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EndGame Macro
Starve the World, Then Pivot…The Harsh Strategy Underneath U.S. Monetary Policy
Ever since Trump returned to office in January, one thing has become clearer every month…global dollar scarcity has been tightening, not easing. And it hasn’t happened by accident. The policies he’s chosen like tariffs, trade friction actually created the perfect setup for the Fed to not cut rates. Instead of loosening financial conditions, the system has been pulled tighter.
From January to now, the Fed kept rates elevated, only trimming lightly in September and October. QT continuing right into December 1st, removing liquidity and collateral from the system. At the same time, Trump’s tariff heavy approach pushed import prices higher, disrupted supply chains, and added a layer of inflationary pressure right when the Fed needed a narrative to justify staying cautious. Every move that supposedly should have pushed Powell toward cuts did the opposite. It reinforced the case for higher for longer.
If Trump genuinely wanted Powell to cut aggressively, this isn’t the policy mix he’d use. Inflation was sticky. And Powell, whose mandate is still framed around stable prices, gets political cover to sit tight and delay meaningful easing.
But that’s where the deeper logic starts to show. High U.S. rates don’t just cool the American economy, they create global dollar scarcity. When dollars are expensive and liquidity is tight, the pressure hits other economies faster and harder than it hits the U.S. Emerging markets feel funding stress. Europe struggles under higher dollar denominated costs. China faces capital strain and tighter refinancing windows. Any nation running dollar debt and that’s most of the world feels the squeeze.
Today the pattern is unmistakable…the dollar is scarce, global funding is tight, and the countries Trump most wants leverage over are the ones struggling most. And because QT isn’t over until December 1st, that scarcity wasn’t just maintained, it intensified throughout his first year back in office.
If the Fed had cut rates aggressively earlier in 2025, it would have eased the pressure abroad. A weaker dollar would have reduced debt burdens, improved financial conditions, and given breathing room to BRICS economies, heavily indebted sovereigns, and energy importers. Rate cuts would have helped the rest of the world far more than they would have helped the U.S. And if your strategic goal is to box rival nations into a corner, the last thing you want is to relieve their pressure valve.
So the contradiction resolves itself…Trump publicly demands cuts while creating conditions that give Powell every excuse not to. Keeping rates high and dollars scarce hurts everyone else first. Then, when global stress peaks, the U.S. can decide who gets access to fresh dollar liquidity likely through stablecoins, tokenized Treasuries, or whatever the next dollar rails become.
That’s the real shift since January, the U.S. looks increasingly willing to tolerate domestic pain to maximize geopolitical leverage abroad. And right now dollar scarcity has become the defining feature of that strategy.
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Starve the World, Then Pivot…The Harsh Strategy Underneath U.S. Monetary Policy
Ever since Trump returned to office in January, one thing has become clearer every month…global dollar scarcity has been tightening, not easing. And it hasn’t happened by accident. The policies he’s chosen like tariffs, trade friction actually created the perfect setup for the Fed to not cut rates. Instead of loosening financial conditions, the system has been pulled tighter.
From January to now, the Fed kept rates elevated, only trimming lightly in September and October. QT continuing right into December 1st, removing liquidity and collateral from the system. At the same time, Trump’s tariff heavy approach pushed import prices higher, disrupted supply chains, and added a layer of inflationary pressure right when the Fed needed a narrative to justify staying cautious. Every move that supposedly should have pushed Powell toward cuts did the opposite. It reinforced the case for higher for longer.
If Trump genuinely wanted Powell to cut aggressively, this isn’t the policy mix he’d use. Inflation was sticky. And Powell, whose mandate is still framed around stable prices, gets political cover to sit tight and delay meaningful easing.
But that’s where the deeper logic starts to show. High U.S. rates don’t just cool the American economy, they create global dollar scarcity. When dollars are expensive and liquidity is tight, the pressure hits other economies faster and harder than it hits the U.S. Emerging markets feel funding stress. Europe struggles under higher dollar denominated costs. China faces capital strain and tighter refinancing windows. Any nation running dollar debt and that’s most of the world feels the squeeze.
