Offshore
Photo
โ InsideArbitrage
$HSIC Henry Schein shares rise (+3.15% pre-market) as it announces ๐๐
โช๏ธ Strategic Investment by KKR,
โช๏ธ Board Changes
โช๏ธ Preliminary Unaudited Financial Results and 2025 Financial Guidance ๐น GAAP Q4 net income: $94M ($0.74/share) ๐น FY 2024: $390M ($3.05/share)
โช๏ธ Increased share repurchase plan by $500 million (~5% of its current market cap) with $250 million to be executed through accelerated share repurchases
๐ The company has been regularly buying back its shares - reducing shares outstanding by 11%+ over the last 4 yrs as seen from the graph below
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$HSIC Henry Schein shares rise (+3.15% pre-market) as it announces ๐๐
โช๏ธ Strategic Investment by KKR,
โช๏ธ Board Changes
โช๏ธ Preliminary Unaudited Financial Results and 2025 Financial Guidance ๐น GAAP Q4 net income: $94M ($0.74/share) ๐น FY 2024: $390M ($3.05/share)
โช๏ธ Increased share repurchase plan by $500 million (~5% of its current market cap) with $250 million to be executed through accelerated share repurchases
๐ The company has been regularly buying back its shares - reducing shares outstanding by 11%+ over the last 4 yrs as seen from the graph below
tweet
Offshore
Photo
โ InsideArbitrage
Third Point, which owns 9.9% of Soho Houseโs $SHCO stock, believes that it is undervalued and that the company would generate more value for shareholders as a private business.
๐ @ThirdPointLLC plans to engage with the board to discuss the potential sale and possible alternatives.
๐ Third Point may participate in the take-private offer, that Soho entered with Chairman Ron Burkle, by rolling over its equity stake or providing financing.
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Third Point, which owns 9.9% of Soho Houseโs $SHCO stock, believes that it is undervalued and that the company would generate more value for shareholders as a private business.
๐ @ThirdPointLLC plans to engage with the board to discuss the potential sale and possible alternatives.
๐ Third Point may participate in the take-private offer, that Soho entered with Chairman Ron Burkle, by rolling over its equity stake or providing financing.
Soho House $SHCO received an offer from a new third-party consortium to acquire the company for $9.00 per share.
โด๏ธThe offer is conditioned on certain significant shareholders, including Soho's Executive Chairman, Ron Burkle, and The Yucaipa Companies, rolling over their equity interests as part of the transaction.
โด๏ธ The Board has formed an independent Special Committee to evaluate the offer. - InsideArbitragetweet
Offshore
Video
โ Startup Archive
Rippling founder Parker Conrad on the opportunity in building โcompound startupsโ
Y Combinator CEO Garry Tan points out that the classic startup advice is โdo one thing and do it extremely well,โ but Parker took a different approach building Rippling that he calls the โcompound startup.โ He set out to solve multiple problems for their customers simultaneously.
Parker elaborates on this:
โI think it actually resembles a lot of software companies that were built 20+ years ago. If you look at companies like SAP, Oracle, and Microsoft, they actually look like compound software businessesโฆ What happened is I think there was this moment in time where it really was possible to do one narrow thing because there was so much greenfield territory in software as everything shifted from on-prem to the cloud. You could go out and do this really narrow thing and turn it into a SaaS company. Almost all of these things ended up โ at least for a period of time โ being worth low-single-digit billions of dollars. And it was really easy to find a niche.โ
But Parker believes this approach is suboptimal because it limits the types of problems you can solve for your customers โ especially big customers.
โYou can actually just wipe out a lot of work and make things function much better if you can take on a whole host of interrelated applications and build one comprehensive solution.โ
Parker argues that if you can solve multiple problems for your customers with parallel applications, your product/market fit becomes much more powerful and harder to displace.
