In other words: the problem is with strategic deterrent capability, not internal security.


PMF and Factions: The Need to Differentiate

What is the PMF?

• An official legal force
• Established by law
• Theoretically and practically under the authority of the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces
• Not a militia, nor an organization outside the state


The PMF was born from the fatwa of the religious authority at a moment of existential danger, when military units collapsed, the state retreated, and Iraq was left alone to face ISIS.

What are the factions?
Within the PMF:

• They are the nucleus of its founding
• Multiple factions
• Different political and ideological loyalties
• Divergent positions on the state and weapons


Some factions:

• Declared readiness to regulate weapons
• Linked this to the withdrawal of foreign forces
• Consider their weapons as resistance arms not subject to the traditional logic of the state


Confusing the PMF as an institution with factions as organizations is deliberate misrepresentation.



Weapons Monopoly: Between the Religious Authority and Political Exploitation

The Religious Authority’s Position
The supreme religious authority clearly called for:

• Weapons to be monopolized by the state
• Rule of law
• Prevention of foreign interventions


But the authority:

• Did not propose dismantling the PMF
• Did not demand eliminating deterrent elements
• Did not grant political authorization for selective use of its discourse


What is happening today is invoking the name of the authority to cover projects that were never built on the completion of the state in the first place.



Positions of Factions and Political Forces

Factions
According to Judge Faiq Zaidan:

• Four factions declared commitment to the principle of weapons monopoly
• Without announcing actual surrender of strategic capabilities


In contrast:

• Other factions refuse to give up their weapons before clear sovereignty conditions are met


Political Forces

• Muqtada al-Sadr: explicitly calls for weapons monopoly by the state and rejects any weapons outside it
• Ammar al-Hakim: encouraged regulating weapons and integrating them into state institutions


These positions reflect a struggle within the Shiite political house over:

• Who holds power?
• Who decides its future?
• How influence is redistributed?




Proposed Scenarios: What Is Being Prepared for the PMF?

So far, two scenarios are on the table—without official announcement:

Scenario One: Turning the PMF into a Ministry

• A minister
• Sectarian quotas
• Political decision instead of field decision
• Bringing the PMF into the balance game


Scenario Two: Dismantling and Merging

• Dissolving the institution
• Distributing individuals across Defense and Interior
• Ending the exceptional status
• Terminating its special identity


In both cases:
The PMF as we know it today will not remain.



Can the Axis of Resistance Hand Over Its Weapons?

The Lebanese experience with Hezbollah shows that:

• Resistance weapons are not surrendered unless:• The state is capable
• The enemy is gone
• Guarantees are real



In Iraq, the question is not:
Do factions want to hand over weapons?
But rather:
Is the state capable of bearing what is required of it after removing the missiles?



Conclusion: The Core of the Battle Is Not Weapons… But Function

This debate is not about:

• A rifle
• Discipline
• Administrative organization


It is about:

• Who holds the deterrence decision?
• Who defines Iraq’s regional role?
• And whether it is allowed to remain a power or quietly neutralized?


When the missile becomes the problem,
we are facing a project of neutralization… not reform.
And when force is dismantled before the state is built,
we are not facing sovereignty,
but the re-engineering of weakness.

🔵Link to the article in Arabic

🖋@observer_5

🔴An urgent, updated reissue of the essential book on the myths—and reality—behind the state of Israel

In this groundbreaking book, the outspoken and radical Israeli historian Ilan Pappe examines the most contested ideas concerning the origins and identity of the contemporary state of Israel. This has been updated with a new afterword on the 2023 invasion of Gaza. 1. Palestine was an Empty Land 2. The Jews were a people with out a land 3. Zionism is Judaism 4. Zionism is not Colonialism 5. The Palestinians Voluntarily Left their Homelands in 1948 6. The June 1967 War was a war of 'No Choice' 7. Israel is the only democracy in the Middle East 8. The Myths about the Oslo Agreement 9. The Lies we tell about Gaza 10. The two state solution is the only way forward

🔵Link to the article in Arabic

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🔴Mohammad Javad Zarif: The Diplomat Between Two Images

From “Architect of Openness” to a Strategic Burden on Iran and the Axis of Resistance

Mohammad Javad Zarif is presented in Western discourse as “the moderate face of Iran” and “the rational diplomat” capable of speaking the language of the world. Yet this image, which he built during his years as Foreign Minister (2013–2021), collides with a political, security, and strategic record weighed down by failures and contradictions.
Was Zarif truly a reformer within the system, or merely a smooth marketer of policies that proved disastrous, harming Iran and the Axis of Resistance?



1. Zarif and the Nuclear Deal – From Promise of Salvation to Total Collapse

The JCPOA – July 14, 2015
Zarif presented the nuclear deal as a historic breakthrough that would end Iran’s isolation, lift sanctions, and open the doors of the global economy. But subsequent events exposed the fragility of this wager:

• May 8, 2018: The United States unilaterally withdrew under Donald Trump, despite Iran’s full compliance according to IAEA reports.
• Washington not only failed to honor its commitments but used the deal as an intelligence and political tool to tighten pressure later.