Today the pattern is unmistakable…the dollar is scarce, global funding is tight, and the countries Trump most wants leverage over are the ones struggling most. And because QT isn’t over until December 1st, that scarcity wasn’t just maintained, it intensified throughout his first year back in office.
If the Fed had cut rates aggressively earlier in 2025, it would have eased the pressure abroad. A weaker dollar would have reduced debt burdens, improved financial conditions, and given breathing room to BRICS economies, heavily indebted sovereigns, and energy importers. Rate cuts would have helped the rest of the world far more than they would have helped the U.S. And if your strategic goal is to box rival nations into a corner, the last thing you want is to relieve their pressure valve.
So the contradiction resolves itself…Trump publicly demands cuts while creating conditions that give Powell every excuse not to. Keeping rates high and dollars scarce hurts everyone else first. Then, when global stress peaks, the U.S. can decide who gets access to fresh dollar liquidity likely through stablecoins, tokenized Treasuries, or whatever the next dollar rails become.
That’s the real shift since January, the U.S. looks increasingly willing to tolerate domestic pain to maximize geopolitical leverage abroad. And right now dollar scarcity has become the defining feature of that strategy.
The enemy has a name: it's the Banking system.
Take a look at the chart of JPM since the great financial crisis. It's been STRAIGHT UP for the last 15 years.
JP Morgan has been consolidating its power as the head of the Banking Crime syndicate through both Obama terms, Trump 1.0 and Biden.
The Fed works for JPM.
They HATE Bitcoin, DEFI and Stablecoins. They quietly architected Chokepoint 1.0 and 2.0. Now, they see Bitcoin as vulnerable and they are putting the screws on MSTR.
Against this, we have Trump, Bessant, and a potentially new Fed in May, completely under treasury contol.
Bitcoin as a strategic asset.
This is going to be an EPIC battle. tweet
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EndGame Macro
The Banking System’s Hidden Wound And Why the Fed Can’t Slip Up
What you’re looking at is the hangover from the fastest rate shock in modern U.S. history. Banks spent years piling into Treasuries and MBS when yields were near zero, and once the Fed slammed rates higher, the value of those bonds collapsed. The blue and brown bars show the gap between what those securities are worth today and what’s on the banks’ books. As of mid 2025, that hole is still enormous. These aren’t realized losses but they’re very real pressure sitting beneath the surface.
Why These Losses Haven’t Blown Up the System (Yet)
Unrealized losses only stay unrealized if banks don’t have to sell. As long as deposits are stable and regulators give them breathing room, they can hold these bonds to maturity and get paid back at par. That’s why the Fed rolled out emergency lending tools in 2023, why they quietly relaxed some capital expectations, and why rate cuts are happening at a slow, careful pace. The entire strategy is about buying time so the duration mismatch can heal instead of detonating.
How They Could Become Real Losses
The danger is forced selling. If banks lose deposits, lose wholesale funding, or get pushed into resolution or merger, they have to mark these securities to market and that’s when paper losses become actual capital hits. Another spike in yields, a confidence shock, or even an aggressive regulatory stance could flip that switch. That’s exactly how SVB went from technically solvent to failure in 48 hours.
This is why the Fed can’t be cavalier here. They can’t keep rates too high for too long without deepening these losses.
They’re threading the needle…easing slowly, keeping liquidity backstops open, and quietly praying no one forces the system to recognize those losses all at once.
