🚨 SOFT POWER CUT-OFF: KUWAITI BUREAUCRACY OR A GEOPOLITICAL MESSAGE?
The decision by Kuwait’s Ministry of Education to revoke the license and permanently close the country’s only Iranian private school goes far beyond a routine administrative matter, as it can be interpreted as a clear exercise of institutional power projection.
While the official narrative refers strictly to educational regulations, licensing standards, and “preserving the public interest,” the geopolitical context surrounding the decision gives it broader significance.
How Did It Happen?
Kuwait’s Minister of Education, Sayed Jalal Al-Tabtabaei, issued a directive revoking the school’s license, immediately halting new student enrollment and forcing hundreds of families to transfer their children to alternative educational institutions.
This effectively dismantles an educational presence that had existed in the Gulf state for decades.
The Real Significance
Schools, cultural centers, and language institutes are among the foundations of soft power.
For Tehran, maintaining educational institutions based on national curricula across the Gulf states represents an important social and cultural anchor for the Iranian community, as well as a means of maintaining cultural influence.
Consequently, closing Kuwait’s only Iranian educational institution effectively cuts one channel of this engagement under the framework of regulatory compliance.
Implications and Consequences
• Tightening Domestic Oversight: Kuwait is sending a message that it will not tolerate external cultural or political influence within its territory, using institutional frameworks to assert full sovereignty over its domestic sphere.
• Rising Gulf-Iran Friction: Removing Iran’s educational foothold in Kuwait adds a sharp social and political dimension to existing regional tensions and signals a narrowing of space for external influence within the civilian sphere.
• Social Disruption: For the Iranian community, the immediate consequences include student transfers, higher costs, and the need to integrate into alternative private or public education systems.
The previous text described this as a “weak model” of defending sovereignty through bureaucratic instruments: no tanks, no high-profile diplomatic expulsions, just a single administrative decision revoking a license that allegedly dismantled one channel of foreign influence “in a single stroke.”
But this raises two fundamental questions:
First: Does removing students from an Iranian school constitute a sovereign decision?
Second: Did Kuwait actually dismantle one of the channels of foreign influence through this decision?
And why focus on Iranian “influence” rather than on foreign colonialism?
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The decision by Kuwait’s Ministry of Education to revoke the license and permanently close the country’s only Iranian private school goes far beyond a routine administrative matter, as it can be interpreted as a clear exercise of institutional power projection.
While the official narrative refers strictly to educational regulations, licensing standards, and “preserving the public interest,” the geopolitical context surrounding the decision gives it broader significance.
How Did It Happen?
Kuwait’s Minister of Education, Sayed Jalal Al-Tabtabaei, issued a directive revoking the school’s license, immediately halting new student enrollment and forcing hundreds of families to transfer their children to alternative educational institutions.
This effectively dismantles an educational presence that had existed in the Gulf state for decades.
The Real Significance
Schools, cultural centers, and language institutes are among the foundations of soft power.
For Tehran, maintaining educational institutions based on national curricula across the Gulf states represents an important social and cultural anchor for the Iranian community, as well as a means of maintaining cultural influence.
Consequently, closing Kuwait’s only Iranian educational institution effectively cuts one channel of this engagement under the framework of regulatory compliance.
Implications and Consequences
• Tightening Domestic Oversight: Kuwait is sending a message that it will not tolerate external cultural or political influence within its territory, using institutional frameworks to assert full sovereignty over its domestic sphere.
• Rising Gulf-Iran Friction: Removing Iran’s educational foothold in Kuwait adds a sharp social and political dimension to existing regional tensions and signals a narrowing of space for external influence within the civilian sphere.
• Social Disruption: For the Iranian community, the immediate consequences include student transfers, higher costs, and the need to integrate into alternative private or public education systems.
The previous text described this as a “weak model” of defending sovereignty through bureaucratic instruments: no tanks, no high-profile diplomatic expulsions, just a single administrative decision revoking a license that allegedly dismantled one channel of foreign influence “in a single stroke.”