Sanctions Instead of Relief
During Zarif’s tenure:

• More than 1,500 new sanctions were imposed under the “maximum pressure” policy (2018–2021).
• On July 31, 2019, Washington sanctioned Zarif himself, a scene that epitomized the futility of trusting the West.


The core accusation emerged:
Was Zarif the architect of sanctions relief, or—unwittingly—one of those who facilitated their tightening?



2. The Assassination of Soleimani and al-Muhandis – The Collapse of the Diplomacy Illusion

January 3, 2020
The United States assassinated General Qassem Soleimani and Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis in Baghdad.
This came at the height of Zarif’s talk of “de-escalation” and opening indirect negotiation channels.

• The event dealt a crushing blow to Zarif’s theory that U.S. behavior could be restrained through diplomacy.
• For the Axis of Resistance, the assassination proved that American hostility is structural, not tactical.




3. April 2021 Leak – An Unintended Admission of Failure

In April 2021, an audio interview was leaked in which Zarif admitted:

• “Diplomacy was sacrificed for the battlefield.”
• The United States was the real player that disrupted his negotiation tracks.


The leak:

• Was used in the West to portray Iran as a divided state.
• Harmed the unity of Iran’s narrative.
• Exposed the limits of Zarif’s influence within the system and weakened his credibility as a “policy architect.”




4. Security Breaches – Fakhrizadeh and Natanz

November 27, 2020
The assassination of nuclear scientist Mohsen Fakhrizadeh inside Iran in a complex Israeli operation.

April 2021
A major sabotage operation at the Natanz nuclear facility.

Although direct responsibility was security-related:

• Zarif’s rivals argued that the climate of openness and negotiation he promoted created a false sense of safety.
• His focus on appeasing the West came at the expense of properly assessing Israeli threats.




5. Women’s Rights and Hijab – Davos Rhetoric vs. Domestic Reality

At international forums like Davos, Zarif declared that the government “chose not to enforce hijab laws by force,” claiming that in reality hijab no longer existed by Islamic state standards, though some still adhered to it and believed in its importance.

Key questions:

• Does Zarif use women’s rights as an external cosmetic tool, while ignoring internal social and political complexities?


This contradiction weakened his credibility:

• Domestically, he was accused of media grandstanding.




6. Zarif, Resistance, and Calls for Dialogue with Washington

Zarif did not hide his preference for direct dialogue with the United States, even after:

• The failure of the nuclear deal.
• The assassinations.
• Maximum sanctions.


The decisive question:
Is this political pragmatism, or a departure from the resistance narrative?

From the Axis of Resistance’s perspective:

• His calls weaken deterrence logic.
• They reproduce the illusion of partnership with an enemy that has not changed its behavior.




7. Relationship with the Supreme Leader

Zarif declares commitment to Velayat-e Faqih (Guardianship of the Jurist), but:

• Abroad, he presents a reformist discourse suggesting the possibility of a “post-Velayat Iran.”
• This creates a duality between internal and external messaging, raising doubts about his true position within the system’s ideological structure.




8. Zarif and the Arabs – Accusatory Rhetoric and Widening the Gap

In many debates and interviews, Zarif accused Arab states of:

• “Betraying Iran.”
• “Aligning with Washington and Tel Aviv.”


But this rhetoric:

• Ignored the complexities of the Arab scene.
• Deepened an unnecessary gap between Iran and environments supportive of the Axis of Resistance.
• Gave opponents propaganda material to portray Iran as confrontational with Arabs.




9. After Zarif – BRICS and the Turn East

After leaving office:

• Iran joined the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (2023).
• Officially entered BRICS (2023).
• Began actual implementation of the 25-year China agreement, though Zarif had persistently undermined Iran’s relations with China.


These major strategic shifts occurred without Zarif, raising a harsh question:
Was he more of an obstacle to this path than a driver of it?



Conclusion

Mohammad Javad Zarif is neither a complete opponent of the system nor a revolutionary reformer.
He is a diplomat, skilled in rhetoric, but:

• He bet on the West and lost.
• Marketed a reformist image that never materialized.
• Opened vulnerabilities that were exploited against Iran and the Axis of Resistance, and continue to be.


Although Zarif is now outside the state, the Pezeshkian government is the closest to his views. Perhaps one could say he is the closest thing to being the intellectual architect behind this government.

🔵Link to the article in Arabic

🖋@observer_5

🔴(Breaking News)

New Escalation Targeting Minorities

Local sources reported an explosion inside Imam Ali Mosque (peace be upon him) in the Wadi al-Dhahab neighborhood of the city of Homs. According to preliminary information, the blast resulted in the martyrdom of twelve individuals and the injury of several others with varying degrees of wounds, amid a state of heightened security alert in the area.

