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God of Prompt
RT @godofprompt: Claude is the smartest AI right now.
But 90% of people prompt it like ChatGPT.
That's why I made the Claude Mastery Guide:
→ How Claude thinks differently
→ Prompts built for Claude
→ Workflows that use its strengths
Comment "Claude" and I'll DM it free. https://t.co/v2SKsVeoOI
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RT @godofprompt: Claude is the smartest AI right now.
But 90% of people prompt it like ChatGPT.
That's why I made the Claude Mastery Guide:
→ How Claude thinks differently
→ Prompts built for Claude
→ Workflows that use its strengths
Comment "Claude" and I'll DM it free. https://t.co/v2SKsVeoOI
tweet
Dimitry Nakhla | Babylon Capital®
RT @aakashgupta: Hohn’s story is wild.
In 2008, he lost 43% and watched his fund collapse from $19 billion to under $5 billion. Investors fled. He publicly swore off activism after getting humiliated in a railroad proxy fight.
17 years later, he just posted the largest single-year hedge fund profit in history.
Here’s what happened in between:
From 2003 to 2007, Chris Hohn was the golden boy of activist investing. He ran TCI like a wrecking ball. Bought 1% of ABN Amro and sent a scathing letter demanding breakup. Triggered a $100 billion bidding war at the peak of the market. Forced out the CEO of Deutsche Börse after killing their London Stock Exchange bid. German politicians called him a “locust.” He didn’t care. Assets soared 30-fold in five years.
Then 2008 hit.
TCI lost 43%. His CSX railroad battle turned into a public disaster when the stock dropped 50% after he won four board seats. He declared defeat, sold his shares, and told the press he was done with activism. By 2012, assets had collapsed to $4.9 billion. Most of his team quit.
What most people don’t know is what Hohn did next.
He looked at his portfolio and realized he’d been playing the wrong game. Special situations. Distressed plays. Banks. He’d strayed from concentration into complexity.
So he rebuilt TCI around a single thesis: own monopolies.
Not “companies with moats.” Actual monopolies. His test: can they price above inflation? If competition can compress margins, he walks. Airlines grow 5% annually and make no money. Airports grow 5% annually and print cash. He wants the airports.
The result is a 10-stock portfolio where GE Aerospace represents 23% of a $50 billion fund. Five holdings account for 73%. Portfolio turnover sits at 21%. Average holding period rivals some marriages.
Griffin’s $16 billion record in 2022 came from running hundreds of strategies across thousands of positions with 2,900 employees. Hohn’s $18.9 billion came from sitting in credit rating agencies and aerospace duopolies for a decade with a team of 8.
Same destination. Opposite paths.
Citadel wins by being everywhere during chaos. TCI wins by being nowhere except inside tollbooths.
The real lesson here: Hohn turned a 43% drawdown and near-total investor exodus into the highest annual profit any hedge fund has ever generated. He did it by becoming the opposite of what made him famous. Less activism, more patience. Fewer stocks, longer holds. No banks, no airlines, just monopolies that can raise prices faster than inflation.
Sometimes the real alpha comes from nearly losing everything.
tweet
RT @aakashgupta: Hohn’s story is wild.
In 2008, he lost 43% and watched his fund collapse from $19 billion to under $5 billion. Investors fled. He publicly swore off activism after getting humiliated in a railroad proxy fight.
17 years later, he just posted the largest single-year hedge fund profit in history.
Here’s what happened in between:
From 2003 to 2007, Chris Hohn was the golden boy of activist investing. He ran TCI like a wrecking ball. Bought 1% of ABN Amro and sent a scathing letter demanding breakup. Triggered a $100 billion bidding war at the peak of the market. Forced out the CEO of Deutsche Börse after killing their London Stock Exchange bid. German politicians called him a “locust.” He didn’t care. Assets soared 30-fold in five years.
Then 2008 hit.
TCI lost 43%. His CSX railroad battle turned into a public disaster when the stock dropped 50% after he won four board seats. He declared defeat, sold his shares, and told the press he was done with activism. By 2012, assets had collapsed to $4.9 billion. Most of his team quit.
What most people don’t know is what Hohn did next.
He looked at his portfolio and realized he’d been playing the wrong game. Special situations. Distressed plays. Banks. He’d strayed from concentration into complexity.
So he rebuilt TCI around a single thesis: own monopolies.