But this raises two fundamental questions:
First: Does removing students from an Iranian school constitute a sovereign decision?
Second: Did Kuwait actually dismantle one of the channels of foreign influence through this decision?
And why focus on Iranian “influence” rather than on foreign colonialism?
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The United Kingdom has agreed to provide military support to Saudi Arabia in response to Houthi attacks in Yemen, following repeated attacks against the Kingdom by Iran-backed militants.
Prime Minister Andy Burnham announced that London had received a request from Saudi Arabia for military assistance and that he approved the request last night on the advice of the Defence Secretary and Foreign Secretary.
The support will be defensive in nature and will include aerial refueling capabilities.
Burnham made the remarks to reporters while traveling to New York to attend meetings of the United Nations General Assembly.
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🔴 LEBANON WAR MONITOR | ISRAELI ATTACKS OVER THE PAST 24 HOURS
📍 Southern Lebanon | September 21–22, 2026
Over the past 24 hours, a new wave of Israeli airstrikes, artillery fire, phosphorus munitions, detonations, and heavy machine-gun fire has been reported across various areas of southern Lebanon.
⏱️ OVERNIGHT — SEPTEMBER 21
✈️ Airstrikes
• Kfar Tebnit: Israeli airstrikes targeted the outskirts of the town.
• Ali al-Taher / Nabatieh al-Fawqa: Airstrikes targeted the Ali al-Taher woodland area.
• Deir Seryan: An Israeli airstrike was reported.
• Baraashit: An airstrike was reported, followed by large detonations.
• Wadi Zibqine: Targeted by Israeli aircraft.
💥 Artillery Fire
• Nabatieh al-Fawqa
• Zawtar al-Sharqiyah
• Khallet Mayfadoun
• Beit Lif
• Hadatha
• Baraashit
• Wadi al-Salouqi
• Touline
• Majdal Zoun
• Mayfadoun
• Al-Mansouri
🔥 Other Activity
• Illumination flares were fired over Zawtar al-Sharqiyah, Markaba, Houla and Hadatha.
• Heavy machine-gun fire was directed toward Sarbine, Hadatha, the outskirts of Mays al-Jabal, Wadi al-Salouqi and Wadi Zibqine.
• Israeli military vehicle movements were reported around Hadatha, Beit Yahoun, Rachaf and Mays al-Jabal.
• Israeli forces reportedly carried out demolitions and detonations in Mansouri, Baraashit and Ainata.
🌅 MORNING — SEPTEMBER 21
🛩️ Israeli airstrikes were reported against Wadi Zibqine, while artillery fire targeted Mansouri, Majdal Zoun and several surrounding valleys.
Israeli aircraft also carried out strikes on areas around Nabatieh al-Fawqa and Kfar Tebnit later in the day.
🌙 NIGHT / EARLY SEPTEMBER 22
💥 Khiyam Plain
Seven artillery shells were reportedly fired at the area.
💥 Nabatieh al-Fawqa / Wadi Zibqine
Israeli artillery fire was reported.
🔥 Wadi al-Salouqi
Several phosphorus bombs were reportedly used.
⚠️ Zawtar al-Sharqiyah / Kfar Tebnit
Additional Israeli airstrikes were reported.
💥 Al-Mansouri
Explosions were reported inside the town.
⚰️ CASUALTIES
No new fatalities or injuries have been independently confirmed in the reports reviewed for this specific 24-hour period.
A report by Jordanian state media, citing Lebanese security sources, also stated that no casualties had been reported in the attacks it covered.
⚠️ IMPORTANT: The casualty figures published by Lebanon’s Ministry of Public Health are cumulative and do not yet provide a confirmed 24-hour breakdown covering all of the attacks listed above. Casualty figures therefore should not be inferred from the scale of the bombardment alone.
