Offshore
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Bourbon Capital
$NFLX free cash flow has experienced exponential growth since 2022
Solid business and printing cash through ads https://t.co/DAegdcKKu9
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$NFLX free cash flow has experienced exponential growth since 2022
Solid business and printing cash through ads https://t.co/DAegdcKKu9
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Offshore
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The Transcript
RT @TheTranscript_: When you see the drawdown on your saas stock: https://t.co/lSDQfX4bWs
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RT @TheTranscript_: When you see the drawdown on your saas stock: https://t.co/lSDQfX4bWs
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DAIR.AI
RT @omarsar0: Connect your agents with Obsidian vaults and never let your agents go hungry for the right context again.
On a serious note, in most cases, all you need are markdown files to get your coding agents to do what you want. Skills and Notes (both in md) are all my agents use now.
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RT @omarsar0: Connect your agents with Obsidian vaults and never let your agents go hungry for the right context again.
On a serious note, in most cases, all you need are markdown files to get your coding agents to do what you want. Skills and Notes (both in md) are all my agents use now.
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Offshore
Video
Moon Dev
my team of quants and i used clawdbot in our internal zoom call
we made some discoveries i have not seen on x yet
so im releasing this private zoom call for a couple day
you may wanna bm it if you cant watch it rn https://t.co/suebThH47R
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my team of quants and i used clawdbot in our internal zoom call
we made some discoveries i have not seen on x yet
so im releasing this private zoom call for a couple day
you may wanna bm it if you cant watch it rn https://t.co/suebThH47R
tweet
The Few Bets That Matter
Did a lot of buying over the last two hours.
$PATH
$NBIS
$ALAB
$BABA
$TMDX
The last add for some of these names. If they don’t bounce here, I’m out. For good.
Also interesting: buyers keep showing up aggressively every evening, an hour before the close.
There’s something there.
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Did a lot of buying over the last two hours.
$PATH
$NBIS
$ALAB
$BABA
$TMDX
The last add for some of these names. If they don’t bounce here, I’m out. For good.
Also interesting: buyers keep showing up aggressively every evening, an hour before the close.
There’s something there.
tweet
Offshore
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Dimitry Nakhla | Babylon Capital®
These kinds of intraday swings following yesterday’s climactic selling feel reminiscent of March 20, 2020 — which also ended up marking a bottom.
Of course, today’s move is far less broad and more concentrated, particularly within SaaS providers.
$CSU $FICO $INTU $NOW https://t.co/K3i82OWhEy
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These kinds of intraday swings following yesterday’s climactic selling feel reminiscent of March 20, 2020 — which also ended up marking a bottom.
Of course, today’s move is far less broad and more concentrated, particularly within SaaS providers.
$CSU $FICO $INTU $NOW https://t.co/K3i82OWhEy
Feels like we may be approaching capitulation across a number of quality SaaS names after today’s climactic selling — this kind of price action that often coincides with forced de-risking, exhaustion, & indiscriminate selling rather than a change in long-term business quality. tweet
Javier Blas
So the nuclear talks are back on, in Oman, say the Iranians. The Associated Press says the White House has agrees to move Iran talks to Oman from Turkey after Arab leaders urge US to hear out Tehran
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So the nuclear talks are back on, in Oman, say the Iranians. The Associated Press says the White House has agrees to move Iran talks to Oman from Turkey after Arab leaders urge US to hear out Tehran
Nuclear talks with the United States are scheduled to be held in Muscat on about 10 am Friday.
I'm grateful to our Omani brothers for making all necessary arrangements. tweet
X (formerly Twitter)
Seyed Abbas Araghchi (@araghchi) on X
Nuclear talks with the United States are scheduled to be held in Muscat on about 10 am Friday.
I'm grateful to our Omani brothers for making all necessary arrangements.
I'm grateful to our Omani brothers for making all necessary arrangements.
Benjamin Hernandez😎
Most losses come from being late.
By the time a tweet is seen, the move is often gone. I share explosive stocks and real-time breakout alerts on WhatsApp while momentum is still building
Stop chasing✅ https://t.co/71FIJId47G
Being early changes the game
$PLTR $SOFI $AMD $OPEN
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Most losses come from being late.
By the time a tweet is seen, the move is often gone. I share explosive stocks and real-time breakout alerts on WhatsApp while momentum is still building
Stop chasing✅ https://t.co/71FIJId47G
Being early changes the game
$PLTR $SOFI $AMD $OPEN
tweet
Benjamin Hernandez😎
Most losses come from being late.
By the time a tweet is seen, the move is often gone. I share explosive stocks and real-time breakout alerts on WhatsApp while momentum is still building
Stop chasing✅ https://t.co/71FIJIdBXe
Being early changes the game
$PLTR $SOFI $AMD $OPEN
tweet
Most losses come from being late.
By the time a tweet is seen, the move is often gone. I share explosive stocks and real-time breakout alerts on WhatsApp while momentum is still building
Stop chasing✅ https://t.co/71FIJIdBXe
Being early changes the game
$PLTR $SOFI $AMD $OPEN
tweet
Javier Blas
RT @citrinowicz: The Collapse? of Nuclear Talks – A Brief Analysis
A. Even if the meeting in Oman will occure, the recent events highlights the fact that the chances of agreement are very low.
