Eventvwr.exe UAC Bypass via mscfile: Anatomy of a Classic HKCU Registry Hijack
Original text: “Eventvwr.exe UAC Bypass via mscfile” — S12 – 0x12Dark Development, Medium (May 28, 2026). The bypass technique itself was originally documented publicly in 2016 by Matt Nelson (@enigma0x3); it is catalogued as MITRE ATT&CK technique T1548.002. C++ source, AV scan table and figures below are reproduced verbatim with attribution captions.
Executive Summary
The…
https://core-jmp.org/2026/05/eventvwr-uac-bypass-mscfile-hkcu-hijack/
Original text: “Eventvwr.exe UAC Bypass via mscfile” — S12 – 0x12Dark Development, Medium (May 28, 2026). The bypass technique itself was originally documented publicly in 2016 by Matt Nelson (@enigma0x3); it is catalogued as MITRE ATT&CK technique T1548.002. C++ source, AV scan table and figures below are reproduced verbatim with attribution captions.
Executive Summary
The…
https://core-jmp.org/2026/05/eventvwr-uac-bypass-mscfile-hkcu-hijack/
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Kernel Karnage Part 1: Patching Windows Kernel Callbacks to Disable EDR from a Driver
Original text: “Kernel Karnage – Part 1” — Sander (@cerbersec), NVISO Labs (21 October 2021). Code blocks and figures below are reproduced verbatim with attribution captions.
Executive Summary
The first post of NVISO Labs’ Kernel Karnage series walks through the opening move of an EDR-bypass research project: write a small Windows kernel driver, locate the…
https://core-jmp.org/2026/06/kernel-karnage-part-1-patching-windows-kernel-callbacks-edr-bypass/
Original text: “Kernel Karnage – Part 1” — Sander (@cerbersec), NVISO Labs (21 October 2021). Code blocks and figures below are reproduced verbatim with attribution captions.
Executive Summary
The first post of NVISO Labs’ Kernel Karnage series walks through the opening move of an EDR-bypass research project: write a small Windows kernel driver, locate the…
https://core-jmp.org/2026/06/kernel-karnage-part-1-patching-windows-kernel-callbacks-edr-bypass/
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Two-Shot Kernel Shellcode: Bypassing CR4 Pinning With KProbes for Linux Kernel Control-Flow Hijack to Shellcode
Original text: “Revisiting Two-Shot Kernel Shellcode Execution From Control Flow Hijacking” — zolutal, zolutal’s blog (10 February 2026). Code blocks below are reproduced verbatim with attribution captions.
Executive Summary
Andrey Konovalov’s 2017 Project Zero write-up showed a clean way to turn a control-flow hijack on the Linux kernel into shellcode execution: pivot into native_write_cr4 with…
https://core-jmp.org/2026/06/two-shot-kernel-shellcode-cr4-pinning-bypass-kprobes/
Original text: “Revisiting Two-Shot Kernel Shellcode Execution From Control Flow Hijacking” — zolutal, zolutal’s blog (10 February 2026). Code blocks below are reproduced verbatim with attribution captions.
Executive Summary
Andrey Konovalov’s 2017 Project Zero write-up showed a clean way to turn a control-flow hijack on the Linux kernel into shellcode execution: pivot into native_write_cr4 with…
https://core-jmp.org/2026/06/two-shot-kernel-shellcode-cr4-pinning-bypass-kprobes/
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Bypassing Windows Defender and AMSI: A Practical Defense Evasion Guide for Red Team Operators
Original text: “Обход Windows Defender и AMSI: практический гайд по defense evasion для Red Team” — Сергей Попов, Codeby.net (21 April 2026). Code blocks below are reproduced verbatim with attribution captions.
Executive Summary
Modern Microsoft Defender is not a single antivirus process — it is a stack of independent layers (static engine, kernel-mode filesystem filter,…
https://core-jmp.org/2026/06/bypassing-windows-defender-amsi-defense-evasion-red-team-guide/
Original text: “Обход Windows Defender и AMSI: практический гайд по defense evasion для Red Team” — Сергей Попов, Codeby.net (21 April 2026). Code blocks below are reproduced verbatim with attribution captions.