This chart is a reminder that the banking system is still carrying a massive rate shock wound. The only thing keeping it contained is time, liquidity support, and a policy path designed to let banks survive long enough for the bonds to mature. Without that, those unrealized losses can become very real, very fast.
tweet
The Banking System’s Hidden Wound And Why the Fed Can’t Slip Up
What you’re looking at is the hangover from the fastest rate shock in modern U.S. history. Banks spent years piling into Treasuries and MBS when yields were near zero, and once the Fed slammed rates higher, the value of those bonds collapsed. The blue and brown bars show the gap between what those securities are worth today and what’s on the banks’ books. As of mid 2025, that hole is still enormous. These aren’t realized losses but they’re very real pressure sitting beneath the surface.
Why These Losses Haven’t Blown Up the System (Yet)
Unrealized losses only stay unrealized if banks don’t have to sell. As long as deposits are stable and regulators give them breathing room, they can hold these bonds to maturity and get paid back at par. That’s why the Fed rolled out emergency lending tools in 2023, why they quietly relaxed some capital expectations, and why rate cuts are happening at a slow, careful pace. The entire strategy is about buying time so the duration mismatch can heal instead of detonating.
How They Could Become Real Losses
The danger is forced selling. If banks lose deposits, lose wholesale funding, or get pushed into resolution or merger, they have to mark these securities to market and that’s when paper losses become actual capital hits. Another spike in yields, a confidence shock, or even an aggressive regulatory stance could flip that switch. That’s exactly how SVB went from technically solvent to failure in 48 hours.
This is why the Fed can’t be cavalier here. They can’t keep rates too high for too long without deepening these losses.
They’re threading the needle…easing slowly, keeping liquidity backstops open, and quietly praying no one forces the system to recognize those losses all at once.
This chart is a reminder that the banking system is still carrying a massive rate shock wound. The only thing keeping it contained is time, liquidity support, and a policy path designed to let banks survive long enough for the bonds to mature. Without that, those unrealized losses can become very real, very fast.
BREAKING 🚨: U.S. Banks
U.S. Banks are now sitting on $395 Billion in unrealized losses as of Q2 2025 👀 https://t.co/uAvaWhquhv tweet
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EndGame Macro
RT @LukeGromen: Note US military official's point on Russia's industrial base; big shift from "Russia's been reduced to using chips from washing machines to make missiles."
Reality just began getting marked to market
"Amateurs talk tactics; professionals study logistics."
-USMC Gen. Barrow https://t.co/DEqiJrawBQ
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RT @LukeGromen: Note US military official's point on Russia's industrial base; big shift from "Russia's been reduced to using chips from washing machines to make missiles."
Reality just began getting marked to market
"Amateurs talk tactics; professionals study logistics."
-USMC Gen. Barrow https://t.co/DEqiJrawBQ
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Quiver Quantitative
JUST IN: The US is reportedly considering an attempt to overthrow Venezuelan leader Nicholas Maduro, per Fox News.
Polymarket now gives a 69% chance of conflict by April. https://t.co/lBjyaHPMrK
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JUST IN: The US is reportedly considering an attempt to overthrow Venezuelan leader Nicholas Maduro, per Fox News.
Polymarket now gives a 69% chance of conflict by April. https://t.co/lBjyaHPMrK
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Fiscal.ai
Li Lu did not buy or sell a single share in Q3.
Talk about patience. https://t.co/fige5vTU1x
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Li Lu did not buy or sell a single share in Q3.
