee the company can meet its dollar obligations through a nasty cycle without being forced to dump core assets or beg the market for capital at terrible prices.
That’s the ONLY real reason you ever pre fund yourself to this scale. It’s not about getting cute with market timing. It’s about making sure you live long enough to be right.
tweet
Why MicroStrategy’s Biggest Move Isn’t Buying Bitcoin…It’s Buying Time
When a company that has spent years branding itself as a levered Bitcoin bet suddenly carves out a $1.44B cash reserve, it’s a risk management alarm.
MicroStrategy’s whole equity story has been that they’re a quasi Bitcoin ETF with operating cash flow attached. That works when BTC is ripping and capital markets are friendly. It works less well when..
• the stock is down 55% in two months,
• Bitcoin is dumping hard, and
• funding costs are much higher than in the zero rate era that birthed the strategy.
In that environment, the worst possible outcome for them is a forced seller scenario…needing dollars to service debt, meet operating needs, or roll maturities precisely when Bitcoin is puking and the equity window is shut. A USD reserve is the firebreak that’s supposed to make sure that day never comes.
So underneath all the navigate market volatility language, the message is simple…they want enough dry powder to cover interest, near term maturities, and basic corporate needs without touching the Bitcoin stack or tapping markets at distressed prices. Everything else is secondary.
Why do it now?
Timing is the tell. You don’t suddenly decide you need a $1.44B buffer at the top of a bull market with easy credit. You do it when:
• volatility has reminded you how quickly mark to market equity can evaporate;
• your stock is already in a drawdown big enough to scare new lenders; and
• you’re looking ahead at debt timelines, regulatory noise, and a macro backdrop where liquidity can vanish faster than your board can schedule an emergency meeting.
In other words, they’re looking at the same tape everyone else is, but from the inside. They see what BTC drawdowns do to their collateral cushion. They see how much of their optionality actually depends on capital markets staying open and friendly. They see the gap between the meme of being long volatility and the reality of having fixed cash obligations in a world of wild asset prices.
A USD reserve is how you quietly admit all of that without saying, “We mispriced tail risk.” You frame it as prudence, “navigating volatility,” “flexibility around guidance,” but the logic is defensive…lock in liquidity while you still can, at terms that aren’t punitive, so you’re not negotiating from your knees later.
Strip it down to the core motive
You can spin other reasons around the edges, maybe they want the option to buy back stock if it gets completely obliterated; maybe they want dry powder to buy Bitcoin on capitulation lows; maybe they’re prepping for regulatory or tax changes. Those are all plausible second order benefits.
But they’re all built on the same first order need…guarantee the company can meet its dollar obligations through a nasty cycle without being forced to dump core assets or beg the market for capital at terrible prices.
That’s the ONLY real reason you ever pre fund yourself to this scale. It’s not about getting cute with market timing. It’s about making sure you live long enough to be right.
A bitcoin reserve company is forced to set up a USD reserve
Ahhhh the irony https://t.co/MAbAJWp6nE tweet
Offshore
Photo
EndGame Macro
The Charts Are Whispering Bitcoin’s Trend Just Got More Complicated
When you line up these charts, you start to see the same story from three different angles. The clean, confident trend we had earlier in the cycle is gone, and what’s replacing it is a more complicated mix of rising volatility, weaker relative performance, and a market that’s becoming more selective about where it takes risk.
The BTC/DVOL Ratio Is Losing Its Edge
That BTC/DVOL chart is basically measuring how much bang for your volatility buck Bitcoin is giving you. Earlier in the year, the line was strong, sitting comfortably above the major moving averages. Volatility was low while price kept grinding higher, the ideal setup for a bull trend. Now the chart has flipped. Price has dipped below the 50 and 200 day EMAs, the ratio is much lower, and RSI is recovering but still sitting in the middle of the range. It’s the look of a market that’s trying to find its footing after losing momentum. Bitcoin is still moving, but every swing comes with more hesitation and more noise.
Other Assets Are Quietly Outperforming Bitcoin
The RKT/BTC and XLV/BTC charts show something people don’t look for often…assets beating Bitcoin in Bitcoin terms. Rocket, which has been dead money for ages, is breaking above long term moving averages with weekly RSI pushing into strength. That doesn’t happen unless Bitcoin is giving up some ground.
XLV…a slow, defensive health care ETF is even more telling. The ratio against BTC has gone vertical, RSI is pinned near the top, and price has clearly reversed a long downtrend. When defensive sectors start outperforming Bitcoin, it means capital is rotating toward safety and cash flows rather than pure speculation.
Putting It All Together
All of these charts together paint the picture of a market transitioning out of its easy phase. Instead of the smooth upside we had earlier, we now have rising volatility, weaker relative strength, and a shift in leadership toward assets that look steadier or structurally undervalued.
My Read
Bitcoin is heading into a more volatile, two sided environment, the kind where it could still rally hard, but those rallies come with sharp reversals and less follow through. It’s a maturing of the trend. The market isn’t chasing everything anymore. It’s getting picky, which usually means the next leg is going to require more conviction and less complacency.
tweet
The Charts Are Whispering Bitcoin’s Trend Just Got More Complicated
When you line up these charts, you start to see the same story from three different angles. The clean, confident trend we had earlier in the cycle is gone, and what’s replacing it is a more complicated mix of rising volatility, weaker relative performance, and a market that’s becoming more selective about where it takes risk.
