arket to new heights.

Before you blame the management of Intel for not trying hard enough to stop its decline, it is worth noting that if anything, they have been trying too hard. In the last few years, Intel has invested massive amounts into its chip manufacturing business (Intel Foundry), trying to compete with TSMC, and almost as much into its new generation of AI chips, hoping to claim market share of the fastest growing markets for AI chips from Nvidia. In fact, a benign assessment of Intel would be that they are making the right moves, but that these moves will take time to pay off, and that the market is being impatient. A not-so-benign reading is that the market does not believe that Intel can compete effectively against either TSMC (on chip manufacture) or Nvidia (on AI chip design), and that the money spent on both endeavors will be wasted. The latter group is clearly winning out in markets, at the moment, but as I will argue in the next section, the question of whether Intel is a good investment at its current depressed price may rest in which group you think has right on its side.

Drugstore Blues: Walgreen Wobbles

From humble beginnings in Chicago, Walgreen has grown to become a key part of the US health care system as a dispenser of pharmacy drugs and products. The company went public in 1927, and in the century since, the company has acquired the characteristics of a mature company, with growth spurts along the way. Its acquisition of a significant stake in Alliance Bootsgave it a larger global presence, albeit at a high price, with the acquisition costing $15.3 billion. Again, to understand, Walgreen's current position, we looked at the company's operating history by looking revenue growth and profit margins over time:


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After double digit growth from 1994 to 2011, the company has struggled to grow in a business, with daunting unit economics and slim operating margins, and the last three years have only seen things worsen on all fronts, with revenue growth down, and margins slipping further, below the Maginot line; with an 1.88% operating margin, it is impossible to generate enough to cover interest expenses and taxes, thus triggering distress.

While management decisions have clearly contributed to the problems, it is also true that the pharmacy business, which forms Walgreen's core, has deteriorated over the last two years, and that can be seen by comparing its market performance to CVS, its highest profile competitor.


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As you can see, both CVS and Walgreens have seen their market capitalizations drop since mid-2022, but the decline in Walgreens has been far more precipitous than at CVS; Walgreens whose market cap exceeded that of CVS in 201[...]

6 currently has one tenth of the market capitalization of CVS. In response to the slowing down of the pharmacy business, Walgreens has tried to find a pathway back to growth, albeit with acquired growth. A new CEO, Roz Brewer, was brought into the company in 2021, from Sam's Club, and wagered the company's future on acquisitions, buying four companies in 2021, with a majority stake in Village MD, a chain of doctor practices and clinics, representing the biggest one. That acquisition, which cost Walgreens $5.2 billion, has been more cash drain than flow, and in 2024, Ms. Brewer was replaced as CEO by Tim Wentworth, and Village MD scaled back its growth plans.

Venti no more The Humbling of Starbucks

On my last visit to Italy, I did make frequent stops at local cafes, to get my espresso shots, and I can say with confidence that none of them had a  caramel macchiato or  an iced brown sugar oatmilk shaken espresso on the menu. Much as we make fun of the myriad offerings at Starbucks, it is undeniable that the company has found a way into the daily lives of many people, whose day cannot begin without their favorite Starbucks drink in hand. Early on, Starbucks eased the process by opening more and more stores, often within blocks of each other, and more recently, by offering online ordering and pick up, with rewards supercharging the process. Howard Schultz, who nursed the company from a single store front in Seattle to an ubiquitous presence across America, was CEO of the company from 1986, and while he retired from the position in 2000, he returned from 2008 to 2017, to restore the company after the financial crisis, and again from 2022 to 2023, as an interim CEO to bridge the gap between the retirement of Kevin Johnson in 2022 and the hiring of Laxman Narasimhan in 2023. To get a measure of how Starbucks has evolved over time, I looked the revenues and margins at the company, over time:


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Unlike Intel and Walgreens, where the aging pattern (of slowing growth and steadying margins) is clearly visible, Starbucks is a tougher case. Revenue growth at Starbucks has slackened over time, but it has remained robust even in the most recent period (2022-2024). Profit margins have actually improved over time, and are much higher than they were in the first two decades of the company's existence. One reason for improving profitability is that the company has become more cautious about store openings, at least in the United States, and sales have increased on a per-store basis:


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In fact, the shift towards online ordering has accelerated this trend, since there is less need for expansive store locations, if a third or more of sales come from customers ordering online, and picking up their orders. In short, these graphs suggest that it is unfair to lump Starbuck with Intel and Walgreens, sinc[...]

e its struggles are more reflecting of a growth company facing middle age.

