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The Few Bets That Matter
RT @WealthyReadings: $TMDX is once again the best buy in the market.
Great and improving fundamentals.
Multiple growth levers until FY30.
Reasonable valuation at $130.
Perfect breakout & retest PA.
This is the #1 set up short, medium & long term, and the many articles in my bio will detail this to you with perfect clarity.
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RT @WealthyReadings: $TMDX is once again the best buy in the market.
Great and improving fundamentals.
Multiple growth levers until FY30.
Reasonable valuation at $130.
Perfect breakout & retest PA.
This is the #1 set up short, medium & long term, and the many articles in my bio will detail this to you with perfect clarity.
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Fiscal.ai
Adobe is spending all of its cash flow (and then some) on share buybacks.
LTM Free Cash Flow: $9.9 billion
LTM Repurchases: $11.3 billion
$ADBE https://t.co/l5mjjYPrNA
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Adobe is spending all of its cash flow (and then some) on share buybacks.
LTM Free Cash Flow: $9.9 billion
LTM Repurchases: $11.3 billion
$ADBE https://t.co/l5mjjYPrNA
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memenodes
The moment you realize you might not be able to retire your parents this crypto bull run
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The moment you realize you might not be able to retire your parents this crypto bull run
Apart from breakup, what else can make a man be like this? https://t.co/22DS3dadq7 tweet
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EndGame Macro
The Bet That Backfired And How the World Built Its Economy Around China
That map isn’t really about trade rankings. It’s about how the global economy slowly organized itself around one production engine and only realized the consequences years later.
Back in the late 1990s and early 2000s, the prevailing idea in Washington was constructive engagement. The belief was simple and, at the time, widely shared that if you bring China into the global trade system, give it access to markets, and economic integration would pull it toward openness, reform, and convergence with Western norms. Leaders promised this would expand U.S. exports without hollowing out domestic industry, arguing America could export products without exporting jobs. It sounded reasonable in a post Cold War world that still believed economics could tame geopolitics.
Once China received permanent normal trade relations and entered the WTO, the incentives flipped almost overnight. U.S. and European firms suddenly had certainty. Capital moved fast. Supply chains followed. And China didn’t just offer cheap labor…it offered scale, speed, infrastructure, and eventually entire industrial ecosystems clustered in one place. That’s when manufacturing stopped being something you could easily move back and forth. It became embedded.
Why the Bet Went Wrong
The core mistake wasn’t opening trade. It was assuming China would play by the same rules.
Western policymakers treated China like a market economy in waiting. China treated trade as a state project. While global firms optimized for efficiency, Beijing optimized for capability. Subsidies, directed credit, technology transfer, and long term industrial planning weren’t bugs in the system, they were the system. China never dismantled state control the way advocates assumed; it used global access to accelerate it.
At the same time, the political costs were unevenly distributed. Consumers benefited from lower prices. Corporations boosted margins. But manufacturing regions lost jobs, skills, and bargaining power. That tension simmered for years while trade deficits widened and supply chains grew more concentrated. By the time the backlash arrived, the structure was already locked in.
That’s what the 2024 map is really showing. Not that China won trade but that the world built its physical economy around the one place that could reliably make almost everything, all the time. Even now, when countries talk about diversification or decoupling, much of the upstream machinery, components, and inputs still trace back to China. The dependence is deeper than final assembly.
The uncomfortable truth is globalization was designed for efficiency, not resilience. China mastered that system faster and more deliberately than anyone else. Reversing it isn’t a switch you flip, it’s a slow, costly rebuild. And until that happens, the map stays red, even as politics tries to move in the opposite direction.
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The Bet That Backfired And How the World Built Its Economy Around China
That map isn’t really about trade rankings. It’s about how the global economy slowly organized itself around one production engine and only realized the consequences years later.
Back in the late 1990s and early 2000s, the prevailing idea in Washington was constructive engagement. The belief was simple and, at the time, widely shared that if you bring China into the global trade system, give it access to markets, and economic integration would pull it toward openness, reform, and convergence with Western norms. Leaders promised this would expand U.S. exports without hollowing out domestic industry, arguing America could export products without exporting jobs. It sounded reasonable in a post Cold War world that still believed economics could tame geopolitics.
Once China received permanent normal trade relations and entered the WTO, the incentives flipped almost overnight. U.S. and European firms suddenly had certainty. Capital moved fast. Supply chains followed. And China didn’t just offer cheap labor…it offered scale, speed, infrastructure, and eventually entire industrial ecosystems clustered in one place. That’s when manufacturing stopped being something you could easily move back and forth. It became embedded.
Why the Bet Went Wrong
The core mistake wasn’t opening trade. It was assuming China would play by the same rules.
Western policymakers treated China like a market economy in waiting. China treated trade as a state project. While global firms optimized for efficiency, Beijing optimized for capability. Subsidies, directed credit, technology transfer, and long term industrial planning weren’t bugs in the system, they were the system. China never dismantled state control the way advocates assumed; it used global access to accelerate it.
At the same time, the political costs were unevenly distributed. Consumers benefited from lower prices. Corporations boosted margins. But manufacturing regions lost jobs, skills, and bargaining power. That tension simmered for years while trade deficits widened and supply chains grew more concentrated. By the time the backlash arrived, the structure was already locked in.
That’s what the 2024 map is really showing. Not that China won trade but that the world built its physical economy around the one place that could reliably make almost everything, all the time. Even now, when countries talk about diversification or decoupling, much of the upstream machinery, components, and inputs still trace back to China. The dependence is deeper than final assembly.
The uncomfortable truth is globalization was designed for efficiency, not resilience. China mastered that system faster and more deliberately than anyone else. Reversing it isn’t a switch you flip, it’s a slow, costly rebuild. And until that happens, the map stays red, even as politics tries to move in the opposite direction.
Over two decades China became the largest source of merchandise imports for two-thirds of countries đź“Š https://t.co/MqjRs5rWSt tweet