Comment

This attack represents a dangerous escalation that appears to deliberately target religious minorities and places of worship, signaling an attempt to inflame sectarian tensions and undermine social stability. Such acts of violence not only violate the sanctity of religious spaces but also threaten civil peace and coexistence. Regardless of the perpetrators, targeting civilians in houses of worship constitutes a grave crime under both international humanitarian norms and basic moral principles.

🔵Link to the article in Arabic

🖋@observer_5

🔴Javad Zarif and the Discourse of “Alternative Iran”: A Critical Reading

Introduction

In his Foreign Affairs article, How America and Iran Can Break the Nuclear Deadlock, Javad Zarif does not merely propose a diplomatic solution to a technical dispute. Rather, he articulates a broader political discourse aimed at redefining Iran’s role, identity, and alliances at a moment of profound regional volatility. Read carefully, the article reveals an attempt at political repositioning rather than conflict resolution.



1. A Message to the Outside, Not the Inside

Zarif’s article is conspicuously detached from Iran’s internal realities. It does not address domestic crises, social tensions, or economic grievances at a time when widespread unrest is anticipated.
Instead, the piece is crafted for Western policymakers and regional actors, presenting Zarif and his current as a reasonable, marketable Iranian alternative.

Even his initiatives — such as the earlier Hormuz Peace Endeavor or the more recent Modarreh/Modda concepts — are branded in ways that resonate externally rather than domestically, reinforcing the impression that the intended audience lies beyond Iran’s borders.



2. Zarif as an Externally Endorsed Alternative

As speculation grows about political alternatives within Iran, Zarif positions himself not through popular legitimacy but through international platforms, forums, and Western publications.
The article functions as a declaration of political viability addressed to foreign capitals, implicitly stating:

“If you seek a different Iran, I represent it.”



3. Redefining the Enemy, Diluting the Conflict

One of the most troubling aspects of Zarif’s argument is his reduction of hostility to a single individual — Benjamin Netanyahu — while portraying the United States and Israel as actors plagued by “misunderstandings” rather than as aggressors engaged in sustained confrontation.

Notably:
• Attacks on Iranian nuclear facilities are not framed as acts of war.
• The existential nature of the conflict is downplayed.
• Structural imperial dynamics are replaced with narratives of miscommunication.

This reframing sanitizes Western aggression and transforms a historical conflict into a solvable diplomatic glitch.



4. From the Nuclear File to a Regional Deal

Zarif’s call for a broader regional agreement is the article’s most consequential proposal.
Given:
• Iran’s previous nuclear concessions,
• and former President Hassan Rouhani’s recent admission that the nuclear deal was merely the first phase of wider negotiations,

the proposed “regional understanding” can only be interpreted as a mechanism to recalibrate Iran’s regional posture — potentially at the expense of the Axis of Resistance.

In this reading, the nuclear issue was the entry point; the regional role is the ultimate prize.



5. A Preemptive Disassociation Before War

Amid escalating tensions and the looming prospect of a regional war, Zarif’s article reads as a preemptive political disassociation from confrontation.
It signals to the West that not all Iranian actors endorse resistance or escalation, and that an alternative path — embodied by Zarif himself — exists.

This is the logic of elites preparing for the post-conflict order rather than enduring the conflict itself.



Conclusion

Zarif’s article is not a neutral peace proposal. It is a carefully constructed political document that seeks to:
• Redefine the enemy,
• Normalize Western aggression,
• And pave the way for a regional arrangement that risks dismantling the Axis of Resistance.

Its danger lies not in what it openly states, but in what it quietly prepares the ground for:
an Iran stripped of confrontation, alliances, and resistance.