Executive Summary
Modern Microsoft Defender is not a single antivirus process — it is a stack of independent layers (static engine, kernel-mode filesystem filter,…
https://core-jmp.org/2026/06/bypassing-windows-defender-amsi-defense-evasion-red-team-guide/
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One Click, One Hash: Unpatched NTLM Coercion in Windows Search URI Handler
Original text by Andrew Schwartz
Key Takeaways
Same bug class. No CVE. No fix. The NTLM coercion primitive in the Windows search: URI handler is technically identical to CVE-2026-33829 in the Snipping Tool. Same severity rating, same mechanism, same potential impact. Microsoft closed it without a CVE or a patch, describing its triage process as…
https://core-jmp.org/2026/06/one-click-one-hash-unpatched-ntlm-coercion-in-windows-search-uri-handler/
Original text by Andrew Schwartz
Key Takeaways
Same bug class. No CVE. No fix. The NTLM coercion primitive in the Windows search: URI handler is technically identical to CVE-2026-33829 in the Snipping Tool. Same severity rating, same mechanism, same potential impact. Microsoft closed it without a CVE or a patch, describing its triage process as…
https://core-jmp.org/2026/06/one-click-one-hash-unpatched-ntlm-coercion-in-windows-search-uri-handler/
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Hidden HTTP/2 Bomb
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FOR
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WriteUP + LABs + PoCs
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FOR
nginx, Apache httpd, Microsoft IIS, Envoy, Cloudflare Pingora*
WriteUP + LABs + PoCs
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Red Team Tactics: Utilizing Syscalls in C# — Writing the Code (Walk-through of Jack Halon’s Direct-Syscall PoC)
Original text: “Red Team Tactics: Utilizing Syscalls in C# – Writing The Code” — Jack Halon, Jack Hacks (16 April 2020, updated). Code blocks and figures below are reproduced verbatim with attribution captions.
Executive Summary
Jack Halon’s second “Utilizing Syscalls in C#” post is the implementation half of the series: take the conceptual understanding of…
https://core-jmp.org/2026/06/red-team-tactics-utilizing-syscalls-in-csharp-writing-the-code/
Original text: “Red Team Tactics: Utilizing Syscalls in C# – Writing The Code” — Jack Halon, Jack Hacks (16 April 2020, updated). Code blocks and figures below are reproduced verbatim with attribution captions.
Executive Summary
Jack Halon’s second “Utilizing Syscalls in C#” post is the implementation half of the series: take the conceptual understanding of…
https://core-jmp.org/2026/06/red-team-tactics-utilizing-syscalls-in-csharp-writing-the-code/
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Reverse-engineering Valorant’s Vanguard Guarded Regions: PML4 Cloning, CR3 Swaps, and the SwapContext Hook PoC (Walk-through of Xyrem’s Post)
Original text: “In-depth analysis on Valorant’s Guarded Regions” — Xyrem, reversing.info (2023). Code blocks and figures below are reproduced verbatim with attribution captions.
Executive Summary
Riot’s Vanguard anti-cheat keeps a slice of Valorant’s game state in memory that is, from any other process or unprivileged thread’s point of view, simply not mapped. Xyrem’s post walks…
https://core-jmp.org/2026/06/reverse-engineering-valorant-vanguard-guarded-regions-pml4-cr3-swap-context-hook/
Original text: “In-depth analysis on Valorant’s Guarded Regions” — Xyrem, reversing.info (2023). Code blocks and figures below are reproduced verbatim with attribution captions.
Executive Summary
Riot’s Vanguard anti-cheat keeps a slice of Valorant’s game state in memory that is, from any other process or unprivileged thread’s point of view, simply not mapped. Xyrem’s post walks…
https://core-jmp.org/2026/06/reverse-engineering-valorant-vanguard-guarded-regions-pml4-cr3-swap-context-hook/
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Social Engineering: Attacking Networks with a BadUSB-ETH, Part 2
Original text by CO11ATERAL
A small USB device can cause a lot of damage when it’s physically plugged into a machine. In this scenario, a BadUSB turns a connection into a bridge for capturing authentication data and gaining network access, even on locked systems.
Welcome back, aspiring cyberwarriors!
In Part 1, we set the foundation…
https://core-jmp.org/2026/06/social-engineering-attacking-networks-with-a-badusb-eth-part-2/
Original text by CO11ATERAL
A small USB device can cause a lot of damage when it’s physically plugged into a machine. In this scenario, a BadUSB turns a connection into a bridge for capturing authentication data and gaining network access, even on locked systems.
Welcome back, aspiring cyberwarriors!