📌 OPERATIONAL PICTURE
The attacks were concentrated primarily across the Nabatieh, Bint Jbeil, Marjayoun and western-sector areas of southern Lebanon, involving multiple forms of fire rather than isolated airstrikes.
The reported operational pattern included:
⚠️ Airstrikes
💥 Artillery bombardment
🚀 Phosphorus munitions
🚨 Illumination flares
🔫 Heavy machine-gun fire
💣 Large-scale detonations
🚙 Military vehicle movements
The attacks occurred despite the U.S.-brokered framework agreement between Lebanon and Israel, which includes arrangements concerning Israeli withdrawal and the deployment of the Lebanese Army.
Sources: Reports from Lebanon’s National News Agency, as cited by Anadolu Agency, Naharnet, Qatar News Agency (QNA), and Jordan News Agency (Petra).
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📍 Southern Lebanon | September 21–22, 2026
Over the past 24 hours, a new wave of Israeli airstrikes, artillery fire, phosphorus munitions, detonations, and heavy machine-gun fire has been reported across various areas of southern Lebanon.
⏱️ OVERNIGHT — SEPTEMBER 21
• Kfar Tebnit: Israeli airstrikes targeted the outskirts of the town.
• Ali al-Taher / Nabatieh al-Fawqa: Airstrikes targeted the Ali al-Taher woodland area.
• Deir Seryan: An Israeli airstrike was reported.
• Baraashit: An airstrike was reported, followed by large detonations.
• Wadi Zibqine: Targeted by Israeli aircraft.
• Nabatieh al-Fawqa
• Zawtar al-Sharqiyah
• Khallet Mayfadoun
• Beit Lif
• Hadatha
• Baraashit
• Wadi al-Salouqi
• Touline
• Majdal Zoun
• Mayfadoun
• Al-Mansouri
• Illumination flares were fired over Zawtar al-Sharqiyah, Markaba, Houla and Hadatha.
• Heavy machine-gun fire was directed toward Sarbine, Hadatha, the outskirts of Mays al-Jabal, Wadi al-Salouqi and Wadi Zibqine.
• Israeli military vehicle movements were reported around Hadatha, Beit Yahoun, Rachaf and Mays al-Jabal.
• Israeli forces reportedly carried out demolitions and detonations in Mansouri, Baraashit and Ainata.
🌅 MORNING — SEPTEMBER 21
Israeli aircraft also carried out strikes on areas around Nabatieh al-Fawqa and Kfar Tebnit later in the day.
Seven artillery shells were reportedly fired at the area.
Israeli artillery fire was reported.
Several phosphorus bombs were reportedly used.
Additional Israeli airstrikes were reported.
Explosions were reported inside the town.
No new fatalities or injuries have been independently confirmed in the reports reviewed for this specific 24-hour period.
A report by Jordanian state media, citing Lebanese security sources, also stated that no casualties had been reported in the attacks it covered.
The attacks were concentrated primarily across the Nabatieh, Bint Jbeil, Marjayoun and western-sector areas of southern Lebanon, involving multiple forms of fire rather than isolated airstrikes.
The reported operational pattern included:
The attacks occurred despite the U.S.-brokered framework agreement between Lebanon and Israel, which includes arrangements concerning Israeli withdrawal and the deployment of the Lebanese Army.
Sources: Reports from Lebanon’s National News Agency, as cited by Anadolu Agency, Naharnet, Qatar News Agency (QNA), and Jordan News Agency (Petra).
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The Observer
🔴 Six Civilians Killed, Including Two Children and a Woman, in Airstrikes on Al-Mokha
📍 Taiz
Six civilians, including two children and a woman, were killed and eight others, including a child and a woman, were injured in airstrikes targeting civilian homes in the city of Al-Mokha, Taiz Governorate, according to a correspondent for Yemen’s Al-Masirah TV.
The Al-Masirah correspondent reported that the strikes targeted a house in the city, resulting in civilian casualties, including women and children. Preliminary images released by the channel showed two infants who were reportedly killed along with members of their family in the Saudi airstrike that hit their home.
