Offshore
ss is in decline, but it may be incentivized, by money or fame, to make big bets (acquisitions, for example), with low odds, hoping for a hit. While the owners of these businesses lose much of the time, the managers who get hits become superstars (and get…
strengths: A company that is in decline may have fewer moats than it used to, but it can still hold on to its remaining strengths that draw on them to fight decline. Thus, Intel, in spite of its troubles in recent years, has technological strengths (people, patents) that may be under utilized right now, and if redirected, could add value. Starbucks remains among the most recognized restaurant brands in the world, but Walgreens in spite of its ubiquity in the United States, has almost no differentiating advantages.
3.
Governance: The decisions on what a declining firm should do, in the face of decline, are not made by its owners, but by its managers. If managers have enough skin in the game, i.e., equity stakes in the company, their decisions will be often very different than if they do not. In fact, in many companies with dispersed shareholding, management incentives (on compensation and recognition) encourage decision makers to go for long-shot bets, since they benefit significantly (personally) if these bets pay off and the downside is funded by other people's money.
4.
Investors: With publicly traded companies, it is the investors who ultimately become the wild card, determining time horizon and feasible options for the company. To the extent that the investors in a declining company want quick payoffs, there will be pressure for companies to accept aging, and shrink or liquidate; that is what private equity investors with enough clout bring to the table. In contrast, if the investors in a declining company have much longer time horizons and see benefits from a turnaround, you are more likely to see revamps and renewals. All three of the companies in our mix are institutionally held, and even at Starbucks, Howard Schultz owns less than 2% of the shares. and his influence comes more from his standing as founder and visionary than from his shareholding.
5.
External factors: Companies do not operate in vacuums, and capital markets and governments can become determinants of what they do, when faced with decline. In general, companies that operate in liquid capital markets, where there are multiple paths to raise capital, have more options than companies than operate in markets where capital is scare or difficult to raise. Governments too can play a role, as we saw in the aftermath of the 2008 crisis, when help (and funding) flowed to companies that were too large to fail, and that we see continually in businesses like the airlines, where even the most damaged airline companies are allowed to limp along.
6.
Luck: Much as we would like to believe that our fates are in our own hands, the truth is that even the best-thought through response to decline needs a hefty dose of luck to succeed.
In the figure below, I summarize the discussion from this section, looking at both the choices that companies can make, and the determinants:
<picturehttps://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F0d78d22a-b4f3-473d-ae88-ddb8c4577739_751x572.heic
<svg<polyline<polyline<line<line
With this framework in place, I am going to try to make my best judgments (which you may disagree with) on what the three companies highlighted in this post should do, and how they will play out for me, as an investor:
1.
Intel: It is my view that Intel's problems stem largely from too much me-too-ism and aspiring for growth levels that they cannot reach. On both Ai and the chip manufacturing business, Intel is going up against competition (Nvidia on AI and TSMC on manufacturing) that has a clear lead and significant competitive advantages. However, the market is large enough and has sufficient growth for Intel to find a place in both, but n[...]
3.
Governance: The decisions on what a declining firm should do, in the face of decline, are not made by its owners, but by its managers. If managers have enough skin in the game, i.e., equity stakes in the company, their decisions will be often very different than if they do not. In fact, in many companies with dispersed shareholding, management incentives (on compensation and recognition) encourage decision makers to go for long-shot bets, since they benefit significantly (personally) if these bets pay off and the downside is funded by other people's money.
4.
Investors: With publicly traded companies, it is the investors who ultimately become the wild card, determining time horizon and feasible options for the company. To the extent that the investors in a declining company want quick payoffs, there will be pressure for companies to accept aging, and shrink or liquidate; that is what private equity investors with enough clout bring to the table. In contrast, if the investors in a declining company have much longer time horizons and see benefits from a turnaround, you are more likely to see revamps and renewals. All three of the companies in our mix are institutionally held, and even at Starbucks, Howard Schultz owns less than 2% of the shares. and his influence comes more from his standing as founder and visionary than from his shareholding.
5.
