🔴We have worked and continue to work to strengthen cohesion between the PMF and the rest of the armed forces and security services, for this is the secret of victory. The coming days will witness important steps in this direction, including the payment of fighters’ salaries through electronic bank cards.


🔵Link to the article in Arabic

🖋@observer_5

🔴Remembering Victory: Iraq’s Defeat of Daesh and its Lasting Consequences

On December 9, 2017, Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi declared that Iraq had achieved final victory over the Islamic State (Daesh), after a brutal three-year campaign that saw the extremist group seize and then lose vast swathes of Iraqi territory. That declaration marked the end of Daesh’s claim to govern a large territorial “caliphate” inside Iraq, but it also closed a dramatic chapter that reshaped Iraqi politics, security, society, and regional alignments.

1. Timeline: rise, expansion, and defeat

Daesh’s rapid rise in Iraq began in earnest in 2014. The group captured Mosul — Iraq’s second largest city — in a swift offensive that culminated on June 10, 2014, exposing the collapse of Iraqi defenses in several provinces and providing Daesh a strategic base for further expansion across Nineveh, Salah al-Din, and Anbar. The fall of Mosul had immediate symbolic and practical consequences: it freed fighters, captured weapons, and prompted mass civilian flight from the city.

A decisive turning point came three days later, when Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani issued a religious call on June 13, 2014 for a defensive (kifāʾī) jihad to repel the extremists — a mobilizing order that prompted tens of thousands of volunteers and paved the way for the institutionalization of volunteer militias under state supervision. That religious legitimation helped convert grassroots energy into coordinated paramilitary structures.

From 2014 through 2017 the fight unfolded in waves: the recapture of Tikrit (2015), the bitter campaigns in Ramadi (2015) and Fallujah (2016), and the grinding, urban battle for Mosul (2016–2017). By 2017 operations extended to Tal Afar, Al-Qaim and Rawa; by December of that year Iraqi forces announced that Daesh had been driven from its last major footholds.

2. The actors: Iraqi state forces and the Axis of Resistance

Iraq’s formal military institutions — the Iraqi Army, the Counter-Terrorism Service (CTS), and Federal Police — bore the central responsibility for retaking urban centers and conducting clearance operations. Parallel to them, however, the Popular Mobilization Forces (al-Hashd al-Shaʿbi, PMF) emerged from volunteers and local militias into a decisive force on the ground. PMF formations, many organized around preexisting groups, played leading roles in operations across central and northern Iraq.

A crucial leadership figure within the PMF was Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, who served as a senior PMF commander and helped coordinate militia efforts during the anti-Daesh campaigns. His role exemplified how veteran militia leaders shaped battlefield tactics, logistics, and local governance in liberated areas. The PMF’s cooperation with Iran’s IRGC advisors and with allied groups — including operational coordination informed by figures such as Qassem Soleimani — enhanced capabilities in intelligence, planning, and close-quarters operations.

3. The human and material cost

The fight against Daesh exacted a heavy toll. Millions of Iraqis were displaced at different periods of the conflict; humanitarian planning documents estimated that by 2017 up to 4.2 million internally displaced people might require assistance as military operations, sieges, and sectarian cleavages produced mass movement. Entire neighborhoods in Mosul, Ramadi and Fallujah were left in ruins, producing long-term reconstruction needs.

Civilian casualty figures remain contested and politically fraught, but independent monitoring and rights groups documented significant civilian deaths during coalition air campaigns and intense urban fighting; these losses deepened social trauma and complicated reconciliation and return efforts. (Different tallies exist; the scale of destruction and civilian suffering is undisputed.)

4. Regional and international context

The anti-Daesh campaign unfolded within a complex international environment. The U.S.

-led coalition provided airpower, training and support to Iraqi government forces and Kurdish units, yet the coalition’s operations were criticized for civilian harm and for at times failing to coordinate effectively with local ground actors. Meanwhile, actors associated with the Axis of Resistance — notably Iran and allied militias — framed the fight as part of a broader confrontation with U.S. and Israeli influence in the region, and they leveraged their battlefield presence to deepen ties with Baghdad.

Daesh’s defeat had the political effect of pushing Baghdad and Tehran into closer security cooperation. Iran’s advisory and material support, and the battlefield prominence of Iran-aligned militias, gave Tehran enhanced leverage in Iraqi affairs and altered the post-2017 balance of regional influence.

