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RT @naiivememe: naiive is sharing tips and experiences for subcribers
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RT @naiivememe: naiive is sharing tips and experiences for subcribers
X sending me 2 ETH every month
what is stopping you from get X Premium and start posting today ? wagmi https://t.co/mvf82i7GsD tweet
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memenodes
RT @naiivememe: X sending me 2 ETH every month
what is stopping you from get X Premium and start posting today ? wagmi https://t.co/mvf82i7GsD
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RT @naiivememe: X sending me 2 ETH every month
what is stopping you from get X Premium and start posting today ? wagmi https://t.co/mvf82i7GsD
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memenodes
Me logging into Crypto Twitter to scroll memes and make bad financial decisions all day https://t.co/UEIH44DCHE
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Me logging into Crypto Twitter to scroll memes and make bad financial decisions all day https://t.co/UEIH44DCHE
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Offshore
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App Economy Insights
What are you watching this week?
• Tuesday: $GME
• Wednesday: $ORCL $ADBE $SNPS $CHWY $MTN
• Thursday: $AVGO $COST
All visualized in our newsletter! https://t.co/5gD4f5aNno
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What are you watching this week?
• Tuesday: $GME
• Wednesday: $ORCL $ADBE $SNPS $CHWY $MTN
• Thursday: $AVGO $COST
All visualized in our newsletter! https://t.co/5gD4f5aNno
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EndGame Macro
Read entire thread…
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Read entire thread…
1) The deflationary rental environment, particularly in the Sun Belt area of America, is one reason why I believe we'll continue to see more inventory hit the market next year.
Simply put, many investors and landlords over-extended themselves during the pandemic boom, bought near peak values and low cap rates, and can't afford to hold properties through a declining rental environment. tweet
X (formerly Twitter)
Nick Gerli (@nickgerli1) on X
1) The deflationary rental environment, particularly in the Sun Belt area of America, is one reason why I believe we'll continue to see more inventory hit the market next year.
Simply put, many investors and landlords over-extended themselves during the…
Simply put, many investors and landlords over-extended themselves during the…
EndGame Macro
RT @onechancefreedm: I’m not being a doomer, just looking at the data. Layoffs in 2025 have already passed 1.1 million, the highest since the pandemic and one of the worst years since the early 90s. November payrolls came in at -32,000. Auto and credit card delinquencies are now brushing up against their Great Financial Crisis peaks, student loan and office building delinquencies have hit record levels, and large corporate bankruptcies are running at a 15 year high. On top of that, national credit scores just saw their fastest drop since 2009, with Gen Z taking the biggest hit. None of that paints a picture of a healthy, accelerating economy, it’s simply where the numbers are right now.
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RT @onechancefreedm: I’m not being a doomer, just looking at the data. Layoffs in 2025 have already passed 1.1 million, the highest since the pandemic and one of the worst years since the early 90s. November payrolls came in at -32,000. Auto and credit card delinquencies are now brushing up against their Great Financial Crisis peaks, student loan and office building delinquencies have hit record levels, and large corporate bankruptcies are running at a 15 year high. On top of that, national credit scores just saw their fastest drop since 2009, with Gen Z taking the biggest hit. None of that paints a picture of a healthy, accelerating economy, it’s simply where the numbers are right now.
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EndGame Macro
The Silent Recession And How Mom And Pop Filings Put Us Back in GFC Territory
This spike in mom and pop bankruptcies is the real economy flashing strain long before it shows up in headlines or aggregate GDP prints. Subchapter V only became its own category in 2020, so earlier cycles don’t have a neat one to one comparison. Before that, these small business reorganizations were counted inside regular Chapter 11 filings, blended in with the bigger corporate cases.
That’s important, because when you isolate Subchapter V now, you can actually see stress that used to be buried inside the broader totals.
