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EndGame Macro
The Day Selling Hit a 35 Year High
This chart is showing the amount of selling happening in stocks that finished down absolutely exploded, to a level we’ve never seen going back to 1990. Declining volume blew past the spikes from 2001, 2008, COVID, everything.
When you get a print like that it’s a sign that the bulk of trading activity was concentrated in stocks getting hit, and hit hard.
Why a Move This Extreme Happens
When declining volume goes vertical like this, the market is usually dealing with a mix of deeper stresses:
Forced or systematic selling
These aren’t the kind of moves retail or even most discretionary funds create. This looks like leverage coming off CTAs, vol targeting funds, risk parity models, hedge funds trimming exposure because their signals flipped or their risk limits got breached. In other words, it’s mechanical, not emotional.
Fragile positioning under the surface
A market with strong, broad participation doesn’t produce this kind of washout. This tends to happen when everyone is crowded into the same themes, the same baskets, the same trades and something nudges the whole group in the opposite direction at the same time. It’s less about panic and more about the structure being brittle.
A late cycle feel
These readings almost always show up when liquidity is tight enough that selling pressure has real bite. Think back to the clusters in the chart: the early 2000s, the lead up to and aftermath of 2008, the 2020 shock. Those were moments when the system was stretched, not relaxed.
What It Means Going Forward
A one off spike doesn’t tell you whether we’re at the beginning of a downturn or the end of a selloff. But it does tell you the environment has changed.
This is the kind of signal you get when the market becomes more sensitive to bad news, when liquidity cushions are thinner, and when small shocks turn into bigger reactions than they would have a year or two ago. It doesn’t guarantee a major move but it raises the probability that the next macro wobble hits harder than expected.
So the takeaway is that the market just showed you how tightly wound it’s become and that’s something you don’t ignore, especially this late in the cycle.
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The Day Selling Hit a 35 Year High
This chart is showing the amount of selling happening in stocks that finished down absolutely exploded, to a level we’ve never seen going back to 1990. Declining volume blew past the spikes from 2001, 2008, COVID, everything.
When you get a print like that it’s a sign that the bulk of trading activity was concentrated in stocks getting hit, and hit hard.
Why a Move This Extreme Happens
When declining volume goes vertical like this, the market is usually dealing with a mix of deeper stresses:
Forced or systematic selling
These aren’t the kind of moves retail or even most discretionary funds create. This looks like leverage coming off CTAs, vol targeting funds, risk parity models, hedge funds trimming exposure because their signals flipped or their risk limits got breached. In other words, it’s mechanical, not emotional.
Fragile positioning under the surface
A market with strong, broad participation doesn’t produce this kind of washout. This tends to happen when everyone is crowded into the same themes, the same baskets, the same trades and something nudges the whole group in the opposite direction at the same time. It’s less about panic and more about the structure being brittle.
A late cycle feel
These readings almost always show up when liquidity is tight enough that selling pressure has real bite. Think back to the clusters in the chart: the early 2000s, the lead up to and aftermath of 2008, the 2020 shock. Those were moments when the system was stretched, not relaxed.
What It Means Going Forward
A one off spike doesn’t tell you whether we’re at the beginning of a downturn or the end of a selloff. But it does tell you the environment has changed.
This is the kind of signal you get when the market becomes more sensitive to bad news, when liquidity cushions are thinner, and when small shocks turn into bigger reactions than they would have a year or two ago. It doesn’t guarantee a major move but it raises the probability that the next macro wobble hits harder than expected.
So the takeaway is that the market just showed you how tightly wound it’s become and that’s something you don’t ignore, especially this late in the cycle.
@cvpayne @SteveMiran The market seems to be getting anxious about it. Yesterday the market saw its biggest single day declining volume. ($NYDNV) https://t.co/foXpT9GTQh tweet
EndGame Macro
Rate cuts are a blunt demand tool, and the cracks in today’s labor market don’t look like a classic not enough demand problem. We’ve got sector mismatches (tech and goods shedding workers while services still hires), firms over levered from the zero rate era, and productivity and automation shocks hitting certain categories of jobs. Cutting another 25–50 bps won’t suddenly make a busted business model viable or retrain a laid off warehouse worker into a nurse. It just makes money cheaper at the margin.
