Offshore
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Fiscal.ai
Toast operates in one of the most competitive markets around and still managed to add 100,000+ new locations over the last 5 years.
Focus matters.
$TOST https://t.co/cWIJLkePPr
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Toast operates in one of the most competitive markets around and still managed to add 100,000+ new locations over the last 5 years.
Focus matters.
$TOST https://t.co/cWIJLkePPr
tweet
Offshore
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WealthyReadings
$TMDX is the best buy in the market today, has been for weeks but might not be in a few as the stock started its move.
Immune to recession fears or consumer weakness.
Immune to interest-rate swings.
Immune to tariff tantrums.
Immune to AI volatility.
A defensive asset growing 30%+ with multiple future growth verticals, transforming one of the most critical areas of modern medicine in the U.S. and soon globally, with a massive network effect and switching costs and no real competition.
You'd better learn about it before it's too late.
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$TMDX is the best buy in the market today, has been for weeks but might not be in a few as the stock started its move.
Immune to recession fears or consumer weakness.
Immune to interest-rate swings.
Immune to tariff tantrums.
Immune to AI volatility.
A defensive asset growing 30%+ with multiple future growth verticals, transforming one of the most critical areas of modern medicine in the U.S. and soon globally, with a massive network effect and switching costs and no real competition.
You'd better learn about it before it's too late.
$TMDX is one of the most interesting growth names in the med-tech sector, and one of the most interesting stocks in the entire market right now.
Here’s why 👇
🔷 The only company providing an end-to-end transplant system in the U.S., from organ recovery to transportation to transplant surgery.
🔷 Leader in organ-preservation technology with growing demand and innovative solutions.
🔷 Rising adoption of their technologies and services.
🔷 Upgrading both lung and heart platforms in FY26, with expansion into kidneys by 2028.
🔷 International expansion coming in Europe in 2026 and more regions after.
🔷 Hospitals tend to rely on specific technologies for decades once integrated into their workflow.
🔷 Revenue growth has been consistent, with multiple levers to sustain it for years.
🔷 Margins are expanding.
🔷 Valuation remains well below comparable med-tech innovators.
The bear case?
🔷 Regulations and social security systems can slow progress - innovation & expansion.
🔷 Reputation is critical in this sector and can be impacted by internal or external events.
You'll find more details in the full breakdown below, but one conclusion stands: $TMDX is one of the most innovative and transformative companies in med-tech, offering a service and product no one else does.
Question is, how long before the market finally prices in the growth story and the importance of their service and hardware in the future of transplants? tweet
Offshore
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App Economy Insights
📊 This Week in Visuals:
🛒 Walmart
📦 PDD
✅ Intuit
🔒 Palo Alto
🎯 Target
and many more!
$WMT $PDD $INTU $PANW $NTES $VEEV $TGT $LENOVO $AS $KLAR $ESTC $GLBE $BLSH
https://t.co/jcblSOwBjH
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📊 This Week in Visuals:
🛒 Walmart
📦 PDD
✅ Intuit
🔒 Palo Alto
🎯 Target
and many more!
$WMT $PDD $INTU $PANW $NTES $VEEV $TGT $LENOVO $AS $KLAR $ESTC $GLBE $BLSH
https://t.co/jcblSOwBjH
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Offshore
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WealthyReadings
Most fail to understand a key reason behind the demand for $NVDA GPUs, which isn't just “more compute.”
Hyperscallers and enterprises aren't just chasing compute, they're chasing energy efficiency.
New GPU generation delivers more compute per unit of energy. That means a data center can dramatically increase compute output without increasing its energy consumption.
The choice is pretty easy from an economic point of view.
🟩 Buy the latest, most energy-efficient GPUs.
🟥 Spend billions building new data centers and securing eew nergy capacity.
Upgrading GPUs is faster, cheaper and easier than expanding infrastructures, while also being safer and easier to maintain.
Add to this CUDA which largely improves $NVDA’s hardware lifecycles thanks to personlization, and not only do you get the most efficient compute but you also get the longest life cycles on the market.
This is a huge part of why $NVDA keeps winning. And will continue to do so.