The BTC/DVOL Ratio Is Losing Its Edge
That BTC/DVOL chart is basically measuring how much bang for your volatility buck Bitcoin is giving you. Earlier in the year, the line was strong, sitting comfortably above the major moving averages. Volatility was low while price kept grinding higher, the ideal setup for a bull trend. Now the chart has flipped. Price has dipped below the 50 and 200 day EMAs, the ratio is much lower, and RSI is recovering but still sitting in the middle of the range. It’s the look of a market that’s trying to find its footing after losing momentum. Bitcoin is still moving, but every swing comes with more hesitation and more noise.
Other Assets Are Quietly Outperforming Bitcoin
The RKT/BTC and XLV/BTC charts show something people don’t look for often…assets beating Bitcoin in Bitcoin terms. Rocket, which has been dead money for ages, is breaking above long term moving averages with weekly RSI pushing into strength. That doesn’t happen unless Bitcoin is giving up some ground.
XLV…a slow, defensive health care ETF is even more telling. The ratio against BTC has gone vertical, RSI is pinned near the top, and price has clearly reversed a long downtrend. When defensive sectors start outperforming Bitcoin, it means capital is rotating toward safety and cash flows rather than pure speculation.
Putting It All Together
All of these charts together paint the picture of a market transitioning out of its easy phase. Instead of the smooth upside we had earlier, we now have rising volatility, weaker relative strength, and a shift in leadership toward assets that look steadier or structurally undervalued.
My Read
Bitcoin is heading into a more volatile, two sided environment, the kind where it could still rally hard, but those rallies come with sharp reversals and less follow through. It’s a maturing of the trend. The market isn’t chasing everything anymore. It’s getting picky, which usually means the next leg is going to require more conviction and less complacency.
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What the Fall of 10 Roads Express Really Signals
On the surface, this reads like another trucking company caught in the crossfire of a bad contract renewal and a long union fight. But 10 Roads Express wasn’t some fringe operator. It was one of the USPS’s core transportation partners, the kind of company that forms part of the invisible backbone that keeps mail, prescriptions, and small parcel freight moving across the country. When a player like that bows out, it’s a sign something deeper is shifting.
The First Order Impact Is Obvious
A few thousand people lose steady work. USPS has to scramble to cover routes it relied on for years. Other carriers get pressured to absorb lanes with almost no lead time, often at higher cost and with limited capacity. In the short run, service reliability takes a hit. That’s the predictable part, the friction you get whenever a major contractor suddenly steps off the field.
The Real Story Is the Second Order Fallout
This is the kind of failure that sends a quiet message through the whole industry. Mid sized transportation companies, especially the ones owned by private equity, the ones already juggling high operating costs and thin margins, will see this and rethink how much risk they can realistically carry. Losing a government contract and facing a tough union at the same time used to be survivable. In a world of higher rates, tighter credit, and more aggressive labor, it’s enough to push a company over the edge.
It also strengthens labor’s hand. The Teamsters didn’t win in the traditional sense, but they demonstrated they can force a confrontation large enough to reshape the economics of the business. That kind of precedent echoes outward with higher wage expectations, more bargaining power, and more companies realizing their operating model only works if labor stays quiet, which it no longer is.
And it nudges the sector toward consolidation. Stronger, better capitalized carriers will absorb the pieces. Smaller ones will try to fill the gaps but risk getting crushed by the same cost pressures that pushed 10 Roads to the brink.
This isn’t just a shutdown. It’s another reminder that the logistics world built for near zero rates and endless cheap capacity doesn’t fit the environment we’re in now. The old model is breaking down in real time, one contractor at a time.
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What the Fall of 10 Roads Express Really Signals
On the surface, this reads like another trucking company caught in the crossfire of a bad contract renewal and a long union fight. But 10 Roads Express wasn’t some fringe operator. It was one of the USPS’s core transportation partners, the kind of company that forms part of the invisible backbone that keeps mail, prescriptions, and small parcel freight moving across the country. When a player like that bows out, it’s a sign something deeper is shifting.
The First Order Impact Is Obvious
A few thousand people lose steady work. USPS has to scramble to cover routes it relied on for years. Other carriers get pressured to absorb lanes with almost no lead time, often at higher cost and with limited capacity. In the short run, service reliability takes a hit. That’s the predictable part, the friction you get whenever a major contractor suddenly steps off the field.
The Real Story Is the Second Order Fallout
This is the kind of failure that sends a quiet message through the whole industry. Mid sized transportation companies, especially the ones owned by private equity, the ones already juggling high operating costs and thin margins, will see this and rethink how much risk they can realistically carry. Losing a government contract and facing a tough union at the same time used to be survivable. In a world of higher rates, tighter credit, and more aggressive labor, it’s enough to push a company over the edge.
It also strengthens labor’s hand. The Teamsters didn’t win in the traditional sense, but they demonstrated they can force a confrontation large enough to reshape the economics of the business. That kind of precedent echoes outward with higher wage expectations, more bargaining power, and more companies realizing their operating model only works if labor stays quiet, which it no longer is.
And it nudges the sector toward consolidation. Stronger, better capitalized carriers will absorb the pieces. Smaller ones will try to fill the gaps but risk getting crushed by the same cost pressures that pushed 10 Roads to the brink.
This isn’t just a shutdown. It’s another reminder that the logistics world built for near zero rates and endless cheap capacity doesn’t fit the environment we’re in now. The old model is breaking down in real time, one contractor at a time.
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in crypto you either extract liquidity or become exit liquidity https://t.co/Z0ivKUuAdk
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in crypto you either extract liquidity or become exit liquidity https://t.co/Z0ivKUuAdk
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