At the same time, inflation is still hovering close enough to target that the Fed is haunted by the 1970s precedent…ease too early into a still warm economy and you don’t get a huge employment gain, you just loosen financial conditions again, pump asset prices, and risk a second leg of inflation. With a pretty flat Phillips curve, the Fed’s worry is that rate cuts don’t buy you much in terms of jobs, but do buy you more pressure on rents, services, and risk assets.
So when he says “cuts won’t patch job market cracks, could do damage to inflation,” the mental model is that the problems in this labor market are slow moving and structural, not a sudden collapse in aggregate demand. Monetary policy can’t micro target those, it can only spray gasoline on overall demand. And from that vantage point, more easing now looks like a bad trade off…limited help for employment, real risk of undoing the hard won progress on inflation and credibility.
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Rate cuts are a blunt demand tool, and the cracks in today’s labor market don’t look like a classic not enough demand problem. We’ve got sector mismatches (tech and goods shedding workers while services still hires), firms over levered from the zero rate era, and productivity and automation shocks hitting certain categories of jobs. Cutting another 25–50 bps won’t suddenly make a busted business model viable or retrain a laid off warehouse worker into a nurse. It just makes money cheaper at the margin.
At the same time, inflation is still hovering close enough to target that the Fed is haunted by the 1970s precedent…ease too early into a still warm economy and you don’t get a huge employment gain, you just loosen financial conditions again, pump asset prices, and risk a second leg of inflation. With a pretty flat Phillips curve, the Fed’s worry is that rate cuts don’t buy you much in terms of jobs, but do buy you more pressure on rents, services, and risk assets.
So when he says “cuts won’t patch job market cracks, could do damage to inflation,” the mental model is that the problems in this labor market are slow moving and structural, not a sudden collapse in aggregate demand. Monetary policy can’t micro target those, it can only spray gasoline on overall demand. And from that vantage point, more easing now looks like a bad trade off…limited help for employment, real risk of undoing the hard won progress on inflation and credibility.
FED'S SCHMID: FURTHER RATE CUTS WON'T PATCH JOB MARKET CRACKS, COULD DO DAMAGE TO INFLATION tweet
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EndGame Macro (@onechancefreedm) on X
Rate cuts are a blunt demand tool, and the cracks in today’s labor market don’t look like a classic not enough demand problem. We’ve got sector mismatches (tech and goods shedding workers while services still hires), firms over levered from the zero rate…
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Fiscal.ai
$MNDY is down 40% in the last year over fears of AI disruption.
Is this what being disrupted by AI looks like? https://t.co/1uukYCArSJ
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$MNDY is down 40% in the last year over fears of AI disruption.
Is this what being disrupted by AI looks like? https://t.co/1uukYCArSJ
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App Economy Insights
📊 This Week in Visuals:
🥕 Instacart
📱 Tencent
🪙 Circle
🖥️ Sony
and many more!
$TCEHY $CSCO $SONY $AMAT $SE $NU $CRWV $JD $FLUT $CRCL $ONON $CART $MNDY $DLO
https://t.co/19y4SKZ0zR
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📊 This Week in Visuals:
🥕 Instacart
📱 Tencent
🪙 Circle
🖥️ Sony
and many more!
$TCEHY $CSCO $SONY $AMAT $SE $NU $CRWV $JD $FLUT $CRCL $ONON $CART $MNDY $DLO
https://t.co/19y4SKZ0zR
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EndGame Macro
RT @DiMartinoBooth: 👇👇👇
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RT @DiMartinoBooth: 👇👇👇
The Fed Just Checked the Brakes
If this story is right, it’s the clearest tell yet that the Fed knows the plumbing is getting tight and is trying to fix the umbrella before it rains.
