🔴 America’s Hidden Confrontation with the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF)

🗃 An Analysis of the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) Update — August 26, 2026

💬 INTRODUCTION

It is no secret that the issue of Iraq’s Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) has long remained at the center of political and security controversy in Iraq. Washington’s calls for reforming, restricting, or restructuring the PMF are not new; they have echoed for years through decision-making circles in both Baghdad and Washington.

What is particularly striking about the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) update of August 26, 2026, however, is the degree of transparency with which it describes U.S. demands toward the Iraqi government—not merely as advice or an abstract call for reform, but as a fundamental condition for Washington to “put the Iraq file to rest” and focus more freely on striking Iran, without having to worry about the PMF moving against U.S. interests from the rear.

In its daily update, the institute cited statements by Brig. Gen. Mohammad Akrami-Nia, an Iranian military spokesman, who outlined Iran’s emerging offensive doctrine based on rapid retaliation, multiple and preemptive strikes, and the expansion of the theater of conflict, with the objective of restoring deterrence against Washington and Tel Aviv.

But the core of the report—and its most significant section—concerned Iraq. The institute closely tracked Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi’s efforts to bring the Popular Mobilization Forces under greater state control. If successful, the report argues, this could potentially move Iraq closer to the U.S. camp in the region by reducing Iranian influence and bringing armed factions—the PMF—more firmly under state authority.

This is precisely why the report deserves careful scrutiny. It is not simply an academic analysis; it provides a potential roadmap for what Washington wants from Baghdad in the next phase.

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🔴 AMERICA’S HIDDEN CONFRONTATION WITH THE POPULAR MOBILIZATION FORCES

🗃 Reading the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) Update — August 26, 2026

🔨 THE CORE ISSUE: THE ATTEMPT TO BRING THE PMF UNDER CONTROL

Against this increasingly tense Iranian backdrop, the report highlights a dangerous internal Iraqi development: Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi’s attempt to implement a fundamental reform of the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF).

The report portrays the move as an attempt to strengthen al-Zaidi’s personal authority—but one with significant regional and international implications.

⭐️ KEY POINTS RAISED BY THE REPORT ON IRAQ:

1. RESTRUCTURING THE PMF

• Al-Zaidi has reactivated the office of the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, placing the PMF under his direct authority.

• The PMF legislation was amended after the original draft had been withdrawn by former Prime Minister Mohammed Shia’ al-Sudani in 2025 under U.S. pressure. The revised draft:

🔹 Removes provisions that could allow the PMF to function as a competitor to the Iraqi Army.

🔹 Sets the retirement age at 60, potentially forcing senior figures such as Faleh al-Fayyad into retirement.

🔹 Allows al-Zaidi to appoint officers from the Iraqi Army and Counter Terrorism Service to senior positions within the PMF.

🔹 Seeks to disperse fighters in order to break up what the report describes as the “factional blocs” associated with Iran-backed militias.

2. 🇺🇸 U.S. OBJECTIVES

• According to the report, these reforms align with Washington’s objective of disarming militias, particularly by removing heavy and strategic weapons from the PMF, and ending attacks against U.S. interests.

• Al-Zaidi reportedly discussed the legislation with U.S. officials during his visit to Washington in July 2026, securing political backing to pressure the factions within the PMF.

3. ⚠️ DOMESTIC OBSTACLE: THE IRAQI PARLIAMENT

• The Parliamentary Security and Defense Committee includes lawmakers affiliated with Iran-backed militia wings—what the report characterizes as political blocs supporting the resistance—making passage of the legislation extremely difficult.

• These lawmakers are expected to oppose any attempt to reduce the privileges and influence of senior PMF commanders.

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🔴 AMERICA’S HIDDEN CONFRONTATION WITH THE POPULAR MOBILIZATION FORCES

🗃 Reading the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) Update — August 26, 2026

4. 🇮🇷 THE IRANIAN OBSTACLE

• Iran has shown less flexibility in recent weeks regarding the disarmament of the militias—the PMF brigades.

• Iranian officials, including Quds Force Commander Ismail Qaani and Iranian Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, have reportedly sought to persuade the Iraqi government to postpone the September 30 deadline for placing weapons under state control.