And the pattern is unmistakable…filings hover around 1,200–1,300 from 2020–2022, then jump to 1,773 in 2023, then 2,211 in 2024, and now 2,221 through November of 2025. That’s acceleration. That’s what it looks like when conditions tighten around operators who don’t have scale, cheap capital, or room to maneuver. Small businesses feel macro stress directly, immediately, and with no buffer.
Why This Rhymes With the Great Financial Crisis
This isn’t a carbon copy of 2008. The trigger is different and the financial plumbing is different. But the stress pattern looks familiar. In the GFC, the wave began inside the financial system and rolled outward. This time, the wave is rolling inward from Main Street. And because Subchapter V is now separated out, you can see the early casualties more clearly than in any prior cycle.
When you add Subchapter V back to Chapter 11 totals…the way it would have looked pre 2020 the numbers line up much closer to the GFC era than most people realize.
Great Financial Crisis Totals
• 2008: 10,000–11,000
• 2009: 14,000–16,000 (peak)
• 2010: 12,000–13,000
2023–2025 Combined Chapter 11 + Subchapter V
• 2023: 9,441
• 2024: 11,531
• 2025: 11,300–11,500
So we’re not at the absolute peak of 2009. But today’s totals are already within the same range as 2008 and 2010, and worse than every recessionary year of the past three decades except the peak of the GFC itself.
Once you understand that Subchapter V filings used to sit inside Chapter 11 filings before 2020, it becomes clear I’m not making these numbers look worse I’m just unpacking a category that used to be blended, and showing its trend in the open.
And the rest of the macro picture supports exactly what these filings are saying. Layoffs are running at the highest pace since the pandemic. Delinquencies across autos, credit cards, student loans, and office CRE are pushing toward or past GFC benchmarks. Corporate bankruptcies are at a 15 year high. Credit scores are falling at the fastest rate since 2009. Every late cycle indicator you’d expect to weaken is weakening.
My Read
This looks like a system that’s been living off momentum and leftover liquidity finally hitting the limits of that buffer. The big players can refinance. They can restructure. They can buy time. Small businesses don’t get that luxury. They feel the slowdown first in their cash flow, in their credit lines, in their customer demand.
And because Subchapter V is now its own category, you can finally see what used to be hidden inside the larger Chapter 11 totals: small business failures rising in a straight line, year after year.
This is the rhythm of a late cycle economy where the stress shows up quietly before it shows up loudly. Things don’t collapse all at once. They fray. They thin. They stop bouncing back. And when Subchapter V filings break records two years in a row at the same time combined bankruptcy totals return to GFC territory, the message is simple…
The people closest to the real economy are running out of room.
US small business bankruptcies are surging as if there is a recession:
A record 2,221 small firms have filed for bankruptcy under Subchapter V year-to-date.
Subchapter V allows businesses and individuals with under $3 million in debt to reorganize more quickly and cheaply than traditional Chapter 11.
Bankruptcies have ri[...]
The Silent Recession And How Mom And Pop Filings Put Us Back in GFC Territory
This spike in mom and pop bankruptcies is the real economy flashing strain long before it shows up in headlines or aggregate GDP prints. Subchapter V only became its own category in 2020, so earlier cycles don’t have a neat one to one comparison. Before that, these small business reorganizations were counted inside regular Chapter 11 filings, blended in with the bigger corporate cases.
That’s important, because when you isolate Subchapter V now, you can actually see stress that used to be buried inside the broader totals.
And the pattern is unmistakable…filings hover around 1,200–1,300 from 2020–2022, then jump to 1,773 in 2023, then 2,211 in 2024, and now 2,221 through November of 2025. That’s acceleration. That’s what it looks like when conditions tighten around operators who don’t have scale, cheap capital, or room to maneuver. Small businesses feel macro stress directly, immediately, and with no buffer.
Why This Rhymes With the Great Financial Crisis
This isn’t a carbon copy of 2008. The trigger is different and the financial plumbing is different. But the stress pattern looks familiar. In the GFC, the wave began inside the financial system and rolled outward. This time, the wave is rolling inward from Main Street. And because Subchapter V is now separated out, you can see the early casualties more clearly than in any prior cycle.