The incident comes amid continued Saudi escalation against Yemen since July, which, according to Al-Masirah, has deliberately targeted unarmed civilians amid what it describes as Saudi military setbacks in the field and major Yemeni military achievements.
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📍 Taiz
Six civilians, including two children and a woman, were killed and eight others, including a child and a woman, were injured in airstrikes targeting civilian homes in the city of Al-Mokha, Taiz Governorate, according to a correspondent for Yemen’s Al-Masirah TV.
The Al-Masirah correspondent reported that the strikes targeted a house in the city, resulting in civilian casualties, including women and children. Preliminary images released by the channel showed two infants who were reportedly killed along with members of their family in the Saudi airstrike that hit their home.
The incident comes amid continued Saudi escalation against Yemen since July, which, according to Al-Masirah, has deliberately targeted unarmed civilians amid what it describes as Saudi military setbacks in the field and major Yemeni military achievements.
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U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio met with Iraqi Prime Minister Ali Al-Zaidi on the sidelines of the 81st session of the United Nations General Assembly in New York to discuss the future of bilateral relations between the two countries, amid sensitive security issues, foremost among them the question of the resistance factions and preventing attacks from being launched from Iraqi territory.
The U.S. State Department said in a statement that the two sides
“agreed on the importance of dismantling what it described as terrorist militias, preventing attacks from being launched from Iraq, and ensuring that Baghdad exercises its full sovereignty.”
The meeting comes at a highly sensitive time, with less than two weeks remaining before the scheduled withdrawal of the remaining U.S. forces from Iraq on September 30, according to media reports.
Sources revealed that the Iraqi prime minister presented a new timetable during the meeting for disarming the armed factions. It would begin with a 90-day ceasefire on attacks starting at the end of September, followed by a gradual handover of weapons to be completed by June 2027.
The issue of placing all weapons under state control, along with the future of the U.S. military presence, is expected to be a major focus of Al-Zaidi’s anticipated visit to Washington, which had originally been scheduled for July.
In this context, Al-Zaidi’s political trajectory cannot be separated from the political context that brought him to power.
While his actions consistently appear to reflect political recklessness and a lack of knowledge of politics and statecraft, one point is clear to everyone: throughout these reckless actions, he has continued to receive full support from the Coordination Framework, which decided to place the Iraqi decision-making process in the hands of the United States amid the fiercest war the region has witnessed.
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📍 Regional Security & Geopolitical Assessment
The regional security picture is entering a highly sensitive phase. Multiple military, political and logistical indicators are converging around Iran, pointing to a significant increase in the risk of renewed confrontation between Tehran, Washington and Israel.
Israel’s Channel 12 reports that the Israeli security establishment has completed preparations for possible escalation scenarios involving Iran. Israeli security officials describe the current situation as highly tense and volatile, with Israeli forces maintaining heightened readiness for potential developments.
Turkish Airlines has suspended flights to Iran until at least March 2027, according to a company representative cited by Iran International. The move comes amid increasing U.S. pressure on Iran’s aviation sector and further restricts Tehran’s international air connectivity.
The disruption extends beyond Turkey. Other major carriers have also suspended or reduced services, while Washington is increasing pressure on companies providing fuel, ground-handling and other services to Iranian airlines.
U.S. officials are increasing political and economic pressure on Iran. President Donald Trump is holding intensive meetings to discuss the Iran file and has warned that the current course does not serve Iran’s interests and could have serious consequences for the region.
INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT
The significance lies not in any single development, but in the convergence of multiple indicators:
Taken together, these developments indicate that the regional security environment is entering a high-risk and highly volatile phase.
The available indicators do not by themselves establish that a direct war is imminent. However, the combination of military readiness, logistical disruption and escalating political pressure creates conditions in which a localized incident or failed diplomatic channel could trigger a rapid escalation.
