Offshore
Photo
The Long Investor
$SPY if you want to see the future, study the past.
MACD and RSI on the weekly chart is as clear as it needs to be. https://t.co/Ezv7z7gHQf
tweet
$SPY if you want to see the future, study the past.
MACD and RSI on the weekly chart is as clear as it needs to be. https://t.co/Ezv7z7gHQf
tweet
Offshore
Photo
Dimitry Nakhla | Babylon Capitalยฎ
A sober valuation analysis on $GOOG ๐ง๐ฝโโ๏ธ
โขNTM P/E Ratio: 22.81x
โข5-Year Mean: 23.49x
โขNTM FCF Yield: 3.77%
โข5-Year Mean: 4.19%
As you can see, $GOOG appears to be trading near fair value
Going forward, investors can receive ~3% MORE in earnings per share & ~13% LESS in FCF per share ๐ง ***
Before we get into valuation, letโs take a look at why $GOOG is a great business
BALANCE SHEETโ
โขCash & Short-Term Inv: $108.09B
โขLong-Term Debt: $13.22B
$GOOG has a strong balance sheet, an AA+ S&P Credit Rating & 332x FFO Interest Coverage
RETURN ON CAPITALโ
โข2019: 16.4%
โข2020: 16.2%
โข2021: 27.6%
โข2022: 26.1%
โข2023: 28.1%
โขLTM: 30.2%
RETURN ON EQUITYโ
โข2019: 18.1%
โข2020: 19.0%
โข2021: 32.1%
โข2022: 23.6%
โข2023: 27.4%
โขLTM: 29.8%
$GOOG has strong return metrics, highlighting the financial efficiency of the business
REVENUESโ
โข2018: $136.82B
โข2023: $307.39
โขCAGR: 17.57%
FREE CASH FLOWโ
โข2018: $22.83B
โข2023: $69.50B
โขCAGR: 24.93%
NORMALIZED EPSโ
โข2018: $2.19
โข2023: $5.80
โขCAGR: 21.50%
SHARE BUYBACKSโ
โข2018 Shares Outstanding: 14.07B
โขLTM Shares Outstanding: 12.65B
By reducing its shares outstanding ~10.0%, $GOOG increased its EPS by ~11.1% (assuming 0 growth)
MARGINSโ
โขLTM Gross Margins: 57.3%
โขLTM Operating Margins: 30.3%
โขLTM Net Income Margins: 25.9%
***NOW TO VALUATION ๐ง
As stated above, investors can expect to receive ~3% MORE in EPS & ~13% LESS in FCF per share
Using Benjamin Grahamโs 2G rule of thumb, $GOOG has to grow earnings at an 11.41% CAGR over the next several years to justify its valuation
Today, analysts anticipate 2024 - 2026 EPS growth over the next few years to be more than the (11.41%) required growth rate:
2024E: $7.50 (29.4% YoY) *FY Dec
2025E: $8.33 (11.0% YoY)
2026E: $9.56 (14.7% YoY)
$GOOG has an excellent track record of meeting analyst estimates ~2 years out, so letโs assume $GOOG ends 2026 with $9.56 in EPS & see its CAGR potential assuming different multiples
24x P/E: $229.44๐ต โฆ ~11.4% CAGR
23x P/E: $219.88๐ต โฆ ~9.7% CAGR
22x P/E: $210.32๐ต โฆ ~7.9% CAGR
21x P/E: 200.76๐ต โฆ ~6.0% CAGR
As you can see, $GOOG appears to have attractive return potential if we assume 23x - 24x earnings (a multiple near its 5-year & 10-year mean)
At 24x earnings, $GOOG CAGR potential is solid & itโs not unreasonable for the business to trade for 24x (given current growth rate estimates, its moat, balance sheet, & exemplary capital allocation)
Today at $173.69๐ต $GOOG appears to be fairly valued
Those investing today can do well & expect decent returns, albeit without much of a margin of safety
$GOOG presents excellent value & a wide margin of safety closer to $150๐ต or 16.2% below todayโs price
At $150๐ต, investors can reasonably expect ~12% CAGR even assuming 21x earnings
#stocks #investing
___
๐๐๐๐๐๐๐๐๐๐โผ๏ธ: ๐๐ก๐ข๐ฌ ๐ข๐ฌ ๐๐๐ ๐๐ง๐ฏ๐๐ฌ๐ญ๐ฆ๐๐ง๐ญ ๐๐๐ฏ๐ข๐๐. ๐๐๐๐ฒ๐ฅ๐จ๐ง ๐๐๐ฉ๐ข๐ญ๐๐ฅยฎ ๐๐ง๐ ๐ข๐ญ๐ฌ ๐ซ๐๐ฉ๐ซ๐๐ฌ๐๐ง๐ญ๐๐ญ๐ข๐ฏ๐๐ฌ ๐ฆ๐๐ฒ ๐ก๐๐ฏ๐ ๐ฉ๐จ๐ฌ๐ข๐ญ๐ข๐จ๐ง๐ฌ ๐ข๐ง ๐ญ๐ก๐ ๐ฌ๐๐๐ฎ๐ซ๐ข๐ญ๐ข๐๐ฌ ๐๐ข๐ฌ๐๐ฎ๐ฌ๐ฌ๐๐ ๐ข๐ง ๐ญ๐ก๐ข๐ฌ ๐ญ๐ฐ๐๐๐ญ.