External factors: Companies do not operate in vacuums, and capital markets and governments can become determinants of what they do, when faced with decline. In general, companies that operate in liquid capital markets, where there are multiple paths to raise capital, have more options than companies than operate in markets where capital is scare or difficult to raise. Governments too can play a role, as we saw in the aftermath of the 2008 crisis, when help (and funding) flowed to companies that were too large to fail, and that we see continually in businesses like the airlines, where even the most damaged airline companies are allowed to limp along.
6.
Luck: Much as we would like to believe that our fates are in our own hands, the truth is that even the best-thought through response to decline needs a hefty dose of luck to succeed.
In the figure below, I summarize the discussion from this section, looking at both the choices that companies can make, and the determinants:
<picturehttps://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F0d78d22a-b4f3-473d-ae88-ddb8c4577739_751x572.heic
<svg<polyline<polyline<line<line
With this framework in place, I am going to try to make my best judgments (which you may disagree with) on what the three companies highlighted in this post should do, and how they will play out for me, as an investor:
1.
Intel: It is my view that Intel's problems stem largely from too much me-too-ism and aspiring for growth levels that they cannot reach. On both Ai and the chip manufacturing business, Intel is going up against competition (Nvidia on AI and TSMC on manufacturing) that has a clear lead and significant competitive advantages. However, the market is large enough and has sufficient growth for Intel to find a place in both, but n[...]
Offshore
Photo
Stock Analysis Compilation
Baron Capital on Park Systems $140860 KS
Thesis: Park Systems’ leadership in AFM technology positions it for substantial growth as semiconductor inspections become more complex and critical
(Extract from their Q2 letter) https://t.co/yWi84VBTEg
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Baron Capital on Park Systems $140860 KS
Thesis: Park Systems’ leadership in AFM technology positions it for substantial growth as semiconductor inspections become more complex and critical
(Extract from their Q2 letter) https://t.co/yWi84VBTEg
tweet
Offshore
Photo
Dimitry Nakhla | Babylon Capital®
A sober valuation analysis on $GOOG 🧘🏽♂️
•NTM P/E Ratio: 18.63x
•10-Year Mean: 24.56x
•NTM FCF Yield: 4.59%
•10-Year Mean: 4.34%
As you can see, $GOOG appears to be trading below fair value