• Iran has proposed alternatives, such as transferring heavy weapons to Iran or placing them under the PMF itself, but opposes any measure that would weaken its influence over the PMF structure.

5. ⚠️ THE REPORT’S ASSESSMENT OF OPPORTUNITIES AND RISKS

🔹 The opportunity: If al-Zaidi succeeds in appointing professional officers—particularly those aligned with the United States—and implementing the proposed [U.S.-backed] reforms, Washington could achieve its objective of weakening the militias within the PMF and reducing Iranian influence.

🔻 The risk: Iranian, Iraqi, and parliamentary resistance could derail the entire project, as reportedly happened during the previous administration of Haider al-Abadi.

• The report cites former Prime Minister Mustafa al-Kadhimi’s experience in reforming the Iraqi Intelligence Service as evidence that institutional reform is possible when there is sufficient political will and professional personnel—particularly personnel with pro-U.S. orientations.

📌 FINAL ASSESSMENT

Al-Zaidi is walking a political tightrope.

He is attempting to exploit U.S. pressure to restructure the PMF in a way that strengthens his own authority, while simultaneously facing joint Iranian-Iraqi opposition both inside and outside parliament.

His success will depend on his ability to impose the proposed reforms and appoint professional cadres with pro-U.S. orientations.

Failure, however, could mean the continued dominance of armed factions—and the further strengthening of the PMF—over Iraq’s security landscape, with significant consequences for domestic stability and Baghdad’s relationship with Washington.

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(PART THREE)

AFFECTED SOUTHERN LEBANESE TOWNS

The involvement of private civilian contractors operating fleets of heavy machinery obtained through commercial distributors—including Hyundai, Caterpillar, Komatsu, Volvo, and Doosan excavators—has been documented in several border towns, including:

🔹 Aitaroun: Extensive residential clearance operations were carried out by civilian contractors, including the Hujairat family’s excavation crew.

🔹 Mays al-Jabal: Commercial excavators operating under military protection were photographed leveling residential homes and municipal facilities.

🔹 Qantara: The town was subjected to extensive structural leveling operations using a combination of explosive charges and excavators operated by civilian contractors.

🔹 Debel: Civilian excavators were documented removing civilian infrastructure, solar-energy arrays, and water lines.

🔹 Kfar Kila, Yaroun, and Mhaibib: Border towns subjected to systematic clearance operations aimed at establishing buffer zones, using mixed fleets of military and privately owned civilian machinery.

CORPORATE AND OPERATIONAL STRUCTURE

🔹 Dealerships and Equipment Sourcing: Arab contractors in Israel typically purchase or lease commercial excavators through major Israeli importers and commercial dealers, such as Zoko Enterprises, the official distributor of Caterpillar equipment in Israel.

🔹 Subcontracting Chains: The Israeli military’s Logistics and Engineering Directorate rarely contracts individuals directly. Instead, the work is generally tendered to major Israeli construction companies, which in turn subcontract the work to contractors from the ‘48 Palestinian community who own local fleets of excavators and heavy machinery and employ family members or local drivers and workers.

🔹 Internal Tensions: The participation of Arab contractors in Israel in the demolition of towns in Southern Lebanon has sparked strong condemnation within Arab communities inside Israel. Critics argue that accepting military demolition contracts constitutes a direct form of economic complicity in the destruction of Arab communities on the other side of the border.

While economic pressure, reliance on government tenders, and market realities are often cited to explain their participation, turning heavy machinery against Arab populations in neighboring countries places private profit above shared identity, solidarity, and basic ethical standards.

By operating excavators and bulldozers to demolish homes, civilian facilities, and livelihoods on the other side of the border, these contractors become direct economic accomplices in military operations that inflict devastating harm on local communities across the region—and particularly in Southern Lebanon.


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🚨

AL-DIYAR EXCLUSIVE | U.S. “ASSURANCES”: A COVER FOR ESCALATION AND A RETURN TO THE OLD DECEPTION SCENARIOS

The U.S.