🔵Link to the article in Arabic

🖋@observer_5

restrictions, resulting in over 30 Iraqi banks being barred from dollar transactions by external decree, paralyzing local trade.
2. Explosive Budgets: The "Electoral Bribe" Economy
* Salary Inflation: Wages and social grants consumed over 70% of the 2024-2025 budget, killing investment development.
* Historic Deficit: The 2025 budget recorded a massive speculative deficit, with internal debt rising to 92 trillion IQD (over 25% of GDP).
* Oil Dependency: Iraq remains 90% dependent on oil revenues, threatening the state with bankruptcy if global energy prices drop.
3. Politically Protected Corruption
* The "Juhi" Network: The 2024 espionage scandal within the PM’s office proved that corruption and security breaches reached the highest levels under his watch.
* Suspicious Settlements: In the "Heist of the Century" ($2.5 billion), his government focused on recovering minor portions of funds in exchange for releasing key defendants instead of delivering justice.
Conclusion: A Second Term Means Iraqi Bankruptcy
A second term for Al-Sudani is a death sentence for the remains of the economy. Iraq needs a genuine economic uprising that frees itself from the U.S. Federal Reserve, not an "employee" executing agendas aimed at starving resistant peoples.
Al-Sudani’s "institutional" vision, promoted "shrewdly," is merely a trap; he uses the names of martyrs Qasem Soleimani and Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis as cover for a platform seeking to bury their legacy. Iraq does not need a mediator for U.S.-Iranian meetings; it needs a leader who imposes the Iraqi will within the Axis of Resistance.
Beautifying the Collapse: Al-Mayadeen’s Fall into the Propaganda Trap
The image of this political deception is incomplete without the suspicious role of Al-Mayadeen. While claiming to be the "voice of the Resistance," the channel has slipped into the role of a "polishing platform" for Al-Sudani’s failures. Its exclusive focus on inflating Al-Sudani’s image, unlike other candidates, raises major questions about its independence.
Can "Al-Mayadeen" be considered biased media?
The answer leans toward the affirmative for several reasons:
* Political Choices : Dedicating resources to polish a figure who plays both sides with the American occupier indicates that "funding" or "narrow interests" have trumped "principle."
* Betrayal of Intellectual Integrity: Presenting Al-Sudani as a Resistance figure while he has not implemented the decision to expel U.S. forces is deliberate deception.
* Absence of Alternatives: The channel intentionally avoids highlighting other political proposals within the Coordination Framework that might be firmer against the U.S. presence.
Al-Mayadeen has lost its revolutionary luster to become an "echo of authority" rather than the "voice of the Resistance."

Al-Sudani’s term was a period of "orbital decay," and a second term would be a catastrophe for the regional struggle against hegemony.


🔵Link to the article in Arabic

🖋@observer_5

🔴Somaliland at the Crossroads: Geopolitics, Israeli Recognition, and International Law

On 26 December 2025, Israel became the first United Nations member state to officially recognize Somaliland as an independent and sovereign state. This move fundamentally altered the geopolitical landscape of the Horn of Africa. This analysis assesses the crisis through the political framework articulated by Mr. Abdul-Malik Badr al-Din al-Houthi in his speech dated 8 Rajab 1447 AH (28 December 2025), alongside established principles of international law.



1. Historical Origins and the “De Facto” Paradox

Somaliland, formerly a British protectorate, gained brief independence in 1960 before voluntarily uniting with the former Italian Somaliland. Following a bloody civil war and the collapse of Siad Barre’s regime in 1991, Somaliland unilaterally declared the dissolution of that union.
• The 1991 Declaration: It was grounded in the restoration of the 1960 borders rather than the creation of a new entity.
• Governance versus Recognition: For 34 years, Somaliland has maintained an effective government, its own currency, and a security apparatus, in contrast to the volatility in Mogadishu.
• The Legal Vacuum: Despite meeting the criteria of the Montevideo Convention (permanent population, defined territory, government), Somaliland remained unrecognized due to the African Union’s adherence to the principle of the “inviolability of borders” (Cairo Declaration, 1964), out of fear of opening a “Pandora’s box” of secessionist movements across the continent.



2. Strategic Interests and the al-Houthi Framework

In his Rajab 1447 AH speech, Abdul-Malik al-Houthi described the Israeli recognition as a “hostile act” and a “project to fragment the region.”
• Israel’s Objective: Control of the Red Sea corridor. Recognition provides a potential military and intelligence hub near the Bab al-Mandeb Strait, a strategic chokepoint, facilitating monitoring of Houthi maritime operations and limiting the influence of regional competitors such as Turkey, which has invested heavily in Mogadishu.
• Regional Encirclement: Al-Houthi views the move not as a localized diplomatic development but as part of a strategic encirclement of Yemen and the Axis of Resistance.
• Fragmentation: From this perspective, the move serves to weaken the Federal Republic of Somalia, which has maintained a firm stance in support of Palestine, by entrenching its division.



Other Beneficiaries of the Status Quo

Local elites in Hargeisa gain legitimacy and investment through the Berbera port deals with the UAE, DP World, and now Israel, strengthening their rule amid accusations of democratic backsliding. External actors such as the UAE secure military bases (Berbera base), while Ethiopia seeks access to the Red Sea; Israel exploits these dynamics in positioning itself against the Houthis. Compared with Kosovo (Western-backed recognition) or Northern Cyprus (Turkish-backed isolation), the Somaliland case benefits actors who exploit divisions in the Horn of Africa without assuming full responsibility.



Israel’s Strategic Calculations

Somaliland’s 850-kilometer coastline along the Gulf of Aden grants Israel surveillance capabilities over Bab al-Mandeb, countering Houthi attacks on shipping and Iranian arms flows, with the potential to transform Berbera into an intelligence hub alongside Emirati facilities. This aligns with Israel’s broader strategy of encircling the Red Sea—through the Abraham Accords and links to Socotra—to pressure Yemen and address displacement narratives from Gaza. Al-Houthi, however, frames this as “regional fragmentation” extending beyond Somalia. Netanyahu’s timing also links domestic politics with maritime security amid escalating Houthi threats.