Talk about patience. https://t.co/fige5vTU1x
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Dimitry Nakhla | Babylon Capital®
Bill Ackman was on Fox Business this week saying “very high-quality businesses are showing up at very attractive levels”
He added that Pershing Square is approaching 15% cash & is “finishing due diligence on a company we’ve really wanted to own for years — now available at a bargain price”
Over the last several weeks, I’ve shared that many quality compounders are trading at the lower end of their 3-year valuation ranges and look attractive relative to their growth, durability, & moats
Before going any further I want to be clear: 𝐞𝐯𝐞𝐫𝐲𝐭𝐡𝐢𝐧𝐠 𝐢𝐧 𝐭𝐡𝐢𝐬 𝐩𝐨𝐬𝐭 𝐚𝐛𝐨𝐮𝐭 𝐰𝐡𝐢𝐜𝐡 𝐜𝐨𝐦𝐩𝐚𝐧𝐲 𝐁𝐢𝐥𝐥 𝐜𝐨𝐮𝐥𝐝 𝐛𝐞 𝐜𝐨𝐧𝐬𝐢𝐝𝐞𝐫𝐢𝐧𝐠 𝐢𝐬 𝐩𝐮𝐫𝐞𝐥𝐲 𝐬𝐩𝐞𝐜𝐮𝐥𝐚𝐭𝐢𝐯𝐞
I simply enjoy analyzing great investors and their frameworks, & @BillAckman has been one I’ve respected for years
Now lets guess 🤔
I believe the company is potentially Mastercard $MA & here’s why:
@KoyfinCharts recently shared Bill’s investment principles & $MA checks off every box
𝟏. 𝐊𝐞𝐲 𝐛𝐮𝐬𝐢𝐧𝐞𝐬𝐬 𝐜𝐡𝐚𝐫𝐚𝐜𝐭𝐞𝐫𝐢𝐬𝐭𝐢𝐜𝐬
✅Simple predictable FCF generative business
• $MA runs a toll-road-like payments network along with value added services & solutions & maintains >50% FCF margins
✅Formiddable barriers to entry
• $MA operates in a duopoly — a new competitor would need global merchant onboarding, bank integrations, regulators’ approval, & brand trust, among other things
✅Limited exposure to extrinsic factors that we cannot control
• $MA revenue is very stable especially over long periods & the company does not lend money, so it has no direct credit or balance-sheet risk
✅Generally low financial leverage levels
• $MA uses modest conservative leverage with strong interest-coverage ratios & stable cash generation
✅Minimal capital markets dependency
• Given its predictable recurring-like FCF, $MA is a self-funded business
✅Typically highly liquid mid & large cap companies
• $MA has a $488B market cap
𝟐. 𝐀𝐭𝐭𝐫𝐚𝐜𝐭𝐢𝐯𝐞 𝐯𝐚𝐥𝐮𝐚𝐭𝐢𝐨𝐧
✅Fair price as is but a substantial discount to optimized value
• $MA trades for 29x (lower end of its 3 year range & a PEG <2.00)
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Bill Ackman was on Fox Business this week saying “very high-quality businesses are showing up at very attractive levels”
He added that Pershing Square is approaching 15% cash & is “finishing due diligence on a company we’ve really wanted to own for years — now available at a bargain price”
Over the last several weeks, I’ve shared that many quality compounders are trading at the lower end of their 3-year valuation ranges and look attractive relative to their growth, durability, & moats
Before going any further I want to be clear: 𝐞𝐯𝐞𝐫𝐲𝐭𝐡𝐢𝐧𝐠 𝐢𝐧 𝐭𝐡𝐢𝐬 𝐩𝐨𝐬𝐭 𝐚𝐛𝐨𝐮𝐭 𝐰𝐡𝐢𝐜𝐡 𝐜𝐨𝐦𝐩𝐚𝐧𝐲 𝐁𝐢𝐥𝐥 𝐜𝐨𝐮𝐥𝐝 𝐛𝐞 𝐜𝐨𝐧𝐬𝐢𝐝𝐞𝐫𝐢𝐧𝐠 𝐢𝐬 𝐩𝐮𝐫𝐞𝐥𝐲 𝐬𝐩𝐞𝐜𝐮𝐥𝐚𝐭𝐢𝐯𝐞
I simply enjoy analyzing great investors and their frameworks, & @BillAckman has been one I’ve respected for years
Now lets guess 🤔
I believe the company is potentially Mastercard $MA & here’s why:
@KoyfinCharts recently shared Bill’s investment principles & $MA checks off every box
𝟏. 𝐊𝐞𝐲 𝐛𝐮𝐬𝐢𝐧𝐞𝐬𝐬 𝐜𝐡𝐚𝐫𝐚𝐜𝐭𝐞𝐫𝐢𝐬𝐭𝐢𝐜𝐬
✅Simple predictable FCF generative business
• $MA runs a toll-road-like payments network along with value added services & solutions & maintains >50% FCF margins
✅Formiddable barriers to entry
• $MA operates in a duopoly — a new competitor would need global merchant onboarding, bank integrations, regulators’ approval, & brand trust, among other things
✅Limited exposure to extrinsic factors that we cannot control
• $MA revenue is very stable especially over long periods & the company does not lend money, so it has no direct credit or balance-sheet risk