So, why the market angst? The first is that there are some Starbucks investors who continue to hold on to the hope that the company will be able to return to double digit growth, and the only pathway to get there requires that Starbucks be able to succeed in China and India. However, Starbucks has had trouble in China competing with domestic lower-priced competitors (Luckin' Coffee and others), and there are restrictions on what Starbucks can do with its joint venture with the Tata Group in India. The second problem is that the narrative for the company, that Howard Schultz sold the market on, where coffee shops become a gathering spot for friends and acquaintances, has broken down, partly because of the success of its online ordering expansion. The third problem is that inflation in product and employee costs has made its products expensive, leading to less spending even from its most loyal customers.

A Life Cycle Perspective

It is undeniable that Intel and Walgreens  are in trouble, not just with markets but operationally, and Starbucks is struggling with its story line. However, they face different challenges, and perhaps different pathways going forward. To make that assessment, I will more use my corporate life cycle framework, with a special emphasis on the the choices that agin companies face, with determinants on what should drive those choices.

The Corporate Life Cycle

I won't bore you with the details, but the corporate life cycle resembles the human life cycle, with start-ups (as babies), very young companies (as toddlers), high growth companies (as teenagers) moving on to mature companies (in middle age) and old companies facing decline and demise:


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The phase of the life cycle that this post is focused on is the last one, and as we will see in the next section, it is the most difficult one to navigate, partly because shrinking as a firm is viewed as failure., and that lesson gets reinforced in business schools and books about business success. I have argued that more money is wasted by companies refusing to act their age, and much of that waste occurs in the decline phase, as companies desperately try to find their way back to their youth, and bankers and consultants egg them on.

The Choices

There is no more difficult phase of a company's life to navigate than decline, since you are often faced with unappetizing choices. Given how badly we (as human beings) face aging, it should come as no surprise that companies (which are entities still run by human beings) also fight aging, often in destructive ways. In this section, I will start with what I believe are the most destructive choices made by declining firms, move on to a middling choice (where there is a possibility of success) before examining the most constructive responses to aging.

a. Destructive

1.
Denial: When management of a declining business is in denial about its problems, attributing the decline in revenues and profit margins to extraordinary circumstances, macro developments or bad luck, it will act accordingly, staying with existing practices on investing, financing and dividends. If that management stays in place, the truth will eventually catch up with the company, but not before more money has been sunk into a bad business that is un-investable.

2.
Desperation: Management may be aware that their busine[...]

ss is in decline, but it may be incentivized, by money or fame, to make big bets (acquisitions, for example), with low odds, hoping for a hit. While the owners of these businesses lose much of the time, the managers who get hits become superstars (and get labeled as turnaround specialists) and increase their earning power, perhaps at other firms.

3.
Survival at any cost: In some declining businesses, top managers believe that it is corporate survival that should be given priority over corporate health, and they act accordingly. In the process, they create zombie or walking dead companies that survive, but as bad businesses that shed value over time.
b. It depends

1.
Me-too-ism: In this choice, management starts with awareness that their existing business model has run out of fuel and faces decline, but believe that a pathway exists back to health (and perhaps even growth) if they can imitate the more successful players in their peer groups. Consequently, their investments will be directed towards the markets or products where success has been found (albeit by others), and financing and cash return policies will follow. Many firms adopt this strategy find themselves at a disadvantage, since they are late to the party, and the winners often have moats that are difficult to broach or a head start that cannot be overcome. For a few firms, imitation does provide a respite and at least a temporary return to mature growth, if not high growth.
c. Constructive

1.
Acceptance: Some firms accept that their business is in decline and that reversing that decline is either impossible to do or will cost too much capital. They follow up by divesting poor-performing assets, spinning off or splitting off their better-performing businesses, paying down debt and returning more cash to the owners. If they can, they settle in on being smaller firms that can continue to operate in subparts of their old business, where they can still create value, and if this is not possible, they will liquidate and go out of business.

2.
Renewals and Revamps: In a renewal (where a company spruces up its existing products to appeal to a larger market) or a revamp (where it adds to its products and service offering to make them more appealing), the hope is that the market is large enough to allow for a return to steady growth and profitability. To pull this off, managers have to be clear eyed about what they offer customers, and recognize that they cannot abandon or neglect their existing customer base in their zeal to find new ones.