The other argument in favor of the compound startup approach is that sales and marketing has gotten much harder and less efficient for software businesses:
โYou see this at every stage, but over the last five years, public companies are spending 50% more on sales and marketing, but theyโre adding 10% less in new ARR with that increase in spend. Fundamentally, the business model for a lot of software is just broken. Thereโs too many businesses.โ
Parker also believes AI sales agents will completely destroy outbound as a channel if they do eventually end up working.
Video source: @ycombinator (2025)
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Rippling founder Parker Conrad on the opportunity in building โcompound startupsโ
Y Combinator CEO Garry Tan points out that the classic startup advice is โdo one thing and do it extremely well,โ but Parker took a different approach building Rippling that he calls the โcompound startup.โ He set out to solve multiple problems for their customers simultaneously.
Parker elaborates on this:
โI think it actually resembles a lot of software companies that were built 20+ years ago. If you look at companies like SAP, Oracle, and Microsoft, they actually look like compound software businessesโฆ What happened is I think there was this moment in time where it really was possible to do one narrow thing because there was so much greenfield territory in software as everything shifted from on-prem to the cloud. You could go out and do this really narrow thing and turn it into a SaaS company. Almost all of these things ended up โ at least for a period of time โ being worth low-single-digit billions of dollars. And it was really easy to find a niche.โ
But Parker believes this approach is suboptimal because it limits the types of problems you can solve for your customers โ especially big customers.
โYou can actually just wipe out a lot of work and make things function much better if you can take on a whole host of interrelated applications and build one comprehensive solution.โ
Parker argues that if you can solve multiple problems for your customers with parallel applications, your product/market fit becomes much more powerful and harder to displace.
The other argument in favor of the compound startup approach is that sales and marketing has gotten much harder and less efficient for software businesses:
โYou see this at every stage, but over the last five years, public companies are spending 50% more on sales and marketing, but theyโre adding 10% less in new ARR with that increase in spend. Fundamentally, the business model for a lot of software is just broken. Thereโs too many businesses.โ
Parker also believes AI sales agents will completely destroy outbound as a channel if they do eventually end up working.
Video source: @ycombinator (2025)
tweet
Offshore
Video
โ Startup Archive
RT @ArthurMacwaters: Parker gave a great talk about this at a YC reunion recently
He pointed out that building a hyperspecialized company that carefully avoids markets held by large incumbents is actually dumb
You have to kill some giants to become the king.
So take on the incumbents and do the stack better
tweet
RT @ArthurMacwaters: Parker gave a great talk about this at a YC reunion recently
He pointed out that building a hyperspecialized company that carefully avoids markets held by large incumbents is actually dumb
You have to kill some giants to become the king.
So take on the incumbents and do the stack better
Rippling founder Parker Conrad on the opportunity in building โcompound startupsโ
Y Combinator CEO Garry Tan points out that the classic startup advice is โdo one thing and do it extremely well,โ but Parker took a different approach building Rippling that he calls the โcompound startup.โ He set out to solve multiple problems for their customers simultaneously.
Parker elaborates on this:
โI think it actually resembles a lot of software companies that were built 20+ years ago. If you look at companies like SAP, Oracle, and Microsoft, they actually look like compound software businessesโฆ What happened is I think there was this moment in time where it really was possible to do one narrow thing because there was so much greenfield territory in software as everything shifted from on-prem to the cloud. You could go out and do this really narrow thing and turn it into a SaaS company. Almost all of these things ended up โ at least for a period of time โ being worth low-single-digit billions of dollars. And it was really easy to find a niche.โ
But Parker believes this approach is suboptimal because it limits the types of problems you can solve for your customers โ especially big customers.
โYou can actually just wipe out a lot of work and make things function much better if you can take on a whole host of interrelated applications and build one comprehensive solution.โ
Parker argues that if you can solve multiple problems for your customers with parallel applications, your product/market fit becomes much more powerful and harder to displace.