Going forward, investors can receive ~31% MORE in earnings per share & ~6% MORE in FCF per share 🧠***
Before we get into valuation, let’s take a look at why $GOOG is a great business
BALANCE SHEET✅
•Cash & Short-Term Inv: $100.73B
•Long-Term Debt: $11.88B
$GOOG has a strong balance sheet, an AA+ S&P Credit Rating & 303x FFO Interest Coverage
RETURN ON CAPITAL✅
•2019: 16.4%
•2020: 16.2%
•2021: 27.6%
•2022: 26.1%
•2023: 28.1%
•LTM: 30.9%
RETURN ON EQUITY✅
•2019: 18.1%
•2020: 19.0%
•2021: 32.1%
•2022: 23.6%
•2023: 27.4%
•LTM: 30.9%
$GOOG has strong return metrics, highlighting the financial efficiency of the business
REVENUES✅
•2013: $55.52B
•2023: $307.39
•CAGR: 18.66%
FREE CASH FLOW✅
•2013: $11.30B
•2023: $69.50B
•CAGR: 19.91%
NORMALIZED EPS✅
•2013: $2.19
•2023: $5.80
•CAGR: 10.22%
SHARE BUYBACKS✅
•2018 Shares Outstanding: 14.07B
•LTM Shares Outstanding: 12.58B
By reducing its shares outstanding ~10.5%, $GOOG increased its EPS by ~11.7% (assuming 0 growth)
MARGINS✅
•LTM Gross Margins: 57.6%
•LTM Operating Margins: 31.0%
•LTM Net Income Margins: 26.7%
***NOW TO VALUATION 🧠
As stated above, investors can expect to receive ~31% MORE in EPS & ~16% MORE in FCF per share
Using Benjamin Graham’s 2G rule of thumb, $GOOG has to grow earnings at a 9.32% CAGR over the next several years to justify its valuation
Today, analysts anticipate 2024 - 2026 EPS growth over the next few years to be more than the (9.32%) required growth rate:
2024E: $7.63 (31.5% YoY) *FY Dec
2025E: $8.69 (14.0% YoY)
2026E: $9.97 (14.8% YoY)
$GOOG has an excellent track record of meeting analyst estimates ~2 years out, so let’s assume $GOOG ends 2026 with $9.97 in EPS & see its CAGR potential assuming different multiples
23x P/E: $229.31💵 … ~20.5% CAGR
22x P/E: $219.34💵 … ~18.3% CAGR
21x P/E: $209.37💵 … ~16.0% CAGR
20x P/E: $199.40💵 … ~13.6% CAGR
19x P/E: $189.43💵 … ~11.2% CAGR
As you can see, $GOOG appears to have attractive return potential EVEN if we assume >19x earnings (a multiple well below its 5-year & 10-year mean)
At >20x earnings, $GOOG CAGR potential is excellent & it’s not unreasonable for the business to even trade for ~23x (given its growth rate, moat, balance sheet, & exemplary capital allocation)
Today at $149.50💵 $GOOG appears to be a strong consideration for investment
#stocks #investing $GOOGL
___
𝐃𝐈𝐒𝐂𝐋𝐎𝐒𝐔𝐑𝐄‼️: 𝐓𝐡𝐢𝐬 𝐢𝐬 𝐍𝐎𝐓 𝐈𝐧𝐯𝐞𝐬𝐭𝐦𝐞𝐧𝐭 𝐀𝐝𝐯𝐢𝐜𝐞. 𝐁𝐚𝐛𝐲𝐥𝐨𝐧 𝐂𝐚𝐩𝐢𝐭𝐚𝐥® 𝐚𝐧𝐝 𝐢𝐭𝐬 𝐫𝐞𝐩𝐫𝐞𝐬𝐞𝐧𝐭𝐚𝐭𝐢𝐯𝐞𝐬 𝐦𝐚𝐲 𝐡𝐚𝐯𝐞 𝐩𝐨𝐬𝐢𝐭𝐢𝐨𝐧𝐬 𝐢𝐧 𝐭𝐡𝐞 𝐬𝐞𝐜𝐮𝐫𝐢𝐭𝐢𝐞𝐬 𝐝𝐢𝐬𝐜𝐮𝐬𝐬𝐞𝐝 𝐢𝐧 𝐭𝐡𝐢𝐬 𝐭𝐰𝐞𝐞𝐭.
𝐓𝐡𝐞 𝐢𝐧𝐟𝐨𝐫𝐦𝐚𝐭𝐢𝐨𝐧 𝐜𝐨𝐧𝐭𝐚𝐢𝐧𝐞𝐝 𝐢𝐧 𝐭𝐡𝐢𝐬 𝐭𝐰𝐞𝐞𝐭 𝐢𝐬 𝐢𝐧𝐭𝐞𝐧𝐝𝐞𝐝 𝐟𝐨𝐫 𝐢𝐧𝐟𝐨𝐫𝐦𝐚𝐭𝐢𝐨𝐧𝐚𝐥 𝐩𝐮𝐫𝐩𝐨𝐬𝐞𝐬 𝐨𝐧𝐥𝐲 𝐚𝐧𝐝 𝐬𝐡𝐨𝐮𝐥𝐝 𝐧𝐨𝐭 𝐛𝐞 𝐜𝐨𝐧𝐬𝐭𝐫𝐮𝐞𝐝 𝐚𝐬 𝐢𝐧𝐯𝐞𝐬𝐭𝐦𝐞𝐧𝐭 𝐚𝐝𝐯𝐢𝐜𝐞 𝐭𝐨 𝐦𝐞𝐞𝐭 𝐭𝐡𝐞 𝐬𝐩𝐞𝐜𝐢𝐟𝐢𝐜 𝐧𝐞𝐞𝐝𝐬 𝐨𝐟 𝐚𝐧𝐲 𝐢𝐧𝐝𝐢𝐯𝐢𝐝𝐮𝐚𝐥 𝐨𝐫 𝐬𝐢𝐭𝐮𝐚𝐭𝐢𝐨𝐧. 𝐏𝐚𝐬𝐭 𝐩𝐞𝐫𝐟𝐨𝐫𝐦𝐚𝐧𝐜𝐞 𝐢𝐬 𝐧𝐨 𝐠𝐮𝐚𝐫𝐚𝐧𝐭𝐞𝐞 𝐨𝐟 𝐟𝐮𝐭𝐮𝐫𝐞 𝐫𝐞𝐬𝐮𝐥𝐭𝐬.