Not “companies with moats.” Actual monopolies. His test: can they price above inflation? If competition can compress margins, he walks. Airlines grow 5% annually and make no money. Airports grow 5% annually and print cash. He wants the airports.
The result is a 10-stock portfolio where GE Aerospace represents 23% of a $50 billion fund. Five holdings account for 73%. Portfolio turnover sits at 21%. Average holding period rivals some marriages.
Griffin’s $16 billion record in 2022 came from running hundreds of strategies across thousands of positions with 2,900 employees. Hohn’s $18.9 billion came from sitting in credit rating agencies and aerospace duopolies for a decade with a team of 8.
Same destination. Opposite paths.
Citadel wins by being everywhere during chaos. TCI wins by being nowhere except inside tollbooths.
The real lesson here: Hohn turned a 43% drawdown and near-total investor exodus into the highest annual profit any hedge fund has ever generated. He did it by becoming the opposite of what made him famous. Less activism, more patience. Fewer stocks, longer holds. No banks, no airlines, just monopolies that can raise prices faster than inflation.
Sometimes the real alpha comes from nearly losing everything.
*HOHN BREAKS CITADEL’S RECORD WITH $18.9 BILLION TRADING PROFIT tweet
X (formerly Twitter)
zerohedge (@zerohedge) on X
*HOHN BREAKS CITADEL’S RECORD WITH $18.9 BILLION TRADING PROFIT
Offshore
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Moon Dev
HIP-3 Liquidations have been added to the moon dev hyperliquid data layer
you literally can not get this info anywhere else. https://t.co/52Npj6r5EL
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HIP-3 Liquidations have been added to the moon dev hyperliquid data layer
you literally can not get this info anywhere else. https://t.co/52Npj6r5EL
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Offshore
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God of Prompt
RT @alex_prompter: Employers are 3.1x more likely to hire AI-ready talent than retrain you.
That's according to Deloitte's 2025 research.
Jan 22, I'm breaking down exactly which AI skills matter in 2026 (and which are already dead).
Free. 3,000+ seats. AI Skills'2026.
Join for free 👉 https://t.co/H3p5CD8bK3
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RT @alex_prompter: Employers are 3.1x more likely to hire AI-ready talent than retrain you.
That's according to Deloitte's 2025 research.
Jan 22, I'm breaking down exactly which AI skills matter in 2026 (and which are already dead).
Free. 3,000+ seats. AI Skills'2026.
Join for free 👉 https://t.co/H3p5CD8bK3
tweet
Offshore
Video
Startup Archive
Ben Horowitz: Running your company without a board after you’ve raised money is a dangerous idea
Jack Altman asks a16z co-founder Ben Horowitz how important boards are for startups. Some venture capital firms pitch it as a selling point that they don’t take a board seat and leave the founders alone. Others believe they can add a lot of value by taking a board seat.
Ben responds:
“First of all, boards are important for founders. The idea that you’re going to run without a board after you’ve given equity to employees and sold equity to people who are not you is the most dangerous f’ing idea in the world.”
He explains:
“If you know anything about securities laws, the only protection you have as CEO from going to jail or getting personally sued is that you run material ideas through the board. That’s a massive protection. If you want to give a 2% grant to this person in the company, you have to realize you’re a fiduciary to the rest of the company that you’re diluting . . . If you run that by the board, it’s all good — you’re completely protected, no problem. If you just make that on your own and somebody wants to sue you, they’re going to win. You really have very little defense at that point. The idea that you’re not going to have a board is a bad idea. Once you start not owning the company 100%, you have got to have a board. That’s just how it goes.”
Video source: @a16z @jaltma (2026)
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Ben Horowitz: Running your company without a board after you’ve raised money is a dangerous idea
Jack Altman asks a16z co-founder Ben Horowitz how important boards are for startups. Some venture capital firms pitch it as a selling point that they don’t take a board seat and leave the founders alone. Others believe they can add a lot of value by taking a board seat.
Ben responds:
“First of all, boards are important for founders. The idea that you’re going to run without a board after you’ve given equity to employees and sold equity to people who are not you is the most dangerous f’ing idea in the world.”