3. Legal Status Under International Law

The legitimacy of Israel’s recognition is contested by the Somali Federal Government, the African Union, and the Arab League.
• Territorial Integrity: UN Resolution 1514 and the African Union’s Constitutive Act prioritize the territorial integrity of existing states.

The Somali Federal Government maintains that Somaliland is an “inseparable and inalienable” part of its territory.
• Authority to Recognize: In international law, recognition is a political act by a sovereign state. While Israel may recognize any entity, such recognition is often considered void if it violates the sovereignty of another UN member state (Somalia).
• The “Occupying Entity” Argument: Al-Houthi’s framework holds that recognition by Israel—described as an “occupying entity”—lacks moral and legal legitimacy, linking Palestinian statelessness to the “fragmentation” of Somalia.



4. Regional Security and Militarization

Recognition transforms an internal secessionist dispute into a high-risk maritime confrontation.
• Military Targets: Al-Houthi explicitly declared that any Israeli presence in Somaliland constitutes a “military target,” raising the possibility of drone or missile strikes on Somaliland ports (such as Berbera) and linking the area to the ongoing Red Sea tanker war.
• Proxy Escalation: Somalia has warned it will not tolerate foreign military bases that drag the country into proxy conflicts. The presence of Israeli intelligence or naval assets would likely provoke the Axis of Resistance and could alter Ethiopia’s security posture, particularly following its controversial memorandum of understanding with Somaliland.
• Axis Framing: Al-Houthi portrays Somaliland as an Israeli “hostile foothold” tied to Palestine through a project of “reshaping the Middle East,” rhetorically merging anti-Zionism, Somali solidarity, and Red Sea defense. Strategically, this framing justifies strikes without requiring a new escalation, embedding Somaliland within resistance narratives against “fragmentation.”



5. Policy Options and International Responses

The international response has been largely condemnatory, prioritizing regional stability over Somaliland’s claims to self-determination.
• Multilateral Channels: Somalia is mobilizing the Arab League, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, and the African Union to isolate the recognition. The Chairperson of the African Union, Mahmoud Ali Youssouf, has already reaffirmed the principle of “non-interference with borders.”
• Diplomatic Reciprocity: Somali Prime Minister Hamza Abdi Barre described the move as “reckless,” suggesting that Israel recognize the State of Palestine instead.
• The Risk of Normalization: Should other states follow Israel’s lead, the principle of territorial integrity in Africa would face a systemic challenge, potentially leading to “Balkanization,” as al-Houthi warns.



Conclusion

Israel’s recognition of Somaliland is less a human-rights-based endorsement of self-determination than a geopolitical maneuver aimed at securing maritime dominance in the Red Sea. While Somaliland gains a powerful—albeit controversial—ally, it risks becoming a forward front in the broader regional confrontation between Israel and the Axis of Resistance. Under prevailing international law, the recognition remains a bilateral political act without the power to alter Somalia’s internationally recognized borders.

🔵Link to the article in Arabic

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🔴From Alliance to Confrontation: How Yemen Became an Open Arena for Saudi–Emirati Conflict

The war on Yemen is no longer merely an externally imposed military campaign led by Saudi Arabia. Over time, it has evolved into a revealing laboratory of intra-Gulf contradictions, exposing the structural fragility of alliances built on coercion, rentier power, and external patronage. The recent crisis between Riyadh and Abu Dhabi—brought into sharp relief by the Saudi targeting of a vessel allegedly carrying weapons in Yemeni waters and its classification as a “security threat”—signals not an isolated incident, but a deeper strategic rupture within the coalition that launched the war.

What was once marketed as a unified “Arab coalition” has unraveled into a competition over spoils, influence, and post-war positioning, with Yemen reduced to contested terrain rather than recognized as a sovereign political entity.

I. How the Alliance Was Formed—and Why It Collapsed

When the war on Yemen began in 2015, Saudi–Emirati coordination appeared firm, backed by full American and Western political cover. The intervention was framed through familiar rhetoric: restoring “legitimacy,” countering Iranian influence, and safeguarding Arab security. Yet this narrative concealed the absence of a shared strategic vision.

Saudi Arabia entered the war driven primarily by border security anxieties and regime survival logic. Its objective was to impose a weakened, compliant Yemeni authority incapable of exercising independent sovereignty. The UAE, by contrast, approached Yemen as a long-term geopolitical investment—a gateway to ports, islands, maritime routes, and influence extending from the Red Sea to the Horn of Africa.

What initially appeared as coordination soon gave way to latent rivalry, then to indirect confrontation. The current crisis merely brings into the open what had long been evident beneath the surface.

