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EndGame Macro
The Inflation Nobody Sees but Everybody Feels
Paychecks have gone up, but the stuff people can’t avoid has gone up faster. Wages climbed steadily from 2021 to today, but shelter, food away from home, and even basic services have pulled ahead and they haven’t come back down. That gap is the entire mood of the economy right now.
Wages Are Up But The Essentials Escaped the Gravity of Paychecks
If you look at the lines one by one, wages rise in a clean, controlled slope. But shelter shoots higher. Eating out shoots higher. Groceries edge higher. Even basic services drift above the wage line. The only categories that actually fit inside the wage gains are things people cut first when money’s tight, recreation and alcohol.
That alone tells you the truth: the things that make life enjoyable are still affordable if you sacrifice somewhere else, but the non negotiables are the ones eating the difference. You don’t feel richer when the gains you make at work are swallowed by rent, food, and service prices before you even touch your discretionary budget.
And that’s the thing the headline numbers never capture. The inflation rate cooled, but the price level never came back. The shock stayed in place. You don’t undo a 25–30% jump in shelter by bringing annual inflation back to 3%. Households live in the new level, not the new rate.
Why Sentiment Feels Worse Than the Data Says
Historically, this isn’t normal. Pre 2020, we basically lived in an era of dead flat inflation and low rates. The economy wasn’t perfect, but it was predictable. Then in four years, everything that matters jumped in price at the fastest pace since the early ’80s. Even if wages kept up on average, most people don’t feel it. Renters got hit the hardest. Young buyers got priced out. Anyone who didn’t lock in a mortgage before the spike feels like they’re paying a premium for the same life their parents got at a discount.
That’s why consumer sentiment still reads like a recession even with unemployment low and stocks at highs: people aren’t reacting to the economy, they’re reacting to what it costs to live in it. We’ve seen strong spending numbers, but underneath that is a shift toward trading down, choosing cheaper brands, cutting back on dinners out, and saving less.
And once people feel squeezed on the essentials, that shapes everything else: politics, mood, expectations, and how secure they feel even with a decent job.
The Real Takeaway
This is a snapshot of a deeper tension in the economy: a world where the macro data looks stable, but the lived experience feels harder. A world where the recovery happened on paper, but the affordability didn’t come with it.
That’s why the vibecession won’t magically disappear. People don’t care that inflation is down, they care that rent is still up. They care that groceries never went back to 2019 levels. They care that eating out is now a conscious decision instead of a casual one.
And until the essentials start moving in the same direction as wages or wages finally outrun the essentials the gap you see in this chart is the gap you’ll keep hearing in the public mood.
tweet
The Inflation Nobody Sees but Everybody Feels
Paychecks have gone up, but the stuff people can’t avoid has gone up faster. Wages climbed steadily from 2021 to today, but shelter, food away from home, and even basic services have pulled ahead and they haven’t come back down. That gap is the entire mood of the economy right now.
Wages Are Up But The Essentials Escaped the Gravity of Paychecks
If you look at the lines one by one, wages rise in a clean, controlled slope. But shelter shoots higher. Eating out shoots higher. Groceries edge higher. Even basic services drift above the wage line. The only categories that actually fit inside the wage gains are things people cut first when money’s tight, recreation and alcohol.
That alone tells you the truth: the things that make life enjoyable are still affordable if you sacrifice somewhere else, but the non negotiables are the ones eating the difference. You don’t feel richer when the gains you make at work are swallowed by rent, food, and service prices before you even touch your discretionary budget.
And that’s the thing the headline numbers never capture. The inflation rate cooled, but the price level never came back. The shock stayed in place. You don’t undo a 25–30% jump in shelter by bringing annual inflation back to 3%. Households live in the new level, not the new rate.
Why Sentiment Feels Worse Than the Data Says
Historically, this isn’t normal. Pre 2020, we basically lived in an era of dead flat inflation and low rates. The economy wasn’t perfect, but it was predictable. Then in four years, everything that matters jumped in price at the fastest pace since the early ’80s. Even if wages kept up on average, most people don’t feel it. Renters got hit the hardest. Young buyers got priced out. Anyone who didn’t lock in a mortgage before the spike feels like they’re paying a premium for the same life their parents got at a discount.