The other argument in favor of the compound startup approach is that sales and marketing has gotten much harder and less efficient for software businesses:
โYou see this at every stage, but over the last five years, public companies are spending 50% more on sales and marketing, but theyโre adding 10% less in new ARR with that increase in spend. Fundamentally, the business model for a lot of software is just broken. Thereโs too many businesses.โ
Parker also believes AI sales agents will completely destroy outbound as a channel if they do eventually end up working.
Video source: @ycombinator (2025) - Startup Archivetweet
Offshore
Photo
โ Dimitry Nakhla | Babylon Capitalยฎ
ASML Holding $ASML Q4 Earnings Report๐ฏ
Rev: โฌ9.26B vs โฌ9.02B est โ | +28% YoY
EPS: โฌ6.85 vs โฌ6.73 est โ | +31% YoY
___
Net bookings: โฌ7.09B vs โฌ3.53B est โ
___
Guidance ๐
Rev Q1 2025: โฌ7.5B-โฌ8.0B vs โฌ7.25B est โ
Rev FY 2025: โฌ30B-โฌ35B vs $32.02B est โ https://t.co/BpEGp9OFEX
tweet
ASML Holding $ASML Q4 Earnings Report๐ฏ
Rev: โฌ9.26B vs โฌ9.02B est โ | +28% YoY
EPS: โฌ6.85 vs โฌ6.73 est โ | +31% YoY
___
Net bookings: โฌ7.09B vs โฌ3.53B est โ
___
Guidance ๐
Rev Q1 2025: โฌ7.5B-โฌ8.0B vs โฌ7.25B est โ
Rev FY 2025: โฌ30B-โฌ35B vs $32.02B est โ https://t.co/BpEGp9OFEX
tweet
Offshore
Photo
โ InsideArbitrage
UK's Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) announced the launch of the merger inquiry for the acquisition of ChampionX $CHX by Schlumberger $SLB.
๐งชThe initial period will commence on January 30, 2025.
๐งชThe deadline for @CMAgovUK to announce its decision on whether to refer the merger for a phase 2 investigation is March 27, 2025.
tweet
UK's Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) announced the launch of the merger inquiry for the acquisition of ChampionX $CHX by Schlumberger $SLB.
๐งชThe initial period will commence on January 30, 2025.
๐งชThe deadline for @CMAgovUK to announce its decision on whether to refer the merger for a phase 2 investigation is March 27, 2025.
tweet
โ InsideArbitrage
$CPF Board authorizes new $30 million share repurchase program (4% of its current market cap) which replaces the prior $20 million share repurchase plan of January 2024
Q4 & FY 2024 Highlights
๐ฐ Net Income: $11.3M ($0.42/share) Q4 | $53.4M ($1.97/share) FY
๐Net interest margin rose to 3.17%, up 10 bps from 3.07% last quarter
๐ต Dividends & Buybacks: Quarterly dividend up 3.8% to $0.27/share | New $30M repurchase plan for 2025
๐ฆ Milestone: Central Pacific Bank joins the Federal Reserve System
โช๏ธ In 2024, the company repurchased 49,960 shares for $0.9M (avg. $18.92/share) and returned $29.1M to shareholders via dividends and buybacks. ๐ฐ๐
tweet
$CPF Board authorizes new $30 million share repurchase program (4% of its current market cap) which replaces the prior $20 million share repurchase plan of January 2024
Q4 & FY 2024 Highlights
๐ฐ Net Income: $11.3M ($0.42/share) Q4 | $53.4M ($1.97/share) FY
๐Net interest margin rose to 3.17%, up 10 bps from 3.07% last quarter
๐ต Dividends & Buybacks: Quarterly dividend up 3.8% to $0.27/share | New $30M repurchase plan for 2025
๐ฆ Milestone: Central Pacific Bank joins the Federal Reserve System
โช๏ธ In 2024, the company repurchased 49,960 shares for $0.9M (avg. $18.92/share) and returned $29.1M to shareholders via dividends and buybacks. ๐ฐ๐
tweet
โ Quiver Quantitative
The national debt increased by about $647M in the first week of Trumpโs presidency.