5. Post-victory challenges

Military victory did not mean the end of insecurity. Daesh transformed from a proto-state into an underground insurgency: sleeper cells and small-unit attacks persisted in Diyala, Kirkuk and desert border regions. Reconstruction proved daunting: housing, utilities, heritage sites, and entire urban infrastructures required massive investment. Political tensions also mounted over the PMF’s legal status, integration into the state, and accountability for abuses — issues that remain central to Iraq’s domestic politics. Lastly, the continued presence of U.S. troops and negotiations over force posture kept Iraq at the intersection of competing foreign agendas.

6. How Iraq commemorates the victory

Anniversaries of the 2017 declaration are marked by official ceremonies, tributes to martyrs, and public remembrance of those who fought and died. The PMF and its constituent formations are publicly commemorated in many parts of the country, and narratives about resistance and liberation shape local memory. At the same time, competing media frames — Western, Gulf, and regional — debate the PMF’s role, with some outlets downplaying militia contributions and others emphasizing their centrality; these contestations echo larger arguments over sovereignty, justice, and Iraq’s political future.

7. Reflection: sovereignty, alignment, and the balance of power

The victory over Daesh reshaped Iraq in three connected ways. First, it restored Iraq’s territorial integrity in practical terms — it removed the immediate territorial threat posed by Daesh — yet it left open questions about the monopoly of force and the relationship between state institutions and armed non-state actors. Second, the war accelerated Baghdad’s alignment with Tehran in security and political spheres, producing new dependencies and domestic tensions over foreign influence. Third, the struggle against Daesh transformed the regional balance by demonstrating that state and non-state actors operating in tandem could expel a major extremist threat — but also that doing so can complicate postwar governance, accountability, and reconstruction.

The anniversary of the victory should therefore be a moment for sober remembrance: to honor the sacrifices made, to measure the unresolved costs, and to press for policies that convert military success into durable security, inclusive governance, and genuine reconstruction — lest the conditions that gave rise to Daesh return in another guise.

🔵Link to the article in Arabic

🖋@observer_5

🔴UAE-backed forces seize South Yemen, raising possibility of independence

The Southern Transitional Council (STC), backed by the United Arab Emirates, has now taken control of all eight southern provinces — a major setback for the UAE’s regional rival, Saudi Arabia.

The UAE-backed military leadership in South Yemen announced that it had seized the entire south — a shift that opens the possibility of declaring independence, potentially restoring Yemen to two states for the first time since 1990.

According to the report, around 10,000 STC fighters entered the oil-rich Hadramawt province last week, followed by Al-Mahra — the sparsely populated province on the border with Oman that had not previously been under STC control.

These victories mark the first time the STC has achieved full control over all provinces that historically constituted “South Yemen.”

In response, the Riyadh-led coalition — previously the most prominent external actor in Yemen — withdrew its forces from the presidential palace in the southern capital Aden, as well as from the airport. This shift indicates that the forces supporting the internationally recognized government have been defeated, at least temporarily.

However, an immediate declaration of statehood by the STC would be a risky step, given the experiences of other regions that pursued secession but later struggled with diplomatic recognition, such as Western Sahara.

It is therefore more likely that the STC will, in the medium term, seek a referendum on separation from the north rather than an immediate declaration of independence. The future of this path depends heavily on the decision of its patron — the UAE.

Since the Houthis seized the capital Sana’a in 2015, the south has been governed by a fragile political alliance that included the Saudi-backed Islah Party (led by President Rashad al-Alimi) and the UAE-backed STC (led by STC chief Aidarous al-Zubaidi).

Despite their partnership under the “Presidential Leadership Council,” the STC maintained stronger military forces. After the Saudi withdrawal to Riyadh, President al-Alimi met with diplomats from France, Britain, and the United States, urging the STC to return to barracks. Yet the STC appears to have subsequently taken control of Yemen’s largest oil company, PetroMasila — a move that strengthens its position in determining the country’s future.

Western diplomats and the United Nations have long opposed dividing Yemen into two states, instead advocating a federal solution that would include both the Houthis and southern forces.

There are indications that the STC may offer two provinces outside traditional South Yemen — Taiz and Marib — a “protected” status to ensure they do not fall into Houthi hands, should they not explicitly join the “southern state.”