I describe this in more depth in my latest quaterly review of the company and go through why the latest bear cases circulating on social medias are mostly noise and do not hold when paired to context and data.
Link's in bio.
tweet
Most fail to understand a key reason behind the demand for $NVDA GPUs, which isn't just “more compute.”
Hyperscallers and enterprises aren't just chasing compute, they're chasing energy efficiency.
New GPU generation delivers more compute per unit of energy. That means a data center can dramatically increase compute output without increasing its energy consumption.
The choice is pretty easy from an economic point of view.
🟩 Buy the latest, most energy-efficient GPUs.
🟥 Spend billions building new data centers and securing eew nergy capacity.
Upgrading GPUs is faster, cheaper and easier than expanding infrastructures, while also being safer and easier to maintain.
Add to this CUDA which largely improves $NVDA’s hardware lifecycles thanks to personlization, and not only do you get the most efficient compute but you also get the longest life cycles on the market.
This is a huge part of why $NVDA keeps winning. And will continue to do so.
I describe this in more depth in my latest quaterly review of the company and go through why the latest bear cases circulating on social medias are mostly noise and do not hold when paired to context and data.
Link's in bio.
tweet
Offshore
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EndGame Macro
A Freeze, A Slowdown, and A Break: Housing Is About to Show Its Real Price
This chart is showing just how strange the housing market has become. It tracks the price of new single family homes divided by the price of existing ones. Normally that ratio is comfortably above zero because new homes carry an obvious premium…they’re larger, newer, and come with warranties and builder incentives. For more than 50 years, new homes typically sold 10–20% higher, sometimes even 30–35% above existing homes.
But look at the right side…the line collapses to zero and even dips slightly negative. That means new homes are now roughly the same price or a bit cheaper than existing ones. We haven’t seen that dynamic since the early 1970s.
The reasons aren’t mysterious. Rate lock has frozen existing supply and millions of owners with 2–3% mortgages refuse to list unless they’re forced to. That keeps existing inventory tight and artificially supports prices. Builders, meanwhile, have no such luxury they need cash flow. So they’re cutting prices, shrinking square footage, buying down mortgage rates, and throwing in incentives. They’re adjusting to reality in a way homeowners can’t. And because so few existing homes are listed, the ones that do hit the market tend to skew higher end, which pushes up the average existing home price.
So this convergence doesn’t mean housing is cheap, it means new construction has repriced, while existing home prices are held aloft by low rate inertia and thin supply.
The Labor Market Is the Real Trigger
What comes next depends on jobs. A lot of stretched buyers are still hanging on, but unemployment is the swing factor. Psychology always turns before the data. People don’t need to lose their job to get nervous…hearing about layoffs, pausing raises, and hiring freezes is enough to pull them back. Even if mortgage rates fall, the willingness to take on a 30 year debt load evaporates when job security feels fragile.
And as unemployment rises, forced sellers start to appear. Suddenly the market gets a wave of people who have to sell…relocations, divorces, investors needing liquidity, borrowers who can’t carry the payment. That’s what breaks the no inventory illusion. Frozen supply begins to thaw under stress, and that’s when existing home prices finally face real downward pressure. Rate lock matters until negative cash flow matters more.
All of this unfolds while monetary policy lags. There’s a popular idea that once the Fed cuts rates or restarts QE, housing demand will explode. But that’s not how cycles work. Looser policy hits financial markets immediately, but the real economy absorbs it slowly and usually over 18–24 months. Historically, the Fed cuts into weakness, not after it resolves. So you often end up with a strange period where mortgage rates fall, but buyers don’t reappear because job security and confidence are deteriorating faster than policy can help.
That’s the backdrop this chart is hinting at. New homes have already bent to reality. Existing homes haven’t repriced, they’ve just stopped trading. As unemployment rises and psychology turns, that foundation gets tested.
The last time this ratio hovered near zero was the 1970s a decade defined by economic stress and a long, grinding adjustment in real home values. You don’t need that entire decade repeated for the rhyme to hold. A slower economy, rising layoffs, and nervous buyers are enough.