“assurances”
delivered to Beirut regarding the Israeli escalation being limited to a
“restricted”
strike are causing serious concern among relevant circles, amid growing doubts that they may simply be a misleading cover intended to lull Lebanese officials into complacency and pave the way for a much broader assault.

The United States’ political record suggests that promises by its officials not to invade or escalate can sometimes point in the opposite direction. Talk of “assurances” has repeatedly been accompanied by preparations for military action:

▫️ IRAQ (2003): U.S. officials repeatedly spoke of maintaining stability and pursuing diplomatic solutions, before Washington launched the invasion and occupation of Iraq—under claims that critics argued were misleading.

▫️ IRAN: U.S. calls for diplomacy have repeatedly coincided with sanctions, pressure campaigns, and military escalation, reinforcing concerns that diplomatic rhetoric can also serve as a tool of strategic maneuvering.

According to sources, the Americans are now speaking of a
“surgical” military operation targeting the Ali al-Taher hills,
while claiming they can contain its scope. But the reality on the ground raises fears of a U.S.
“green light”

for heating up the southern front, alongside increased pressure on Iran.

⚠️ There are no guarantees that the situation will remain contained or that escalation will not serve Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s political objectives.

The concern extends beyond the southern border. There are also fears of high-profile targeted assassinations being carried out ahead of Lebanon’s upcoming parliamentary elections on October 27, potentially reshaping the political and security landscape.


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🇪🇸🇮🇷🇺🇸

SÁNCHEZ TO TRUMP: YOUR SANCTIONS MEAN NOTHING

🚨 While China and Russia have announced their rejection of the sanctions imposed by Donald Trump on Iran, following Washington’s failure to achieve its military objectives, Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez took an even more embarrassing step for Trump: he did not merely reject the sanctions politically, but moved in practice to undermine the effects of the economic blockade on Iran.

📍 It was announced that a Spanish company had obtained a license to operate in the extraction and processing of minerals in South Khorasan Province, raising a broader question:

What remains of the effectiveness of U.S. sanctions when European countries and companies begin doing business with Iran despite American pressure?

⚡️ But Sánchez’s confrontation with Trump did not begin here.

Throughout the months of war and escalation against Iran, the Spanish prime minister adopted an openly critical position toward the war, refused to participate in supporting it, and maintained that Iran has the right to defend itself—while simultaneously taking increasingly critical positions toward Israel and the war in Palestine.

And this is where the real message lies:

Sanctions do not become powerful simply because Washington announces them.

Their power depends on the United States’ ability to enforce them on others. When major powers or European companies begin circumventing them, sanctions gradually stop being merely an instrument of pressure and become a test of the credibility of American influence itself.

🇪🇸

Sánchez has demonstrated, at least politically, that confronting Washington does not require aircraft carriers.

Sometimes, all it takes is saying:

NO.

And refusing to submit.

📌 That is why history may remember the Pedro Sánchez experience for a long time: he chose to pay a political price for opposing the war, challenging U.S. and Israeli policies, defending Iran’s right to protect itself, and defending the Palestinian people’s right to live.

As for those who run toward Washington at the first threat…

They should learn something from Madrid about the meaning of political dignity.

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🔴

SHOCKING ASSESSMENT FROM THE COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS: TRUMP FACES STRATEGIC DEFEAT IN THE IRAN WAR

The Council on Foreign Relations (CFR)—one of the United States’ leading foreign-policy think tanks—has published a striking assessment marking six months of the U.S.-Israeli war against Iran, warning that Washington is drifting toward a

“strategic defeat”

as a result of miscalculations and confusion over its objectives.

Key points from the center’s experts:

1️⃣ STEVEN COOK — Middle East and Turkey specialist

▫️ A major miscalculation:

“President Donald Trump did not expect Iran to resist U.S. military power,”

turning that assumption into both a battlefield and political setback.

▫️ Allies left exposed:
After six months, Washington’s Gulf partners have become increasingly vulnerable to Iranian strikes, while Tehran’s incentive to preserve or pursue a nuclear option has reached its highest levels.