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The Observer
On the 17th of September, the NYT reported that Washington’s campaign to isolate Iran is no longer confined to financial sanctions. It is now moving into the aviation and transportation sphere, with direct consequences for Iran’s civilian connectivity.
On September 8, the U.S. Treasury expanded “Operation Economic Outcast”, sanctioning the remaining Iranian airlines and entities involved in aviation services, while warning third-country companies that continue supporting Iranian carriers.
The pressure is already producing results. Mahan Air has suspended several international routes, including services to Turkey and Oman, as sanctions increasingly target the ground-handling, sales and logistical networks that allow Iranian airlines to operate abroad.
Against this backdrop, Iraq’s decision to suspend flights to and from Iran across its airports is difficult to view as an independent strategic choice. It effectively adds Iraqi airspace to the growing architecture of Iran’s isolation.
And this is where the decision deserves scrutiny.
🇮🇶 Iraq has legitimate security and economic interests to protect. But there is a difference between protecting Iraqi aviation from sanctions exposure and voluntarily becoming an instrument of another state’s pressure campaign.
The consequences are not limited to governments or airlines. They fall directly on ordinary Iranian passengers, students, families, patients, traders and businesses, whose regional mobility is being progressively restricted.
From a broader regional perspective, the sequence is significant:
U.S. sanctions → pressure on foreign aviation providers → suspension of Iranian routes → shrinking regional air connectivity → greater isolation of Iran.
Iraq should be asking whether its own national interests are served by participating in this chain.
The issue is therefore larger than one flight suspension. It concerns Iraq’s control over its airspace, its economic sovereignty, and its freedom to conduct relations with its neighbors without external coercion.
At a moment when Washington is explicitly pursuing the isolation of Iran, Baghdad should be extremely cautious about allowing Iraqi territory and infrastructure to become part of that strategy.
Source: U.S. Treasury / U.S. State Department / international aviation reporting.
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The meeting between Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian and the Lebanese delegation headed by Prime Minister Nawaf Salam on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly comes amid escalating regional tensions, military pressure and intense diplomatic activity.
The meeting goes beyond protocol. It brings together questions of regional security, Lebanon’s sovereignty, Hezbollah’s future role, reconstruction and the possibility of a broader diplomatic understanding.
For Beirut, the meeting provides an opportunity to assess Tehran’s policy, the scope of its regional support and its response to the rapidly changing rules of engagement.
For Tehran, maintaining political coordination with Lebanon and its regional partners remains important as military and diplomatic pressure intensifies.
The immediate objective is therefore crisis management, maintaining communication channels and preventing miscalculation.
Pezeshkian’s stated readiness for dialogue aimed at achieving sustainable peace and genuine security signals an attempt to open a diplomatic channel without abandoning Iran’s core positions.
The calculation is straightforward: negotiate from a position of strength, not under coercion.
With Washington simultaneously discussing possible diplomatic understandings while maintaining military pressure, Tehran appears to be testing what diplomacy can achieve without becoming a vehicle for strategic concessions.
One of the most sensitive questions is whether Hezbollah’s weapons and possible disarmament could feature directly or indirectly in the discussions.
Any move toward placing Hezbollah’s military capabilities exclusively under state authority would have major implications for Lebanon’s security arrangements, political balance and sovereignty.
For Tehran and Hezbollah, however, the issue is also tied to the wider regional equation of deterrence, resistance and the balance of power with Israel.
The role and status of Iran’s ambassador, Al Shibani, could also become part of the broader discussion over Tehran’s diplomatic engagement in Lebanon.
The issue touches on Iran’s political activity, diplomatic conduct and the framework governing relations between Tehran and the Lebanese state.
Reconstruction in southern Lebanon is another potential area of discussion.
Iranian assistance could involve humanitarian aid, infrastructure and cooperation with Lebanese institutions. For Beirut, however, reconstruction raises questions of state coordination, transparency, financing and sanctions compliance.
For Tehran, reconstruction could reinforce its engagement with Lebanon while becoming part of the wider contest over influence and the post-conflict political order.