3.
Rebirths: This is perhaps every declining company's dream, where you can find a new market or product that will reset where the company in the life cycle. This pitch is powered by case studies of companies that have succeeded in pulling off this feat (Apple with the iPhone, Microsoft with Azure), but these successes are rare and difficult to replicate. While one can point to common features including visionary management and organic growth (where the new business is built within the company rather than acquired), there is a strong element of luck even in the success stories.
The Determinants

Clearly, not all declining companies adopt the same pathway, when faced with decline, and more companies, in my view, take the destructive paths than the constructive one. To understand why and how declining companies choose to do what they do, you may want to consider the following:

1.
The Business: A declining company in an otherwise healthy industry or market has better odds for survival and recovery than one that is in a declining industry or bad business. With the three companies in our discussion, Intel's troubles make it an outlier in an otherwise healthy and profitable business (semiconductors), whereas Walgreens operates in a business (brick and mortar retail and pharmacy) that is wounded. Finally, the challenges that Starbucks faces of a saturated market and changing customer demands is common to large restaurants in the United States.

2.
Company's[...]

strengths: A company that is in decline may have fewer moats than it used to, but it can still hold on to its remaining strengths that draw on them to fight decline. Thus, Intel, in spite of its troubles in recent years, has technological strengths (people, patents) that may be under utilized right now, and if redirected, could add value. Starbucks remains among the most recognized restaurant brands in the world, but Walgreens in spite of its ubiquity in the United States, has almost no differentiating advantages.

3.
Governance: The decisions on what a declining firm should do, in the face of decline, are not made by its owners, but by its managers. If managers have enough skin in the game, i.e., equity stakes in the company, their decisions will be often very different than if they do not. In fact, in many companies with dispersed shareholding, management incentives (on compensation and recognition) encourage decision makers to go for long-shot bets, since they benefit significantly (personally) if these bets pay off and the downside is funded by other people's money.

4.
Investors: With publicly traded companies, it is the investors who ultimately become the wild card, determining time horizon and feasible options for the company. To the extent that the investors in a declining company want quick payoffs, there will be pressure for companies to accept aging, and shrink or liquidate; that is what private equity investors with enough clout bring to the table. In contrast, if the investors in a declining company have much longer time horizons and see benefits from a turnaround, you are more likely to see revamps and renewals. All three of the companies in our mix are institutionally held, and even at Starbucks, Howard Schultz owns less than 2% of the shares. and his influence comes more from his standing as founder and visionary than from his shareholding.

5.
External factors: Companies do not operate in vacuums, and capital markets and governments can become determinants of what they do, when faced with decline. In general, companies that operate in liquid capital markets, where there are multiple paths to raise capital, have more options than companies than operate in markets where capital is scare or difficult to raise. Governments too can play a role, as we saw in the aftermath of the 2008 crisis, when help (and funding) flowed to companies that were too large to fail, and that we see continually in businesses like the airlines, where even the most damaged airline companies are allowed to limp along.

6.
Luck: Much as we would like to believe that our fates are in our own hands, the truth is that even the best-thought through response to decline needs a hefty dose of luck to succeed.
In the figure below, I summarize the discussion from this section, looking at both the choices that companies can make, and the determinants:


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With this framework in place, I am going to try to make my best judgments (which you may disagree with) on what the three companies highlighted in this post should do, and how they will play out for me, as an investor:

1.
Intel: It is my view that Intel's problems stem largely from too much me-too-ism and aspiring for growth levels that they cannot reach. On both Ai and the chip manufacturing business, Intel is going up against competition (Nvidia on AI and TSMC on manufacturing) that has a clear lead and significant competitive advantages. However, the market is large enough and has sufficient growth for Intel to find a place in both, but n[...]