That’s why consumer sentiment still reads like a recession even with unemployment low and stocks at highs: people aren’t reacting to the economy, they’re reacting to what it costs to live in it. We’ve seen strong spending numbers, but underneath that is a shift toward trading down, choosing cheaper brands, cutting back on dinners out, and saving less.
And once people feel squeezed on the essentials, that shapes everything else: politics, mood, expectations, and how secure they feel even with a decent job.
The Real Takeaway
This is a snapshot of a deeper tension in the economy: a world where the macro data looks stable, but the lived experience feels harder. A world where the recovery happened on paper, but the affordability didn’t come with it.
That’s why the vibecession won’t magically disappear. People don’t care that inflation is down, they care that rent is still up. They care that groceries never went back to 2019 levels. They care that eating out is now a conscious decision instead of a casual one.
And until the essentials start moving in the same direction as wages or wages finally outrun the essentials the gap you see in this chart is the gap you’ll keep hearing in the public mood.
Why there never was a Vibecession in one chart.
It’s always been about the prices of essentials. https://t.co/lDhA1HqIa2 tweet
EndGame Macro
Stephen Miran’s Quiet Revolt And Why He Says the Fed’s Leverage Fix Doesn’t Go Far Enough
Miran isn’t against giving banks capital relief. The new rule cuts the enhanced leverage buffer and trims TLAC and long term debt, opening up more balance sheet space for Treasuries, reserves, and repo, exactly the mechanical change I laid out before. What he’s saying is that, in normal times, the leverage ratio shouldn’t be the thing that bites, because when it does, it pressures banks to reach for riskier, higher yielding assets just to justify the capital they’re forced to hold.
Where he breaks from the rest of the Board is on the structure. The new rule still counts Treasuries and Fed reserves in the leverage denominator; it just lowers the required ratio. Miran thinks that’s fundamentally inconsistent. Regulators require banks to hold these instruments as high quality liquid assets, and risk based capital already treats them as essentially risk free. In his view, it makes no sense to demand those holdings for liquidity, then penalize them again through the leverage test. He wants Treasuries and reserves excluded from the SLR denominator altogether.
He ties this directly to market plumbing. Treasury and repo desks are low margin, high volume businesses that keep the government’s funding machine running. If you make those books capital intensive, banks will naturally shrink them at the margin, especially when volatility is high. That, in his eyes, makes the Treasury market shallower and more fragile just when the fiscal side needs it most.
He also points back to 2020, when regulators temporarily carved Treasuries and reserves out of the SLR to stop the market from seizing. His argument is don’t wait for the next panic and improvise another exemption that looks like a bailout. Set the rule in advance, make it transparent, and avoid having to bend it under pressure.
So the Board majority is saying they will keep the basic leverage design, but dial it down so it stops choking balance sheets. Miran is saying, If you really believe these assets are the safest in the system, they shouldn’t be in this ratio at all.
How I Read the Tradeoff
On logic, he has a strong case. It is hard to defend a framework that forces banks to hold Treasuries and reserves, calls them risk free in one part of the rulebook, and then treats them as if they’re just another asset in the leverage test. That really does discourage the kind of Treasury market intermediation policymakers say they want.
But taking Treasuries and reserves completely out of the denominator isn’t costless. For the largest banks, those positions are enormous. If you ignore them in the leverage ratio, that ratio stops being a real backstop and you slide back toward relying almost entirely on risk weighted models and supervisory judgment, the combination that badly underestimated risk pre 2008. You also invite banks to grow very large books of risk free sovereign exposure, which deepens the link between the banking system and the state. That’s fine until confidence in the sovereign wobbles; then you’re flirting with the kind of bank sovereign doom loops Europe has already lived through.
So I see the majority trying to walk a middle line: keep a meaningful leverage check, but loosen it enough to free up trillions of balance sheet space. Miran is pushing the internal logic all the way to the end that if the real goal is smooth Treasury financing and deep liquidity, then the clean answer is to stop letting the leverage ratio lean on those holdings at all.