The standing repo facility (SRF) is supposed to be the fire extinguisher on the wall so if funding gets tight, dealers hand the Fed Treasuries, get cash overnight at a known rate, and repo markets calm down. The fact that New York Fed felt the need to call the big banks in and ask, “Why aren’t you using this thing, even when market rates trade above it?” tells you two things at once:
They’re Seeing Real Strain Under The Surface
You don’t convene that meeting if everything is perfectly “ample.” Between QT about to end, a big TGA, heavy Treasury issuance, and RRP nearly empty, reserves are a lot thinner than the headline balance sheet makes it look. The recent pops in SOFR and episodes where private repo traded above the SRF rate are exactly the kind of signals that would make them nervous about a 2019 style funding spike.
They’re Worried The Safety Valve Won’t Actually Be Used In An Accident
Banks still treat Fed backstops with stigma: because tapping a facility can look like weakness to risk committees, boards, shareholders, or regulators. Add operational friction (legal docs, intraday limits, internal charges) and you get a tool that exists on paper, but isn’t the first call when funding gets sticky. The Fed does not want to discover in real time that its main shock absorber is psychologically or operationally off limits.
So My Read Is This
This meeting is less about announcing a new problem and more about the Fed admitting to itself that we’re at the edge of the ample reserves zone. They’re trying to destigmatize the SRF, understand what would make dealers actually use it, and buy insurance against the combination of a high TGA, low RRP, and continued issuance colliding with some random shock.
For markets, that cuts both ways. On one hand, it’s reassuring: the Fed is paying attention and doesn’t want a plumbing accident. If they tweak terms, widen access, or just convince dealers the SRF is safe to use, short term funding should be more stable. On the other hand, it’s a quiet confirmation of what the SOFR spikes and H.4.1 have been hinting at: the buffers are thin. When the central bank is calling around about its emergency hose, it’s because they see dry brush building up around the house.
This is a sign we’re close enough to the edge that the Fed is double checking the brakes. Liquidity can still look fine day to day, but in a late cycle setup like this, even small shocks hit harder than they did a year ago. tweet
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EndGame Macro
Holiday Demand Is Missing in Action
This is the linehaul spot rate, what truckers earn per mile, excluding fuel. Normally, heading into Thanksgiving, this chart bends up. Shippers rush to move last minute retail volume, carriers gain leverage, and spot rates usually get a seasonal lift.
But here, the line is fading. After peaking near $1.83 in early November, rates are sliding back toward $1.74 just as we enter one of the busiest weeks of the year. That’s the opposite of what this season typically delivers.
What It Likely Means Under the Surface
The simplest way to read this is that demand is soft and capacity is still too loose.
Retailers don’t seem to be scrambling for trucks. Either they ordered early, they’re keeping inventories lean, or consumer goods demand just isn’t strong enough to stress the network. When shippers feel no urgency, carriers lose pricing power even during peak season.
And remember we’ve been living through an extended freight downturn. Too many trucks, not enough loads. That dynamic doesn’t magically fix itself during the holidays, especially when smaller carriers are still feeling the pinch from higher operating costs and tight margins.
Contract freight is also likely absorbing the healthier lanes, leaving the spot market as the overflow and that overflow doesn’t look very full.
Why It Matters
Cooling spot rates into Thanksgiving is one more soft signal from the real economy. It’s not saying things are falling apart; it’s saying things aren’t heating up either. Freight tends to turn before the broader economy, and right now it’s telling you that demand is “meh” than having momentum.
So when this chart dips into a major holiday instead of spiking, it’s not a fluke. It’s freight quietly reminding us that the goods side of the economy is still fragile and the people most exposed to that fragility are the small and mid sized carriers who usually count on Q4 to bail them out.
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Holiday Demand Is Missing in Action
This is the linehaul spot rate, what truckers earn per mile, excluding fuel. Normally, heading into Thanksgiving, this chart bends up. Shippers rush to move last minute retail volume, carriers gain leverage, and spot rates usually get a seasonal lift.