๐๐ก๐ ๐ข๐ง๐๐จ๐ซ๐ฆ๐๐ญ๐ข๐จ๐ง ๐๐จ๐ง๐ญ๐๐ข๐ง๐๐ ๐ข๐ง ๐ญ๐ก๐ข๐ฌ ๐ญ๐ฐ๐๐๐ญ ๐ข๐ฌ ๐ข๐ง๐ญ๐๐ง๐๐๐ ๐๐จ๐ซ ๐ข๐ง๐๐จ๐ซ๐ฆ๐๐ญ๐ข๐จ๐ง๐๐ฅ ๐ฉ๐ฎ๐ซ๐ฉ๐จ๐ฌ๐๐ฌ ๐จ๐ง๐ฅ๐ฒ ๐๐ง๐ ๐ฌ๐ก๐จ๐ฎ๐ฅ๐ ๐ง๐จ๐ญ ๐๐ ๐๐จ๐ง๐ฌ๐ญ๐ซ๐ฎ๐๐ ๐๐ฌ ๐ข๐ง๐ฏ๐๐ฌ๐ญ๐ฆ๐๐ง๐ญ ๐๐๐ฏ๐ข๐๐ ๐ญ๐จ ๐ฆ๐๐๐ญ ๐ญ๐ก๐ ๐ฌ๐ฉ๐๐๐ข๐๐ข๐ ๐ง๐๐๐๐ฌ ๐จ๐ ๐๐ง๐ฒ ๐ข๐ง๐๐ข๐ฏ๐ข๐๐ฎ๐๐ฅ ๐จ๐ซ ๐ฌ๐ข๐ญ๐ฎ๐๐ญ๐ข๐จ๐ง. ๐๐๐ฌ๐ญ ๐ฉ๐๐ซ๐๐จ๐ซ๐ฆ๐๐ง๐๐ ๐ข๐ฌ ๐ง๐จ ๐ ๐ฎ๐๐ซ๐๐ง๐ญ๐๐ ๐จ๐ ๐๐ฎ๐ญ๐ฎ๐ซ๐ ๐ซ๐๐ฌ๐ฎ๐ฅ๐ญ๐ฌ.
๐๐ง๐๐จ๐ซ๐ฆ๐๐ญ๐ข๐จ๐ง ๐๐จ๐ง๐ญ๐๐ข๐ง๐๐ ๐ข๐ง ๐ญ๐ก๐ข๐ฌ ๐ญ๐ฐ๐๐๐ญ ๐ก๐๐ฌ ๐๐๐๐ง ๐จ๐๐ญ๐๐ข๐ง๐๐ ๐๐ซ๐จ๐ฆ ๐ฌ๐จ๐ฎ๐ซ๐๐๐ฌ ๐๐๐ฅ๐ข๐๐ฏ๐๐ ๐ญ๐จ ๐๐ ๐ซ๐๐ฅ๐ข๐๐๐ฅ๐, ๐๐ฎ๐ญ ๐ข๐ฌ ๐ง๐จ๐ญ ๐ ๐ฎ๐๐ซ๐๐ง๐ญ๐๐๐ ๐๐ฌ ๐ญ๐จ ๐๐จ๐ฆ๐ฉ๐ฅ๐๐ญ๐๐ง๐๐ฌ๐ฌ ๐จ๐ซ ๐๐๐๐ฎ๐ซ๐๐๐ฒ.