⁠Hidden Value Gems
Quote of the day #83 https://t.co/IrRs55C02v
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⁠Stock Analysis Compilation
Baron Capital on Park Systems $140860 KS

Thesis: Park Systems’ leadership in AFM technology positions it for substantial growth as semiconductor inspections become more complex and critical

(Extract from their Q2 letter) https://t.co/yWi84VBTEg
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⁠Dimitry Nakhla | Babylon Capital®
A sober valuation analysis on $GOOG 🧘🏽‍♂️

•NTM P/E Ratio: 18.63x
•10-Year Mean: 24.56x

•NTM FCF Yield: 4.59%
•10-Year Mean: 4.34%

As you can see, $GOOG appears to be trading below fair value

Going forward, investors can receive ~31% MORE in earnings per share & ~6% MORE in FCF per share 🧠***

Before we get into valuation, let’s take a look at why $GOOG is a great business

BALANCE SHEET✅
•Cash & Short-Term Inv: $100.73B
•Long-Term Debt: $11.88B

$GOOG has a strong balance sheet, an AA+ S&P Credit Rating & 303x FFO Interest Coverage

RETURN ON CAPITAL✅
•2019: 16.4%
•2020: 16.2%
•2021: 27.6%
•2022: 26.1%
•2023: 28.1%
•LTM: 30.9%

RETURN ON EQUITY✅
•2019: 18.1%
•2020: 19.0%
•2021: 32.1%
•2022: 23.6%
•2023: 27.4%
•LTM: 30.9%

$GOOG has strong return metrics, highlighting the financial efficiency of the business

REVENUES✅
•2013: $55.52B
•2023: $307.39
•CAGR: 18.66%

FREE CASH FLOW✅
•2013: $11.30B
•2023: $69.50B
•CAGR: 19.91%

NORMALIZED EPS✅
•2013: $2.19
•2023: $5.80
•CAGR: 10.22%

SHARE BUYBACKS✅
•2018 Shares Outstanding: 14.07B
•LTM Shares Outstanding: 12.58B

By reducing its shares outstanding ~10.5%, $GOOG increased its EPS by ~11.7% (assuming 0 growth)

MARGINS✅
•LTM Gross Margins: 57.6%
•LTM Operating Margins: 31.0%
•LTM Net Income Margins: 26.7%

***NOW TO VALUATION 🧠

As stated above, investors can expect to receive ~31% MORE in EPS & ~16% MORE in FCF per share

Using Benjamin Graham’s 2G rule of thumb, $GOOG has to grow earnings at a 9.32% CAGR over the next several years to justify its valuation

Today, analysts anticipate 2024 - 2026 EPS growth over the next few years to be more than the (9.32%) required growth rate:

2024E: $7.63 (31.5% YoY) *FY Dec
2025E: $8.69 (14.0% YoY)
2026E: $9.97 (14.8% YoY)

$GOOG has an excellent track record of meeting analyst estimates ~2 years out, so let’s assume $GOOG ends 2026 with $9.97 in EPS & see its CAGR potential assuming different multiples

23x P/E: $229.31💵 … ~20.5% CAGR

22x P/E: $219.34💵 … ~18.3% CAGR

21x P/E: $209.37💵 … ~16.0% CAGR

20x P/E: $199.40💵 … ~13.6% CAGR

19x P/E: $189.43💵 … ~11.2% CAGR

As you can see, $GOOG appears to have attractive return potential EVEN if we assume >19x earnings (a multiple well below its 5-year & 10-year mean)

At >20x earnings, $GOOG CAGR potential is excellent & it’s not unreasonable for the business to even trade for ~23x (given its growth rate, moat, balance sheet, & exemplary capital allocation)

Today at $149.50💵 $GOOG appears to be a strong consideration for investment

#stocks #investing $GOOGL
___

𝐃𝐈𝐒𝐂𝐋𝐎𝐒𝐔𝐑𝐄‼️: 𝐓𝐡𝐢𝐬 𝐢𝐬 𝐍𝐎𝐓 𝐈𝐧𝐯𝐞𝐬𝐭𝐦𝐞𝐧𝐭 𝐀𝐝𝐯𝐢𝐜𝐞. 𝐁𝐚𝐛𝐲𝐥𝐨𝐧 𝐂𝐚𝐩𝐢𝐭𝐚𝐥® 𝐚𝐧𝐝 𝐢𝐭𝐬 𝐫𝐞𝐩𝐫𝐞𝐬𝐞𝐧𝐭𝐚𝐭𝐢𝐯𝐞𝐬 𝐦𝐚𝐲 𝐡𝐚𝐯𝐞 𝐩𝐨𝐬𝐢𝐭𝐢𝐨𝐧𝐬 𝐢𝐧 𝐭𝐡𝐞 𝐬𝐞𝐜𝐮𝐫𝐢𝐭𝐢𝐞𝐬 𝐝𝐢𝐬𝐜𝐮𝐬𝐬𝐞𝐝 𝐢𝐧 𝐭𝐡𝐢𝐬 𝐭𝐰𝐞𝐞𝐭.