But here, the line is fading. After peaking near $1.83 in early November, rates are sliding back toward $1.74 just as we enter one of the busiest weeks of the year. That’s the opposite of what this season typically delivers.
What It Likely Means Under the Surface
The simplest way to read this is that demand is soft and capacity is still too loose.
Retailers don’t seem to be scrambling for trucks. Either they ordered early, they’re keeping inventories lean, or consumer goods demand just isn’t strong enough to stress the network. When shippers feel no urgency, carriers lose pricing power even during peak season.
And remember we’ve been living through an extended freight downturn. Too many trucks, not enough loads. That dynamic doesn’t magically fix itself during the holidays, especially when smaller carriers are still feeling the pinch from higher operating costs and tight margins.
Contract freight is also likely absorbing the healthier lanes, leaving the spot market as the overflow and that overflow doesn’t look very full.
Why It Matters
Cooling spot rates into Thanksgiving is one more soft signal from the real economy. It’s not saying things are falling apart; it’s saying things aren’t heating up either. Freight tends to turn before the broader economy, and right now it’s telling you that demand is “meh” than having momentum.
So when this chart dips into a major holiday instead of spiking, it’s not a fluke. It’s freight quietly reminding us that the goods side of the economy is still fragile and the people most exposed to that fragility are the small and mid sized carriers who usually count on Q4 to bail them out.
Spot rates are cooling off as we move into Thanksgiving week.
This is not normal. Spot rates usually cook as we head into a major holiday. https://t.co/UkNhMtrNJM tweet
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EndGame Macro
What Harvard’s IBIT Position Is Really Telling Us
IBIT sits at the top of their 13F slice, towering over Microsoft, Amazon, Alphabet, Meta, and even gold. But that’s more about the way 13Fs work than Harvard suddenly reinventing itself.
A 13F only shows one narrow sleeve of their public equity book. The whole endowment is about $57 billion, and this position is roughly 1% at the total level. It only shows up as 20% here because the rest of the holdings in this slice are smaller, spread out positions. So this isn’t Harvard loading the boat on Bitcoin. It’s Harvard placing a small, asymmetric long term bet that just looks oversized inside this particular window.
Why Make This Move Now?
If you look at the university’s financial backdrop, the timing becomes a lot more intuitive. Harvard just ran a $113 million operating deficit. Federal funding was frozen during a political fight. A new endowment tax is about to chew hundreds of millions a year starting in 2026. Donations toward the endowment have softened. And they issued $750 million in bonds earlier this year to keep operations steady.
They’re not in distress, but the flow of money around them is getting tighter. In that environment, big, long lived institutions often reach for a little more return. Not recklessly but just enough to tilt the long term math in their favor. Pensions do it through private equity. Endowments do it through venture. Bitcoin, in ETF form, has become another way to do the same thing without overhauling the entire risk budget.
A 1% position barely hurts if it flops, but it matters if it compounds. That’s exactly the kind of trade endowments like Harvard are comfortable making.
How They’re Probably Framing Bitcoin Internally
Look at the neighbors in the holdings list…Microsoft, Amazon, Alphabet, Meta, Nvidia, Taiwan Semi, plus gold. That’s not random. It shows how they see Bitcoin somewhere between digital gold and high beta tech optionality.
It’s a hedge against a long term world where governments run persistent deficits, liquidity comes in unpredictable waves, and real returns are harder to find. And it’s a call option on a future where digital infrastructure like payments, custody, tokenization becomes a bigger part of the financial system.
For an allocator thinking in decades, not quarters, that makes practical sense.
Why the ETF Structure Was a Breakthrough
The other reason this is happening now is simple: the wrapper finally works for them.
A spot ETF solves every headache that kept institutions away like custody, compliance, reporting, liquidity, accounting. It turns Bitcoin into something that looks just like GLD, QQQ, or any other clean line item. That’s when conservative pools of capital finally move: when the operational risk goes away.