▫️ The illusion of economic pressure:
Trump is relying on

“economic ostracism”

to either bring down the Iranian government or force it into negotiations. But Cook argues that Trump

“may be overstating the impact of economic pain,”

particularly because the Iranian population was already suffering economically and has developed mechanisms to adapt.

▫️ A crisis of confidence:
Trump expected a

“quick victory.”

Instead, Washington now faces the possibility of defeat, while regional allies are increasingly questioning whether the United States has the capability—and the willingness—to guarantee their security.

2️⃣ ELLIOTT ABRAMS — Former U.S. diplomat and CFR fellow

▫️ A widening domestic divide:
The war has generated diplomatic disagreements and fierce criticism from both the far right and far left within the United States.

▫️ Conflicting objectives with Israel:
Washington seeks to force a

“change in Iran’s behavior,”

including regarding its nuclear program and its activities around the Strait of Hormuz. Israel, however, views

“regime change”

as the only viable option—making any settlement or memorandum of understanding a persistent source of disagreement between Washington and Tel Aviv.

▫️ Declining public support:
Polling has shown a notable decline in support for Israel among both Republicans and Democrats, alongside growing editorial and political voices accusing Israel of

“dragging the United States into war with Iran.”

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🚨
FINANCIAL TIMES: U.S. SANCTIONS TARGET EGYPT’S SECOND-LARGEST STATE-OWNED BANK OVER IRAN

The U.S. Treasury Department has imposed strict financial restrictions on branches of Banque Misr in the United Arab Emirates, citing the facilitation of financial transactions linked to Iran and violations of the limits imposed under the sanctions regime.

KEY IMPLICATIONS:

▫️ Targeting a sovereign banking institution:
The measures target Egypt’s second-largest state-owned bank, putting direct diplomatic and economic pressure on Cairo.

▫️ Tightening financial surveillance in the Gulf:
The move reflects the expansion of Washington’s financial monitoring of banking hubs in the UAE, aimed at closing potential channels through which Tehran could circumvent the financial blockade.

▫️ Consequences for cross-border transactions:
Arab banks are increasingly being forced into difficult choices between complying with U.S. Treasury requirements and maintaining their regional commercial relationships.


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🔴

Washington Pulls the Rug Out: The Repeated Pattern of U.S. Abandonment and the End of the Support Model in Erbil

📍 Erbil

Washington has sent yet another clear signal reminiscent of painful chapters in the history of abandoning allies. On September 30, the Trump administration is preparing to halt more than $60 million in direct defense funding, ground training, and operational support for the Iraqi Kurdish Peshmerga, as the current Memorandum of Understanding expires.

For two decades, the United States provided support and arms programs to the Peshmerga forces, which essentially served as an advanced defensive shield against terrorism.

Today, Washington is repeating its historical pattern of abandoning the Kurds once their usefulness has been exhausted, leaving these forces to confront the consequences of a model that for years relied on shifting American promises.

Why is this happening now ⁉️

This is not merely an administrative delay. It is a strategic shift reflecting the pragmatic nature of U.S. policy, which has repeatedly ended with the abandonment of its allies:

• The End of the “Necessity” Argument

The Peshmerga played an active role and made major sacrifices in the campaign to defeat ISIS.

But as military operations decline and the U.S. presence is reduced, the Pentagon is once again following its historical approach of distancing itself from partners once its immediate interests disappear, regardless of whether local stability still requires continued support.

• Washington’s Frustration with Political and Military Division

For years, U.S. officials have pressured the Kurdistan Regional Government to accelerate the unification of the Peshmerga under the Ministry of Peshmerga Affairs. However, political leadership in the region has remained divided, with Peshmerga forces effectively split between the spheres of influence of Erbil—the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and Unit 80 formations—and Sulaymaniyah—the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and Unit 70 formations.

Washington has increasingly cited this administrative and military division as grounds for reducing funding, while overlooking the complexities of the region’s domestic political landscape.

• The Shift Toward Baghdad-Centered Relations

U.S. policy has increasingly been compelled to align with Baghdad’s demand for unified military decision-making, prompting Washington to redesign its presence around arrangements with the central government.

