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God of Prompt
RT @alex_prompter: Employers are 3.1x more likely to hire AI-ready talent than retrain you.

That's according to Deloitte's 2025 research.

Jan 22, I'm breaking down exactly which AI skills matter in 2026 (and which are already dead).

Free. 3,000+ seats. AI Skills'2026.

Join for free ๐Ÿ‘‰ https://t.co/H3p5CD8bK3
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Startup Archive
Ben Horowitz: Running your company without a board after youโ€™ve raised money is a dangerous idea

Jack Altman asks a16z co-founder Ben Horowitz how important boards are for startups. Some venture capital firms pitch it as a selling point that they donโ€™t take a board seat and leave the founders alone. Others believe they can add a lot of value by taking a board seat.

Ben responds:

โ€œFirst of all, boards are important for founders. The idea that youโ€™re going to run without a board after youโ€™ve given equity to employees and sold equity to people who are not you is the most dangerous fโ€™ing idea in the world.โ€

He explains:

โ€œIf you know anything about securities laws, the only protection you have as CEO from going to jail or getting personally sued is that you run material ideas through the board. Thatโ€™s a massive protection. If you want to give a 2% grant to this person in the company, you have to realize youโ€™re a fiduciary to the rest of the company that youโ€™re diluting . . . If you run that by the board, itโ€™s all good โ€” youโ€™re completely protected, no problem. If you just make that on your own and somebody wants to sue you, theyโ€™re going to win. You really have very little defense at that point. The idea that youโ€™re not going to have a board is a bad idea. Once you start not owning the company 100%, you have got to have a board. Thatโ€™s just how it goes.โ€

Video source: @a16z @jaltma (2026)
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Giuliano
CEO Archetype: The Operator
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Dimitry Nakhla | Babylon Capitalยฎ
Chris Hohn is a legend & this post by @aakashgupta is beautifully written ๐Ÿ“

My favorite line:

โ€œHe did it by becoming the opposite of what made him famous.โ€

That line hits hard because it captures the rarest trait in investing: humility.

Most people double down on their identity when things go wrong. The great ones evolve โ€” they adapt, simplify, and rebuild their process around what actually works.

In markets, reinvention after failure isnโ€™t a weakness โ€” it can be the source of the next decade of exceptional results.

Hohnโ€™s story is wild.

In 2008, he lost 43% and watched his fund collapse from $19 billion to under $5 billion. Investors fled. He publicly swore off activism after getting humiliated in a railroad proxy fight.

17 years later, he just posted the largest single-year hedge fund profit in history.

Hereโ€™s what happened in between:

From 2003 to 2007, Chris Hohn was the golden boy of activist investing. He ran TCI like a wrecking ball. Bought 1% of ABN Amro and sent a scathing letter demanding breakup. Triggered a $100 billion bidding war at the peak of the market. Forced out the CEO of Deutsche Bรถrse after killing their London Stock Exchange bid. German politicians called him a โ€œlocust.โ€ He didnโ€™t care. Assets soared 30-fold in five years.

Then 2008 hit.

TCI lost 43%. His CSX railroad battle turned into a public disaster when the stock dropped 50% after he won four board seats. He declared defeat, sold his shares, and told the press he was done with activism. By 2012, assets had collapsed to $4.9 billion. Most of his team quit.

What most people donโ€™t know is what Hohn did next.

He looked at his portfolio and realized heโ€™d been playing the wrong game. Special situations. Distressed plays. Banks. Heโ€™d strayed from concentration into complexity.

So he rebuilt TCI around a single thesis: own monopolies.

Not โ€œcompanies with moats.โ€ Actual monopolies. His test: can they price above inflation? If competition can compress margins, he walks. Airlines grow 5% annually and make no money. Airports grow 5% annually and print cash. He wants the airports.

The result is a 10-stock portfolio where GE Aerospace represents 23% of a $50 billion fund. Five holdings account for 73%. Portfolio turnover sits at 21%. Average holding period rivals some marriages.