When you add Subchapter V back to Chapter 11 totals…the way it would have looked pre 2020 the numbers line up much closer to the GFC era than most people realize.
Great Financial Crisis Totals
• 2008: 10,000–11,000
• 2009: 14,000–16,000 (peak)
• 2010: 12,000–13,000
2023–2025 Combined Chapter 11 + Subchapter V
• 2023: 9,441
• 2024: 11,531
• 2025: 11,300–11,500
So we’re not at the absolute peak of 2009. But today’s totals are already within the same range as 2008 and 2010, and worse than every recessionary year of the past three decades except the peak of the GFC itself.
Once you understand that Subchapter V filings used to sit inside Chapter 11 filings before 2020, it becomes clear I’m not making these numbers look worse I’m just unpacking a category that used to be blended, and showing its trend in the open.
And the rest of the macro picture supports exactly what these filings are saying. Layoffs are running at the highest pace since the pandemic. Delinquencies across autos, credit cards, student loans, and office CRE are pushing toward or past GFC benchmarks. Corporate bankruptcies are at a 15 year high. Credit scores are falling at the fastest rate since 2009. Every late cycle indicator you’d expect to weaken is weakening.
My Read
This looks like a system that’s been living off momentum and leftover liquidity finally hitting the limits of that buffer. The big players can refinance. They can restructure. They can buy time. Small businesses don’t get that luxury. They feel the slowdown first in their cash flow, in their credit lines, in their customer demand.
And because Subchapter V is now its own category, you can finally see what used to be hidden inside the larger Chapter 11 totals: small business failures rising in a straight line, year after year.
This is the rhythm of a late cycle economy where the stress shows up quietly before it shows up loudly. Things don’t collapse all at once. They fray. They thin. They stop bouncing back. And when Subchapter V filings break records two years in a row at the same time combined bankruptcy totals return to GFC territory, the message is simple…
The people closest to the real economy are running out of room.
US small business bankruptcies are surging as if there is a recession:
A record 2,221 small firms have filed for bankruptcy under Subchapter V year-to-date.
Subchapter V allows businesses and individuals with under $3 million in debt to reorganize more quickly and cheaply than traditional Chapter 11.
Bankruptcies have ri[...]
Offshore
EndGame Macro The Silent Recession And How Mom And Pop Filings Put Us Back in GFC Territory This spike in mom and pop bankruptcies is the real economy flashing strain long before it shows up in headlines or aggregate GDP prints. Subchapter V only became its…
sen +83% over the last 5 years.
This surge has continued despite the debt limit being reduced from $7.5 million to $3 million last year, which made it harder for larger businesses to qualify.
The increase has been driven by persistently high borrowing costs, cautious consumer spending, and overall economic uncertainty, which have weighed on small business earnings.
US small firms are struggling. - The Kobeissi Letter tweet
This surge has continued despite the debt limit being reduced from $7.5 million to $3 million last year, which made it harder for larger businesses to qualify.
The increase has been driven by persistently high borrowing costs, cautious consumer spending, and overall economic uncertainty, which have weighed on small business earnings.
US small firms are struggling. - The Kobeissi Letter tweet
Offshore
Photo
EndGame Macro
The Silent Recession And How Mom And Pop Filings Put Us Back in GFC Territory
This spike in mom and pop bankruptcies is the real economy flashing strain long before it shows up in headlines or aggregate GDP prints. Subchapter V only became its own category in 2020, so earlier cycles don’t have a neat one to one comparison. Before that, these small business reorganizations were counted inside regular Chapter 11 filings, blended in with the bigger corporate cases.
That’s important, because when you isolate Subchapter V now, you can actually see stress that used to be buried inside the broader totals.