Obviously too early for this to mean anything yet, itโs noisy data, but hereโs how that compares to past years over a similar time period:
2024: +$58B
2023: +$3B
2022: +$51B
2021: +$3B
2020: +$33B
2019: +$2B
2018: +$236M
2017: -$10B
2016: +$30B
Planning on posting updates as more policies get enacted, and we get a larger sample size.
tweet
The national debt increased by about $647M in the first week of Trumpโs presidency.
Obviously too early for this to mean anything yet, itโs noisy data, but hereโs how that compares to past years over a similar time period:
2024: +$58B
2023: +$3B
2022: +$51B
2021: +$3B
2020: +$33B
2019: +$2B
2018: +$236M
2017: -$10B
2016: +$30B
Planning on posting updates as more policies get enacted, and we get a larger sample size.
tweet
Offshore
Photo
โ Dimitry Nakhla | Babylon Capitalยฎ
6 months ago I suggested $DHR was trading for a substantial premium at $240๐ต & that Iโd be more interested closer to $200๐ต
After its Q4 earnings report, $DHR shares are down ~6% & down over the past 6 months
___
As I stated in the analysis (post shared below):
โAs you can see, $DHR needs to trade above 32x to have attractive return potential
While possible, I wouldnโt want to rely on that assumption as it doesnโt leave us with any margin of safety
While the 10-year mean multiple is 25.18x, Iโd be content relying on somewhere closer to 27x - 28x earnings given $DHR quality, culture, competitive advantage, earnings growth rate & the quality of earnings, & long-term tailwinds in the sector
Yet, even at 27x - 28x earnings, the return potential outlook is bleak
Today at $240๐ต $DHR is trading at a substantial premium
Iโd become interested in $DHR closer to $200๐ต or at ~25.50x NTM earnings (roughly 16.7% below todayโs price)โ
A sober valuation analysis on $DHR ๐ง๐ฝโโ๏ธ
โขNTM P/E Ratio: 30.69x
โข10-Year Mean: 25.18x
โขNTM FCF Yield: 4.34%
โข10-Year Mean: 3.24%
As you can see, $DHR appears to be trading above fair value
Going forward, investors can receive ~18% LESS in earnings per share & ~25% LESS in FCF per share ๐ง ***
Before we get into valuation, letโs take a look at why $DHR is a quality business
BALANCE SHEETโ
โขCash & Short-Term Inv: $7.03B
โขLong-Term Debt: $16.42B
$DHR has a great balance sheet, an A- S&P Credit Rating, & 22x FFO Interest Coverage
RETURN ON CAPITAL๐*
โข2019: 6.2%
โข2020: 7.8%
โข2021: 10.3%
โข2022: 10.7%
โข2023: 7.4%
โขLTM: 7.2%
*ROIC relatively low partly due to $DHR growth strategy (acquisitions, capital allocation, etc)
RETURN ON EQUITY๐
โข2019: 8.3%
โข2020: 10.8%
โข2021: 12.8%
โข2022: 13.3%
โข2023: 8.2%
โขLTM: 7.8%
$DHR has decent return metrics, highlighting the financial efficiency of the business
REVENUESโ
โข2018: $17.05B
โข2023: $23.89B
โขCAGR: 6.97%
FREE CASH FLOWโ
โข2018: $3.44B
โข2023: $5.78B
โขCAGR: 10.93%
NORMALIZED EPSโ
โข2018: $7.58
โข2023: $4.52
โขCAGR: 10.89%
SHARE BUYBACKSโ
โข2018 Shares Outstanding: 0.70B
โขLTM Shares Outstanding: 0.74B
MARGINSโ