A researcher at the Sana’a Center for Strategic Studies said: “This may be the most important turning point in Yemen’s history since Sana’a fell to the Houthis in 2015. It has the potential to reshape local and regional alliances, and could even draw the UAE into conflict with Saudi Arabia.” She added that the STC would be in a strong position to demand southern autonomy if negotiations begin, while Saudi Arabia would face serious concerns over its border security, especially given past Houthi attacks on its territory.

Finally, the report notes that some observers suspect the STC is acting on a “signal” from the UAE — possibly in response to Riyadh’s move to ask the former U.S. president to intervene in the war in Sudan, which angered the UAE and prompted it to reshuffle its cards in Yemen.

A Saudi delegation remains in Hadramawt, attempting to contain the fallout, amid intense pressure from Riyadh to halt what it has described as chaos.

➡️Link to the article (click here)


🔵Link to the article in Arabic

🖋@observer_5

🔴Palmyra, Syria

An unidentified gunman opened fire on a patrol involving U.S. forces and local security personnel near the central Syrian city of Palmyra on Tuesday, wounding several members of the patrol, according to sources familiar with the incident.

The patrol was conducting a field mission when it came under fire, triggering a security alert in the area. The attacker’s identity and motive remain unclear, and no group has claimed responsibility for the incident.

Further details were not immediately available.

🔵Link to the article in Arabic

🖋@observer_5

🔴Tom Barrack’s statements at the Doha Forum:

“Look, everything is in process, and let’s begin from America’s point of view. America fought in one of the fiercest battles in history, called the Civil War. Now, all of us in the Western world don’t like to talk about minorities, but the Civil War was a majority in the Union against a minority of Confederates. And we spent a hundred years trying to define what the Union is. Is it a federal union? Is it a republic? Is it a union? How do you integrate communities that have different cultural aspects, different desires, different religions, different educational systems, and hundreds of years of their own history?

In a country like America that started anew, how do you do that in a civilization with thousands of years of history, where survival depended first on the tribe, then the family, then evolved into community, from community to religion, from religion to sectors, and finally we invented nation-states. There was no such thing until the beginning of the 20th century.

So, in integrating these very difficult issues, America took the view of untangling problems that lead to solutions. And we are trying to do the same with Lebanon. We have wonderful new leadership everywhere. Wonderful new leadership in Syria. Wonderful new leadership with the new Prime Minister and President Aoun in Lebanon. Wonderful new leadership here, and thank you for hosting us. I think what we all feel is that this is one of the most important forums where we can have these discussions in Qatar with Sheikh Tamim, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE. We have a new set of opportunities.

The first thing that must happen is to allow Syria to define itself without Western expectations saying ‘we want democracy within 12 months.’ We have never seen democracy here before, and I see that Israel can claim it is a democracy, but in this region, what has really worked—whether you like it or not—is benevolent monarchy. That is the style that has succeeded.

So we are inventing something different. And every time the West intervenes and says ‘well, this is the kind of parliamentary dialogue we want,’ every time we intervene—whether in Libya or Iraq or anywhere we tried to impose a colonial mandate—it has not been successful. We end up in paralysis. So our view is: provide guidance. We all need to contribute, not criticize, not say we need more foreign fighters released faster, not say we need to find more missing people faster, not say communities are being punished unfairly until they take their small steps to get there. They have just taken over leadership and control. They first need stability. We must give them the chance to integrate all viewpoints. But ultimately, all viewpoints do not create a state. They must define what creates a state. Is it centralization? Is it federalism? Is it a mixed system? What will it be?

From America’s point of view, what we have learned is that we are not good at imposing those expectations, especially in the Middle East, on others. Israel is a confusing case. What I think this President, Jared Kushner, and Steve Wit did together with Qatar—and by the way, I am here to tell you as a soldier on the ground—none of this would have happened without Qatar’s intervention. Whatever our view of what happened in Israel, the greatest thing that happened is that we got a ceasefire and hostages returned, and it simply would not have happened without Qatar’s intervention. One of the most frustrating things—and I heard it was a great discussion between Tucker Carlson and Sheikh Mohammed—I tell you, as someone at the heart of it, Sheikh Mohammed under the Emir’s supervision was the most important person to maintain dialogue with Hamas. Whatever the West’s view, they were wrong. If we did not have that, and if Turkey had not intervened alongside him—Turkey was also criticized for holding dialogue with Hamas—we would not be where we are today.

So we must look at that as we look at Syria and Israel. These are small steps, it is a process, not a single event.