He explains:
“If you know anything about securities laws, the only protection you have as CEO from going to jail or getting personally sued is that you run material ideas through the board. That’s a massive protection. If you want to give a 2% grant to this person in the company, you have to realize you’re a fiduciary to the rest of the company that you’re diluting . . . If you run that by the board, it’s all good — you’re completely protected, no problem. If you just make that on your own and somebody wants to sue you, they’re going to win. You really have very little defense at that point. The idea that you’re not going to have a board is a bad idea. Once you start not owning the company 100%, you have got to have a board. That’s just how it goes.”
Video source: @a16z @jaltma (2026)
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Offshore
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Dimitry Nakhla | Babylon Capital®
Chris Hohn is a legend & this post by @aakashgupta is beautifully written 📝
My favorite line:
“He did it by becoming the opposite of what made him famous.”
That line hits hard because it captures the rarest trait in investing: humility.
Most people double down on their identity when things go wrong. The great ones evolve — they adapt, simplify, and rebuild their process around what actually works.
In markets, reinvention after failure isn’t a weakness — it can be the source of the next decade of exceptional results.
tweet
Chris Hohn is a legend & this post by @aakashgupta is beautifully written 📝
My favorite line:
“He did it by becoming the opposite of what made him famous.”
That line hits hard because it captures the rarest trait in investing: humility.
Most people double down on their identity when things go wrong. The great ones evolve — they adapt, simplify, and rebuild their process around what actually works.
In markets, reinvention after failure isn’t a weakness — it can be the source of the next decade of exceptional results.
Hohn’s story is wild.
In 2008, he lost 43% and watched his fund collapse from $19 billion to under $5 billion. Investors fled. He publicly swore off activism after getting humiliated in a railroad proxy fight.
17 years later, he just posted the largest single-year hedge fund profit in history.
Here’s what happened in between:
From 2003 to 2007, Chris Hohn was the golden boy of activist investing. He ran TCI like a wrecking ball. Bought 1% of ABN Amro and sent a scathing letter demanding breakup. Triggered a $100 billion bidding war at the peak of the market. Forced out the CEO of Deutsche Börse after killing their London Stock Exchange bid. German politicians called him a “locust.” He didn’t care. Assets soared 30-fold in five years.
Then 2008 hit.
TCI lost 43%. His CSX railroad battle turned into a public disaster when the stock dropped 50% after he won four board seats. He declared defeat, sold his shares, and told the press he was done with activism. By 2012, assets had collapsed to $4.9 billion. Most of his team quit.
What most people don’t know is what Hohn did next.
He looked at his portfolio and realized he’d been playing the wrong game. Special situations. Distressed plays. Banks. He’d strayed from concentration into complexity.
So he rebuilt TCI around a single thesis: own monopolies.
Not “companies with moats.” Actual monopolies. His test: can they price above inflation? If competition can compress margins, he walks. Airlines grow 5% annually and make no money. Airports grow 5% annually and print cash. He wants the airports.
The result is a 10-stock portfolio where GE Aerospace represents 23% of a $50 billion fund. Five holdings account for 73%. Portfolio turnover sits at 21%. Average holding period rivals some marriages.
Griffin’s $16 billion record in 2022 came from running hundreds of strategies across thousands of positions with 2,900 employees. Hohn’s $18.9 billion came from sitting in credit rating agencies and aerospace duopolies for a decade with a team of 8.
Same destination. Opposite paths.
Citadel wins by being everywhere during chaos. TCI wins by being nowhere except inside tollbooths.
The real lesson here: Hohn turned a 43% drawdown and near-total investor exodus into the highest annual profit any hedge fund has ever generated. He did it by becoming the opposite of what made him famous. Less activism, more patience. Fewer stocks, longer holds. No banks, no airlines, just monopolies that can raise prices faster than inflation.