B. The core reason for this is not merely a gap in positions, but a far deeper and more dangerous gap in how each side perceives the other.
C. Iran’s Supreme Leader, inherently suspicious of the United States in general and of the current U.S. president in particular, arrives at this moment after series of events he views as part of a coordinated campaign to topple the regime: the recent military confrontation, and more importantly, the wave of domestic protests across Iran.
D. From this perspective, it is unsurprising that he is unwilling to compromise on what he sees as the regime’s foundational principles. From his vantage point, it is entirely plausible that the United States has already decided on a military strike, or is at least working with regional allies to degrade Iran’s ability to defend itself. Faced with this reality, he prefers to risk a strike rather than concede.
E. By contrast, the U.S. administration appears to be operating from the assumption that Iran has been significantly weakened, strategically, economically, and domestically—by the recent conflict and internal unrest.
F. In Washington’s assessment, this exposure, combined with sustained military pressure and force projection, should eventually compel Tehran to accept U.S. terms not only on the nuclear program, but also on missiles and regional proxies.
G. This perception gap prevents the sides from even sitting down at the table, because at a basic level they have little to negotiate. Both may wish to avoid escalation, and both may prefer a negotiated compromise, but their underlying assumptions about leverage and vulnerability are fundamentally incompatible.
H. It is easy to dismiss Iran’s self-perception as exaggerated or detached from reality. Yet from the regime’s standpoint, its survival through both military confrontation and domestic unrest reinforces the belief that it has withstood a broader Western plot. This belief is central to its strategic calculus.
I. As a result, even if talks will take place in Oman against all odds because of Qatari involvement, the starting positions all but guarantee failure. As long as Ayatollah Khamenei remains in power, no amount of pressure from Washington is likely to produce capitulation. At the same time, regime collapse is no guarantee of a stable or democratic Iran; it could just as easily produce greater instability.
J. Iran’s current trajectory is unsustainable, but for its leadership, ideological fidelity to the revolution outweighs economic well-being or long-term national viability. In their view, abandoning these principles would mean abandoning the revolution itself.
K. There is little value in playing a game of chicken with Iran. It is highly doubtful they will back down even an inch. This leaves the administration with a stark choice: make profound concessions at the negotiating table, or drift toward military action. One reality must be acknowledged—regardless of pressure, threats, or signaling, Iran is not going to accept Washington’s terms.
Under current conditions, escalation appears increasingly unavoidable but not necessary imminent.
#IranRevolution2026
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RT @citrinowicz: The Collapse? of Nuclear Talks – A Brief Analysis
A. Even if the meeting in Oman will occure, the recent events highlights the fact that the chances of agreement are very low.
B. The core reason for this is not merely a gap in positions, but a far deeper and more dangerous gap in how each side perceives the other.
C. Iran’s Supreme Leader, inherently suspicious of the United States in general and of the current U.S. president in particular, arrives at this moment after series of events he views as part of a coordinated campaign to topple the regime: the recent military confrontation, and more importantly, the wave of domestic protests across Iran.
D. From this perspective, it is unsurprising that he is unwilling to compromise on what he sees as the regime’s foundational principles. From his vantage point, it is entirely plausible that the United States has already decided on a military strike, or is at least working with regional allies to degrade Iran’s ability to defend itself. Faced with this reality, he prefers to risk a strike rather than concede.
E. By contrast, the U.S. administration appears to be operating from the assumption that Iran has been significantly weakened, strategically, economically, and domestically—by the recent conflict and internal unrest.
F. In Washington’s assessment, this exposure, combined with sustained military pressure and force projection, should eventually compel Tehran to accept U.S. terms not only on the nuclear program, but also on missiles and regional proxies.
G. This perception gap prevents the sides from even sitting down at the table, because at a basic level they have little to negotiate. Both may wish to avoid escalation, and both may prefer a negotiated compromise, but their underlying assumptions about leverage and vulnerability are fundamentally incompatible.
H. It is easy to dismiss Iran’s self-perception as exaggerated or detached from reality. Yet from the regime’s standpoint, its survival through both military confrontation and domestic unrest reinforces the belief that it has withstood a broader Western plot. This belief is central to its strategic calculus.
I. As a result, even if talks will take place in Oman against all odds because of Qatari involvement, the starting positions all but guarantee failure. As long as Ayatollah Khamenei remains in power, no amount of pressure from Washington is likely to produce capitulation. At the same time, regime collapse is no guarantee of a stable or democratic Iran; it could just as easily produce greater instability.
J. Iran’s current trajectory is unsustainable, but for its leadership, ideological fidelity to the revolution outweighs economic well-being or long-term national viability. In their view, abandoning these principles would mean abandoning the revolution itself.
K. There is little value in playing a game of chicken with Iran. It is highly doubtful they will back down even an inch. This leaves the administration with a stark choice: make profound concessions at the negotiating table, or drift toward military action. One reality must be acknowledged—regardless of pressure, threats, or signaling, Iran is not going to accept Washington’s terms.
Under current conditions, escalation appears increasingly unavoidable but not necessary imminent.
#IranRevolution2026
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