โขLTM Gross Margins: 58.9%
โขLTM Operating Margins: 21.9%
โขLTM Net Income Margins: 17.1%
***NOW TO VALUATION ๐ง
As stated above, investors can expect to receive ~18% LESS in EPS & ~25% LESS in FCF per share
Using Benjamin Grahamโs 2G rule of thumb, $DHR has to grow earnings at a 15.35% CAGR over the next several years to justify its valuation
Today, analysts anticipate 2024 - 2026 EPS growth over the next few years to be less than the (15.35%) required growth rate:
2024E: $7.62 (0.5% YoY) *FY Dec
2025E: $8.74 (14.8% YoY)
2026E: $9.71 (11.0% YoY)
$DHR has a decent track record of meeting analyst estimates ~2 years out, so letโs assume $DHR ends 2026 with $9.71 in EPS & see its CAGR potential assuming different multiples
32x P/E: $310.72๐ต โฆ ~11.3% CAGR
28x P/E: $271.88๐ต โฆ ~5.5% CAGR
27x P/E: $262.16๐ต โฆ ~4.0% CAGR
26x P/E: $252.46๐ต โฆ ~2.5% CAGR
25x P/E: $242.75๐ต โฆ ~1.0% CAGR
As you can see, $DHR needs to trade above 32x to have attractive return potential
While possible, I wouldnโt want to rely on that assumption as it doesnโt leave us with any margin of safety
While the 10-year mean multiple is 25.18x, Iโd be content relying on somewhere closer to 27x - 28x earnings given $DHR quality, culture, competitive advantage, earnings growth rate & the quality of earnings, & long-term tailwinds in the sector
Yet, even at 27x - 28x earnings, the return potential outlook is bleak
Today at $240๐ต $DHR is trading at a substantial premium
Iโd become interested in $DHR closer to $200๐ต or at ~25.50x NTM earnings (roughly 16.7% below tod[...]
6 months ago I suggested $DHR was trading for a substantial premium at $240๐ต & that Iโd be more interested closer to $200๐ต
After its Q4 earnings report, $DHR shares are down ~6% & down over the past 6 months
___
As I stated in the analysis (post shared below):
โAs you can see, $DHR needs to trade above 32x to have attractive return potential
While possible, I wouldnโt want to rely on that assumption as it doesnโt leave us with any margin of safety
While the 10-year mean multiple is 25.18x, Iโd be content relying on somewhere closer to 27x - 28x earnings given $DHR quality, culture, competitive advantage, earnings growth rate & the quality of earnings, & long-term tailwinds in the sector
Yet, even at 27x - 28x earnings, the return potential outlook is bleak
Today at $240๐ต $DHR is trading at a substantial premium
Iโd become interested in $DHR closer to $200๐ต or at ~25.50x NTM earnings (roughly 16.7% below todayโs price)โ
A sober valuation analysis on $DHR ๐ง๐ฝโโ๏ธ
โขNTM P/E Ratio: 30.69x
โข10-Year Mean: 25.18x
โขNTM FCF Yield: 4.34%
โข10-Year Mean: 3.24%
As you can see, $DHR appears to be trading above fair value
Going forward, investors can receive ~18% LESS in earnings per share & ~25% LESS in FCF per share ๐ง ***
Before we get into valuation, letโs take a look at why $DHR is a quality business
BALANCE SHEETโ
โขCash & Short-Term Inv: $7.03B
โขLong-Term Debt: $16.42B