If that’s where we’re headed, the danger isn’t that prices stay too high forever. It’s that once income confidence cracks, prices move the only way they can…down in real terms first, and if the labor damage is deep enough, down in nominal terms too, even with lower mortgage rates.
See the last times throughout history the prices have converged.
DISCUSS!
“For the first time in more than 50 years, the price of a new single-family home is lower than the average price of an existing single-family home, see chart below.”
cc @m3_melody
@apolloglobal [...]
A Freeze, A Slowdown, and A Break: Housing Is About to Show Its Real Price
This chart is showing just how strange the housing market has become. It tracks the price of new single family homes divided by the price of existing ones. Normally that ratio is comfortably above zero because new homes carry an obvious premium…they’re larger, newer, and come with warranties and builder incentives. For more than 50 years, new homes typically sold 10–20% higher, sometimes even 30–35% above existing homes.
But look at the right side…the line collapses to zero and even dips slightly negative. That means new homes are now roughly the same price or a bit cheaper than existing ones. We haven’t seen that dynamic since the early 1970s.
The reasons aren’t mysterious. Rate lock has frozen existing supply and millions of owners with 2–3% mortgages refuse to list unless they’re forced to. That keeps existing inventory tight and artificially supports prices. Builders, meanwhile, have no such luxury they need cash flow. So they’re cutting prices, shrinking square footage, buying down mortgage rates, and throwing in incentives. They’re adjusting to reality in a way homeowners can’t. And because so few existing homes are listed, the ones that do hit the market tend to skew higher end, which pushes up the average existing home price.
So this convergence doesn’t mean housing is cheap, it means new construction has repriced, while existing home prices are held aloft by low rate inertia and thin supply.
The Labor Market Is the Real Trigger
What comes next depends on jobs. A lot of stretched buyers are still hanging on, but unemployment is the swing factor. Psychology always turns before the data. People don’t need to lose their job to get nervous…hearing about layoffs, pausing raises, and hiring freezes is enough to pull them back. Even if mortgage rates fall, the willingness to take on a 30 year debt load evaporates when job security feels fragile.
And as unemployment rises, forced sellers start to appear. Suddenly the market gets a wave of people who have to sell…relocations, divorces, investors needing liquidity, borrowers who can’t carry the payment. That’s what breaks the no inventory illusion. Frozen supply begins to thaw under stress, and that’s when existing home prices finally face real downward pressure. Rate lock matters until negative cash flow matters more.
All of this unfolds while monetary policy lags. There’s a popular idea that once the Fed cuts rates or restarts QE, housing demand will explode. But that’s not how cycles work. Looser policy hits financial markets immediately, but the real economy absorbs it slowly and usually over 18–24 months. Historically, the Fed cuts into weakness, not after it resolves. So you often end up with a strange period where mortgage rates fall, but buyers don’t reappear because job security and confidence are deteriorating faster than policy can help.
That’s the backdrop this chart is hinting at. New homes have already bent to reality. Existing homes haven’t repriced, they’ve just stopped trading. As unemployment rises and psychology turns, that foundation gets tested.
The last time this ratio hovered near zero was the 1970s a decade defined by economic stress and a long, grinding adjustment in real home values. You don’t need that entire decade repeated for the rhyme to hold. A slower economy, rising layoffs, and nervous buyers are enough.
If that’s where we’re headed, the danger isn’t that prices stay too high forever. It’s that once income confidence cracks, prices move the only way they can…down in real terms first, and if the labor damage is deep enough, down in nominal terms too, even with lower mortgage rates.
See the last times throughout history the prices have converged.
DISCUSS!
“For the first time in more than 50 years, the price of a new single-family home is lower than the average price of an existing single-family home, see chart below.”
cc @m3_melody
@apolloglobal [...]
Offshore
EndGame Macro A Freeze, A Slowdown, and A Break: Housing Is About to Show Its Real Price This chart is showing just how strange the housing market has become. It tracks the price of new single family homes divided by the price of existing ones. Normally that…
https://t.co/tJt6ymZZQT - Danielle DiMartino Booth tweet
Offshore
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Fiscal.ai
How much would Amazon Web Services be worth on its own?