The Bigger Meaning
Harvard didn’t suddenly believe in Bitcoin. They made a small, thoughtful allocation that fits their long term goals, reflects the tougher funding environment they’re facing, and positions them inside an emerging financial landscape instead of outside it.
The real signal isn’t that Harvard is betting big on crypto. It’s that Harvard is no longer treating Bitcoin as something outside the institutional universe.
When one of the most cautious, traditional stewards of capital on earth decides Bitcoin belongs in the portfolio, even at 1% it tells you the asset has crossed a psychological line.
We’re not at the beginning of that shift anymore. We’re somewhere in the middle.
Just checked and yeah $IBIT is now Harvard's largest position in its 13F and its biggest position increase in Q3. It's super rare/difficult to get an endowment to bite on an ETF- esp a Harvard or Yale, it's as good a validation as an ETF can get. That said, half a billion is a mere 1% of total endowment. Big enough to rank 16th among IBIT holders tho. - Eric Balchunas tweet
What Harvard’s IBIT Position Is Really Telling Us
IBIT sits at the top of their 13F slice, towering over Microsoft, Amazon, Alphabet, Meta, and even gold. But that’s more about the way 13Fs work than Harvard suddenly reinventing itself.
A 13F only shows one narrow sleeve of their public equity book. The whole endowment is about $57 billion, and this position is roughly 1% at the total level. It only shows up as 20% here because the rest of the holdings in this slice are smaller, spread out positions. So this isn’t Harvard loading the boat on Bitcoin. It’s Harvard placing a small, asymmetric long term bet that just looks oversized inside this particular window.
Why Make This Move Now?
If you look at the university’s financial backdrop, the timing becomes a lot more intuitive. Harvard just ran a $113 million operating deficit. Federal funding was frozen during a political fight. A new endowment tax is about to chew hundreds of millions a year starting in 2026. Donations toward the endowment have softened. And they issued $750 million in bonds earlier this year to keep operations steady.
They’re not in distress, but the flow of money around them is getting tighter. In that environment, big, long lived institutions often reach for a little more return. Not recklessly but just enough to tilt the long term math in their favor. Pensions do it through private equity. Endowments do it through venture. Bitcoin, in ETF form, has become another way to do the same thing without overhauling the entire risk budget.
A 1% position barely hurts if it flops, but it matters if it compounds. That’s exactly the kind of trade endowments like Harvard are comfortable making.
How They’re Probably Framing Bitcoin Internally
Look at the neighbors in the holdings list…Microsoft, Amazon, Alphabet, Meta, Nvidia, Taiwan Semi, plus gold. That’s not random. It shows how they see Bitcoin somewhere between digital gold and high beta tech optionality.
It’s a hedge against a long term world where governments run persistent deficits, liquidity comes in unpredictable waves, and real returns are harder to find. And it’s a call option on a future where digital infrastructure like payments, custody, tokenization becomes a bigger part of the financial system.
For an allocator thinking in decades, not quarters, that makes practical sense.
Why the ETF Structure Was a Breakthrough
The other reason this is happening now is simple: the wrapper finally works for them.
A spot ETF solves every headache that kept institutions away like custody, compliance, reporting, liquidity, accounting. It turns Bitcoin into something that looks just like GLD, QQQ, or any other clean line item. That’s when conservative pools of capital finally move: when the operational risk goes away.
The Bigger Meaning
Harvard didn’t suddenly believe in Bitcoin. They made a small, thoughtful allocation that fits their long term goals, reflects the tougher funding environment they’re facing, and positions them inside an emerging financial landscape instead of outside it.
The real signal isn’t that Harvard is betting big on crypto. It’s that Harvard is no longer treating Bitcoin as something outside the institutional universe.
When one of the most cautious, traditional stewards of capital on earth decides Bitcoin belongs in the portfolio, even at 1% it tells you the asset has crossed a psychological line.
We’re not at the beginning of that shift anymore. We’re somewhere in the middle.