𝐈𝐧𝐟𝐨𝐫𝐦𝐚𝐭𝐢𝐨𝐧 𝐜𝐨𝐧𝐭𝐚𝐢𝐧𝐞𝐝 𝐢𝐧 𝐭𝐡𝐢𝐬 𝐭𝐰𝐞𝐞𝐭 𝐡𝐚𝐬 𝐛𝐞𝐞𝐧 𝐨𝐛𝐭𝐚𝐢𝐧𝐞𝐝 𝐟𝐫𝐨𝐦 𝐬𝐨𝐮𝐫𝐜𝐞𝐬 𝐛𝐞𝐥𝐢𝐞𝐯𝐞𝐝 𝐭𝐨 𝐛𝐞 𝐫𝐞𝐥𝐢𝐚𝐛𝐥𝐞, 𝐛𝐮𝐭 𝐢𝐬 𝐧𝐨𝐭 𝐠𝐮𝐚𝐫𝐚𝐧𝐭𝐞𝐞𝐝 𝐚𝐬 𝐭𝐨 𝐜𝐨𝐦𝐩𝐥𝐞𝐭𝐞𝐧𝐞𝐬𝐬 𝐨𝐫 𝐚𝐜𝐜𝐮𝐫𝐚𝐜𝐲.
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A sober valuation analysis on $GOOG 🧘🏽♂️
•NTM P/E Ratio: 18.63x
•10-Year Mean: 24.56x
•NTM FCF Yield: 4.59%
•10-Year Mean: 4.34%
As you can see, $GOOG appears to be trading below fair value
Going forward, investors can receive ~31% MORE in earnings per share & ~6% MORE in FCF per share 🧠***
Before we get into valuation, let’s take a look at why $GOOG is a great business
BALANCE SHEET✅
•Cash & Short-Term Inv: $100.73B
•Long-Term Debt: $11.88B
$GOOG has a strong balance sheet, an AA+ S&P Credit Rating & 303x FFO Interest Coverage
RETURN ON CAPITAL✅
•2019: 16.4%
•2020: 16.2%
•2021: 27.6%
•2022: 26.1%
•2023: 28.1%
•LTM: 30.9%
RETURN ON EQUITY✅
•2019: 18.1%
•2020: 19.0%
•2021: 32.1%
•2022: 23.6%
•2023: 27.4%
•LTM: 30.9%
$GOOG has strong return metrics, highlighting the financial efficiency of the business
REVENUES✅
•2013: $55.52B
•2023: $307.39
•CAGR: 18.66%
FREE CASH FLOW✅
•2013: $11.30B
•2023: $69.50B
•CAGR: 19.91%
NORMALIZED EPS✅
•2013: $2.19
•2023: $5.80
•CAGR: 10.22%
SHARE BUYBACKS✅
•2018 Shares Outstanding: 14.07B
•LTM Shares Outstanding: 12.58B
By reducing its shares outstanding ~10.5%, $GOOG increased its EPS by ~11.7% (assuming 0 growth)
MARGINS✅
•LTM Gross Margins: 57.6%
•LTM Operating Margins: 31.0%
•LTM Net Income Margins: 26.7%
***NOW TO VALUATION 🧠
As stated above, investors can expect to receive ~31% MORE in EPS & ~16% MORE in FCF per share