$DHR has a great balance sheet, an A- S&P Credit Rating, & 22x FFO Interest Coverage
RETURN ON CAPITAL๐*
โข2019: 6.2%
โข2020: 7.8%
โข2021: 10.3%
โข2022: 10.7%
โข2023: 7.4%
โขLTM: 7.2%
*ROIC relatively low partly due to $DHR growth strategy (acquisitions, capital allocation, etc)
RETURN ON EQUITY๐
โข2019: 8.3%
โข2020: 10.8%
โข2021: 12.8%
โข2022: 13.3%
โข2023: 8.2%
โขLTM: 7.8%
$DHR has decent return metrics, highlighting the financial efficiency of the business
REVENUESโ
โข2018: $17.05B
โข2023: $23.89B
โขCAGR: 6.97%
FREE CASH FLOWโ
โข2018: $3.44B
โข2023: $5.78B
โขCAGR: 10.93%
NORMALIZED EPSโ
โข2018: $7.58
โข2023: $4.52
โขCAGR: 10.89%
SHARE BUYBACKSโ
โข2018 Shares Outstanding: 0.70B
โขLTM Shares Outstanding: 0.74B
MARGINSโ
โขLTM Gross Margins: 58.9%
โขLTM Operating Margins: 21.9%
โขLTM Net Income Margins: 17.1%
***NOW TO VALUATION ๐ง
As stated above, investors can expect to receive ~18% LESS in EPS & ~25% LESS in FCF per share
Using Benjamin Grahamโs 2G rule of thumb, $DHR has to grow earnings at a 15.35% CAGR over the next several years to justify its valuation
Today, analysts anticipate 2024 - 2026 EPS growth over the next few years to be less than the (15.35%) required growth rate:
2024E: $7.62 (0.5% YoY) *FY Dec
2025E: $8.74 (14.8% YoY)
2026E: $9.71 (11.0% YoY)
$DHR has a decent track record of meeting analyst estimates ~2 years out, so letโs assume $DHR ends 2026 with $9.71 in EPS & see its CAGR potential assuming different multiples
32x P/E: $310.72๐ต โฆ ~11.3% CAGR
28x P/E: $271.88๐ต โฆ ~5.5% CAGR
27x P/E: $262.16๐ต โฆ ~4.0% CAGR
26x P/E: $252.46๐ต โฆ ~2.5% CAGR
25x P/E: $242.75๐ต โฆ ~1.0% CAGR
As you can see, $DHR needs to trade above 32x to have attractive return potential
While possible, I wouldnโt want to rely on that assumption as it doesnโt leave us with any margin of safety
While the 10-year mean multiple is 25.18x, Iโd be content relying on somewhere closer to 27x - 28x earnings given $DHR quality, culture, competitive advantage, earnings growth rate & the quality of earnings, & long-term tailwinds in the sector
Yet, even at 27x - 28x earnings, the return potential outlook is bleak
Today at $240๐ต $DHR is trading at a substantial premium
Iโd become interested in $DHR closer to $200๐ต or at ~25.50x NTM earnings (roughly 16.7% below tod[...]
Offshore
โ Dimitry Nakhla | Babylon Capitalยฎ 6 months ago I suggested $DHR was trading for a substantial premium at $240๐ต & that Iโd be more interested closer to $200๐ต After its Q4 earnings report, $DHR shares are down ~6% & down over the past 6 months ___ As I statedโฆ
ayโs price)
At that price, I can reasonably expect ~12% CAGR while assuming 27x & ~10.2% CAGR while assuming 26x, a multiple I view as fair for $DHR
#stocks #investing
___
๐๐๐๐๐๐๐๐๐๐โผ๏ธ: ๐๐ก๐ข๐ฌ ๐ข๐ฌ ๐๐๐ ๐๐ง๐ฏ๐๐ฌ๐ญ๐ฆ๐๐ง๐ญ ๐๐๐ฏ๐ข๐๐. ๐๐๐๐ฒ๐ฅ๐จ๐ง ๐๐๐ฉ๐ข๐ญ๐๐ฅยฎ ๐๐ง๐ ๐ข๐ญ๐ฌ ๐ซ๐๐ฉ๐ซ๐๐ฌ๐๐ง๐ญ๐๐ญ๐ข๐ฏ๐๐ฌ ๐ฆ๐๐ฒ ๐ก๐๐ฏ๐ ๐ฉ๐จ๐ฌ๐ข๐ญ๐ข๐จ๐ง๐ฌ ๐ข๐ง ๐ญ๐ก๐ ๐ฌ๐๐๐ฎ๐ซ๐ข๐ญ๐ข๐๐ฌ ๐๐ข๐ฌ๐๐ฎ๐ฌ๐ฌ๐๐ ๐ข๐ง ๐ญ๐ก๐ข๐ฌ ๐ญ๐ฐ๐๐๐ญ.