𝐓𝐡𝐞 𝐢𝐧𝐟𝐨𝐫𝐦𝐚𝐭𝐢𝐨𝐧 𝐜𝐨𝐧𝐭𝐚𝐢𝐧𝐞𝐝 𝐢𝐧 𝐭𝐡𝐢𝐬 𝐭𝐰𝐞𝐞𝐭 𝐢𝐬 𝐢𝐧𝐭𝐞𝐧𝐝𝐞𝐝 𝐟𝐨𝐫 𝐢𝐧𝐟𝐨𝐫𝐦𝐚𝐭𝐢𝐨𝐧𝐚𝐥 𝐩𝐮𝐫𝐩𝐨𝐬𝐞𝐬 𝐨𝐧𝐥𝐲 𝐚𝐧𝐝 𝐬𝐡𝐨𝐮𝐥𝐝 𝐧𝐨𝐭 𝐛𝐞 𝐜𝐨𝐧𝐬𝐭𝐫𝐮𝐞𝐝 𝐚𝐬 𝐢𝐧𝐯𝐞𝐬𝐭𝐦𝐞𝐧𝐭 𝐚𝐝𝐯𝐢𝐜𝐞 𝐭𝐨 𝐦𝐞𝐞𝐭 𝐭𝐡𝐞 𝐬𝐩𝐞𝐜𝐢𝐟𝐢𝐜 𝐧𝐞𝐞𝐝𝐬 𝐨𝐟 𝐚𝐧𝐲 𝐢𝐧𝐝𝐢𝐯𝐢𝐝𝐮𝐚𝐥 𝐨𝐫 𝐬𝐢𝐭𝐮𝐚𝐭𝐢𝐨𝐧. 𝐏𝐚𝐬𝐭 𝐩𝐞𝐫𝐟𝐨𝐫𝐦𝐚𝐧𝐜𝐞 𝐢𝐬 𝐧𝐨 𝐠𝐮𝐚𝐫𝐚𝐧𝐭𝐞𝐞 𝐨𝐟 𝐟𝐮𝐭𝐮𝐫𝐞 𝐫𝐞𝐬𝐮𝐥𝐭𝐬.

𝐈𝐧𝐟𝐨𝐫𝐦𝐚𝐭𝐢𝐨𝐧 𝐜𝐨𝐧𝐭𝐚𝐢𝐧𝐞𝐝 𝐢𝐧 𝐭𝐡𝐢𝐬 𝐭𝐰𝐞𝐞𝐭 𝐡𝐚𝐬 𝐛𝐞𝐞𝐧 𝐨𝐛𝐭𝐚𝐢𝐧𝐞𝐝 𝐟𝐫𝐨𝐦 𝐬𝐨𝐮𝐫𝐜𝐞𝐬 𝐛𝐞𝐥𝐢𝐞𝐯𝐞𝐝 𝐭𝐨 𝐛𝐞 𝐫𝐞𝐥𝐢𝐚𝐛𝐥𝐞, 𝐛𝐮𝐭 𝐢𝐬 𝐧𝐨𝐭 𝐠𝐮𝐚𝐫𝐚𝐧𝐭𝐞𝐞𝐝 𝐚𝐬 𝐭𝐨 𝐜𝐨𝐦𝐩𝐥𝐞𝐭𝐞𝐧𝐞𝐬𝐬 𝐨𝐫 𝐚𝐜𝐜𝐮𝐫𝐚𝐜𝐲.
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⁠App Economy Insights
$ORCL Oracle just hit a new all-time high.

What's driving the momentum?

📊 Q1 visualized.
☁️ OCI's rising market share.
⚙️ Ellison's bold prediction on AI.
https://t.co/iFIo4ewI0q
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⁠Stock Analysis Compilation
Baron Capital on Vulcan Materials Company $VMC US

Thesis: Vulcan's dominant position in aggregates, coupled with high barriers to entry and robust pricing power, makes it a prime beneficiary of accelerating infrastructure spending in the U.S

(Extract from their Q2 letter) https://t.co/VFGSnG90hh
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⁠Investing visuals
Microsoft $MSFT is down 13% from its peak in July, making its risk/reward quite attractive.

Here’s a quick overview of the company👇🔍 https://t.co/DLR60DA20p
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