tweet
A sober valuation analysis on $GOOG ๐ง๐ฝโโ๏ธ
โขNTM P/E Ratio: 22.81x
โข5-Year Mean: 23.49x
โขNTM FCF Yield: 3.77%
โข5-Year Mean: 4.19%
As you can see, $GOOG appears to be trading near fair value
Going forward, investors can receive ~3% MORE in earnings per share & ~13% LESS in FCF per share ๐ง ***
Before we get into valuation, letโs take a look at why $GOOG is a great business
BALANCE SHEETโ
โขCash & Short-Term Inv: $108.09B
โขLong-Term Debt: $13.22B
$GOOG has a strong balance sheet, an AA+ S&P Credit Rating & 332x FFO Interest Coverage
RETURN ON CAPITALโ
โข2019: 16.4%
โข2020: 16.2%
โข2021: 27.6%
โข2022: 26.1%
โข2023: 28.1%
โขLTM: 30.2%
RETURN ON EQUITYโ
โข2019: 18.1%
โข2020: 19.0%
โข2021: 32.1%
โข2022: 23.6%
โข2023: 27.4%
โขLTM: 29.8%
$GOOG has strong return metrics, highlighting the financial efficiency of the business
REVENUESโ
โข2018: $136.82B
โข2023: $307.39
โขCAGR: 17.57%
FREE CASH FLOWโ
โข2018: $22.83B
โข2023: $69.50B
โขCAGR: 24.93%
NORMALIZED EPSโ
โข2018: $2.19
โข2023: $5.80
โขCAGR: 21.50%
SHARE BUYBACKSโ
โข2018 Shares Outstanding: 14.07B
โขLTM Shares Outstanding: 12.65B
By reducing its shares outstanding ~10.0%, $GOOG increased its EPS by ~11.1% (assuming 0 growth)
MARGINSโ
โขLTM Gross Margins: 57.3%
โขLTM Operating Margins: 30.3%
โขLTM Net Income Margins: 25.9%
***NOW TO VALUATION ๐ง
As stated above, investors can expect to receive ~3% MORE in EPS & ~13% LESS in FCF per share
Using Benjamin Grahamโs 2G rule of thumb, $GOOG has to grow earnings at an 11.41% CAGR over the next several years to justify its valuation
Today, analysts anticipate 2024 - 2026 EPS growth over the next few years to be more than the (11.41%) required growth rate:
2024E: $7.50 (29.4% YoY) *FY Dec
2025E: $8.33 (11.0% YoY)
2026E: $9.56 (14.7% YoY)
$GOOG has an excellent track record of meeting analyst estimates ~2 years out, so letโs assume $GOOG ends 2026 with $9.56 in EPS & see its CAGR potential assuming different multiples
24x P/E: $229.44๐ต โฆ ~11.4% CAGR
23x P/E: $219.88๐ต โฆ ~9.7% CAGR
22x P/E: $210.32๐ต โฆ ~7.9% CAGR
21x P/E: 200.76๐ต โฆ ~6.0% CAGR
As you can see, $GOOG appears to have attractive return potential if we assume 23x - 24x earnings (a multiple near its 5-year & 10-year mean)
At 24x earnings, $GOOG CAGR potential is solid & itโs not unreasonable for the business to trade for 24x (given current growth rate estimates, its moat, balance sheet, & exemplary capital allocation)
Today at $173.69๐ต $GOOG appears to be fairly valued
Those investing today can do well & expect decent returns, albeit without much of a margin of safety
$GOOG presents excellent value & a wide margin of safety closer to $150๐ต or 16.2% below todayโs price
At $150๐ต, investors can reasonably expect ~12% CAGR even assuming 21x earnings
#stocks #investing
___
๐๐๐๐๐๐๐๐๐๐โผ๏ธ: ๐๐ก๐ข๐ฌ ๐ข๐ฌ ๐๐๐ ๐๐ง๐ฏ๐๐ฌ๐ญ๐ฆ๐๐ง๐ญ ๐๐๐ฏ๐ข๐๐. ๐๐๐๐ฒ๐ฅ๐จ๐ง ๐๐๐ฉ๐ข๐ญ๐๐ฅยฎ ๐๐ง๐ ๐ข๐ญ๐ฌ ๐ซ๐๐ฉ๐ซ๐๐ฌ๐๐ง๐ญ๐๐ญ๐ข๐ฏ๐๐ฌ ๐ฆ๐๐ฒ ๐ก๐๐ฏ๐ ๐ฉ๐จ๐ฌ๐ข๐ญ๐ข๐จ๐ง๐ฌ ๐ข๐ง ๐ญ๐ก๐ ๐ฌ๐๐๐ฎ๐ซ๐ข๐ญ๐ข๐๐ฌ ๐๐ข๐ฌ๐๐ฎ๐ฌ๐ฌ๐๐ ๐ข๐ง ๐ญ๐ก๐ข๐ฌ ๐ญ๐ฐ๐๐๐ญ.