The deeper signal is that everyone involved shares the same fear of a huge refinancing wave, a softer economy, and a Treasury market that cannot afford another March 2020 moment. The disagreement is not about whether to use bank balance sheets as shock absorbers, that decision has basically been made. It’s about how much of the old armor they’re willing to strip off to make that strategy work.
My statement on the final rule on levera[...]
Stephen Miran’s Quiet Revolt And Why He Says the Fed’s Leverage Fix Doesn’t Go Far Enough
Miran isn’t against giving banks capital relief. The new rule cuts the enhanced leverage buffer and trims TLAC and long term debt, opening up more balance sheet space for Treasuries, reserves, and repo, exactly the mechanical change I laid out before. What he’s saying is that, in normal times, the leverage ratio shouldn’t be the thing that bites, because when it does, it pressures banks to reach for riskier, higher yielding assets just to justify the capital they’re forced to hold.
Where he breaks from the rest of the Board is on the structure. The new rule still counts Treasuries and Fed reserves in the leverage denominator; it just lowers the required ratio. Miran thinks that’s fundamentally inconsistent. Regulators require banks to hold these instruments as high quality liquid assets, and risk based capital already treats them as essentially risk free. In his view, it makes no sense to demand those holdings for liquidity, then penalize them again through the leverage test. He wants Treasuries and reserves excluded from the SLR denominator altogether.
He ties this directly to market plumbing. Treasury and repo desks are low margin, high volume businesses that keep the government’s funding machine running. If you make those books capital intensive, banks will naturally shrink them at the margin, especially when volatility is high. That, in his eyes, makes the Treasury market shallower and more fragile just when the fiscal side needs it most.
He also points back to 2020, when regulators temporarily carved Treasuries and reserves out of the SLR to stop the market from seizing. His argument is don’t wait for the next panic and improvise another exemption that looks like a bailout. Set the rule in advance, make it transparent, and avoid having to bend it under pressure.
So the Board majority is saying they will keep the basic leverage design, but dial it down so it stops choking balance sheets. Miran is saying, If you really believe these assets are the safest in the system, they shouldn’t be in this ratio at all.
How I Read the Tradeoff
On logic, he has a strong case. It is hard to defend a framework that forces banks to hold Treasuries and reserves, calls them risk free in one part of the rulebook, and then treats them as if they’re just another asset in the leverage test. That really does discourage the kind of Treasury market intermediation policymakers say they want.
But taking Treasuries and reserves completely out of the denominator isn’t costless. For the largest banks, those positions are enormous. If you ignore them in the leverage ratio, that ratio stops being a real backstop and you slide back toward relying almost entirely on risk weighted models and supervisory judgment, the combination that badly underestimated risk pre 2008. You also invite banks to grow very large books of risk free sovereign exposure, which deepens the link between the banking system and the state. That’s fine until confidence in the sovereign wobbles; then you’re flirting with the kind of bank sovereign doom loops Europe has already lived through.
So I see the majority trying to walk a middle line: keep a meaningful leverage check, but loosen it enough to free up trillions of balance sheet space. Miran is pushing the internal logic all the way to the end that if the real goal is smooth Treasury financing and deep liquidity, then the clean answer is to stop letting the leverage ratio lean on those holdings at all.
The deeper signal is that everyone involved shares the same fear of a huge refinancing wave, a softer economy, and a Treasury market that cannot afford another March 2020 moment. The disagreement is not about whether to use bank balance sheets as shock absorbers, that decision has basically been made. It’s about how much of the old armor they’re willing to strip off to make that strategy work.
My statement on the final rule on levera[...]
Offshore
EndGame Macro Stephen Miran’s Quiet Revolt And Why He Says the Fed’s Leverage Fix Doesn’t Go Far Enough Miran isn’t against giving banks capital relief. The new rule cuts the enhanced leverage buffer and trims TLAC and long term debt, opening up more balance…
ge ratio capital relief. I think we should give further attention to removal of Treasury securities and reserves from leverage ratio calcluations, since we force banks to hold these through liquidity requirements. https://t.co/umglzUrFzw - Stephen Miran tweet
www.federalreserve.gov
Statement on Enhanced Supplementary Leverage Ratio Final Rule by Governor Stephen I. Miran
The Federal Reserve Board of Governors in Washington DC.
