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Javier Blas
RT @citrinowicz: The Collapse? of Nuclear Talks – A Brief Analysis

A. Even if the meeting in Oman will occure, the recent events highlights the fact that the chances of agreement are very low.

B. The core reason for this is not merely a gap in positions, but a far deeper and more dangerous gap in how each side perceives the other.

C. Iran’s Supreme Leader, inherently suspicious of the United States in general and of the current U.S. president in particular, arrives at this moment after series of events he views as part of a coordinated campaign to topple the regime: the recent military confrontation, and more importantly, the wave of domestic protests across Iran.

D. From this perspective, it is unsurprising that he is unwilling to compromise on what he sees as the regime’s foundational principles. From his vantage point, it is entirely plausible that the United States has already decided on a military strike, or is at least working with regional allies to degrade Iran’s ability to defend itself. Faced with this reality, he prefers to risk a strike rather than concede.

E. By contrast, the U.S. administration appears to be operating from the assumption that Iran has been significantly weakened, strategically, economically, and domestically—by the recent conflict and internal unrest.

F. In Washington’s assessment, this exposure, combined with sustained military pressure and force projection, should eventually compel Tehran to accept U.S. terms not only on the nuclear program, but also on missiles and regional proxies.

G. This perception gap prevents the sides from even sitting down at the table, because at a basic level they have little to negotiate. Both may wish to avoid escalation, and both may prefer a negotiated compromise, but their underlying assumptions about leverage and vulnerability are fundamentally incompatible.

H. It is easy to dismiss Iran’s self-perception as exaggerated or detached from reality. Yet from the regime’s standpoint, its survival through both military confrontation and domestic unrest reinforces the belief that it has withstood a broader Western plot. This belief is central to its strategic calculus.

I. As a result, even if talks will take place in Oman against all odds because of Qatari involvement, the starting positions all but guarantee failure. As long as Ayatollah Khamenei remains in power, no amount of pressure from Washington is likely to produce capitulation. At the same time, regime collapse is no guarantee of a stable or democratic Iran; it could just as easily produce greater instability.

J. Iran’s current trajectory is unsustainable, but for its leadership, ideological fidelity to the revolution outweighs economic well-being or long-term national viability. In their view, abandoning these principles would mean abandoning the revolution itself.

K. There is little value in playing a game of chicken with Iran. It is highly doubtful they will back down even an inch. This leaves the administration with a stark choice: make profound concessions at the negotiating table, or drift toward military action. One reality must be acknowledged—regardless of pressure, threats, or signaling, Iran is not going to accept Washington’s terms.

Under current conditions, escalation appears increasingly unavoidable but not necessary imminent.

#IranRevolution2026
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