๐๐ก๐ ๐ข๐ง๐๐จ๐ซ๐ฆ๐๐ญ๐ข๐จ๐ง ๐๐จ๐ง๐ญ๐๐ข๐ง๐๐ ๐ข๐ง ๐ญ๐ก๐ข๐ฌ ๐ญ๐ฐ๐๐๐ญ ๐ข๐ฌ ๐ข๐ง๐ญ๐๐ง๐๐๐ ๐๐จ๐ซ ๐ข๐ง๐๐จ๐ซ๐ฆ๐๐ญ๐ข๐จ๐ง๐๐ฅ ๐ฉ๐ฎ๐ซ๐ฉ๐จ๐ฌ๐๐ฌ ๐จ๐ง๐ฅ๐ฒ ๐๐ง๐ ๐ฌ๐ก๐จ๐ฎ๐ฅ๐ ๐ง๐จ๐ญ ๐๐ ๐๐จ๐ง๐ฌ๐ญ๐ซ๐ฎ๐๐ ๐๐ฌ ๐ข๐ง๐ฏ๐๐ฌ๐ญ๐ฆ๐๐ง๐ญ ๐๐๐ฏ๐ข๐๐ ๐ญ๐จ ๐ฆ๐๐๐ญ ๐ญ๐ก๐ ๐ฌ๐ฉ๐๐๐ข๐๐ข๐ ๐ง๐๐๐๐ฌ ๐จ๐ ๐๐ง๐ฒ ๐ข๐ง๐๐ข๐ฏ๐ข๐๐ฎ๐๐ฅ ๐จ๐ซ ๐ฌ๐ข๐ญ๐ฎ๐๐ญ๐ข๐จ๐ง. ๐๐๐ฌ๐ญ ๐ฉ๐๐ซ๐๐จ๐ซ๐ฆ๐๐ง๐๐ ๐ข๐ฌ ๐ง๐จ ๐ ๐ฎ๐๐ซ๐๐ง๐ญ๐๐ ๐จ๐ ๐๐ฎ๐ญ๐ฎ๐ซ๐ ๐ซ๐๐ฌ๐ฎ๐ฅ๐ญ๐ฌ.
๐๐ง๐๐จ๐ซ๐ฆ๐๐ญ๐ข๐จ๐ง ๐๐จ๐ง๐ญ๐๐ข๐ง๐๐ ๐ข๐ง ๐ญ๐ก๐ข๐ฌ ๐ญ๐ฐ๐๐๐ญ ๐ก๐๐ฌ ๐๐๐๐ง ๐จ๐๐ญ๐๐ข๐ง๐๐ ๐๐ซ๐จ๐ฆ ๐ฌ๐จ๐ฎ๐ซ๐๐๐ฌ ๐๐๐ฅ๐ข๐๐ฏ๐๐ ๐ญ๐จ ๐๐ ๐ซ๐๐ฅ๐ข๐๐๐ฅ๐, ๐๐ฎ๐ญ ๐ข๐ฌ ๐ง๐จ๐ญ ๐ ๐ฎ๐๐ซ๐๐ง๐ญ๐๐๐ ๐๐ฌ ๐ญ๐จ ๐๐จ๐ฆ๐ฉ๐ฅ๐๐ญ๐๐ง๐๐ฌ๐ฌ ๐จ๐ซ ๐๐๐๐ฎ๐ซ๐๐๐ฒ.
tweet
Offshore
Photo
The Long Investor
$BTC I have white circled the moment the price hit the 50 Day MA on Tuesday and Weds this week and rejected.