Using Benjamin Graham’s 2G rule of thumb, $GOOG has to grow earnings at a 9.32% CAGR over the next several years to justify its valuation
Today, analysts anticipate 2024 - 2026 EPS growth over the next few years to be more than the (9.32%) required growth rate:
2024E: $7.63 (31.5% YoY) *FY Dec
2025E: $8.69 (14.0% YoY)
2026E: $9.97 (14.8% YoY)
$GOOG has an excellent track record of meeting analyst estimates ~2 years out, so let’s assume $GOOG ends 2026 with $9.97 in EPS & see its CAGR potential assuming different multiples
23x P/E: $229.31💵 … ~20.5% CAGR
22x P/E: $219.34💵 … ~18.3% CAGR
21x P/E: $209.37💵 … ~16.0% CAGR
20x P/E: $199.40💵 … ~13.6% CAGR
19x P/E: $189.43💵 … ~11.2% CAGR
As you can see, $GOOG appears to have attractive return potential EVEN if we assume >19x earnings (a multiple well below its 5-year & 10-year mean)
At >20x earnings, $GOOG CAGR potential is excellent & it’s not unreasonable for the business to even trade for ~23x (given its growth rate, moat, balance sheet, & exemplary capital allocation)
Today at $149.50💵 $GOOG appears to be a strong consideration for investment
#stocks #investing $GOOGL
___
𝐃𝐈𝐒𝐂𝐋𝐎𝐒𝐔𝐑𝐄‼️: 𝐓𝐡𝐢𝐬 𝐢𝐬 𝐍𝐎𝐓 𝐈𝐧𝐯𝐞𝐬𝐭𝐦𝐞𝐧𝐭 𝐀𝐝𝐯𝐢𝐜𝐞. 𝐁𝐚𝐛𝐲𝐥𝐨𝐧 𝐂𝐚𝐩𝐢𝐭𝐚𝐥® 𝐚𝐧𝐝 𝐢𝐭𝐬 𝐫𝐞𝐩𝐫𝐞𝐬𝐞𝐧𝐭𝐚𝐭𝐢𝐯𝐞𝐬 𝐦𝐚𝐲 𝐡𝐚𝐯𝐞 𝐩𝐨𝐬𝐢𝐭𝐢𝐨𝐧𝐬 𝐢𝐧 𝐭𝐡𝐞 𝐬𝐞𝐜𝐮𝐫𝐢𝐭𝐢𝐞𝐬 𝐝𝐢𝐬𝐜𝐮𝐬𝐬𝐞𝐝 𝐢𝐧 𝐭𝐡𝐢𝐬 𝐭𝐰𝐞𝐞𝐭.
𝐓𝐡𝐞 𝐢𝐧𝐟𝐨𝐫𝐦𝐚𝐭𝐢𝐨𝐧 𝐜𝐨𝐧𝐭𝐚𝐢𝐧𝐞𝐝 𝐢𝐧 𝐭𝐡𝐢𝐬 𝐭𝐰𝐞𝐞𝐭 𝐢𝐬 𝐢𝐧𝐭𝐞𝐧𝐝𝐞𝐝 𝐟𝐨𝐫 𝐢𝐧𝐟𝐨𝐫𝐦𝐚𝐭𝐢𝐨𝐧𝐚𝐥 𝐩𝐮𝐫𝐩𝐨𝐬𝐞𝐬 𝐨𝐧𝐥𝐲 𝐚𝐧𝐝 𝐬𝐡𝐨𝐮𝐥𝐝 𝐧𝐨𝐭 𝐛𝐞 𝐜𝐨𝐧𝐬𝐭𝐫𝐮𝐞𝐝 𝐚𝐬 𝐢𝐧𝐯𝐞𝐬𝐭𝐦𝐞𝐧𝐭 𝐚𝐝𝐯𝐢𝐜𝐞 𝐭𝐨 𝐦𝐞𝐞𝐭 𝐭𝐡𝐞 𝐬𝐩𝐞𝐜𝐢𝐟𝐢𝐜 𝐧𝐞𝐞𝐝𝐬 𝐨𝐟 𝐚𝐧𝐲 𝐢𝐧𝐝𝐢𝐯𝐢𝐝𝐮𝐚𝐥 𝐨𝐫 𝐬𝐢𝐭𝐮𝐚𝐭𝐢𝐨𝐧. 𝐏𝐚𝐬𝐭 𝐩𝐞𝐫𝐟𝐨𝐫𝐦𝐚𝐧𝐜𝐞 𝐢𝐬 𝐧𝐨 𝐠𝐮𝐚𝐫𝐚𝐧𝐭𝐞𝐞 𝐨𝐟 𝐟𝐮𝐭𝐮𝐫𝐞 𝐫𝐞𝐬𝐮𝐥𝐭𝐬.