Revenue: $122B, +20% YoY
Operating Income: $44B
$AMZN https://t.co/v3FC1OQRIz
tweet
How much would Amazon Web Services be worth on its own?
Revenue: $122B, +20% YoY
Operating Income: $44B
$AMZN https://t.co/v3FC1OQRIz
tweet
Offshore
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EndGame Macro
When Oil Gets Historically Cheap, Pain Usually Follows Then a Spike.
This is about the price of oil relative to the amount of money in the system. It takes the nominal price of crude and divides it by U.S. M2 money supply. In plain language…“How expensive is oil once you account for how many dollars we’ve printed?”
When you look at it that way, you get a very different picture. In nominal terms, oil doesn’t look cheap. But adjusted for money supply, it’s sitting right back near the historically cheap zone, the same kind of levels we saw after major downturns or periods of severe underinvestment. You don’t need to obsess about the exact formula to get the point…oil hasn’t kept up with the massive monetary expansion of the last decade. In real terms, it’s lagging everything else.
That’s why Tavi is saying what he’s saying. Relative to the ocean of dollars we’ve created, oil is one of the few things that hasn’t inflated.
What Happens When Prices Sit Below Profitability
Here’s the part people underestimate, the oil industry can handle volatility, but it can’t handle long periods below the break even range. And for most U.S. producers, the sustainable zone is roughly $55–$70 a barrel, depending on the basin and the balance sheet.
When prices hang out below that level for too long, the entire ecosystem starts to contract…
•Drilling slows because new wells no longer make sense.
•Shale decline curves quietly pull existing production lower.
•Smaller, heavily indebted operators start to struggle.
•Service companies…the rigs, the frack crews, the logistics lay off workers or mothball equipment.
Oil supply doesn’t collapse overnight, it just erodes day by day while nobody’s paying attention.
That’s what makes the lag so dangerous. It takes months to slow investment… and months to years to turn it back on. Even in fast cycle U.S. shale, getting rigs, crews, sand, infrastructure, and financing lined up takes real time. Six months at the absolute best and often closer to a year. For offshore or conventional fields, it can be several years before new supply shows up.
So when the world finally realizes that demand is picking back up or when a geopolitical shock hits, the system simply can’t respond fast enough. And that’s when prices don’t just rise… they spike.
We’ve seen this before in the late ’90s, post 2008, again after the 2014–2016 shale bust. Low prices encourage underinvestment. Underinvestment shrinks spare capacity. Then any modest rebound in demand creates a squeeze. And because supply can’t respond in real time, price does all the adjusting.
Right now we have all the ingredients for that setup with oil cheap in real terms, investment constrained, political pressure against drilling, and a global system that has much less cushion than it did ten years ago.
Oil doesn’t stay this cheap in real terms, without something giving. And historically, what gives is supply… followed by prices ripping higher when the lag finally catches up.
tweet
When Oil Gets Historically Cheap, Pain Usually Follows Then a Spike.
This is about the price of oil relative to the amount of money in the system. It takes the nominal price of crude and divides it by U.S. M2 money supply. In plain language…“How expensive is oil once you account for how many dollars we’ve printed?”
When you look at it that way, you get a very different picture. In nominal terms, oil doesn’t look cheap. But adjusted for money supply, it’s sitting right back near the historically cheap zone, the same kind of levels we saw after major downturns or periods of severe underinvestment. You don’t need to obsess about the exact formula to get the point…oil hasn’t kept up with the massive monetary expansion of the last decade. In real terms, it’s lagging everything else.
That’s why Tavi is saying what he’s saying. Relative to the ocean of dollars we’ve created, oil is one of the few things that hasn’t inflated.
What Happens When Prices Sit Below Profitability
Here’s the part people underestimate, the oil industry can handle volatility, but it can’t handle long periods below the break even range. And for most U.S. producers, the sustainable zone is roughly $55–$70 a barrel, depending on the basin and the balance sheet.
When prices hang out below that level for too long, the entire ecosystem starts to contract…
•Drilling slows because new wells no longer make sense.
•Shale decline curves quietly pull existing production lower.
•Smaller, heavily indebted operators start to struggle.
•Service companies…the rigs, the frack crews, the logistics lay off workers or mothball equipment.