The $SPY is now testing the 50 Day MA from below.
$BTC looks to be a few days ahead of the market....is this an indication of what will happen to the $SPY next? https://t.co/EjYfUyq6Lg
tweet
$BTC I have white circled the moment the price hit the 50 Day MA on Tuesday and Weds this week and rejected.
The $SPY is now testing the 50 Day MA from below.
$BTC looks to be a few days ahead of the market....is this an indication of what will happen to the $SPY next? https://t.co/EjYfUyq6Lg
$BTC let there be no doubt who has been correct on $BTC for the last year.
Chart below on the 16th of March and today, with no changes.
Wave A is currently underway, 0.38 fib is the target. https://t.co/GcKUVTzYtM - The Long Investortweet
Offshore
Photo
The Long Investor
$QQQ on the weekly chart giving the same indications as the $SPY chart. https://t.co/oIKzOH9upp
tweet
$QQQ on the weekly chart giving the same indications as the $SPY chart. https://t.co/oIKzOH9upp
tweet
Offshore
Photo
The Long Investor
$PFE Earnings due on Weds before the market opens.
$22 would be the sweet spot to add
But has this beaten down stock got the ability to drop another 15% to get there?
Trying to catch the bottom is normally not a good idea. https://t.co/cN5K7uaQNa
tweet
$PFE Earnings due on Weds before the market opens.
$22 would be the sweet spot to add
But has this beaten down stock got the ability to drop another 15% to get there?
Trying to catch the bottom is normally not a good idea. https://t.co/cN5K7uaQNa
$PFE bounced within the 0. 618 Fib - 0.78 Fib in 2009
It is showing signs of bouncing in this range now too.
It may be the ultimate cyclical stock and a 5.95% dividend too.
Very attractive long term hold. https://t.co/2cD5yeGfnl - The Long Investortweet
The Long Investor
Wall Street does not inform retail investors when they expect a correction.
People will generally stop buying, there will be less trades and many leave investing or trading for good and do not return....they'll make one sell and exit.
This is not how Wall Street makes money
When have you heard Wall Street say, be patient, wait, control your triggers....instead they are exploring 24/7 trading instead.
tweet
Wall Street does not inform retail investors when they expect a correction.
People will generally stop buying, there will be less trades and many leave investing or trading for good and do not return....they'll make one sell and exit.
This is not how Wall Street makes money
When have you heard Wall Street say, be patient, wait, control your triggers....instead they are exploring 24/7 trading instead.
tweet
Offshore
Photo
Giuliano
In their last letter, $BUR made clear what the path forward is.
This must not be overlooked, for it dramatically changes $BUR economics.
In 2008, Chris noticed demand for funding litigation claims and thought he should take his hobby seriously. Alongside Jonathan Molot, both decided to raise institutional capital to address this unmet need. Burford raised 130M dollars in its IPO. Demand was so strong that Chris and John did a follow up in 2010. More equity was sold on a secondary offering for an aggregate of 175M dollars. Ever since, no more capital has been raised via this avenue. Rather, the team waited for their investments to yield results for writing more business.
In 2014, Burford started issuing debt in the UK market, though moderately. Two years later, management acquired GKC, an investment management firm. The purpose of this acquisition was to invest in other verticals legal finance offers that they couldnโt do otherwise, for capital was a major constraint. Managing private funds offers flexibility and capacity for rapidly raising capital. This way, Burford grew its group-wide business to over 7bn dollars.
However, private fundsโ commitments were taking share of the overall business. In 2019, out of 1.6 billion in commitments, only 726M were Burford-only. The former had quadrupled while the latter didnโt even double in the prior 3 years. Management mentions not to have liked this dynamic as shareholders themselves. Managing private funds ended up being a costly way to grow. Indirectly, it capped the companyโs capacity to write new business and was poised to continue on such a path.
Having passed the phase and counting Burford with more resources now, it wouldโve been a mistake to keep running the business in this manner.