Griffinโ€™s $16 billion record in 2022 came from running hundreds of strategies across thousands of positions with 2,900 employees. Hohnโ€™s $18.9 billion came from sitting in credit rating agencies and aerospace duopolies for a decade with a team of 8.

Same destination. Opposite paths.
Citadel wins by being everywhere during chaos. TCI wins by being nowhere except inside tollbooths.

The real lesson here: Hohn turned a 43% drawdown and near-total investor exodus into the highest annual profit any hedge fund has ever generated. He did it by becoming the opposite of what made him famous. Less activism, more patience. Fewer stocks, longer holds. No banks, no airlines, just monopolies that can raise prices faster than inflation.

Sometimes the real alpha comes from nearly losing everything.
- Aakash Gupta
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Dimitry Nakhla | Babylon Capitalยฎ
RT @DimitryNakhla: The reason $CSU is being sold (multiple compression due to AI fears & potential uncertainty surrounding its moat, among other things) ๐™˜๐™ค๐™ช๐™ก๐™™ ๐™š๐™ฃ๐™™ ๐™ช๐™ฅ ๐™—๐™š๐™ž๐™ฃ๐™œ ๐™ฉ๐™๐™š ๐™š๐™ญ๐™–๐™˜๐™ฉ ๐™ง๐™š๐™–๐™จ๐™ค๐™ฃ ๐™ž๐™ฉ๐™จ ๐™˜๐™–๐™ฅ๐™ž๐™ฉ๐™–๐™ก ๐™–๐™ก๐™ก๐™ค๐™˜๐™–๐™ฉ๐™ž๐™ค๐™ฃ ๐™š๐™ฃ๐™œ๐™ž๐™ฃ๐™š ๐™œ๐™š๐™ฉ๐™จ ๐™—๐™š๐™ฉ๐™ฉ๐™š๐™ง ๐™–๐™œ๐™–๐™ž๐™ฃ

๐“๐ก๐ž ๐ข๐ซ๐จ๐ง๐ฒ: ๐ญ๐ก๐ž ๐ฌ๐จ๐Ÿ๐ญ๐ฐ๐š๐ซ๐ž ๐ซ๐ž-๐ซ๐š๐ญ๐ข๐ง๐  ๐ฐ๐žโ€™๐ซ๐ž ๐ฌ๐ž๐ž๐ข๐ง๐  ๐ญ๐จ๐๐š๐ฒ (๐ฉ๐š๐ซ๐ญ๐ฅ๐ฒ ๐๐ซ๐ข๐ฏ๐ž๐ง ๐›๐ฒ ๐€๐ˆ ๐๐ข๐ฌ๐ซ๐ฎ๐ฉ๐ญ๐ข๐จ๐ง ๐Ÿ๐ž๐š๐ซ๐ฌ) ๐ฆ๐š๐ฒ ๐š๐œ๐ญ๐ฎ๐š๐ฅ๐ฅ๐ฒ ๐ข๐ฆ๐ฉ๐ซ๐จ๐ฏ๐ž $๐‚๐’๐”โ€™๐ฌ ๐จ๐ฉ๐ฉ๐จ๐ซ๐ญ๐ฎ๐ง๐ข๐ญ๐ฒ ๐ฌ๐ž๐ญ

When public multiples compress, private-market deal pricing often follows โ€” creating better entry points and potentially higher IRRs for $CSUโ€™s next wave of acquisitions

So yes, one of the common critiques many investors will cite is that $CSU returns on capital have been trending down over the last few years

Yet, given this set up, perhaps it will trend higher over the next few years

At 2,845, $CSU looks like an interesting contrarian opportunity amid peak fear
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memenodes
Did u sleep well?

Me: https://t.co/1iswgXqliW
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memenodes
Bro I thought this was supposed to be the future of finance https://t.co/Z2oYvBjSPj
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memenodes
I asked for "the usual" and this is what they did to me. https://t.co/D26AAhQ15Q
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