The United States has conveyed a message to the mediators and to the countries expected to take part in Gaza’s international force (ISF) that it will allow Israel to resume the war in Gaza if Hamas does not disarm.

Israel Hayom has learned that the U.S. Ambassador to the UN, Mike Waltz, stated this explicitly during the Security Council deliberations.

(Israel Hayom)

The UN Security Council adopted the Trump plan on Gaza. Russia and China abstained.

Here is Hamas' response:

Hamas condemns the Security Council's decision to approve the American proposal for Gaza:
"The decision imposes an international trusteeship mechanism on the Gaza Strip, which our people, forces, and factions reject. Resistance to the occupation by all means is a legitimate right anchored by international laws and conventions. The weapon of resistance is linked to the existence of the occupation, and any discussion on the matter should remain an internal national issue related to a political path that guarantees the end of the occupation, the establishment of the state, and the determination of fate."

Senior member of the Lebanese Forces party Charles Jabbour:

My problem isn't with Israel or America, my problem is with Hezbullah... Hezbullah is my enemy.

The American proposal that has been approved at the UN Security Council represents a strategic turning point in the campaign against Hamas, because it establishes the framework for “the day after” in a way that erases any possibility of Hamas returning to power. Unlike past resolutions that left room for interpretation, this time the world is drawing a clear line: Gaza will be administered without Hamas, and its ability to rebuild is being officially blocked.

First, the proposal strips Hamas of the international status that terror organizations fight for over many years. Hamas is not defined as a party, not as a partner, and not as a political actor with any role. A diplomatic document at the highest level presents it as a problem to be solved, not as an entity that must be accommodated. For an organization that spent years trying to portray itself as a legitimate governing authority, this is a strategic loss whose significance cannot be overstated.

Second, the resolution includes—for the first time—a clear recognition of the need to create a mechanism that will prevent Hamas from recovering. The dismantling of its infrastructure, the prevention of future rearmament, and the establishment of international monitoring mechanisms all appear in the approved text. The meaning is simple: even if Hamas tries to preserve an underground core, the world will act to prevent it from ever rebuilding.

Third, the resolution establishes a governing alternative for Gaza that is completely independent of Hamas. There is no longer any monopoly on governance, and no longer the argument of “there is no one to replace us.” The moment the international community defines another body to administer Gaza, Hamas loses the most basic foundation of control: recognition.

Additionally, Hamas’s central strategy over the years has been to drag out time, hold on, and gamble on Israeli fatigue and international pressure. The American proposal closes this window. Once the framework for “the day after” is set without them, it no longer matters how long they remain in the tunnels—they are not part of Gaza’s defined future.

The proposal also shatters Hamas’s core narrative: the narrative of “resistance.” The moment even pro-Palestinian states like Algeria vote to designate Hamas as an element that must be removed, Hamas loses the only asset it has left: the image of being able to impose reality. An organization whose narrative collapses loses its appeal even among the Palestinian public.

The resolution also reinforces the line connecting Hamas, Iran, and other regional terror groups. The world is signaling that the struggle against Hamas is not a local conflict but part of a broader campaign against a regional terror network. This narrows the space of maneuver for those who supported Hamas and prevents the organization from obtaining new resources in the future.

Finally, Israel receives diplomatic backing for the objective it set from the start: Hamas will not return to power. The resolution creates an international framework in which this demand is not only Israeli but global. Strategically, this is a significant victory, because it anchors the military achievements in the official language of the international community.

Bottom line: the American proposal does not merely respond to the situation on the ground—it cements it. The universal recognition that Hamas is not part of Gaza’s future turns its defeat into a political fact, not just a military one.

(Carmel News)

Texas designates the Muslim Brotherhood as a “terrorist organization”.

The Saudi crown prince said that he will join the Abraham Accords only if there is a two-state solution. Now President Trump will have to convince him that the vague reference to that issue in the UN Security Council resolution statement is sufficient.