Offshore
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WealthyReadings
$BABA will shock the market when it posts 15%+ YoY growth in Q1-26.
The market isn’t pricing this in and still believe $BABA's growth is slowing. It isn’t.
$BABA sold Inmut and Sun Art Q4-24, two businesses that generating roughly RMB 20B per quarter. Their removal from revenues makes this year’s growth look softer simply because comps include businesses that no longer exist in the group.
Adjusted for those, $BABA growth has actually been accelerating over the last three quarters: 10% → 10.7% → 15%
It’s not obvious in the numbers, but it will be once Q1-26 is compared against the first fully post-selling quarter.
Just wait for the market’s reaction.
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$BABA will shock the market when it posts 15%+ YoY growth in Q1-26.
The market isn’t pricing this in and still believe $BABA's growth is slowing. It isn’t.
$BABA sold Inmut and Sun Art Q4-24, two businesses that generating roughly RMB 20B per quarter. Their removal from revenues makes this year’s growth look softer simply because comps include businesses that no longer exist in the group.
Adjusted for those, $BABA growth has actually been accelerating over the last three quarters: 10% → 10.7% → 15%
It’s not obvious in the numbers, but it will be once Q1-26 is compared against the first fully post-selling quarter.
Just wait for the market’s reaction.
tweet
Offshore
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EndGame Macro
When a Stablecoin Outbuys Central Banks And Why Tether’s Gold Grab Actually Makes Sense
The red bar is Tether. The blue bars are countries.
This isn’t total reserves, it’s net gold buying in one quarter. Tether added about 26 tonnes of gold. The next biggest buyers were Kazakhstan and Brazil, then a string of emerging market central banks picking up much smaller amounts. In other words, for that quarter, a stablecoin issuer out bought every single central bank on the planet.
That’s wild at first glance, but if you think about the world Tether operates in, it’s not random at all.
Why a stablecoin central bank is stocking up on metal
Tether now sits in a strange place: it’s not a country, but it functions like a shadow central bank for the crypto world. It collects huge yields on its reserve portfolio, mostly short term Treasuries and cash. That pile is growing fast, and they can’t afford to keep all of it in one bucket.
Look at the macro backdrop they’re seeing…
Rates were hiked at record speed, public debt is at record levels, and there’s open talk about financial repression as the long term way out. At the same time, geopolitics has turned money into a weapon; Russia’s FX reserves getting frozen was a billboard to the rest of the world. You can see the response in official data: emerging market central banks have been quietly shifting away from Treasuries at the margin and buying gold instead. It’s the oldest hedge in the book against both inflation and sanctions risk.
Tether is just following that playbook, but with crypto flavor. If your whole business is issuing dollar IOUs outside the regulated banking system, you care a lot about two things…
1.Assets that can’t easily be frozen or haircut by a single government.
2.Assets that your users intuitively trust.
Gold fits both. A bar in a Swiss vault is harder to seize than a bank deposit at a U.S. institution. And in a community that already loves hard money narratives, our reserves include physical gold is a powerful marketing line, whether you fully believe it or not.
There’s also a straightforward product angle. Tether issues a gold backed token (XAUt), so it needs physical inventory anyway. Buying more metal doesn’t just diversify the USDT reserve; it also deepens their ability to run that whole tokenized gold business.
Why it actually makes sense in this cycle
Seen from the outside, “Tether bought more gold than every central bank” sounds like peak absurdity. Seen from their balance sheet, it’s consistent.
They’re swimming in cash from reserve income. Sovereign debt dynamics look shaky. The dollar’s hegemony is still intact but being chipped at the edges. Central banks are buying gold at the fastest pace in decades. And Tether itself lives in a legal gray zone where banking relationships can change on a headline.
In that environment, swapping a slice of T‑bills for bullion is rational. It reduces their dependence on any one jurisdiction, helps them ride the same derisk from fiat wave their users believe in, and gives them an asset that, in a worst case scenario, still has value outside the traditional system.
You can absolutely worry about transparency, concentration risk, and what it means for a private, opaque firm to be this big in the gold market. Those are real concerns.