๐๐ก๐ ๐ข๐ง๐๐จ๐ซ๐ฆ๐๐ญ๐ข๐จ๐ง ๐๐จ๐ง๐ญ๐๐ข๐ง๐๐ ๐ข๐ง ๐ญ๐ก๐ข๐ฌ ๐ญ๐ฐ๐๐๐ญ ๐ข๐ฌ ๐ข๐ง๐ญ๐๐ง๐๐๐ ๐๐จ๐ซ ๐ข๐ง๐๐จ๐ซ๐ฆ๐๐ญ๐ข๐จ๐ง๐๐ฅ ๐ฉ๐ฎ๐ซ๐ฉ๐จ๐ฌ๐๐ฌ ๐จ๐ง๐ฅ๐ฒ ๐๐ง๐ ๐ฌ๐ก๐จ๐ฎ๐ฅ๐ ๐ง๐จ๐ญ ๐๐ ๐๐จ๐ง๐ฌ๐ญ๐ซ๐ฎ๐๐ ๐๐ฌ ๐ข๐ง๐ฏ๐๐ฌ๐ญ๐ฆ๐๐ง๐ญ ๐๐๐ฏ๐ข๐๐ ๐ญ๐จ ๐ฆ๐๐๐ญ ๐ญ๐ก๐ ๐ฌ๐ฉ๐๐๐ข๐๐ข๐ ๐ง๐๐๐๐ฌ ๐จ๐ ๐๐ง๐ฒ ๐ข๐ง๐๐ข๐ฏ๐ข๐๐ฎ๐๐ฅ ๐จ๐ซ ๐ฌ๐ข๐ญ๐ฎ๐๐ญ๐ข๐จ๐ง. ๐๐๐ฌ๐ญ ๐ฉ๐๐ซ๐๐จ๐ซ๐ฆ๐๐ง๐๐ ๐ข๐ฌ ๐ง๐จ ๐ ๐ฎ๐๐ซ๐๐ง๐ญ๐๐ ๐จ๐ ๐๐ฎ๐ญ๐ฎ๐ซ๐ ๐ซ๐๐ฌ๐ฎ๐ฅ๐ญ๐ฌ.
๐๐ง๐๐จ๐ซ๐ฆ๐๐ญ๐ข๐จ๐ง ๐๐จ๐ง๐ญ๐๐ข๐ง๐๐ ๐ข๐ง ๐ญ๐ก๐ข๐ฌ ๐ญ๐ฐ๐๐๐ญ ๐ก๐๐ฌ ๐๐๐๐ง ๐จ๐๐ญ๐๐ข๐ง๐๐ ๐๐ซ๐จ๐ฆ ๐ฌ๐จ๐ฎ๐ซ๐๐๐ฌ ๐๐๐ฅ๐ข๐๐ฏ๐๐ ๐ญ๐จ ๐๐ ๐ซ๐๐ฅ๐ข๐๐๐ฅ๐, ๐๐ฎ๐ญ ๐ข๐ฌ ๐ง๐จ๐ญ ๐ ๐ฎ๐๐ซ๐๐ง๐ญ๐๐๐. - Dimitry Nakhla | Babylon Capitalยฎ tweet
At that price, I can reasonably expect ~12% CAGR while assuming 27x & ~10.2% CAGR while assuming 26x, a multiple I view as fair for $DHR
#stocks #investing
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๐๐๐๐๐๐๐๐๐๐โผ๏ธ: ๐๐ก๐ข๐ฌ ๐ข๐ฌ ๐๐๐ ๐๐ง๐ฏ๐๐ฌ๐ญ๐ฆ๐๐ง๐ญ ๐๐๐ฏ๐ข๐๐. ๐๐๐๐ฒ๐ฅ๐จ๐ง ๐๐๐ฉ๐ข๐ญ๐๐ฅยฎ ๐๐ง๐ ๐ข๐ญ๐ฌ ๐ซ๐๐ฉ๐ซ๐๐ฌ๐๐ง๐ญ๐๐ญ๐ข๐ฏ๐๐ฌ ๐ฆ๐๐ฒ ๐ก๐๐ฏ๐ ๐ฉ๐จ๐ฌ๐ข๐ญ๐ข๐จ๐ง๐ฌ ๐ข๐ง ๐ญ๐ก๐ ๐ฌ๐๐๐ฎ๐ซ๐ข๐ญ๐ข๐๐ฌ ๐๐ข๐ฌ๐๐ฎ๐ฌ๐ฌ๐๐ ๐ข๐ง ๐ญ๐ก๐ข๐ฌ ๐ญ๐ฐ๐๐๐ญ.