🔴We will face bumps, we will face ongoing atrocities, we will face dilemmas. We need to bring Lebanon and Syria together and align two of the oldest and most beautiful civilizations. Iraq faces the same dilemma through paralysis and its parliamentary process. We do not want to interfere in those political discussions.

My hope and belief is that we will move from the payphone to satellites. We will not have a gradual process, and the young leadership we have in Syria, Lebanon, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE are holding hands. I have great hope, but it requires all of us to ease the pressure we put on these places regarding our Western expectations, and give them the resources they need.”


🔵Link to the article in Arabic

🖋@observer_5

Barrack claims to criticize the Sykes–Picot Agreement, yet this “critique” does not stem from the right of peoples to self-determination, but from the logic that says:

We are the ones who drew the borders, and we are the ones who reinterpret them.

His statements about “uniting Syria and Lebanon” clearly expose this logic. Even when praising Lebanese leadership, he treats Lebanon as an entity that can be dissolved within larger regional arrangements—namely, absorbed into Syria. This is not a mere verbal slip, but an extension of a vision that treats sovereignty as an administrative function rather than a historical or legal right. Despite widespread criticism, he neither retracted his remarks nor offered an apology.

Here, Orientalism intersects with neocolonialism:

Borders are not sacred when they obstruct Western interests, but they become “international legitimacy” when they serve them.



Fifth: Recognizing Occupation as a “Colonial Mandate” Without Accountability

Barrack’s admission that the occupations of Iraq and Libya were “colonial” is among his most dangerous statements—not because it represents radical critique, but because it is recognition without consequences. In postcolonial studies, this form of acknowledgment functions to close the file rather than open it:
• No apology
• No compensation
• No accountability
• No dismantling of the structures of domination

Colonialism is reduced to “a phase in which mistakes were made,” rather than a crime whose economic, political, and social effects remain ongoing.



Theoretical Conclusion

Thomas Barrack’s discourse cannot be understood as a “critical shift” in U.S. policy. It must instead be read as a formal transformation in the language of hegemony.

It is a discourse that is:
• Orientalist in its denial of popular political capacity
• Neocolonial in its instruments
• Politically racist in its exceptions

In this discourse, democracy is not a right, sovereignty is not a principle, and borders are not fixed realities; they are variables managed from the center of power. This is precisely the essence of colonialism when it sheds the military uniform and dons the suit of the diplomat.

🔵Link to the article in Arabic

🖋@observer_5

🔴From the rise of constitutionalism during the rule of despotic Qajars, foreign invasions, the Pahlavi regimes’ destructive politics, economic, cultural and social modernization efforts and the oil nationalization movement, to the Iranian Revolution, its high hopes, broken promises, repression and intolerance causing national discontent and another socio-political upheaval today, the history of modern Iran has been eventful, unstable and turbulent. In this textbook, Ali Rahnema draws on his experience teaching and researching on modern Iran to render one hundred years of modern Iranian politics and history into easy-to-follow episodic chapters. Step by step, and taking a chronological approach, students are given the core information, analysis, and critical assessment to understand the flow of contemporary Iranian history. This is a comprehensive and exhaustive guide for undergraduate and graduate level courses on modern Iranian history and politics. The textbook is complete with the following pedagogical features: * An initial chapter on how to study Iranian history and how to approach historiography * Images of key individuals discussed in each chapter * Text boxes throughout to highlight key episodes, concepts, and ideas *Three types of exam questions; factual and analytical, seminar, and discussion at the end of each chapter * Glossaries at the end of each chapter *A comprehensive timeline Topics covered include: party formations; the flourishing of the press; the expansion or reduction of political and civil rights; repression and human right abuses; foreign intervention and influence; obsessions over conspiracies; the influence of Western ideologies, the role of nationalism, cultural and historical Persian chauvinism; and Shi’i Islam and competing Shiisms.

🔵Link to the article in Arabic

🖋@observer_5

Alert News :

🔴 United States
Trump administration unveils plan requiring all tourists to submit their DNAs , disclose five years of social media activity, along with past email addresses and phone numbers, as part of new entry rules. The measure would apply even to travelers from visa‑exempt
countries


🔵Link to the article in Arabic

🖋@observer_5

🔴From Violence to Narrative Weaponization — The Sydney Hanukkah Attack as a Case of Securitization and False-Flag Politics

The blood had barely dried on the pavement at Bondi Beach before the machinery of imperialist propaganda began its work. The horrific attack on the Hanukkah celebration in Sydney is a tragedy for the families involved, but for the strategists in Tel Aviv and Washington, it is something else entirely:

an asset.