But purely on incentives and macro, this isn’t some crazy stunt. It’s a logical move from an entity that has quietly started acting like a mid sized central bank, one that doesn’t trust the existing system enough to leave all of its chips on the table.
tweet
When a Stablecoin Outbuys Central Banks And Why Tether’s Gold Grab Actually Makes Sense
The red bar is Tether. The blue bars are countries.
This isn’t total reserves, it’s net gold buying in one quarter. Tether added about 26 tonnes of gold. The next biggest buyers were Kazakhstan and Brazil, then a string of emerging market central banks picking up much smaller amounts. In other words, for that quarter, a stablecoin issuer out bought every single central bank on the planet.
That’s wild at first glance, but if you think about the world Tether operates in, it’s not random at all.
Why a stablecoin central bank is stocking up on metal
Tether now sits in a strange place: it’s not a country, but it functions like a shadow central bank for the crypto world. It collects huge yields on its reserve portfolio, mostly short term Treasuries and cash. That pile is growing fast, and they can’t afford to keep all of it in one bucket.
Look at the macro backdrop they’re seeing…
Rates were hiked at record speed, public debt is at record levels, and there’s open talk about financial repression as the long term way out. At the same time, geopolitics has turned money into a weapon; Russia’s FX reserves getting frozen was a billboard to the rest of the world. You can see the response in official data: emerging market central banks have been quietly shifting away from Treasuries at the margin and buying gold instead. It’s the oldest hedge in the book against both inflation and sanctions risk.
Tether is just following that playbook, but with crypto flavor. If your whole business is issuing dollar IOUs outside the regulated banking system, you care a lot about two things…
1.Assets that can’t easily be frozen or haircut by a single government.
2.Assets that your users intuitively trust.
Gold fits both. A bar in a Swiss vault is harder to seize than a bank deposit at a U.S. institution. And in a community that already loves hard money narratives, our reserves include physical gold is a powerful marketing line, whether you fully believe it or not.
There’s also a straightforward product angle. Tether issues a gold backed token (XAUt), so it needs physical inventory anyway. Buying more metal doesn’t just diversify the USDT reserve; it also deepens their ability to run that whole tokenized gold business.
Why it actually makes sense in this cycle
Seen from the outside, “Tether bought more gold than every central bank” sounds like peak absurdity. Seen from their balance sheet, it’s consistent.
They’re swimming in cash from reserve income. Sovereign debt dynamics look shaky. The dollar’s hegemony is still intact but being chipped at the edges. Central banks are buying gold at the fastest pace in decades. And Tether itself lives in a legal gray zone where banking relationships can change on a headline.
In that environment, swapping a slice of T‑bills for bullion is rational. It reduces their dependence on any one jurisdiction, helps them ride the same derisk from fiat wave their users believe in, and gives them an asset that, in a worst case scenario, still has value outside the traditional system.
You can absolutely worry about transparency, concentration risk, and what it means for a private, opaque firm to be this big in the gold market. Those are real concerns.
But purely on incentives and macro, this isn’t some crazy stunt. It’s a logical move from an entity that has quietly started acting like a mid sized central bank, one that doesn’t trust the existing system enough to leave all of its chips on the table.
tweet
Offshore
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EndGame Macro
Housing’s Turn: Cooling at the Edges, Setting Up for a Jobs Driven Reset
Look past the heat map and you see a clear shift that the wild housing boom is losing altitude.
Eleven of the 20 Case Shiller cities are down year over year. The soft spots are the pandemic winners and investor markets including Phoenix, Tampa, Vegas, Seattle, San Diego, San Francisco, Denver. Many peaked 30–40 months ago and now sit 5–8% below their highs.
The steady metros are still holding up. Chicago, New York, Boston, Cleveland, Detroit never went vertical in 2020–21, and they’re still posting mid single digit gains, sitting at or near new highs.
The national 20 city index is less than 1% off peak. So on the surface this is a cooling, not a crash. But housing always moves this way: transactions freeze first, then the mix of sales changes, and only then do reported prices roll over.
How this rhymes with past cycles
Housing prices are lagging indicators. The leading pieces like purchase apps, builder sentiment, rent growth, affordability turned months ago.