Oil supply doesn’t collapse overnight, it just erodes day by day while nobody’s paying attention.
That’s what makes the lag so dangerous. It takes months to slow investment… and months to years to turn it back on. Even in fast cycle U.S. shale, getting rigs, crews, sand, infrastructure, and financing lined up takes real time. Six months at the absolute best and often closer to a year. For offshore or conventional fields, it can be several years before new supply shows up.
So when the world finally realizes that demand is picking back up or when a geopolitical shock hits, the system simply can’t respond fast enough. And that’s when prices don’t just rise… they spike.
We’ve seen this before in the late ’90s, post 2008, again after the 2014–2016 shale bust. Low prices encourage underinvestment. Underinvestment shrinks spare capacity. Then any modest rebound in demand creates a squeeze. And because supply can’t respond in real time, price does all the adjusting.
Right now we have all the ingredients for that setup with oil cheap in real terms, investment constrained, political pressure against drilling, and a global system that has much less cushion than it did ten years ago.
Oil doesn’t stay this cheap in real terms, without something giving. And historically, what gives is supply… followed by prices ripping higher when the lag finally catches up.
Oil is currently near its cheapest levels in history when measured against money supply.
Each time we reach this point, investors come up with reasons why “this time is different” and why prices might stay depressed — but historically, that narrative has never held up.
Oil is likely one of the most undervalued commodities in the world today, in my view. tweet
Offshore
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EndGame Macro
When the Biggest Meatpacker Starts Cutting Capacity, You Know the Cycle Has Turned
What Tyson is doing here isn’t a one off business decision, it’s a signal that the entire cattle and beef cycle has entered a painful stage. Tyson’s Lexington, Nebraska plant handles about 5% of total U.S. slaughter capacity, yet it’s being shut down because cattle supplies have fallen to their lowest level in nearly 75 years.
When supplies get this tight, packers like Tyson are forced to outbid each other for every animal. Ranchers finally have leverage; processors are the ones getting squeezed. Tyson’s beef division has already posted over $700M in losses across the last two fiscal years, and they’re projecting another $400M–$600M loss for 2026.
A plant that big can’t run profitably in that environment, especially when the drought driven herd liquidation that caused this shortage will take years to reverse. Closing Lexington early is Tyson basically admitting that Cattle won’t be plentiful anytime soon, so they need to shrink now rather than bleed slowly.
When Cycles Get Tight, Everything Downstream Breaks
Beef processing is brutally cyclical. During COVID, packers made record profits because labor shortages limited output and meat prices exploded. But those margins hid the structural damage happening upstream: drought destroyed pasture, feed costs soared, and ranchers culled their herds.
Now we’re living with the consequences. Cattle supply is scarce. Feedlot operators have fewer animals. Packers are fighting over limited inventory. And a plant that once ran 5,000 head per day is now running below capacity. Once that happens, the economics flip, a giant facility becomes a liability.
The local impact is enormous. Lexington is a town of about 10,000 people; losing a 3,200 worker anchor employer will hit everything from feedyards to grocery stores. Tyson knows this, which is why their statements emphasized the impact on team members and communities. But the math is what it is.
Policy Made a Tight Cycle Even Tighter
Layer policy over this and the situation gets even messier.
Tariffs on Canadian and Mexican beef raised costs for U.S. processors. Retaliatory tariffs from countries like Vietnam and Thailand cut into export markets. Meanwhile, the White House accused packers of manipulating beef prices and pushed to increase imports to bring consumer prices down, all while packers were already paying record high cattle costs.
It’s a contradiction…the government wants cheaper beef for consumers, but it has simultaneously made processors’ cost structure worse, reduced their export options, and created more volatility in supply chains.
Tyson isn’t closing plants because demand is weak. They’re closing because margin pressure, policy pressure, and supply pressure are hitting all at once.
This Is What a Commodity Crunch Looks Like
This is the classic cattle cycle playing out in real time. Years of drought and underinvestment shrink supply, the shortage forces packers to pay up, losses mount, and eventually capacity gets shuttered. And because cattle take years to grow, you can’t fix it quickly. The pain always shows up downstream first…at the processors, then in rural communities, and eventually in consumer prices.