In a matter of hours, a criminal act of violence has been transmuted into a geopolitical weapon. We are witnessing a masterclass in securitization—where a localized event is inflated into an existential threat to justify predetermined military escalations. To accept the Western narrative at face value is to ignore the timing, the beneficiaries, and the brutal logic of hybrid warfare. We must interrogate the script being written for us.


1. Who Benefits? Reframing the Question of Perpetration

We are told, almost instantly, that the trails lead to Tehran or the Southern Suburbs of Beirut. But before we consume this pre-packaged conclusion, we must apply the foundational question of forensic politics:

Who benefits?

* The Evidence Void:

At this stage, concrete evidence linking the shooters to state-level command structures in Iran or Hezbollah is non-existent. The attribution relies on "intelligence assessments" and "probing links"—phrases that historically serve as placeholders for political intent rather than factual certainty.

* The Strategic Gain:

The Resistance Axis gains nothing from indiscriminately targeting civilians in Australia. Such an act alienates the Global South and invites crushing sanctions. Conversely, the Zionist entity and its Western backers gain everything. The attack provides the perfect distraction from their failures in the Levant and a fresh pretext to demand global coalitions against the "Iranian threat."


False-Flag Theory Application:

In political sociology, a "false flag" does not always mean a staged event with actors; it often refers to the exploitation of ambiguity. By rushing to blame external enemies before the smoke clears, Western intelligence agencies practice "strategic attribution." The ambiguity of the perpetrators is not a bug; it is a feature. It allows the state to project its preferred enemy onto the blank face of the attacker.

2. Timing as Strategy, Not Coincidence

We must refuse to view events in a vacuum. This attack occurred barely 24 hours after the significant strike on American and Israeli assets in Palmyra (Tadmur), Syria.

* The Palmyra Context:

On December 13, US occupation forces and their proxies suffered a humiliating blow in central Syria. The narrative was shifting toward the vulnerability of US forces and the resilience of the Syrian state.

* The Sydney Pivot:

The Sydney attack violently wrenches the global news cycle away from Western military failure to Western victimhood.
This temporal proximity is not accidental; it is functional. In the doctrine of narrative warfare, "victimhood" is a strategic resource.

The Sydney attack effectively erases the Palmyra defeat from the headlines, replacing the image of a defeated occupier with that of a grieving victim, thereby re-legitimizing aggressive military posturing.

3. Netanyahu’s Accusation: Securitization in Real Time

Prime Minister Netanyahu’s immediate finger-pointing at Iran and Hezbollah is a textbook example of securitization theory in action.

* The Speech Act:

By declaring this a "Hezbollah-linked" attack, Netanyahu performs a "speech act." He moves the issue out of the realm of criminal justice (police, courts, trials) and into the realm of national security (war, airstrikes, emergency powers).

* Manufacturing Consent:

This accusation is not about justice for Sydney; it is about permission to attack Lebanon. It constructs a narrative where bombing Beirut is framed as "defense" of Australian streets.

It is a cynical attempt to globalize his war, forcing nations like Australia to treat the Resistance not as a distant political movement, but as a domestic terror threat.
Securitization transforms fear into consent. It tricks the Australian public into accepting surveillance and foreign wars under the guise of local safety.


4. False-Flag Logic vs. Evidentiary Logic

Why is "false flag" considered a conspiracy theory when directed at Western states, yet treated as "intelligence analysis" when directed at the Resistance?

* The Double Standard:

When the US claims a "lone wolf" attack was actually directed by ISIS or Iran, it is called "connecting the dots." When analysts suggest that Western intelligence might facilitate or exploit violence to justify policy, it is dismissed as paranoia.


* Critical Framework:

False-flag analysis is a legitimate tool of security discourse. It asks us to look at the capabilities and intent. The Zionist regime has a documented history (e.g., the Lavon Affair) of using violence to manipulate Western opinion. To ignore this historical precedent in favor of blind trust in Western intelligence is intellectual negligence.


5. The Human Cost of Narrative Warfare


The immediate victims are the dead and wounded in Sydney. But the secondary victims are already being lined up.

* Normalization of Collective Punishment:

By linking a local crime to a foreign state without evidence, the media normalizes the collective punishment of Lebanese and Iranian civilians. If Sydney is "Iran's fault," then bombing Tehran becomes "justice."