The meeting underscores a broader reality: Lebanon can no longer separate its domestic political calculations from the wider regional equation.
Military developments, diplomacy and economic pressure are increasingly interconnected.
Tehran appears to be pursuing both tracks simultaneously: maintaining regional deterrence while opening diplomatic channels.
For Lebanon, any emerging regional understanding could directly affect Hezbollah’s role, state sovereignty, reconstruction and internal stability.
The central challenge for Beirut is to protect its national interests without allowing Lebanon to become merely an arena for the next phase of regional bargaining.
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The Iraqi Oil Minister’s statement that Iraq’s oil exports reached 4 million barrels in a single day during September is significant, but the figure requires careful interpretation.
Iraq’s Ministry of Oil clarified that the 4-million-barrel level was recorded on a single day, while the average crude oil exports during September stood at approximately 2.6 million barrels per day.
Nevertheless, the figure remains an important indicator of Iraq’s ability to restore a substantial portion of its oil flows following the sharp decline in exports during the period of maritime disruptions.
🇮🇷 This is where Iran’s role becomes important
This development cannot be separated from the nature of Iraq-Iran relations and coordination between the two countries.
According to recent reports, Iran allowed Iraqi oil tankers to transit through the Strait of Hormuz following repeated diplomatic requests from Baghdad. This provided Iraq with a practical channel for maintaining part of its exports at a time when maritime traffic through the strait was facing significant disruption.
This was more than temporary cooperation.
▪️ Iraq’s average seaborne oil exports exceeded 3.2 million barrels per day in 2024, with virtually all of its seaborne exports leaving through southern terminals on the Gulf.
▪️ In August 2026, Iraq’s exports increased to approximately 2.34 million barrels per day, up from around 1.35 million barrels per day in July, as access to maritime routes through Hormuz improved.
▪️ Before the maritime disruptions, Iraq’s exports exceeded 3.3 million barrels per day, before falling sharply as shipping routes were disrupted.
▪️ The energy relationship is equally significant. Iraq’s electricity system relies heavily on Iranian gas. International Energy Agency estimates indicate that Iranian gas accounts for approximately 40% of Iraq’s gas supply, while other data indicate that imported Iranian gas has covered more than 40% of the fuel used for power generation in Iraq.
▪️ Under a 2024 agreement, Iraq and Iran agreed on the potential supply of up to approximately 50 million cubic metres of gas per day, reinforcing an energy relationship extending over several years.
🛢️ Oil and electricity… a relationship that crosses borders
Therefore, Iraq’s oil exports cannot be viewed solely through the lens of Baghdad’s production capacity.
There is also a broader network of economic, energy and logistical ties between Iraq and Iran that has practical implications for Iraq’s ability to manage disruptions and maintain energy flows.
With regard specifically to oil exports, the authorization of Iraqi tankers to transit through waters and maritime routes associated with Iran was an important factor in maintaining commercial flows during the period of maritime disruption.
Iraq holds enormous oil reserves of approximately 145 billion barrels and is the second-largest crude oil producer in OPEC after Saudi Arabia.
But production capacity requires secure export routes and regional relationships capable of supporting the continuity of trade.
This is where the significance of Iraq-Iran relations becomes apparent:
At a moment when Iraq’s export routes were facing exceptional pressure, Baghdad was not dealing with Tehran simply as a political neighbour, but as a regional partner with direct relevance to energy flows and maritime access.
The 4-million-barrel figure is not simply a one-day export record. It also illustrates how regional relationships, particularly Iraq-Iran relations, can become a practical factor in maintaining oil flows and commercial activity when export routes come under pressure.
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Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu will travel to the United States tomorrow for a brief one-day visit, during which he is scheduled to deliver a speech before the United Nations General Assembly.
According to sources cited by Haaretz, Netanyahu will be accompanied by an unusually large security detail during the visit, amid reported threats to his life linked to the war and in anticipation of demonstrations in New York.