This episode looks like a blend of the early 80s and the mid 2000s. Like the 80s, a huge rate shock wrecked affordability. Unlike 2006, we don’t have the same wall of teaser rate mortgages or speculative leverage, and most owners are locked into cheap long term loans, which slows forced selling.
But valuations stretched much further than in the 80s. Prices out ran incomes and rents in a big way. That gap has to close through some mix of lower prices, higher wages, and time.
Meanwhile, the stress building outside housing is hard to ignore where auto loan and card delinquencies are at or near multi decade highs, student loan delinquencies jumped when payments resumed, aggregate delinquency is rising, and recent grads are dealing with high unemployment and sliding credit scores, the future first time buyer pool is weakening, not strengthening.
Baseline with unemployment drifting higher
If you assume unemployment stays flat, you can argue for a long, mild real correction. But the more realistic lens now is that joblessness creeps higher from here. Credit is tightening, rejection rates for new credit are at record levels, and regulators are already loosening capital rules to give banks room for stress which is itself a tell about the macro path.
Under that backdrop, my base case isn’t just a soft, real terms adjustment. It’s a jobs driven reset that eventually bleeds into the safe markets too.
Nationally, I still think this plays out over years, not quarters: boomtowns and investor cities see the deepest nominal declines; the Midwest and Northeast slide later and less, but they don’t escape. As unemployment grinds up, more households in every region move from locked in and fine to can’t quite carry this anymore, especially younger owners already stretched by car, card, and student loan payments. First time buyers, with weaker credit and more delinquencies, won’t be able to clear the market at current prices.
In that environment, the gentle drift off the peak becomes a more visible move: national prices down something like 10–15% over several years, with the late cycle gains in places like New York or Boston partially given back instead of frozen in place. It still doesn’t have to look like 2008, the plumbing and leverage mix are different but it does look like a broad, grinding reset rather than a quick breather.
So yes, the most unaffordable housing market on record is cooling. Viewed through an unemployment curve that’s likely edging higher, that cooling looks less like a pause and more like the early stages of a jobs driven repricing that eventually reaches every zip code, just on a lag.
🚨 Housing shift: 11 of the 20 Case-Shiller cities saw prices fall over the past year.
The most unaffordable housing market in history is finally starting to cool. https://t.co/luJabdD8b2 - Charlie Bilello tweet
Housing’s Turn: Cooling at the Edges, Setting Up for a Jobs Driven Reset
Look past the heat map and you see a clear shift that the wild housing boom is losing altitude.
Eleven of the 20 Case Shiller cities are down year over year. The soft spots are the pandemic winners and investor markets including Phoenix, Tampa, Vegas, Seattle, San Diego, San Francisco, Denver. Many peaked 30–40 months ago and now sit 5–8% below their highs.
The steady metros are still holding up. Chicago, New York, Boston, Cleveland, Detroit never went vertical in 2020–21, and they’re still posting mid single digit gains, sitting at or near new highs.
The national 20 city index is less than 1% off peak. So on the surface this is a cooling, not a crash. But housing always moves this way: transactions freeze first, then the mix of sales changes, and only then do reported prices roll over.
How this rhymes with past cycles
Housing prices are lagging indicators. The leading pieces like purchase apps, builder sentiment, rent growth, affordability turned months ago.
This episode looks like a blend of the early 80s and the mid 2000s. Like the 80s, a huge rate shock wrecked affordability. Unlike 2006, we don’t have the same wall of teaser rate mortgages or speculative leverage, and most owners are locked into cheap long term loans, which slows forced selling.
But valuations stretched much further than in the 80s. Prices out ran incomes and rents in a big way. That gap has to close through some mix of lower prices, higher wages, and time.
Meanwhile, the stress building outside housing is hard to ignore where auto loan and card delinquencies are at or near multi decade highs, student loan delinquencies jumped when payments resumed, aggregate delinquency is rising, and recent grads are dealing with high unemployment and sliding credit scores, the future first time buyer pool is weakening, not strengthening.