Just checked and yeah $IBIT is now Harvard's largest position in its 13F and its biggest position increase in Q3. It's super rare/difficult to get an endowment to bite on an ETF- esp a Harvard or Yale, it's as good a validation as an ETF can get. That said, half a billion is a mere 1% of total endowment. Big enough to rank 16th among IBIT holders tho. - Eric Balchunas tweet
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🗓️ What are you watching this week?
• Tuesday: $AS $KLAR $PDD
• Wednesday: $NVDA $PANW $TGT $BLSH
• Thursday: $WMT $INTU $VEEV $ESTC $NTES
All visualized in our newsletter. https://t.co/j4Zb8NHOZv
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🗓️ What are you watching this week?
• Tuesday: $AS $KLAR $PDD
• Wednesday: $NVDA $PANW $TGT $BLSH
• Thursday: $WMT $INTU $VEEV $ESTC $NTES
All visualized in our newsletter. https://t.co/j4Zb8NHOZv
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EndGame Macro
RT @onechancefreedm: (2/2) This triangulation matters. Washington’s pressure on cartels and its push to realign Venezuelan oil exports are designed not only to weaken Maduro but to block China from entrenching its role as creditor and investor, and to prevent Russia from securing permanent military outposts in the Caribbean basin. By dismantling cartel controlled flows of minerals, fuel, and shadow finance, the U.S. aims to deny Beijing and Moscow channels through which they can project power. In effect, cartels are the lever by which rivals can tap the hemisphere’s resources and liquidity outside U.S. oversight. Breaking that lever is a prerequisite to maintaining dominance.
The Fourth Turning framework amplifies the stakes. Every 80–90 years, U.S. order has reset through crisis: the Civil War, the Depression and WWII, the Cold War and Bretton Woods. Each climax produced new institutions and new definitions of power. By that cycle, the decisive window is 2025–2032. The dollar order created after 1971 is fraying under debt, inflation shocks, and rival clearing systems experimenting with gold, commodities, or digital rails. To preserve leverage through this reset, Washington must secure uncontested depth at home. That means ensuring that oil from Guyana and Venezuela flows west, that lithium and rare earths are channeled into Western industries, that migration crises are controlled, and that shadow banking no longer launders cartel dollars in ways that undermine the financial system.
Grandin and Leech help decode why Venezuela is pivotal. Grandin shows us that U.S. interventions in Latin America are not distractions but rehearsals for global contests, refining methods that are later applied elsewhere. Leech reminds us that behind every campaign lies energy: wars, sanctions, and financial crackdowns follow the pipelines of oil and minerals. Add China and Russia into the frame and the picture sharpens: Beijing building credit and trade networks to tilt the hemisphere eastward, Moscow offering military muscle to erode U.S. dominance.
The risk is timing. If cartels remain powerful, if Chinese loans sustain Caracas, or if Russian arms alter the balance of deterrence in the Caribbean, the U.S. could face simultaneous crises abroad and instability at home just as the global order resets. But if Washington succeeds in breaking cartel sovereignty, redirecting oil flows, and limiting Beijing and Moscow’s footholds, it would emerge into the next system with secure depth, resource corridors intact, and dollar dominance reinforced.
In this light, the struggle in Venezuela is foundational. It is where imperial methods are tested again, where energy and minerals are rewired into U.S.-aligned circuits, and where rivals are blocked from turning the hemisphere into a pressure point. Grandin and Leech provided the intellectual scaffolding to see this. The contest now unfolding, between Washington’s bid to reassert control, China’s economic lifelines, and Russia’s military shield, is not about one man in Caracas. It is about who writes the rules of the next global order.
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RT @onechancefreedm: (2/2) This triangulation matters. Washington’s pressure on cartels and its push to realign Venezuelan oil exports are designed not only to weaken Maduro but to block China from entrenching its role as creditor and investor, and to prevent Russia from securing permanent military outposts in the Caribbean basin. By dismantling cartel controlled flows of minerals, fuel, and shadow finance, the U.S. aims to deny Beijing and Moscow channels through which they can project power. In effect, cartels are the lever by which rivals can tap the hemisphere’s resources and liquidity outside U.S. oversight. Breaking that lever is a prerequisite to maintaining dominance.