Sometimes the real alpha comes from nearly losing everything. tweet
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Dimitry Nakhla | Babylon Capital®
RT @DimitryNakhla: The reason $CSU is being sold (multiple compression due to AI fears & potential uncertainty surrounding its moat, among other things) 𝙘𝙤𝙪𝙡𝙙 𝙚𝙣𝙙 𝙪𝙥 𝙗𝙚𝙞𝙣𝙜 𝙩𝙝𝙚 𝙚𝙭𝙖𝙘𝙩 𝙧𝙚𝙖𝙨𝙤𝙣 𝙞𝙩𝙨 𝙘𝙖𝙥𝙞𝙩𝙖𝙡 𝙖𝙡𝙡𝙤𝙘𝙖𝙩𝙞𝙤𝙣 𝙚𝙣𝙜𝙞𝙣𝙚 𝙜𝙚𝙩𝙨 𝙗𝙚𝙩𝙩𝙚𝙧 𝙖𝙜𝙖𝙞𝙣
𝐓𝐡𝐞 𝐢𝐫𝐨𝐧𝐲: 𝐭𝐡𝐞 𝐬𝐨𝐟𝐭𝐰𝐚𝐫𝐞 𝐫𝐞-𝐫𝐚𝐭𝐢𝐧𝐠 𝐰𝐞’𝐫𝐞 𝐬𝐞𝐞𝐢𝐧𝐠 𝐭𝐨𝐝𝐚𝐲 (𝐩𝐚𝐫𝐭𝐥𝐲 𝐝𝐫𝐢𝐯𝐞𝐧 𝐛𝐲 𝐀𝐈 𝐝𝐢𝐬𝐫𝐮𝐩𝐭𝐢𝐨𝐧 𝐟𝐞𝐚𝐫𝐬) 𝐦𝐚𝐲 𝐚𝐜𝐭𝐮𝐚𝐥𝐥𝐲 𝐢𝐦𝐩𝐫𝐨𝐯𝐞 $𝐂𝐒𝐔’𝐬 𝐨𝐩𝐩𝐨𝐫𝐭𝐮𝐧𝐢𝐭𝐲 𝐬𝐞𝐭
When public multiples compress, private-market deal pricing often follows — creating better entry points and potentially higher IRRs for $CSU’s next wave of acquisitions
So yes, one of the common critiques many investors will cite is that $CSU returns on capital have been trending down over the last few years
Yet, given this set up, perhaps it will trend higher over the next few years
At 2,845, $CSU looks like an interesting contrarian opportunity amid peak fear
tweet
RT @DimitryNakhla: The reason $CSU is being sold (multiple compression due to AI fears & potential uncertainty surrounding its moat, among other things) 𝙘𝙤𝙪𝙡𝙙 𝙚𝙣𝙙 𝙪𝙥 𝙗𝙚𝙞𝙣𝙜 𝙩𝙝𝙚 𝙚𝙭𝙖𝙘𝙩 𝙧𝙚𝙖𝙨𝙤𝙣 𝙞𝙩𝙨 𝙘𝙖𝙥𝙞𝙩𝙖𝙡 𝙖𝙡𝙡𝙤𝙘𝙖𝙩𝙞𝙤𝙣 𝙚𝙣𝙜𝙞𝙣𝙚 𝙜𝙚𝙩𝙨 𝙗𝙚𝙩𝙩𝙚𝙧 𝙖𝙜𝙖𝙞𝙣
𝐓𝐡𝐞 𝐢𝐫𝐨𝐧𝐲: 𝐭𝐡𝐞 𝐬𝐨𝐟𝐭𝐰𝐚𝐫𝐞 𝐫𝐞-𝐫𝐚𝐭𝐢𝐧𝐠 𝐰𝐞’𝐫𝐞 𝐬𝐞𝐞𝐢𝐧𝐠 𝐭𝐨𝐝𝐚𝐲 (𝐩𝐚𝐫𝐭𝐥𝐲 𝐝𝐫𝐢𝐯𝐞𝐧 𝐛𝐲 𝐀𝐈 𝐝𝐢𝐬𝐫𝐮𝐩𝐭𝐢𝐨𝐧 𝐟𝐞𝐚𝐫𝐬) 𝐦𝐚𝐲 𝐚𝐜𝐭𝐮𝐚𝐥𝐥𝐲 𝐢𝐦𝐩𝐫𝐨𝐯𝐞 $𝐂𝐒𝐔’𝐬 𝐨𝐩𝐩𝐨𝐫𝐭𝐮𝐧𝐢𝐭𝐲 𝐬𝐞𝐭
When public multiples compress, private-market deal pricing often follows — creating better entry points and potentially higher IRRs for $CSU’s next wave of acquisitions
So yes, one of the common critiques many investors will cite is that $CSU returns on capital have been trending down over the last few years
Yet, given this set up, perhaps it will trend higher over the next few years
At 2,845, $CSU looks like an interesting contrarian opportunity amid peak fear
tweet