๐๐ก๐ ๐ข๐ง๐๐จ๐ซ๐ฆ๐๐ญ๐ข๐จ๐ง ๐๐จ๐ง๐ญ๐๐ข๐ง๐๐ ๐ข๐ง ๐ญ๐ก๐ข๐ฌ ๐ญ๐ฐ๐๐๐ญ ๐ข๐ฌ ๐ข๐ง๐ญ๐๐ง๐๐๐ ๐๐จ๐ซ ๐ข๐ง๐๐จ๐ซ๐ฆ๐๐ญ๐ข๐จ๐ง๐๐ฅ ๐ฉ๐ฎ๐ซ๐ฉ๐จ๐ฌ๐๐ฌ ๐จ๐ง๐ฅ๐ฒ ๐๐ง๐ ๐ฌ๐ก๐จ๐ฎ๐ฅ๐ ๐ง๐จ๐ญ ๐๐ ๐๐จ๐ง๐ฌ๐ญ๐ซ๐ฎ๐๐ ๐๐ฌ ๐ข๐ง๐ฏ๐๐ฌ๐ญ๐ฆ๐๐ง๐ญ ๐๐๐ฏ๐ข๐๐ ๐ญ๐จ ๐ฆ๐๐๐ญ ๐ญ๐ก๐ ๐ฌ๐ฉ๐๐๐ข๐๐ข๐ ๐ง๐๐๐๐ฌ ๐จ๐ ๐๐ง๐ฒ ๐ข๐ง๐๐ข๐ฏ๐ข๐๐ฎ๐๐ฅ ๐จ๐ซ ๐ฌ๐ข๐ญ๐ฎ๐๐ญ๐ข๐จ๐ง. ๐๐๐ฌ๐ญ ๐ฉ๐๐ซ๐๐จ๐ซ๐ฆ๐๐ง๐๐ ๐ข๐ฌ ๐ง๐จ ๐ ๐ฎ๐๐ซ๐๐ง๐ญ๐๐ ๐จ๐ ๐๐ฎ๐ญ๐ฎ๐ซ๐ ๐ซ๐๐ฌ๐ฎ๐ฅ๐ญ๐ฌ.
๐๐ง๐๐จ๐ซ๐ฆ๐๐ญ๐ข๐จ๐ง ๐๐จ๐ง๐ญ๐๐ข๐ง๐๐ ๐ข๐ง ๐ญ๐ก๐ข๐ฌ ๐ญ๐ฐ๐๐๐ญ ๐ก๐๐ฌ ๐๐๐๐ง ๐จ๐๐ญ๐๐ข๐ง๐๐ ๐๐ซ๐จ๐ฆ ๐ฌ๐จ๐ฎ๐ซ๐๐๐ฌ ๐๐๐ฅ๐ข๐๐ฏ๐๐ ๐ญ๐จ ๐๐ ๐ซ๐๐ฅ๐ข๐๐๐ฅ๐, ๐๐ฎ๐ญ ๐ข๐ฌ ๐ง๐จ๐ญ ๐ ๐ฎ๐๐ซ๐๐ง๐ญ๐๐๐. - Dimitry Nakhla | Babylon Capitalยฎ tweet