In consequence, management focused on accessing the US market. In 2020, they registered with the SEC and added $BUR listing to the NYSE. This allowed the company to tap into the US debt market. Thereafter, Burford issued debt on four separate occasions.
This ought not to be overlooked, for it dramatically changes Burfordโs economics:
โThis cost of capital is game-changing for us. With 2/20 fund capital, we pay around 80% of investment profits to our fund investors for the use of their capital. Now, given the average 7% interest rate on our debt and the average 2.5-year duration of our matters, we are instead paying only a total of around 20% of investment profits for the debt, fundamentally changing the economics for the balance sheet.โ
The team has on getting capital from this cheaper source and reducing their reliance on private funds. Their 2/20 structure turned out to be highly disadvantageous, considering the teamโs skill. In fact, BOF-C is generating 88% of asset management income, although the portfolio is smaller than that of the others. It is to be observed that BOF-C fee structure differs from the rest of partnerships.
Burford closed the Strategic Value Fund and decided not to immediately replace Burford Opportunity Fund. New complex strategies investments will be carried out with capital from the balance sheet, if sound investments are found. BOF-C agreement was renewed last year. Finally, another Advantage Fund will not be immediately raised after expiry. To the extent lower-risk legal finance investments are made, theyโll be done so with balance sheet capital.
tweet
In their last letter, $BUR made clear what the path forward is.
This must not be overlooked, for it dramatically changes $BUR economics.
In 2008, Chris noticed demand for funding litigation claims and thought he should take his hobby seriously. Alongside Jonathan Molot, both decided to raise institutional capital to address this unmet need. Burford raised 130M dollars in its IPO. Demand was so strong that Chris and John did a follow up in 2010. More equity was sold on a secondary offering for an aggregate of 175M dollars. Ever since, no more capital has been raised via this avenue. Rather, the team waited for their investments to yield results for writing more business.
In 2014, Burford started issuing debt in the UK market, though moderately. Two years later, management acquired GKC, an investment management firm. The purpose of this acquisition was to invest in other verticals legal finance offers that they couldnโt do otherwise, for capital was a major constraint. Managing private funds offers flexibility and capacity for rapidly raising capital. This way, Burford grew its group-wide business to over 7bn dollars.
However, private fundsโ commitments were taking share of the overall business. In 2019, out of 1.6 billion in commitments, only 726M were Burford-only. The former had quadrupled while the latter didnโt even double in the prior 3 years. Management mentions not to have liked this dynamic as shareholders themselves. Managing private funds ended up being a costly way to grow. Indirectly, it capped the companyโs capacity to write new business and was poised to continue on such a path.
Having passed the phase and counting Burford with more resources now, it wouldโve been a mistake to keep running the business in this manner.
In consequence, management focused on accessing the US market. In 2020, they registered with the SEC and added $BUR listing to the NYSE. This allowed the company to tap into the US debt market. Thereafter, Burford issued debt on four separate occasions.
This ought not to be overlooked, for it dramatically changes Burfordโs economics:
โThis cost of capital is game-changing for us. With 2/20 fund capital, we pay around 80% of investment profits to our fund investors for the use of their capital. Now, given the average 7% interest rate on our debt and the average 2.5-year duration of our matters, we are instead paying only a total of around 20% of investment profits for the debt, fundamentally changing the economics for the balance sheet.โ
The team has on getting capital from this cheaper source and reducing their reliance on private funds. Their 2/20 structure turned out to be highly disadvantageous, considering the teamโs skill. In fact, BOF-C is generating 88% of asset management income, although the portfolio is smaller than that of the others. It is to be observed that BOF-C fee structure differs from the rest of partnerships.
Burford closed the Strategic Value Fund and decided not to immediately replace Burford Opportunity Fund. New complex strategies investments will be carried out with capital from the balance sheet, if sound investments are found. BOF-C agreement was renewed last year. Finally, another Advantage Fund will not be immediately raised after expiry. To the extent lower-risk legal finance investments are made, theyโll be done so with balance sheet capital.
tweet
Offshore
Photo
The Long Investor
$QQQ the 24 Year Resistance line has been tested and rejected. https://t.co/jNRYOZsXEH
tweet
$QQQ the 24 Year Resistance line has been tested and rejected. https://t.co/jNRYOZsXEH
tweet