The Fourth Turning framework amplifies the stakes. Every 80–90 years, U.S. order has reset through crisis: the Civil War, the Depression and WWII, the Cold War and Bretton Woods. Each climax produced new institutions and new definitions of power. By that cycle, the decisive window is 2025–2032. The dollar order created after 1971 is fraying under debt, inflation shocks, and rival clearing systems experimenting with gold, commodities, or digital rails. To preserve leverage through this reset, Washington must secure uncontested depth at home. That means ensuring that oil from Guyana and Venezuela flows west, that lithium and rare earths are channeled into Western industries, that migration crises are controlled, and that shadow banking no longer launders cartel dollars in ways that undermine the financial system.
Grandin and Leech help decode why Venezuela is pivotal. Grandin shows us that U.S. interventions in Latin America are not distractions but rehearsals for global contests, refining methods that are later applied elsewhere. Leech reminds us that behind every campaign lies energy: wars, sanctions, and financial crackdowns follow the pipelines of oil and minerals. Add China and Russia into the frame and the picture sharpens: Beijing building credit and trade networks to tilt the hemisphere eastward, Moscow offering military muscle to erode U.S. dominance.
The risk is timing. If cartels remain powerful, if Chinese loans sustain Caracas, or if Russian arms alter the balance of deterrence in the Caribbean, the U.S. could face simultaneous crises abroad and instability at home just as the global order resets. But if Washington succeeds in breaking cartel sovereignty, redirecting oil flows, and limiting Beijing and Moscow’s footholds, it would emerge into the next system with secure depth, resource corridors intact, and dollar dominance reinforced.
In this light, the struggle in Venezuela is foundational. It is where imperial methods are tested again, where energy and minerals are rewired into U.S.-aligned circuits, and where rivals are blocked from turning the hemisphere into a pressure point. Grandin and Leech provided the intellectual scaffolding to see this. The contest now unfolding, between Washington’s bid to reassert control, China’s economic lifelines, and Russia’s military shield, is not about one man in Caracas. It is about who writes the rules of the next global order.
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RT @onechancefreedm: (1/2) Empire’s Workshop, Crude Interventions, and the New Struggle for Venezuela: U.S., China, Russia, and the Fight to Lock Down the Hemisphere
Greg Grandin’s Empire’s Workshop argued that Latin America was the testing ground where Washington refined the tools of modern empire with sanctions, covert wars, regime destabilization, and the ability to fold raw power into the language of democracy. Garry Leech’s Crude Interventions showed how U.S. foreign policy cannot be separated from oil, with military campaigns and financial pressure used to guarantee access to hydrocarbons and maintain the global dollar order. When read together, these books describe with eerie precision the storm now unfolding around Venezuela.
The U.S. is not treating Venezuela as a peripheral crisis but as a hinge point for the Western Hemisphere. Washington knows that in a Fourth Turning moment, when institutional and monetary systems globally are under stress, it cannot afford to let rivals exploit instability in its own backyard. This is why the narrative of a drug war has given way to a broader strategic frame: cartels as shadow sovereigns, controlling not only narcotics but also ports, trucking fleets, pipelines, minerals, and even migration flows. By designating them as terrorist entities, sanctioning their banks, and targeting their logistics networks, the U.S. is asserting that migration, minerals, and energy corridors fall under national security, not law enforcement.
Here Grandin’s thesis is alive: Latin America once again becomes the workshop where imperial methods are refined. But Leech’s oil centric warning is also central: this is not ultimately about law enforcement, it is about restructuring energy and financial flows to ensure they remain under U.S. command. Guyana’s new oil reserves, Venezuelan offshore rigs, and cartel linked extortion of refineries are treated as strategic arteries of the global economy. Washington’s military patrols in the Caribbean, sanctions on narco linked banks, and crackdowns on illicit shipping are less about Maduro than about guaranteeing that adversaries cannot disrupt or capture these arteries.