In Part 1, we set the foundation…
https://core-jmp.org/2026/06/social-engineering-attacking-networks-with-a-badusb-eth-part-2/
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Qualcomm QAIC Kernel Driver Page Use-After-Free: From Stale Mmap to Pipe-Buffer-Backed Kernel R/W (Walk-through of Lukas Maar’s Linux v6.18 Exploit)
Original text: “Privilege Escalation via a Page Use-After-Free in Qualcomm’s AI Accelerator Linux Kernel Driver” — Lukas Maar, Security Blog (23 May 2026). Code blocks and figures below are reproduced verbatim with attribution captions.
Executive Summary
Lukas Maar’s post writes up a clean page-level use-after-free in the upstream drivers/accel/qaic Linux kernel driver. The bug is…
https://core-jmp.org/2026/06/qualcomm-qaic-kernel-driver-page-uaf-pipe-buffer-kernel-rw-lukas-maar/
Original text: “Privilege Escalation via a Page Use-After-Free in Qualcomm’s AI Accelerator Linux Kernel Driver” — Lukas Maar, Security Blog (23 May 2026). Code blocks and figures below are reproduced verbatim with attribution captions.
Executive Summary
Lukas Maar’s post writes up a clean page-level use-after-free in the upstream drivers/accel/qaic Linux kernel driver. The bug is…
https://core-jmp.org/2026/06/qualcomm-qaic-kernel-driver-page-uaf-pipe-buffer-kernel-rw-lukas-maar/
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BOF Cocktails in Cobalt Strike: Instrumenting BOFs with BEACON_INLINE_EXECUTE and Crystal Palace
Original text: “BOF Cocktails in Cobalt Strike” — Rasta Mouse, rastamouse.me (05 Jun 2026). Code blocks and the screenshot below are reproduced verbatim from the source with attribution.
Executive Summary
Post-exploitation Beacon Object Files (BOFs) historically inherited their evasion posture from whatever agent or loader executed them. If the loader took care of unhooking, masking,…
https://core-jmp.org/2026/06/bof-cocktails-cobalt-strike-beacon-inline-execute-crystal-palace/
Original text: “BOF Cocktails in Cobalt Strike” — Rasta Mouse, rastamouse.me (05 Jun 2026). Code blocks and the screenshot below are reproduced verbatim from the source with attribution.
Executive Summary
Post-exploitation Beacon Object Files (BOFs) historically inherited their evasion posture from whatever agent or loader executed them. If the loader took care of unhooking, masking,…
https://core-jmp.org/2026/06/bof-cocktails-cobalt-strike-beacon-inline-execute-crystal-palace/
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BusyWork: Replacing Sleep with Real Work to Break Behavioral Detection
Original text: “BusyWork: Replacing Sleep with Real Work to Break Behavioral Detection” — patchi.fyi (07 Jun 2026, byline shows only the site handle — author not publicly attributed). Library source: github.com/PatchRequest/BusyWork. Short illustrative code excerpts are reproduced with attribution; longer routines are summarised — consult the upstream repo for full sources.
Executive Summary
A thread…
https://core-jmp.org/2026/06/busywork-replacing-sleep-with-real-work-behavioral-detection/
Original text: “BusyWork: Replacing Sleep with Real Work to Break Behavioral Detection” — patchi.fyi (07 Jun 2026, byline shows only the site handle — author not publicly attributed). Library source: github.com/PatchRequest/BusyWork. Short illustrative code excerpts are reproduced with attribution; longer routines are summarised — consult the upstream repo for full sources.
Executive Summary
A thread…
https://core-jmp.org/2026/06/busywork-replacing-sleep-with-real-work-behavioral-detection/
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OOBdump: Single-Shot Heap-OOB Exploitation of objdump -g via FR30 Relocations
Original text: “OOBdump: Relocation Oriented Programming” — Calif, blog.calif.io (08 Jun 2026, no individual byline). PoCs and writeups: github.com/califio/publications/…/oobdump. Short illustrative code excerpts and the original article’s diagrams are reproduced with attribution; the prose is paraphrased.
Executive Summary
The Calif team has been quietly collecting trophy bugs in reverse-engineering tooling for a while — IDA…
https://core-jmp.org/2026/06/oobdump-objdump-fr30-relocation-oriented-programming/
Original text: “OOBdump: Relocation Oriented Programming” — Calif, blog.calif.io (08 Jun 2026, no individual byline). PoCs and writeups: github.com/califio/publications/…/oobdump. Short illustrative code excerpts and the original article’s diagrams are reproduced with attribution; the prose is paraphrased.