Trump told the Saudi crown prince that the U.S. put Saudi Arabia in a better position following the attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities. In response, the crown prince announced that Saudi investment in America will be $1 trillion, up from $600 billion.

And they funded Mamdani

Saudi Arabia and the US signed a series of significant agreements in various fields following the visit of the Saudi Crown Prince to Washington, as follows:

1. Saudi Arabia will invest one trillion dollars in infrastructure, industry, and technology.

2. A strategic defense agreement was signed between the US and Saudi Arabia (SDA).

3. Arms deals - Saudi Arabia is purchasing from the US: F-35 aircraft and 300 Abrams tanks.

4. An agreement for nuclear cooperation for civilian purposes under a strict standard of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

5. Strategic minerals agreement - cooperation and coordination of national strategies.

6. A memorandum of understanding was signed on artificial intelligence - granting Saudi Arabia access to American artificial intelligence technology.

7. An agreement to expand commercial and regulatory cooperation.

8. A financial cooperation agreement between the countries’ finance ministries in the fields of customs, standards, and capital market regulation.

Saudi Arabia’s status and power have risen a notch in the past 24 hours – Trump makes sure to highlight this and gives his “dear” guest all the honors that money can buy. In the Middle East, they definitely understand what this means.

(Abu Ali)

Iran released the oil tanker it seized in the Strait of Hormuz last week along with all 21 of its crew members

(AP)

After Hamas denied that the site struck last night in Lebanon by the IDF was a facility used by the terror group, the IDF’s Arabic-language spokesperson, Col. Avichay Adraee, released an announcement circulated by Hamas’s branch in Lebanon inside the Ain al-Hilweh Palestinian refugee camp. The announcement explicitly calls on young people to join its activities — and one of the listed registration centers is none other than the training complex that was targeted.

The crowd was stunned by the acrobatic capabilities of the new Russian-made SU-57 fighter jet at the 2025 Dubai Airshow. But are these capabilities simply a spectacular solution to the wrong problem?

The Russian Su-57 is a perfect example of an aircraft that brilliantly solves a problem that doesn’t actually exist. Its aerodynamic performance is impressive — no doubt. There’s serious question as to whether the F-35 could perform similar maneuvers, but an even bigger question is whether it would ever need to. The Su-57’s missiles won’t lock onto an F-35, while the F-35’s missiles will blow the Su-57 out of the sky despite its aerobatics, because they will detect it long before.

The Su-57 is certainly far less stealthy than the F-35. In fact, it’s so unstealthy that online debates abound over whether it should even be classified as a stealth aircraft. Ultimately, the Russians chose aerodynamic performance over true low observability.

And while its aerobatic displays look spectacular at airshows, the reality is that Russia already had aircraft with excellent maneuverability — such as the Su-27 and Su-35.

In short, it’s questionable whether the Su-57 can genuinely be considered a 5th-generation stealth fighter. It’s more accurate to call it a 4.5-generation jet with some stealth features — except that it comes with a 5th-generation price tag in a country that already produces solid 4.5-generation aircraft.

I wouldn’t be surprised if, in the end, the Russians end up buying the Chinese J-20 for true stealth capabilities instead of exporting their own Su-57. It’s entirely possible that these dramatic aerobatic performances are the swan song of Russia’s once-glorious aviation industry.

(Eliyahu Ben Asher)

The Gaza-born Palestinian-American journalist Ahmed Fouad Alkhatib wrote:

Hamas's young and brain-dead minions in the United States and the West have come out in full force against the Security Council resolution because they are opposed to the establishment of the Board of Peace, the International Stabilization Force (ISF), and a broad vision that could actually transform Gaza. Interestingly, it appears that these so-called "activists" are following orders from their masters, Hamas and Islamic Jihad, who have both come out against the resolution's disarmament clause and who said they oppose the stabilization force.