China and Russia complicate this picture. Beijing has become Venezuela’s primary creditor and economic lifeline, providing billions in loans, supplying oil and goods to circumvent U.S. sanctions, and securing new deals to develop oil fields that could generate over $1 billion in investment by 2026. Beyond Venezuela, China is now the leading trading partner for much of South America, backing infrastructure projects from Brazilian ports to Chilean energy grids. Its strategy is patient, embedding influence through debt, trade, and long term supply chains.
Russia, by contrast, plays a narrower but sharper role. Its influence rests on military and security cooperation. In 2025, Moscow and Caracas signed a new strategic partnership, followed by the opening of a Kalashnikov ammunition factory in Venezuela. Russia also positions itself as lender of last resort, offering oil swaps and financial lifelines despite sanctions. On the information front, it aligns with Maduro’s worldview, using state media to amplify narratives of resistance against U.S. imperialism. Its objective is less about economic penetration than about ensuring the U.S. faces constant friction in its own hemisphere. Continued on page 2…..
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RT @onechancefreedm: (1/2) Empire’s Workshop, Crude Interventions, and the New Struggle for Venezuela: U.S., China, Russia, and the Fight to Lock Down the Hemisphere
Greg Grandin’s Empire’s Workshop argued that Latin America was the testing ground where Washington refined the tools of modern empire with sanctions, covert wars, regime destabilization, and the ability to fold raw power into the language of democracy. Garry Leech’s Crude Interventions showed how U.S. foreign policy cannot be separated from oil, with military campaigns and financial pressure used to guarantee access to hydrocarbons and maintain the global dollar order. When read together, these books describe with eerie precision the storm now unfolding around Venezuela.
The U.S. is not treating Venezuela as a peripheral crisis but as a hinge point for the Western Hemisphere. Washington knows that in a Fourth Turning moment, when institutional and monetary systems globally are under stress, it cannot afford to let rivals exploit instability in its own backyard. This is why the narrative of a drug war has given way to a broader strategic frame: cartels as shadow sovereigns, controlling not only narcotics but also ports, trucking fleets, pipelines, minerals, and even migration flows. By designating them as terrorist entities, sanctioning their banks, and targeting their logistics networks, the U.S. is asserting that migration, minerals, and energy corridors fall under national security, not law enforcement.
Here Grandin’s thesis is alive: Latin America once again becomes the workshop where imperial methods are refined. But Leech’s oil centric warning is also central: this is not ultimately about law enforcement, it is about restructuring energy and financial flows to ensure they remain under U.S. command. Guyana’s new oil reserves, Venezuelan offshore rigs, and cartel linked extortion of refineries are treated as strategic arteries of the global economy. Washington’s military patrols in the Caribbean, sanctions on narco linked banks, and crackdowns on illicit shipping are less about Maduro than about guaranteeing that adversaries cannot disrupt or capture these arteries.
China and Russia complicate this picture. Beijing has become Venezuela’s primary creditor and economic lifeline, providing billions in loans, supplying oil and goods to circumvent U.S. sanctions, and securing new deals to develop oil fields that could generate over $1 billion in investment by 2026. Beyond Venezuela, China is now the leading trading partner for much of South America, backing infrastructure projects from Brazilian ports to Chilean energy grids. Its strategy is patient, embedding influence through debt, trade, and long term supply chains.
Russia, by contrast, plays a narrower but sharper role. Its influence rests on military and security cooperation. In 2025, Moscow and Caracas signed a new strategic partnership, followed by the opening of a Kalashnikov ammunition factory in Venezuela. Russia also positions itself as lender of last resort, offering oil swaps and financial lifelines despite sanctions. On the information front, it aligns with Maduro’s worldview, using state media to amplify narratives of resistance against U.S. imperialism. Its objective is less about economic penetration than about ensuring the U.S. faces constant friction in its own hemisphere. Continued on page 2…..
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