✅Generally low financial leverage levels
• $MA uses modest conservative leverage with strong interest-coverage ratios & stable cash generation
✅Minimal capital markets dependency
• Given its predictable recurring-like FCF, $MA is a self-funded business
✅Typically highly liquid mid & large cap companies
• $MA has a $488B market cap
𝟐. 𝐀𝐭𝐭𝐫𝐚𝐜𝐭𝐢𝐯𝐞 𝐯𝐚𝐥𝐮𝐚𝐭𝐢𝐨𝐧
✅Fair price as is but a substantial discount to optimized value
• $MA trades for 29x (lower end of its 3 year range & a PEG <2.00)
Bill Ackman's core investment principles, which he has engraved and keeps on a tablet on his desk. https://t.co/HxTULNJOVm tweet
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EndGame Macro
The Quiet Turning Point And How America’s Demographics Are About to Reshape the Housing Map
When births fall for 30 years and deaths steadily rise, you eventually hit a point where the population isn’t growing on its own anymore. That doesn’t mean the country is about to shrink overnight,
it just means the old engine of housing demand starts running on fumes.
For decades, America could rely on a constant flow of new households…young adults, new families, bigger generations coming up behind the older ones. That natural tailwind is fading. And once it fades, the whole system gets more sensitive to whatever else is going on with interest rates, immigration, zoning, job opportunities, all of it. The baseline isn’t pushing you upward anymore.
What the U.S. Will Actually Feel
The part people tend to miss is that this plays out unevenly. Japan already lived it. Once their population started turning down, the impact didn’t hit everywhere the same way.
The rural parts hollowed out first…falling prices, rising vacancies, towns struggling to keep services going. Meanwhile places like Tokyo and Osaka stayed tight and expensive because that’s where young people moved for work. Same demographics, totally different realities depending on where you lived.
The U.S. is heading for a similar split.
Not a national crash but a widening gap…
•Places already losing young people (Midwest counties, rural areas, older suburbs) will start feeling the demographic drag sooner. Homes sit longer. Vacancies rise. Local budgets get strained.
•Cities with economic pull like the Austins, Nashvilles, Bostons, D.C.s, Carolinas will act more like Japan’s big metros: still expensive, still competitive, still shaped by job gravity.
And then you layer in Boomers. They hold a massive share of U.S. homes, and their mortality curve picks up in the 2030s. Even a modest uptick in estate driven listings adds steady inventory to markets that already weren’t growing. It’s a drip that never stops.
Why This Matters Long Term
Demographics don’t blow up housing. But they do change the rules.
They make markets more uneven. They make policy and migration matter more. They create towns that slowly empty out and others that stay permanently tight. And they force the U.S. to confront something it hasn’t had to think about seriously in a long time: what happens when growth isn’t guaranteed?
That’s the real story behind this chart.
Not doom. Not collapse. Just a long, subtle shift where the U.S. starts looking a lot more like Japan except in the American version, the winners and losers will be even farther apart.
tweet
The Quiet Turning Point And How America’s Demographics Are About to Reshape the Housing Map
When births fall for 30 years and deaths steadily rise, you eventually hit a point where the population isn’t growing on its own anymore. That doesn’t mean the country is about to shrink overnight,
it just means the old engine of housing demand starts running on fumes.