And the pattern is unmistakable…filings hover around 1,200–1,300 from 2020–2022, then jump to 1,773 in 2023, then 2,211 in 2024, and now 2,221 through November of 2025. That’s acceleration. That’s what it looks like when conditions tighten around operators who don’t have scale, cheap capital, or room to maneuver. Small businesses feel macro stress directly, immediately, and with no buffer.
Why This Rhymes With the Great Financial Crisis
This isn’t a carbon copy of 2008. The trigger is different and the financial plumbing is different. But the stress pattern looks familiar. In the GFC, the wave began inside the financial system and rolled outward. This time, the wave is rolling inward from Main Street. And because Subchapter V is now separated out, you can see the early casualties more clearly than in any prior cycle.
When you add Subchapter V back to Chapter 11 totals…the way it would have looked pre 2020 the numbers line up much closer to the GFC era than most people realize.
Great Financial Crisis Totals
• 2008: 10,000–11,000
• 2009: 14,000–16,000 (peak)
• 2010: 12,000–13,000
2023–2025 Combined Chapter 11 + Subchapter V
• 2023: 9,441
• 2024: 11,531
• 2025: 11,300–11,500
So we’re not at the absolute peak of 2009. But today’s totals are already within the same range as 2008 and 2010, and worse than every recessionary year of the past three decades except the peak of the GFC itself.
Once you understand that Subchapter V filings used to sit inside Chapter 11 filings before 2020, it becomes clear I’m not making these numbers look worse I’m just unpacking a category that used to be blended, and showing its trend in the open.
And the rest of the macro picture supports exactly what these filings are saying. Layoffs are running at the highest pace since the pandemic. Delinquencies across autos, credit cards, student loans, and office CRE are pushing toward or past GFC benchmarks. Corporate bankruptcies are at a 15 year high. Credit scores are falling at the fastest rate since 2009. Every late cycle indicator you’d expect to weaken is weakening.
My Read
This looks like a system that’s been living off momentum and leftover liquidity finally hitting the limits of that buffer. The big players can refinance. They can restructure. They can buy time. Small businesses don’t get that luxury. They feel the slowdown first in their cash flow, in their credit lines, in their customer demand.
And because Subchapter V is now its own category, you can finally see what used to be hidden inside the larger Chapter 11 totals: small business failures rising in a straight line, year after year.
This is the rhythm of a late cycle economy where the stress shows up quietly before it shows up loudly. Things don’t collapse all at once. They fray. They thin. They stop bouncing back. And when Subchapter V filings break records two years in a row at the same time combined bankruptcy totals return to GFC territory, the message is simple…
The people closest to the real economy are running out of room.
US small business bankruptcies are surging as if there is a recession:
A record 2,221 small firms have filed for bankruptcy under Subchapter V year-to-date.
Subchapter V allows businesses and individuals with under $3 million in debt to reorganize more quickly and cheaply than traditional Chapter 11.
Bankruptcies have ri[...]
The Silent Recession And How Mom And Pop Filings Put Us Back in GFC Territory
This spike in mom and pop bankruptcies is the real economy flashing strain long before it shows up in headlines or aggregate GDP prints. Subchapter V only became its own category in 2020, so earlier cycles don’t have a neat one to one comparison. Before that, these small business reorganizations were counted inside regular Chapter 11 filings, blended in with the bigger corporate cases.
That’s important, because when you isolate Subchapter V now, you can actually see stress that used to be buried inside the broader totals.
And the pattern is unmistakable…filings hover around 1,200–1,300 from 2020–2022, then jump to 1,773 in 2023, then 2,211 in 2024, and now 2,221 through November of 2025. That’s acceleration. That’s what it looks like when conditions tighten around operators who don’t have scale, cheap capital, or room to maneuver. Small businesses feel macro stress directly, immediately, and with no buffer.
Why This Rhymes With the Great Financial Crisis
This isn’t a carbon copy of 2008. The trigger is different and the financial plumbing is different. But the stress pattern looks familiar. In the GFC, the wave began inside the financial system and rolled outward. This time, the wave is rolling inward from Main Street. And because Subchapter V is now separated out, you can see the early casualties more clearly than in any prior cycle.