To many elements of the "pro-Palestine" movement, they are genuinely bummed that the war appears to be over; they miss scenes of maimed and killed Gazans to get a sense of purpose and fuel useless, do-nothing activism. They require the continuous bloodshed of Palestinians to maintain relevance, get over their guilty conscience, make money, feel a connection with others, and gain a sense of moral supremacy to justify their hate, ignorance, and misinformed screaming.

The people of Gaza have been clear over the past 24 hours: they welcome the internationalization of Gaza and the elimination of Hamas as the dominant force in the Strip. Unlike Western "pro-Palestine" activists, Gazans are not interested in the return of "famine" and "genocide" that turns them into social media content for performative activism in the West.

The Iranian Regime Under Pressure: Nuclear Ambiguity Policy Faces a New Test

Reformist commentator Davoud Khashmati has published a detailed analysis warning that the Islamic Republic’s core nuclear strategy - its policy of “ambiguity” - is shifting from a tactical advantage into a significant vulnerability in the aftermath of the 12-Day War.
This strategy, designed to deflect responsibility for attacks on nuclear facilities onto the United States and to obscure the true status of Iran’s enriched-uranium stockpile, is now facing unprecedented pressure from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

Khashmati notes that at the outset of the attacks, a serious strategic blunder was made by officials close to the parliament speaker, who falsely claimed that the uranium stockpile had been moved out of Fordow. Only later did the Foreign Ministry correct the error and reinstate the ambiguity line: neither confirm nor deny, and keep the fate of the nuclear material intentionally vague.
But what initially served as a political pressure tactic, he argues, has now become a dangerous gamble that threatens to backfire on the Islamic Republic.

The latest report submitted by Director General Rafael Grossi to the IAEA Board of Governors has further intensified the pressure. Data revealed by The Wall Street Journal shows that the agency views Iran’s 440.9 kg stockpile of 60% enriched uranium as a crisis requiring urgent action.

The significance of the report’s language is far more than semantic. For the international community, the fact that Iran is the only non-nuclear-weapon state holding such a quantity - while refusing to verify its location - raises exceptional concern with far-reaching diplomatic and security implications.

Khashmati also highlights that until the end of May 2025, Iran had granted inspectors one-year visas, but abruptly stopped doing so afterward. While the regime continues to allow access to undamaged facilities, it blocks inspectors from entering those that were attacked. This has created a situation in which Iran offers only partial cooperation, while the most critical element - the inspection of enriched material - remains entirely out of the agency’s reach. According to Khashmati, this arrangement is unsustainable.

The report also references a new enrichment facility in Isfahan, which Iran disclosed to the agency in July. While Iran initially agreed to immediate inspection, the 12-Day War halted the verification process. As a result, the agency currently has no knowledge of the facility’s precise location, condition, possible damage, or whether nuclear material is present. This uncertainty, Khashmati says, further undermines Iran’s ability to maintain its ambiguity doctrine.

He argues that the agency - and following it, both the United States and Israel - intend to obtain full clarity on the fate of the enriched uranium.
• If the uranium remains under Iranian control, it can be subjected to calibrated pressure.
• If it lies buried beneath the ruins of Natanz or Fordow, Iran will be forced to explain how highly enriched material ended up outside international oversight.

For Tehran, this is a strategic trap: either outcome creates a different kind of external pressure.

Khashmati concludes that from this point onward, ambiguity no longer serves as the protective shield it was immediately after the attacks - it has turned into a liability that the regime may find increasingly difficult to sustain. Iran’s refusal to grant the agency access to bombed sites risks becoming a new flashpoint in its relations with the international community. In a context where Western governments and the IAEA emphasize “urgent action,” “serious concern,” and “verification failures,” continued obfuscation could deepen Iran’s confrontation with major powers and harm its strategic interests more severely than any alternative.

Thus, Khashmati argues, the regime has reached a decisive moment: either continue the ambiguity policy and risk escalating international isolation, or begin a new chapter that includes at least partial transparency regarding the fate of the highly enriched uranium. Both options are difficult, but the current reality no longer allows Tehran to operate as it has until now.

(Iran News)