If anything, shutting a plant this large before 2026 tells you Tyson expects the worst of the shortage hasn’t even hit yet. The herd will rebuild, but slowly. The market will rebalance, but not tomorrow. And when supply finally returns, it will do so unevenly with fewer plants left standing to process it.
This is the U.S. beef supply chain signaling that a multi year scarcity cycle is underway and the consequences will ripple through the entire system.
Exclusive: Tyson Foods, America’s largest meat supplier, is planning to close one of its largest beef-processing plants in Nebraska at a time when a cattle shortage in the U.S. squeezes meatpacking companies https://t.co/QcaowlaCGz - The Wall Street Journal tweet
When the Biggest Meatpacker Starts Cutting Capacity, You Know the Cycle Has Turned
What Tyson is doing here isn’t a one off business decision, it’s a signal that the entire cattle and beef cycle has entered a painful stage. Tyson’s Lexington, Nebraska plant handles about 5% of total U.S. slaughter capacity, yet it’s being shut down because cattle supplies have fallen to their lowest level in nearly 75 years.
When supplies get this tight, packers like Tyson are forced to outbid each other for every animal. Ranchers finally have leverage; processors are the ones getting squeezed. Tyson’s beef division has already posted over $700M in losses across the last two fiscal years, and they’re projecting another $400M–$600M loss for 2026.
A plant that big can’t run profitably in that environment, especially when the drought driven herd liquidation that caused this shortage will take years to reverse. Closing Lexington early is Tyson basically admitting that Cattle won’t be plentiful anytime soon, so they need to shrink now rather than bleed slowly.
When Cycles Get Tight, Everything Downstream Breaks
Beef processing is brutally cyclical. During COVID, packers made record profits because labor shortages limited output and meat prices exploded. But those margins hid the structural damage happening upstream: drought destroyed pasture, feed costs soared, and ranchers culled their herds.
Now we’re living with the consequences. Cattle supply is scarce. Feedlot operators have fewer animals. Packers are fighting over limited inventory. And a plant that once ran 5,000 head per day is now running below capacity. Once that happens, the economics flip, a giant facility becomes a liability.
The local impact is enormous. Lexington is a town of about 10,000 people; losing a 3,200 worker anchor employer will hit everything from feedyards to grocery stores. Tyson knows this, which is why their statements emphasized the impact on team members and communities. But the math is what it is.
Policy Made a Tight Cycle Even Tighter
Layer policy over this and the situation gets even messier.
Tariffs on Canadian and Mexican beef raised costs for U.S. processors. Retaliatory tariffs from countries like Vietnam and Thailand cut into export markets. Meanwhile, the White House accused packers of manipulating beef prices and pushed to increase imports to bring consumer prices down, all while packers were already paying record high cattle costs.
It’s a contradiction…the government wants cheaper beef for consumers, but it has simultaneously made processors’ cost structure worse, reduced their export options, and created more volatility in supply chains.
Tyson isn’t closing plants because demand is weak. They’re closing because margin pressure, policy pressure, and supply pressure are hitting all at once.
This Is What a Commodity Crunch Looks Like
This is the classic cattle cycle playing out in real time. Years of drought and underinvestment shrink supply, the shortage forces packers to pay up, losses mount, and eventually capacity gets shuttered. And because cattle take years to grow, you can’t fix it quickly. The pain always shows up downstream first…at the processors, then in rural communities, and eventually in consumer prices.
If anything, shutting a plant this large before 2026 tells you Tyson expects the worst of the shortage hasn’t even hit yet. The herd will rebuild, but slowly. The market will rebalance, but not tomorrow. And when supply finally returns, it will do so unevenly with fewer plants left standing to process it.
This is the U.S. beef supply chain signaling that a multi year scarcity cycle is underway and the consequences will ripple through the entire system.
Exclusive: Tyson Foods, America’s largest meat supplier, is planning to close one of its largest beef-processing plants in Nebraska at a time when a cattle shortage in the U.S. squeezes meatpacking companies https://t.co/QcaowlaCGz - The Wall Street Journal tweet