II. Yemen: Not a Civil War, but a Contested Prize

The Saudi attack on the alleged arms ship cannot be understood as a routine security measure. It is, rather, a symptom of collapsing trust between former partners. Riyadh’s framing of the shipment as a threat implicitly acknowledges that control over weapons, territory, and proxies inside Yemen has slipped beyond Saudi command.

The UAE’s sustained backing of local militias—particularly separatist forces in southern Yemen—has actively contributed to state fragmentation. Saudi Arabia, meanwhile, remains trapped in a war of attrition, unable to claim victory yet unwilling to withdraw. Yemen, in this calculus, is neither a nation nor a people, but a divisible geopolitical asset.

III. Competing Regional Projects: Borders versus Ports

At the heart of the Saudi–Emirati rift lies a clash between two distinct regional strategies:
• Saudi Arabia seeks a centralized but weak Yemeni state, functioning as a security buffer along its southern border.
• The UAE favors a decentralized Yemen, dominated through ports, islands, commercial corridors, and loyal militias—particularly in Aden, Socotra, and along the Bab al-Mandab Strait.

Southern Yemen has thus become a focal point of this rivalry, stripping the coalition discourse of any remaining credibility.

IV. Washington and Tel Aviv: Managing Disorder, Not Resolving It

The United States has historically viewed intra-Gulf tensions not as liabilities, but as tools of control. Under Donald Trump’s administration—defined by transactional diplomacy and arms-deal politics—Washington showed little interest in resolving structural conflicts. Its priority was preventing escalation only insofar as it threatened energy markets or Israeli security.

Israel, meanwhile, emerges as the silent beneficiary of Gulf fragmentation. Saudi–Emirati discord enhances:
• Israeli leverage over Red Sea maritime security,
• intelligence cooperation with Gulf states,
• and Israel’s role as a pillar of the anti–Axis of Resistance architecture.

Normalization, in this context, is not peace-making—it is regional reengineering at the expense of popular sovereignty.

🔴V. Yemen and the Axis of Resistance: Strategic Reversal

Ironically, fractures within the aggressor camp have strengthened Yemen’s resistance forces, which—despite siege and devastation—have imposed new deterrence equations. The Saudi–Emirati split exposes:
• the failure of the US-backed Gulf intervention,
• the fragility of alliances grounded in opportunism,
• and the limits of military superiority when confronted by organized popular resistance.

Yemen has shifted from being perceived as the weakest link to becoming a site of systemic exposure for the regional order imposed by Washington and its allies.

VI. Where Is the Crisis Headed?

The Saudi–Emirati rift is not a temporary misunderstanding. It is structural and enduring, even if temporarily managed through American mediation. As long as Yemen remains under indirect occupation, conflict among occupiers is inevitable.

Future trajectories include:
• managed rivalry below open warfare,
• proxy-based escalation,
• or forced strategic retreat driven by battlefield realities favoring the resistance.

In all scenarios, one conclusion is unavoidable: the war on Yemen has failed, and its internal contradictions now pose a greater threat to its architects than to their adversaries.

Conclusion

What is unfolding between Saudi Arabia and the UAE marks the end of an era. The illusion of a cohesive Gulf-led regional order is dissolving, while resistance movements continue to consolidate power and legitimacy. Yemen—once targeted for submission—has become a witness to the collapse of hegemonic fantasies and a pivotal arena in the reconfiguration of regional power.

🔵Link to the article in Arabic

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• Hadhramout, Yemen’s largest governorate and a critical energy corridor, is emerging as the next arena of Saudi–Emirati competition. Saudi Arabia has been expanding its footprint there precisely as Emirati influence elsewhere is questioned. A power vacuum here could either be filled by Riyadh or destabilized further—both scenarios carry risks.
• Taiz, long neglected and fragmented, may experience renewed contestation as external patrons reposition. Emirati disengagement could weaken certain militias, but without a sovereign Yemeni framework, instability may persist.

In both cases, the absence of a unified Yemeni state—a condition deliberately produced by years of intervention—means that withdrawals do not automatically translate into sovereignty.

What This Means for the Houthis—and for Yemen

For Ansar Allah, the Emirati announcement is a strategic vindication. It confirms what the resistance has argued consistently: that the coalition is fragmenting under pressure, and that steadfastness alters equations.

Yet the Houthis are unlikely to misread the situation. They understand that:
• Emirati influence has not vanished,
• Saudi intentions remain ambiguous,
• and external actors may attempt to freeze, rather than resolve, the conflict.

For Yemen as a whole, the moment is ambiguous but consequential. Reduced foreign military presence may lower immediate tensions, but it also exposes the reality that Yemen’s fate has been negotiated over—not with—its people.

Saudi–Emirati Relations: Beyond Tactical Disputes

This episode will not destroy Saudi–Emirati relations, but it has permanently altered them. What once appeared as a unified Gulf front is now unmistakably a managed rivalry, characterized by:
• diverging threat perceptions,
• competition over influence,
• and conflicting endgames in Yemen.