New York City Mayor Zohran Mamdani had previously called for Netanyahu to be arrested upon his arrival in the city, citing the International Criminal Court arrest warrant issued against the Israeli prime minister.
Mamdani later said that New York City does not have independent legal authority to enforce the ICC warrant, while reiterating his position regarding the warrant itself.
Netanyahu’s brief visit therefore comes amid heightened security measures surrounding the UN General Assembly, expected demonstrations, and continuing political and legal controversy surrounding the ICC warrant.
The visit is scheduled as a rapid 24-hour trip, underscoring the unusually sensitive security and political circumstances surrounding his appearance at the United Nations.
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Behind the scenes, talk of a broad cabinet reshuffle is intensifying, amid an increasingly clear struggle over the composition of the government, who controls sovereign and foreign-policy files, and which regional capitals have the ability to define the limits of political change.
According to what Ibrahim Al-Amin revealed in Al-Akhbar, discussions are circulating over President Joseph Aoun’s reported desire to appoint his adviser Jan Aziz as Foreign Minister, replacing Youssef Raggi.
According to the article, Aoun does not want foreign-policy decision-making to be divided among multiple centers of power, signaling an attempt to strengthen the presidency’s role in managing sensitive foreign-policy files.
Meanwhile, the article indicates that Samir Geagea is moving toward demanding a change involving Minister Sadi, amid what the article describes as failure during his tenure at the Energy Ministry, and a push for a more effective and influential service-oriented portfolio.
🇸🇦 RIYADH ENTERS THE RESHUFFLE BATTLE
The most sensitive issue, however, concerns the Saudi position.
According to Al-Amin, Riyadh informed President Aoun that there is no room for changing the current governing formula, and that it is aware of his inclination to put forward Najib Mikati for the premiership. At the same time, Riyadh reportedly wants Nawaf Salam to remain in his position.
If these reports are accurate, the debate over the cabinet reshuffle reveals something far deeper than a simple change of ministers.
The issue concerns who controls appointments, who determines the shape of government, and who has the power to draw red lines around any attempt to reshape the executive authority.
▪️ Domestic politics under external influence: The confrontation once again highlights the extent to which government formation or reshuffling in Lebanon remains vulnerable to regional “green lights” and “vetoes,” raising questions about the autonomy of national decision-making.
▪️ Institutional paralysis: The persistence of competing conditions and counter-conditions risks pushing the country into another cycle of political deadlock or governmental paralysis, with direct consequences for Lebanon’s already severe economic and social conditions.
▪️ A message to the international community: The dispute risks reinforcing the perception among international actors and potential donors that political power-sharing remains a dominant priority in Lebanon, rather than structural reform.
At the heart of this struggle are the Foreign Ministry and the premiership, two key centers of influence in the broader battle over the distribution of political power and decision-making in Lebanon.
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The Observer
Japan’s Kyodo News Agency, citing a senior Iranian official, reported that Iran has offered to reopen the Strait of Hormuz within seven days if Washington takes initial steps to ease military pressure and lift the blockade on Iranian ports, as part of an effort to revive negotiations and bring the war to an end.
Following the publication of the report, global oil prices fell significantly:
• U.S. West Texas Intermediate (WTI): fell to around $90 per barrel
• Brent crude: declined to approximately $94–98 per barrel
• Percentage decline: reached around 6.41% in some trading sessions
The market interpreted Iran’s offer as a potential signal of de-escalation in the Gulf, prompting traders to reduce the geopolitical risk premium that had been supporting oil prices.
This is not the first time Iranian diplomacy has contributed to a decline in oil prices. Last April, Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi announced on X that Iran would fully reopen the Strait of Hormuz during a ceasefire. WTI subsequently fell to $81, from $93.40, while Brent declined to $98.05.
While higher oil prices exert real pressure on the United States and provide the Axis with greater leverage on the ground, statements that drive oil prices lower can be viewed as a unilateral concession that ultimately undermines the Axis’s own strategic leverage.
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