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App Economy Insights
$ORCL Oracle just raised its FY26 CapEx forecast by $15B to $50B, fueling fears about debt and cash burn.
Free cash flow declined to negative $13B over the past 12 months (negative $10B in the last quarter alone).
The backlog is surging, but so is the bill to build it. https://t.co/Hvxc1oVnpi
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$ORCL Oracle just raised its FY26 CapEx forecast by $15B to $50B, fueling fears about debt and cash burn.
Free cash flow declined to negative $13B over the past 12 months (negative $10B in the last quarter alone).
The backlog is surging, but so is the bill to build it. https://t.co/Hvxc1oVnpi
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EndGame Macro
What the Haas Paper Really Says About Demographics, Power, and the Timing of War
The core argument isn’t that demographics cause war. It’s that demographics quietly reshape the incentives and constraints around it.
There are two main channels. The first is capacity. As societies age, growth slows and a larger share of public money gets locked into pensions and healthcare. That squeezes what’s left for long term power projection. It doesn’t make countries peaceful by default, but it does tighten the balance sheet and shorten the runway for big strategic bets.
The second channel is behavioral and political. Older populations can become more risk averse and more sensitive to casualties, which can dampen appetite for long wars. But that same pressure can also push leaders in the opposite direction. When domestic growth is weak, debt is high, and legitimacy feels fragile, the temptation rises to reach for external conflict as a way to redirect attention or lock in gains while the window is still open. The point isn’t that aging guarantees conflict. It’s that it can compress decision timelines and make near term moves feel more urgent.
Are incentives for conflict rising right now?
If you just look at the global backdrop, the answer is yes in a very specific way. The world is already operating with an unusually high number of active conflicts, proxy wars, and unresolved flashpoints. That raises the odds of overlap, spillover, and miscalculation even if no one is actively seeking a global war.
What aging does here is subtle. Countries with shrinking or soon to shrink workforces are less likely to want long, grinding wars of attrition. But they may be more willing to take limited, fast, asymmetric actions that don’t require mass mobilization. Think gray zone pressure, blockades, cyber operations, proxy forces, or tightly scoped conventional strikes. These are cheaper, politically easier to sell, and easier to stop short of calling a war.
That’s the real demographic tension. It doesn’t scream expansionism. It whispers urgency.
So what about another world war?
I wouldn’t say it’s the base case. But it’s also not something you can wave away the way people did in the 2010s. The risk has risen because there are more live theaters, tighter alliance commitments, and more economic fragility layered on top of each other.
The most plausible path isn’t that multiple powers suddenly decide to conquer the world. It’s escalation through miscalculation. One major flashpoint gets hotter than expected, markets and energy flows react, alliances harden, and leaders feel boxed in by domestic and fiscal constraints. At that point, backing down can look more dangerous than pushing forward.
The uncomfortable insight is aging societies don’t necessarily become peaceful. They become more sensitive to time, credibility, and control. And in a world where conflict can start below the threshold of formal war, that combination raises the chance that something meant to be limited doesn’t stay that way.
tweet
What the Haas Paper Really Says About Demographics, Power, and the Timing of War
The core argument isn’t that demographics cause war. It’s that demographics quietly reshape the incentives and constraints around it.
There are two main channels. The first is capacity. As societies age, growth slows and a larger share of public money gets locked into pensions and healthcare. That squeezes what’s left for long term power projection. It doesn’t make countries peaceful by default, but it does tighten the balance sheet and shorten the runway for big strategic bets.
The second channel is behavioral and political. Older populations can become more risk averse and more sensitive to casualties, which can dampen appetite for long wars. But that same pressure can also push leaders in the opposite direction. When domestic growth is weak, debt is high, and legitimacy feels fragile, the temptation rises to reach for external conflict as a way to redirect attention or lock in gains while the window is still open. The point isn’t that aging guarantees conflict. It’s that it can compress decision timelines and make near term moves feel more urgent.
Are incentives for conflict rising right now?
If you just look at the global backdrop, the answer is yes in a very specific way. The world is already operating with an unusually high number of active conflicts, proxy wars, and unresolved flashpoints. That raises the odds of overlap, spillover, and miscalculation even if no one is actively seeking a global war.
What aging does here is subtle. Countries with shrinking or soon to shrink workforces are less likely to want long, grinding wars of attrition. But they may be more willing to take limited, fast, asymmetric actions that don’t require mass mobilization. Think gray zone pressure, blockades, cyber operations, proxy forces, or tightly scoped conventional strikes. These are cheaper, politically easier to sell, and easier to stop short of calling a war.
That’s the real demographic tension. It doesn’t scream expansionism. It whispers urgency.
So what about another world war?
I wouldn’t say it’s the base case. But it’s also not something you can wave away the way people did in the 2010s. The risk has risen because there are more live theaters, tighter alliance commitments, and more economic fragility layered on top of each other.
The most plausible path isn’t that multiple powers suddenly decide to conquer the world. It’s escalation through miscalculation. One major flashpoint gets hotter than expected, markets and energy flows react, alliances harden, and leaders feel boxed in by domestic and fiscal constraints. At that point, backing down can look more dangerous than pushing forward.
The uncomfortable insight is aging societies don’t necessarily become peaceful. They become more sensitive to time, credibility, and control. And in a world where conflict can start below the threshold of formal war, that combination raises the chance that something meant to be limited doesn’t stay that way.
tweet
Offshore
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EndGame Macro
If I only get one trade, I’m taking B, mostly because it’s doing more of the work for me. In B you can see a real change in behavior where the price stops going down, spends time going nowhere while the moving averages catch up, and then breaks higher with volume that actually means something. That tells me new money is stepping in, not just shorts covering or price drifting on low participation. After the breakout, it doesn’t collapse back into the range, it holds near the highs, which is usually the market checking whether it’s comfortable at these levels. That’s the part I trust. In A, the moves are choppier, the averages are tangled, and price keeps pushing into areas where earlier buyers might want out. You can trade that, but it’s a faster, more active game and easier to get chopped if you’re even a little early or late. B gives me a clearer line where I’m wrong and a cleaner path if I’m right. If it’s already stretched, I don’t chase it. I wait for price to come back toward the breakout area or the rising averages, because the best trades don’t need urgency. They tend to make themselves obvious, and B is closer to that than A.
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If I only get one trade, I’m taking B, mostly because it’s doing more of the work for me. In B you can see a real change in behavior where the price stops going down, spends time going nowhere while the moving averages catch up, and then breaks higher with volume that actually means something. That tells me new money is stepping in, not just shorts covering or price drifting on low participation. After the breakout, it doesn’t collapse back into the range, it holds near the highs, which is usually the market checking whether it’s comfortable at these levels. That’s the part I trust. In A, the moves are choppier, the averages are tangled, and price keeps pushing into areas where earlier buyers might want out. You can trade that, but it’s a faster, more active game and easier to get chopped if you’re even a little early or late. B gives me a clearer line where I’m wrong and a cleaner path if I’m right. If it’s already stretched, I don’t chase it. I wait for price to come back toward the breakout area or the rising averages, because the best trades don’t need urgency. They tend to make themselves obvious, and B is closer to that than A.
QUIZ TIME 🎯
You have two charts in front of you.
The market conditions are Good for trading.
You are allowed to open ONLY ONE position.
Question:
Which chart are you more likely to trade Setup A or Setup B ? & Why ?
(Assume both are liquid and meet your risk rules.)
Answer Below 👇 tweet
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memenodes
This his last tweet btw https://t.co/LyOpzn5NwM
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This his last tweet btw https://t.co/LyOpzn5NwM
Been coughing all morning today lol tweet