👣 The Legacy of Disorder: Between Local Responsibility and External Abandonment

Reliance on American promises was not an easy choice; rather, it emerged from a complex reality that contributed to fragmenting the security landscape:

🔻 Undermining National Sovereignty

Foreign support gave the region a broad margin of autonomy. But reliance on Washington’s shifting promises made security decision-making increasingly dependent on the calculations of a great power that has frequently failed to honor its strategic commitments over the long term.

🔻 Expansion and Field Tensions

After initially focusing on defending its territory and protecting its security against the threat of invasion in 2014 and afterward, the Peshmerga—following major victories and the liberation of territory, in coordination with Iraqi military operations and the efforts of the Iraqi Armed Forces and Popular Mobilization Forces—expanded their deployment into so-called “disputed territories,” including Kirkuk and areas such as Hawija.

Relying on American and international backing, this process ultimately contributed to the crisis surrounding the September 2017 independence referendum, after which the Iraqi state reasserted federal control over those areas and brought that trajectory to an end.

🔻 Internal Conflicts

Alignment with external polarization did not help build a professional national military institution. Instead, it fueled partisan and familial competition within the region.

⚠️ What Does This Mean for Iraqi Sovereignty and Security?

The termination of U.S. support represents a genuine test for the future relationship between the Kurdistan Region and Baghdad:

🔹 Pressure Toward Institutional Integration

Since salaries and core funding are formally linked to the federal treasury in Baghdad through the national budget, the suspension of American logistical, weapons, and training support will increase the need for Kurdish leadership in Erbil and Sulaymaniyah to coordinate militarily with Baghdad. This, in turn, creates greater pressure to accelerate the genuine unification and integration of these forces into Iraq’s national defense institutions.

🔹The End of the Illusion of Permanent Alliances

The move is a reminder that relying on foreign patronage comes at a heavy price and often ends in repeated abandonment.

🔹A Potential Security Gap

The Peshmerga’s tactical readiness and intelligence capabilities could be temporarily affected by the absence of direct U.S. support. This would require Baghdad and the Kurdistan Regional Government to close the resulting gap in order to ensure the stability of Iraq’s northern border areas.

🎯 Conclusion

What has happened—and what is now unfolding—reinforces a recurring historical principle: the United States has no permanent allies, only temporary interests.

The Peshmerga have paid the price for trusting Washington’s shifting promises. Today, the question is no longer whether the Kurdistan Region can continue with its previous model, but rather:

Will Kurdish leaders in Erbil and Sulaymaniyah absorb the lesson of American abandonment and consolidate their cooperation and trajectory with the Iraqi state and its federal institutions—protecting their people without gambling their future on external powers?


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🔴🇮🇱🇱🇧

THE POLITICAL SURVIVAL GAME: HOW ISRAEL’S NEXT ELECTION COULD RESHAPE THE NORTHERN FRONT

🚨 Israel’s next election is not simply a contest between Netanyahu and the opposition. It is a referendum on who can control the security narrative—and survive politically.

Israel is scheduled to hold its next Knesset election in October 2026. But beneath the familiar “left vs. right” framing lies a much simpler equation:

61 seats = political survival.

And when neither camp can comfortably guarantee those 61 seats, the northern front becomes more than a security issue. It becomes part of the political battlefield.

⚠️ THE NETANYAHU SURVIVAL MECHANISM

Former Prime Minister Ehud Barak has accused Benjamin Netanyahu of deliberately maintaining pressure across multiple security fronts in order to postpone an electoral reckoning.

His warning included extreme possibilities—from attempts to delay elections to the potential use of emergency conditions.

Whether those scenarios materialize is another question.

But the underlying political logic deserves attention:

👉 A government fighting a “national security emergency” operates under a fundamentally different political environment from a government forced to answer for its domestic failures.

As long as Israel remains locked in a multi-front confrontation, security dominates the public agenda.

And that is politically valuable for Netanyahu.

Because the moment the guns fall silent, other questions return:

❗️The October 7 failures
❗️Government accountability
❗️The Gaza war
❗️The judicial crisis
❗️Netanyahu’s political future
❗️Coalition corruption and internal divisions

The longer the security crisis dominates the agenda, the harder it becomes for the opposition to transform public anger into a coherent electoral alternative.