Coordination will continue where interests align—especially under US mediation—but trust has been eroded.

Conclusion: Withdrawal as Admission

The Emirati withdrawal from Yemen does not signal peace; it signals admission—admission of limits, of failure, and of the impossibility of imposing outcomes by force on a resisting society.

As argued in Part I, Yemen was never merely a battlefield. It was a test of regional order. Today, that order is cracking.

Whether this moment leads to genuine Yemeni sovereignty or merely a rebranding of domination will depend less on Gulf declarations and more on the balance forged by resistance, resilience, and political clarity inside Yemen itself.

🔵Link to the article in Arabic

🖋@observer_5

🔴Vice President of the Popular Mobilization Forces


The position of Vice President of the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) did not disappear from circulation because the need for it ceased to exist, but because invoking it has become an embarrassment.

This embarrassment is neither administrative nor organizational; it is eminently political and ethical. It leads directly to the name of Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, to an assassination that occurred on Iraqi soil, and to a political class that consciously decided to turn its back on its obligations rather than confront them.

This position was not a bureaucratic detail or an honorary title. It was a complex role that combined the duties of Chief of Staff, supreme field commander, and the political and military management of the conflict during Iraq's most dangerous modern moment. When army units collapsed, cities fell in succession, and terrorism advanced across more than half of the country’s geography, Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis was not a "symbolic figurehead." He was the brain and the axis of the war: planning, coordinating, providing, and holding the threads of decision-making from the battlefield to the Parliament and the Government. This weight is what linked the position to his person—not because institutions are built on individuals, but because the state itself was absent, and the vacuum was filled by the one who possessed the competence and the will.

It is true that this position was exceptional, and perhaps indeed, no one was—or is—able to fill it with that same specificity and complex blend of military expertise, political acumen, and regional reach. But this fact, however valid, does not justify what happened later. The absence of a successor does not explain the erasure of the position itself. We are not talking about a technical inability here, but a conscious political decision to cancel the post from the official memory because its permanence opens a file that many do not wish to approach.
More dangerously, this erasure has been accompanied by a deliberate re-engineering of rhetoric. A significant number of politicians prefer to use the expression "Leaders of Victory" instead of clearly mentioning names and titles. This linguistic choice is neither innocent nor spontaneous; it is a vague description, carrying less legal and political cost. It allows for the achievement to be generalized and diluted, avoiding the explicit recognition that an official Iraqi figure of the stature of the Vice President of the PMF was targeted in a direct American assassination on Iraqi soil.

From here, the systematic mitigation of responsibility begins. Since day one, the idea has been promoted that the target was not Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, but General Qasem Soleimani. This is a deliberate disregard for leaks and statements issued from within the U.S. administration itself—most notably the U.S. President’s description of the operation as "two for the price of one." Denying that al-Muhandis was a target is not an error in judgment, but an intentional attempt to transform the crime from an assault on Iraqi sovereignty into an ambiguous regional file, the consequences of which are cast beyond the borders.

In this manner, al-Muhandis's name is forcibly merged with Soleimani's and presented as if he were an escort or a secondary detail, rather than an official Iraqi leader. The result is clear: an evasion of the duty to pursue legal and political accountability for the assassination of an Iraqi citizen and military commander, and the avoidance of any serious confrontation with the United States—which does not hide its disdain for the political class in Baghdad.

Even the Iraqi judicial decision to issue an arrest warrant for Donald Trump was no exception to this path. It was issued to be recorded, not executed, and quickly became ink on paper amidst continued political meetings. The height of political absurdity was reached when the Iraqi Prime Minister nominated Trump for the Nobel Peace Prize.

Here, silence is no longer neutrality; it becomes actual participation in emptying justice of its substance.

The conclusion requires no linguistic softening:

The position of Vice President of the PMF was not sidelined simply because its holder is irreplaceable, but because sidelining the position serves a clear objective: burying questions of sovereignty, assassination, and political responsibility.

The ruling class chose to manage memory instead of confronting the truth, preferring safety with foreign powers over acknowledging a crime within its own borders.

This is not a fleeting shortcoming, but a failure that will remain recorded in the political and ethical ledger of the Iraqi state.

🔵Link to the article in Arabic

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🔴The Gunboat Diplomacy of the Unipolar Twilight: The Illegal U.S. Aggression Against Venezuela



The early hours of January 3, 2026, mark a definitive fracture in the crumbling facade of the "rules-based international order." Under the direct authorization of Donald Trump, the United States has launched a naked act of military aggression against the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela. This operation—characterized by the U.S. executive as a "large-scale strike"—reportedly involved the illegal abduction of President Nicolás Maduro and First Lady Cilia Flores by elite Delta Force units.
For the Axis of Resistance and the broader Global South, this is not merely a regional crisis; it is an existential challenge to the principle of Westphalian sovereignty. Washington has once again demonstrated that when its economic blackmail and hybrid warfare fail to crush a defiant nation, it resorts to the primitive logic of the pirate and the colonial administrator.