For decades, America could rely on a constant flow of new households…young adults, new families, bigger generations coming up behind the older ones. That natural tailwind is fading. And once it fades, the whole system gets more sensitive to whatever else is going on with interest rates, immigration, zoning, job opportunities, all of it. The baseline isn’t pushing you upward anymore.
What the U.S. Will Actually Feel
The part people tend to miss is that this plays out unevenly. Japan already lived it. Once their population started turning down, the impact didn’t hit everywhere the same way.
The rural parts hollowed out first…falling prices, rising vacancies, towns struggling to keep services going. Meanwhile places like Tokyo and Osaka stayed tight and expensive because that’s where young people moved for work. Same demographics, totally different realities depending on where you lived.
The U.S. is heading for a similar split.
Not a national crash but a widening gap…
•Places already losing young people (Midwest counties, rural areas, older suburbs) will start feeling the demographic drag sooner. Homes sit longer. Vacancies rise. Local budgets get strained.
•Cities with economic pull like the Austins, Nashvilles, Bostons, D.C.s, Carolinas will act more like Japan’s big metros: still expensive, still competitive, still shaped by job gravity.
And then you layer in Boomers. They hold a massive share of U.S. homes, and their mortality curve picks up in the 2030s. Even a modest uptick in estate driven listings adds steady inventory to markets that already weren’t growing. It’s a drip that never stops.
Why This Matters Long Term
Demographics don’t blow up housing. But they do change the rules.
They make markets more uneven. They make policy and migration matter more. They create towns that slowly empty out and others that stay permanently tight. And they force the U.S. to confront something it hasn’t had to think about seriously in a long time: what happens when growth isn’t guaranteed?
That’s the real story behind this chart.
Not doom. Not collapse. Just a long, subtle shift where the U.S. starts looking a lot more like Japan except in the American version, the winners and losers will be even farther apart.
The U.S. Housing Market is about to get hit by a big demographic shift.
By 2032, there will be more deaths than births in the U.S.
This crossover point will be the continuation of a long-term trend over the last four decades, and ultimately will have the following impacts:
a) structurally lower homebuyer demand, as declining births and family formation lowers the need and urgency for young people to buy houses
b) more inventory, as incrementally more deaths and the aging out of the Baby Boomer generation increases listings (Freddie Mac estimates 9 million homes by 2035).
This will likely have a disinflationary and/or deflationary impact on home prices over the long-term.
Reventure just added Birth/Death Ratio data for every county in the U.S., going back 30 years, under 'Demographic Data'. Sign up to see the demographic trends in your area at https://t.co/Gn64thZUlO. tweet
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Fiscal.ai
Which food delivery business will be larger in 2030?
Current Bookings:
DoorDash: $94 billion, +25% YoY
Uber Eats: $85 billion, +25% YoY
$DASH $UBER https://t.co/WGgg7bCIra
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Which food delivery business will be larger in 2030?
Current Bookings:
DoorDash: $94 billion, +25% YoY
Uber Eats: $85 billion, +25% YoY
$DASH $UBER https://t.co/WGgg7bCIra
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WealthyReadings
Portfolio Update: what stays, what's missing?
$TMDX – the strongest name in my book. Unnafected by macro, AI, rate-cuts, recession...
$PYPL – More weakness than I expected, would trim for better names.
$BABA & $KWEB – China thesis remains intact. Planning to increase the positions.
$NBIS & $ALAB – Staying steady. Not adding until I see a confirmed local bottom.
$BTC – The king. No explanations needed.
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Portfolio Update: what stays, what's missing?
$TMDX – the strongest name in my book. Unnafected by macro, AI, rate-cuts, recession...
$PYPL – More weakness than I expected, would trim for better names.
$BABA & $KWEB – China thesis remains intact. Planning to increase the positions.
$NBIS & $ALAB – Staying steady. Not adding until I see a confirmed local bottom.
$BTC – The king. No explanations needed.
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