ℹ️THE 61-SEAT WALL

The mathematics of Israeli politics is brutal.

Netanyahu’s right-wing and religious bloc has a highly committed electoral base, but reaching the magic 61-seat majority remains dependent on his coalition partners—including the far right.

The opposition faces the opposite problem.

It contains centrists, former military commanders, secular right-wing voters and figures such as Benny Gantz, Gadi Eisenkot and Naftali Bennett—but these forces do not necessarily agree on what comes after Netanyahu.

And one issue is particularly explosive:

Can an anti-Netanyahu government depend on Arab-majority parties to survive?

That question alone could prevent an otherwise viable opposition bloc from becoming a stable governing coalition.

🇮🇱 THE MOST LIKELY OUTCOME?

Not a landslide.

Not a clean ideological victory.

But another political deadlock.

A Knesset divided so tightly that weeks—or months—of coalition negotiations become inevitable.

Israel could once again find itself facing:

🔻 fragile coalitions
🔻 rotation arrangements
🔻 defections
🔻 political bargaining
🔻 and potentially another government with a short lifespan.

And this is where the northern border becomes strategically important.

🇱🇧🔥 SOUTH LEBANON: THE FRONT THAT POLITICS CANNOT IGNORE

Do not make the mistake of assuming that a change of government in Jerusalem automatically means a change in military doctrine toward Lebanon.

It probably won’t.

🇮🇱 IF NETANYAHU SURVIVES

Expect the northern front to remain politically useful.

Limited exchanges, targeted strikes, military deployments and sustained pressure against Hezbollah can maintain the perception that Israel remains in a state of national emergency.

A complete de-escalation, by contrast, risks moving the political spotlight back toward Netanyahu himself.

The quieter the border becomes, the louder domestic politics can become.

🇮🇱 IF THE OPPOSITION WINS

The tone may change.

Relations with Washington could improve. Diplomatic initiatives could receive greater attention. International mediation over the northern border could become more attractive.

But do not confuse a change in government with a change in Israeli strategic doctrine.

Figures such as Eisenkot and Bennett come from a security establishment that remains deeply hostile to Hezbollah’s military infrastructure and highly sensitive to threats from Lebanon.

An opposition government might negotiate differently.

It is unlikely to think fundamentally differently about military deterrence.

⚔️ THE REAL QUESTION

The crucial issue is not simply:

“Who will win the Israeli election?”

It is:

“What happens to Israel’s northern military posture when electoral survival becomes the overriding political objective?”

Because in Israel, elections do not exist in a vacuum.

Security operations shape political narratives.

Political narratives shape coalition survival.

And coalition survival can influence the timing, intensity and presentation of military action.

🎯 THE BOTTOM LINE

Israel’s October 2026 election could produce a new government—but not necessarily a new northern strategy.

Whether Netanyahu remains in power or an opposition coalition takes over, the basic political reality remains:

🇮🇱 No Israeli government can afford to appear weak on Hezbollah or the northern border.

For South Lebanon, therefore, the election should not be watched merely as a contest over Netanyahu’s future.

It should be watched as a potential indicator of how Jerusalem calculates the cost—and political utility—of continued confrontation on the northern front.

The battlefield and the ballot box are no longer separate arenas.

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🚨🚨

The End of Patience: The Axis of Resistance Takes the Offensive ( Part 1 )

The equation in the Middle East has definitively changed. The Era of Strategic Patience is over, and the Axis of Resistance has drawn a red line in fire and steel.
At approximately 2:25 AM Tehran time, the Islamic Republic of Iran launched a coordinated, multi-front military response across the region, firing precision strikes from launch sites spread across 32 Iranian cities and provinces.

The message is single-minded and direct: aggression will no longer be absorbed; it will be met with overwhelming, offensive strength.