1. Operational Barbarism: The Delta Force Abduction

The mechanics of the attack reveal a terrifying evolution of the U.S. "regime-change doctrine." Reports from Caracas confirm at least seven major explosions targeting strategic installations, including the Fuerte Tiuna military complex and the La Carlota airbase. However, the core of the mission was not destruction, but the "forced removal" of the head of state.
According to high-level leaks and official boasts from Washington, members of the 1st Special Forces Operational Detachment–Delta (Delta Force) conducted a surgical extraction of President Maduro. This act of state-sponsored kidnapping is a direct descendant of the 1989 invasion of Panama and the 2004 removal of Jean-Bertrand Aristide in Haiti. By treating a sovereign leader as a "high-value target" in a pseudo-criminal operation, the U.S. seeks to delegitimize the very concept of the Venezuelan state, reducing a nation of 28 million people to a mere "jurisdiction" for American law enforcement.


2. The Imperial Consensus: Bipartisan Complicity

While Trump’s rhetoric is uniquely abrasive, the attack is the fruit of a long-standing bipartisan imperial consensus. The silence and tactical support from Democratic Party leadership underscore a fundamental truth: the U.S. political establishment is unified in its commitment to hegemony.
The Democratic opposition, while occasionally critiquing Trump’s "unilateralism," has historically paved the way through the "Extraordinary Threat" executive orders and the recognition of "parallel" puppet governments. This attack is the logical conclusion of a decades-long policy that views Latin America as a private plantation. There is no "anti-war" wing in the halls of the American Congress; there is only a debate over the most efficient method of subversion.


3. International Reaction: The EU’s Moral Bankruptcy

The response from the European Union has been a masterclass in colonial hypocrisy. While EU officials offer "great concern" and platitudes about "moderation," their refusal to unequivocally condemn the violation of Venezuelan sovereignty speaks volumes. By maintaining a political alignment with Washington’s "regime change" goals, the EU has rendered its rhetoric on international law irrelevant.

In contrast, the regional response highlights a sharpening divide. While U.S. satellites in the region remain paralyzed or supportive, sovereign voices like Cuba and Colombia (under President Gustavo Petro) have denounced the strike as "state terrorism." Petro’s call for an emergency UN Security Council meeting reflects the desperate need for a collective defense against a resurgent Monroe Doctrine.


4. Trump’s Sixth Strike: The Colonial Project Reaffirmed

This aggression marks Donald Trump’s sixth major military or coercive action against a sovereign state since his return to power—a list that includes strikes in Iran, the Sahel, and the ongoing naval blockade of the Caribbean. This is not "isolationism"; it is unfettered colonialism.
Trump’s strategy utilizes the U.S.

military as a tool for "extortion," as described by Venezuelan Vice President Delcy Rodríguez. By framing the attack as a "narcotics" operation, the administration attempts to bypass the laws of war, treating the Caribbean as a "non-international armed conflict" zone where U.S. power is the only law.


5. Multipolarity vs. Unipolarity: The Global Response

The attack on Venezuela is a direct assault on the emerging multipolar world. Russia and China have swiftly condemned the aggression, with Moscow describing it as a triumph of "ideological hostility over pragmatism." For the Axis of Resistance, Venezuela is a frontline state.

Strategically, the U.S. expects that by removing Maduro, it can sever a critical node of the BRICS+ influence in the Western Hemisphere. However, this move is likely to backfire. As Washington burns its remaining bridges of diplomatic credibility, the necessity for a parallel security and financial architecture—one that can withstand U.S. piracy—becomes the primary objective for the global majority.


6. The Death of International Law at the UN

Legally, the U.S. attack is a grotesque violation of the UN Charter, specifically Article 2(4), which prohibits the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state. There is no "self-defense" justification (Article 51) for kidnapping a foreign leader on their own soil.
The UN Security Council’s current state of paralysis—rendered impotent by the U.S. veto—demonstrates that the post-1945 institutions are no longer capable of restraining the hegemon. The "cowboy behavior" condemned by Russia and China at the UN is not a glitch; it is the operating system of a dying empire attempting to preserve its unipolar status through raw violence.


Conclusion: Resistance is the Only Path

The illegal attack on Venezuela is a clarion call. It proves that within the current U.S.-led order, no state is sovereign if its resources or ideology conflict with Washington’s interests.

The resistance of the Venezuelan people and the Bolivarian National Armed Forces (FANB) is now the vanguard of a global struggle. The Axis of Resistance does not just fight for Caracas; it fights for the right of every nation to exist free from the shadow of the Delta Force and the hangman's noose of U.S. sanctions.

🔵Link to the article in Arabic

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