Baseline with unemployment drifting higher
If you assume unemployment stays flat, you can argue for a long, mild real correction. But the more realistic lens now is that joblessness creeps higher from here. Credit is tightening, rejection rates for new credit are at record levels, and regulators are already loosening capital rules to give banks room for stress which is itself a tell about the macro path.
Under that backdrop, my base case isn’t just a soft, real terms adjustment. It’s a jobs driven reset that eventually bleeds into the safe markets too.
Nationally, I still think this plays out over years, not quarters: boomtowns and investor cities see the deepest nominal declines; the Midwest and Northeast slide later and less, but they don’t escape. As unemployment grinds up, more households in every region move from locked in and fine to can’t quite carry this anymore, especially younger owners already stretched by car, card, and student loan payments. First time buyers, with weaker credit and more delinquencies, won’t be able to clear the market at current prices.
In that environment, the gentle drift off the peak becomes a more visible move: national prices down something like 10–15% over several years, with the late cycle gains in places like New York or Boston partially given back instead of frozen in place. It still doesn’t have to look like 2008, the plumbing and leverage mix are different but it does look like a broad, grinding reset rather than a quick breather.
So yes, the most unaffordable housing market on record is cooling. Viewed through an unemployment curve that’s likely edging higher, that cooling looks less like a pause and more like the early stages of a jobs driven repricing that eventually reaches every zip code, just on a lag.
🚨 Housing shift: 11 of the 20 Case-Shiller cities saw prices fall over the past year.
The most unaffordable housing market in history is finally starting to cool. https://t.co/luJabdD8b2 - Charlie Bilello tweet
Offshore
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WealthyReadings
$TMDX keeps printing new yearly highs and is getting close to analysts’ upper targets.
Ratings follow price, not fundamentals. Analysts can't let momentum run without them, they’d look stupid otherwise.
Just a matter of time before re-ratings, justified by accelerating flight data and strong expectations for Q4.
We're going higher.
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$TMDX keeps printing new yearly highs and is getting close to analysts’ upper targets.
Ratings follow price, not fundamentals. Analysts can't let momentum run without them, they’d look stupid otherwise.
Just a matter of time before re-ratings, justified by accelerating flight data and strong expectations for Q4.
We're going higher.
tweet
Quiver Quantitative
Representative Jacobs is the 18th wealthiest member of Congress, per our estimates.
https://t.co/HWjy13y9Hx
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Representative Jacobs is the 18th wealthiest member of Congress, per our estimates.
https://t.co/HWjy13y9Hx
As one of the richest Members of Congress, if I can co-sponsor the bipartisan Restore Trust in Congress Act to ban Members of Congress (and their families) from owning and trading individual stocks, then every Member should too. Let’s pass this bill! tweet
X (formerly Twitter)
Congresswoman Sara Jacobs (@RepSaraJacobs) on X
As one of the richest Members of Congress, if I can co-sponsor the bipartisan Restore Trust in Congress Act to ban Members of Congress (and their families) from owning and trading individual stocks, then every Member should too. Let’s pass this bill!
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App Economy Insights
👀 Sneak peek at our latest report!
📊 100+ market leaders visualized. https://t.co/X84Ddnldgy
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👀 Sneak peek at our latest report!
📊 100+ market leaders visualized. https://t.co/X84Ddnldgy
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WealthyReadings
Everyone is talking about a rotation happening and we can clearly see it on the charts.
But that doesn’t mean what worked in 2025 will stop working in 2026. Tech & several other winning sectors still offer great value and potential returns.
What it means is that our focus for the next narratives has to shift. We need to start fishing where we weren’t fishing this year.
The AI trade isn’t over, far from it, but the best returns might not come from there next year - not from the obvious names at least.
New narratives are opening up, let's be ready to catch them
tweet
Everyone is talking about a rotation happening and we can clearly see it on the charts.
But that doesn’t mean what worked in 2025 will stop working in 2026. Tech & several other winning sectors still offer great value and potential returns.
What it means is that our focus for the next narratives has to shift. We need to start fishing where we weren’t fishing this year.
The AI trade isn’t over, far from it, but the best returns might not come from there next year - not from the obvious names at least.
New narratives are opening up, let's be ready to catch them
tweet