When you add Subchapter V back to Chapter 11 totals…the way it would have looked pre 2020 the numbers line up much closer to the GFC era than most people realize.
Great Financial Crisis Totals
• 2008: 10,000–11,000
• 2009: 14,000–16,000 (peak)
• 2010: 12,000–13,000
2023–2025 Combined Chapter 11 + Subchapter V
• 2023: 9,441
• 2024: 11,531
• 2025: 11,300–11,500
So we’re not at the absolute peak of 2009. But today’s totals are already within the same range as 2008 and 2010, and worse than every recessionary year of the past three decades except the peak of the GFC itself.
Once you understand that Subchapter V filings used to sit inside Chapter 11 filings before 2020, it becomes clear I’m not making these numbers look worse I’m just unpacking a category that used to be blended, and showing its trend in the open.
And the rest of the macro picture supports exactly what these filings are saying. Layoffs are running at the highest pace since the pandemic. Delinquencies across autos, credit cards, student loans, and office CRE are pushing toward or past GFC benchmarks. Corporate bankruptcies are at a 15 year high. Credit scores are falling at the fastest rate since 2009. Every late cycle indicator you’d expect to weaken is weakening.
My Read
This looks like a system that’s been living off momentum and leftover liquidity finally hitting the limits of that buffer. The big players can refinance. They can restructure. They can buy time. Small businesses don’t get that luxury. They feel the slowdown first in their cash flow, in their credit lines, in their customer demand.
And because Subchapter V is now its own category, you can finally see what used to be hidden inside the larger Chapter 11 totals: small business failures rising in a straight line, year after year.
This is the rhythm of a late cycle economy where the stress shows up quietly before it shows up loudly. Things don’t collapse all at once. They fray. They thin. They stop bouncing back. And when Subchapter V filings break records two years in a row at the same time combined bankruptcy totals return to GFC territory, the message is simple…
The people closest to the real economy are running out of room.
US small business bankruptcies are surging as if there is a recession:
A record 2,221 small firms have filed for bankruptcy under Subchapter V year-to-date.
Subchapter V allows businesses and individuals with under $3 million in debt to reorganize more quickly and cheaply than traditional Chapter 11.
Bankruptcies have ri[...]
Offshore
EndGame Macro The Silent Recession And How Mom And Pop Filings Put Us Back in GFC Territory This spike in mom and pop bankruptcies is the real economy flashing strain long before it shows up in headlines or aggregate GDP prints. Subchapter V only became its…
sen +83% over the last 5 years.
This surge has continued despite the debt limit being reduced from $7.5 million to $3 million last year, which made it harder for larger businesses to qualify.
The increase has been driven by persistently high borrowing costs, cautious consumer spending, and overall economic uncertainty, which have weighed on small business earnings.
US small firms are struggling. - The Kobeissi Letter tweet
This surge has continued despite the debt limit being reduced from $7.5 million to $3 million last year, which made it harder for larger businesses to qualify.
The increase has been driven by persistently high borrowing costs, cautious consumer spending, and overall economic uncertainty, which have weighed on small business earnings.
US small firms are struggling. - The Kobeissi Letter tweet
Offshore
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EndGame Macro
When the Edges Crack First And What This Spike in Small Cap Shorts Is Signaling
A median Russell 2000 stock sitting at roughly 5.5% short interest is the market pointing toward the part of the economy that’s most exposed when things tighten up. Small cap companies usually run with thinner margins, more floating rate debt, and a lot less breathing room. When credit gets harder or demand softens, they’re the ones who feel it first.
So you end up with this dynamic where investors hide out in mega cap names with fortress balance sheets and use small caps as the hedge. Some of the short interest is also just math because when prices fall, short interest as a percentage of market cap goes up. But the gap between the Russell 2000 and something like the Nasdaq 100 is the real signal. The market is saying, quietly but clearly that the risk is concentrated at the edges.