𝐈𝐧𝐟𝐨𝐫𝐦𝐚𝐭𝐢𝐨𝐧 𝐜𝐨𝐧𝐭𝐚𝐢𝐧𝐞𝐝 𝐢𝐧 𝐭𝐡𝐢𝐬 𝐭𝐰𝐞𝐞𝐭 𝐡𝐚𝐬 𝐛𝐞𝐞𝐧 𝐨𝐛𝐭𝐚𝐢𝐧𝐞𝐝 𝐟𝐫𝐨𝐦 𝐬𝐨𝐮𝐫𝐜𝐞𝐬 𝐛𝐞𝐥𝐢𝐞𝐯𝐞𝐝 𝐭𝐨 𝐛𝐞 𝐫𝐞𝐥𝐢𝐚𝐛𝐥𝐞, 𝐛𝐮𝐭 𝐢𝐬 𝐧𝐨𝐭 𝐠𝐮𝐚𝐫𝐚𝐧𝐭𝐞𝐞𝐝 𝐚𝐬 𝐭𝐨 𝐜𝐨𝐦𝐩𝐥𝐞𝐭𝐞𝐧𝐞𝐬𝐬 𝐨𝐫 𝐚𝐜𝐜𝐮𝐫𝐚𝐜𝐲.
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App Economy Insights
$ORCL Oracle just hit a new all-time high.
What's driving the momentum?
📊 Q1 visualized.
☁️ OCI's rising market share.
⚙️ Ellison's bold prediction on AI.
https://t.co/iFIo4ewI0q
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$ORCL Oracle just hit a new all-time high.
What's driving the momentum?
📊 Q1 visualized.
☁️ OCI's rising market share.
⚙️ Ellison's bold prediction on AI.
https://t.co/iFIo4ewI0q
tweet
Offshore
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Stock Analysis Compilation
Baron Capital on Vulcan Materials Company $VMC US
Thesis: Vulcan's dominant position in aggregates, coupled with high barriers to entry and robust pricing power, makes it a prime beneficiary of accelerating infrastructure spending in the U.S
(Extract from their Q2 letter) https://t.co/VFGSnG90hh
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Baron Capital on Vulcan Materials Company $VMC US
Thesis: Vulcan's dominant position in aggregates, coupled with high barriers to entry and robust pricing power, makes it a prime beneficiary of accelerating infrastructure spending in the U.S
(Extract from their Q2 letter) https://t.co/VFGSnG90hh
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Offshore
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Investing visuals
Microsoft $MSFT is down 13% from its peak in July, making its risk/reward quite attractive.
Here’s a quick overview of the company👇🔍 https://t.co/DLR60DA20p
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Microsoft $MSFT is down 13% from its peak in July, making its risk/reward quite attractive.
Here’s a quick overview of the company👇🔍 https://t.co/DLR60DA20p
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Stock Analysis Compilation
Baron Capital on Ibotta $IBTA US
Thesis: Ibotta's strong partnerships, especially with Walmart, and its scalable, profitable cashback model position it as a leader in the digital rewards space, poised for significant growth
(Extract from their Q2 letter) https://t.co/tp19n82lSO
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Baron Capital on Ibotta $IBTA US
Thesis: Ibotta's strong partnerships, especially with Walmart, and its scalable, profitable cashback model position it as a leader in the digital rewards space, poised for significant growth
(Extract from their Q2 letter) https://t.co/tp19n82lSO
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AkhenOsiris
@munster_gene
ATT CEO now on CNBC: I don't think this phone will be crazy (like 4G to 5G) but ultimately the consumer will decide.
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@munster_gene
ATT CEO now on CNBC: I don't think this phone will be crazy (like 4G to 5G) but ultimately the consumer will decide.
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