The Target and the Arsenal: Defensive Patience End, Offensive Reality Begins

This counter-strike targeted key infrastructure supporting the American military presence and naval blockade in the region:


🔹US Bases in Jordan: The IRGC Aerospace Force unleashed concentrated salvoes of medium-range ballistic missiles against the King Hussein Air Base and Al-Azraq Air Base in Jordan. These sites serve as critical hubs for regional US military logistics and air operations. The strikes systematically targeted technical repair hangars, maintenance infrastructure, and fighter jet housing facilities, degrading operational capability on the ground.


🔹US Maritime Assets in the Strait of Hormuz: Simultaneously, Iranian coastal units launched advanced anti-ship cruise missiles targeting US destroyers and naval assets enforcing the blockade near the Strait of Hormuz.

The operation utilized an integrated mix of Iran’s precision-guided ballistic arsenal—including Khaibar Shekan and Fattah-class systems—complemented by high-speed cruise missiles and swarms of loitering munitions. The scale of simultaneous launches across 32 provinces proved that Iran’s operational depth remains completely intact, unified, and ready for deployment at a moment's notice.


Why Iran Struck: Legitimate Defense Against Unprovoked Aggression

This military response was neither unprovoked nor isolated; it was an absolute necessity.
Around 2:40 AM, and following earlier provocations on Sunday, American forces conducted hostile strikes against Iranian territory on Larak Island. American strikes targeting Iranian territorial sovereignty spilled the blood of Iranian fighters and civilians. Combined with Washington’s illegal naval blockade—which has unlawfully intercepted, redirected, or disabled 88 commercial vessels in regional waters—the US has consistently pushed the region toward open conflict.
Iran acted out of sovereign duty to defend its soil, protect its people, and break an illegal economic and military siege. As Ebrahim Azizi, Head of the Iranian Parliament's National Security and Foreign Policy Committee, declared:

"Testing our resolve once again will only multiply the cost of your defeats. Wait in terror and fear."

🚨🚨

Grounded in Faith and Unity: The Mandate for the Offensive Shift (Part 2)

This shift in military doctrine directly reflects the landmark address delivered by the Leader of the Islamic Revolution, Sayyed Mojtaba Khamenei, during the 40th International Islamic Unity Conference of 2026 in the Iranian capital, Tehran. The conference began on Thursday, August 27, 2026, and concluded on Sunday, August 30, 2026, coinciding with the events of Islamic Unity Week and the anniversary of the birth of the Noble Prophet Muhammad (PBUH).

Addressing a unified gathering of Shia and Sunni scholars from across the Muslim world, the Leader declared that the Muslim Ummah can no longer afford to remain in a posture of passive defense while hostile foreign powers occupy, blockade, and strike Muslim lands.

“Iran is no longer on the defensive side. We are on the offensive.”

This statement was not merely rhetorical; it represented a reset of military doctrine. The offensive operations carried out across the region demonstrate that when the sovereign dignity of the Islamic Republic—or the broader Muslim world—is violated, the response will be immediate, assertive, and unyielding.

The unity celebrated by Sunni and Shia leaders and scholars in Tehran has now materialized as unified resistance against external coercion.

🌍 Current Regional Ripple Effects

The impact of Iran’s precision strikes was felt immediately across the Middle Eastern theater of operations:

🔻 Saudi Arabia:
Commercial flight operations were completely suspended at King Abdulaziz International Airport in Jeddah, effectively disrupting the activities of this major regional air-transport hub.

🔻🔻 Jordan & Qatar:
Jordanian authorities reported interceptions over their airspace, while Qatar’s Ministry of Interior raised the security threat level to its maximum and instructed residents to remain indoors.

🔻🔻🔻 Occupied Palestine & Southern Lebanon:
Israeli fighter aircraft entered a state of maximum alert, conducting low-altitude sorties from southern Lebanese airspace toward the border areas.

Concurrently, occupation forces began heavy artillery fire and white-phosphorus shelling against targets in Nabatieh al-Fawqa, Mayfadoun, and Baraachit in southern Lebanon.

The message from Tehran and the Axis of Resistance is unequivocal:

The days of unilateral aggression without a price or consequences are over.

Any further miscalculation by foreign forces will face an even harsher and more decisive reality on the ground.


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