Why This Looks Familiar If You Lived Through 2006–2008
Back before the GFC, the big shorts weren’t broad small cap hate. They were sharp, focused bets against the credit plumbing like subprime lenders, mortgage originators, levered financial structures. But even then, the broader pattern was the same as what we’re seeing now. When people get nervous, they rotate into liquidity and size, and they lean against anything that relies heavily on easy financing or steady demand.
The trigger today isn’t subprime mortgages, but the behavior is uncannily similar. Money piles into the cleanest balance sheets and slowly backs away from companies that depend on refinancing windows staying open. You don’t need the same catalyst to get the same rotation you just need the same late cycle tension.
Why It Matters
This setup doesn’t promise an immediate crash. Sometimes markets sit in this posture for a long time. But it does tell you where investors think the weak spots are if the cycle rolls over. High short interest in small caps is basically a map of perceived fragility.
If growth picks up and credit conditions loosen, this positioning can unwind quickly and small caps can rally hard. But if credit tightens, if refinancing risk spreads, or if the soft parts of the economy soften further, then what you’re seeing now is the opening act of a broader derisking.
The tell real tell is in the credit spreads, lending standards, and refinancing data. That’s where you see whether this is just a crowded hedge… or whether the market is quietly preparing for something bigger.
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When the Edges Crack First And What This Spike in Small Cap Shorts Is Signaling
A median Russell 2000 stock sitting at roughly 5.5% short interest is the market pointing toward the part of the economy that’s most exposed when things tighten up. Small cap companies usually run with thinner margins, more floating rate debt, and a lot less breathing room. When credit gets harder or demand softens, they’re the ones who feel it first.
So you end up with this dynamic where investors hide out in mega cap names with fortress balance sheets and use small caps as the hedge. Some of the short interest is also just math because when prices fall, short interest as a percentage of market cap goes up. But the gap between the Russell 2000 and something like the Nasdaq 100 is the real signal. The market is saying, quietly but clearly that the risk is concentrated at the edges.
Why This Looks Familiar If You Lived Through 2006–2008
Back before the GFC, the big shorts weren’t broad small cap hate. They were sharp, focused bets against the credit plumbing like subprime lenders, mortgage originators, levered financial structures. But even then, the broader pattern was the same as what we’re seeing now. When people get nervous, they rotate into liquidity and size, and they lean against anything that relies heavily on easy financing or steady demand.
The trigger today isn’t subprime mortgages, but the behavior is uncannily similar. Money piles into the cleanest balance sheets and slowly backs away from companies that depend on refinancing windows staying open. You don’t need the same catalyst to get the same rotation you just need the same late cycle tension.
Why It Matters
This setup doesn’t promise an immediate crash. Sometimes markets sit in this posture for a long time. But it does tell you where investors think the weak spots are if the cycle rolls over. High short interest in small caps is basically a map of perceived fragility.
If growth picks up and credit conditions loosen, this positioning can unwind quickly and small caps can rally hard. But if credit tightens, if refinancing risk spreads, or if the soft parts of the economy soften further, then what you’re seeing now is the opening act of a broader derisking.
The tell real tell is in the credit spreads, lending standards, and refinancing data. That’s where you see whether this is just a crowded hedge… or whether the market is quietly preparing for something bigger.
Short interest remains high in small-cap stocks:
The median Russell 2000 stock has a short interest of 5.5% of its market cap, the highest among major indices.
This is more than double the 2.5% for Nasdaq-100 stocks and 2.4% for S&P 500 stocks, with the S&P 500 figure the highest in 7 years.
Short exposure in the median S&P 500 stock has risen +1.0 percentage point over the last 3 years.
By comparison, their long-term average is 1.9% over the last 30 years.
Meanwhile, short interest in the Information Technology and Commercial Services sectors stands at 2.4% and 2.0%, both below their historical norms.
Investors are betting heavily against small-cap and defensive sectors. tweet