Executive Summary
The Calif team has been quietly collecting trophy bugs in reverse-engineering tooling for a while — IDA…
https://core-jmp.org/2026/06/oobdump-objdump-fr30-relocation-oriented-programming/
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Microsoft Defender Now Monitors Remote RPC Activity: What It Catches and How to Hunt
Original text: “Microsoft Defender now monitors RPC activity” — EdanZwick, Microsoft Tech Community / Microsoft Defender for Endpoint Blog (08 Jun 2026). The three KQL hunting queries below are reproduced verbatim with attribution. Prose is paraphrased; for the Defender XDR alert / detection screenshots, see the original post.
Executive Summary
Microsoft has extended Defender’s existing…
https://core-jmp.org/2026/06/microsoft-defender-monitors-remote-rpc-activity/
Original text: “Microsoft Defender now monitors RPC activity” — EdanZwick, Microsoft Tech Community / Microsoft Defender for Endpoint Blog (08 Jun 2026). The three KQL hunting queries below are reproduced verbatim with attribution. Prose is paraphrased; for the Defender XDR alert / detection screenshots, see the original post.
Executive Summary
Microsoft has extended Defender’s existing…
https://core-jmp.org/2026/06/microsoft-defender-monitors-remote-rpc-activity/
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Client-Side Container Attack: DLL Sideloading wab.exe via Email Archive Delivery
Original text: “Initial access. Client side container attack” — Leigh Gilbert, Exploitz (exploitz.ca, June 2026). The diagrams below are reproduced with attribution; prose is paraphrased. MITRE ATT&CK reference: T1574.001 — DLL Search Order Hijacking.
Executive Summary
Leigh Gilbert’s walkthrough chains together a long-known but still effective initial-access pattern: ship a signed Microsoft binary that has…
https://core-jmp.org/2026/06/client-side-container-attack-dll-sideloading-wab-exe-email-archive/
Original text: “Initial access. Client side container attack” — Leigh Gilbert, Exploitz (exploitz.ca, June 2026). The diagrams below are reproduced with attribution; prose is paraphrased. MITRE ATT&CK reference: T1574.001 — DLL Search Order Hijacking.
Executive Summary
Leigh Gilbert’s walkthrough chains together a long-known but still effective initial-access pattern: ship a signed Microsoft binary that has…
https://core-jmp.org/2026/06/client-side-container-attack-dll-sideloading-wab-exe-email-archive/
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Patching the Windows Kernel via BYOVD: ThrottleStop.sys, MmMapIoSpace and the NtAddAtom Trampoline
Original text: “Whoops! I did it again. I patched Windows Kernel at Milan0day 2026” — zer0matt, zer0matt’s blog (29 May 2026). PoC: github.com/zer0matt/Milan0day2026. Diagrams below are reproduced from the original with attribution; prose is paraphrased.
Executive Summary
zer0matt’s Milan0day 2026 talk and accompanying writeup demonstrate a clean Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver (BYOVD) chain that…
https://core-jmp.org/2026/06/patching-windows-kernel-byovd-throttlestop-mmmapiospace-ntaddatom/
Original text: “Whoops! I did it again. I patched Windows Kernel at Milan0day 2026” — zer0matt, zer0matt’s blog (29 May 2026). PoC: github.com/zer0matt/Milan0day2026. Diagrams below are reproduced from the original with attribution; prose is paraphrased.
Executive Summary
zer0matt’s Milan0day 2026 talk and accompanying writeup demonstrate a clean Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver (BYOVD) chain that…
https://core-jmp.org/2026/06/patching-windows-kernel-byovd-throttlestop-mmmapiospace-ntaddatom/
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Covert Kernel/User Communication Channels on Windows: Rootkits, Game Cheats, and Detection
Original text: “Covert Kernel/User Communication Channels on Windows: Rootkits, Game Cheats, and Detection” — kernullist, Kernullist’s Blog (Jun 10, 2026). Classification tables, ASCII flow diagrams, and C-language structure declarations below are reproduced verbatim with attribution captions.
Executive Summary
A modern Windows kernel-assisted threat is almost never a single user-mode binary doing all the work. It…
https://core-jmp.org/2026/06/covert-kernel-user-communication-channels-windows-rootkits-cheats-detection/
Original text: “Covert Kernel/User Communication Channels on Windows: Rootkits, Game Cheats, and Detection” — kernullist, Kernullist’s Blog (Jun 10, 2026). Classification tables, ASCII flow diagrams, and C-language structure declarations below are reproduced verbatim with attribution captions.
Executive Summary
A modern Windows kernel-assisted threat is almost never a single user-mode binary doing all the work. It…
https://core-jmp.org/2026/06/covert-kernel-user-communication-channels-windows-rootkits-cheats-detection/
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