* Domestic Fallout:

This narrative weaponization deliberately inflames Islamophobia and anti-Arab sentiment. It turns every diaspora community into a "suspect population," justifying draconian policing and the erosion of civil liberties.

Conclusion


The Sydney attack is a tragedy, but the use of the attack is a strategy. We are watching fear being nationalized, internationalized, and militarized in real-time.
The danger is not just the violence on the streets of Bondi; it is the speed with which that violence is folded into a pre-existing war narrative. The script demands new enemies, new sanctions, and new wars.

We must have the courage to ask: are we mourning the victims, or are we being conscripted into the next phase of a global conflict?


🔵Link to the article in Arabic

🖋@observer_5

In the Bondi incident, information was leaked early, and only one narrative was presented:
The attacker was anti-Semitic.
The attacker was Pakistani and Muslim.
Before the investigation was even finished, and before any other explanations were considered.

This does not mean that anti-Semitism doesn’t exist,
but it means that choosing this particular explanation was a political-media decision.

5.2 The Political Context
Before the incident, Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu issued threats to countries, including Australia, for their stance on recognizing the Palestinian state.

This context makes any political criticism immediately labeled as religious hatred.



6. What About Israeli Intelligence?

There is no conclusive evidence of direct involvement.

But what is clear is:
• The swift use of rhetoric about “Iran” and “Hezbollah”,
• Shifting the blame abroad,
• Exonerating the regimes that created these militarized subjects from accountability.

The real question is not:
Did intelligence agencies get involved?

But:
How are these narratives used to keep the world in a constant state of emergency?



7. A Simplified Conclusion

What these cases reveal is:
• People shaped by violent systems who were then abandoned,
• Victims whose level of visibility is selected,
• Narratives imposed faster than the truth.

One final noteworthy piece of information:
• Naveed’s mother is Italian, and his father is Indian,
• He was known to be a very kind person,
• Similarly, Benjamin Erickson was described as polite.

This doesn’t absolve them,
but it reminds us that evil doesn’t emerge suddenly; it is gradually made.

In a time of perpetual emergency,
the most responsible position is to resist quick judgments and hold on to the question.



8. Ahmad al-Ahmad: The Overlooked Truth

One of the facts that wasn’t highlighted in the media:

Ahmad al-Ahmad, a Muslim man, intervened and confronted one of the attackers, preventing further casualties.

This detail is very important because:
• It dismantles the idea of a “Muslim attacker versus a Jewish victim,”
• It proves that religious identity doesn’t explain violence,
• It challenges the simplistic narrative, which is why it was marginalized.



9. Was the Attack an Act of Religious Hatred?

The official narrative says yes.
But the facts suggest legitimate questions:
• The attack wasn’t random,
• It didn’t target Australian bystanders,
• It seemed to be linked to political symbolism rather than general religious hatred.

This does not justify violence,
but it means that automatically labeling it as “anti-Semitic” is a political reduction.

The bigger problem here is the confusion between Judaism, Zionism, and the policies of the Israeli state.

🔵Link to the article in Arabic

🖋@observer_5

On my mind

✍ Asaad Abu Khalil

Tucker Carlson may currently be Israel’s biggest nightmare in all of America. I remember this man as an extreme Zionist in the 1990s, and as an enemy of the Palestinian cause. He is a talented and energetic writer who rose to prominence at a time when print journalism was becoming scarce. Yet he is among the few who transitioned smoothly from print to visual media.

He achieved great success and now has millions of viewers online. In fact, Carlson’s audience is larger than the combined viewership of all the news programs on CNN, which will soon come under the ownership of the hardline Zionist Ellison family. The podcast phenomenon on YouTube now rivals all the so-called “legacy” media (that is, traditional media) here.

Carlson’s rise is due to the fact that he was one of the theorists behind the “America First” and “Make America Great Again” movements, which were embodied by Trump’s election campaign and later his administration.

He is a polished, eloquent, and well-informed speaker who prepares extensively for his interviews (like Ahmad Mansour on Al Jazeera, and unlike Taher Barakeh on Al Arabiya). The interview he conducted recently with Senator Ted Cruz (one of the heroes of the Cedar Revolution and a pillar of the current political order because of his deep attachment to Israeli interests) contributed to undermining Cruz’s standing even within his own party.

Carlson questioned him repeatedly about Iran, exposing his ignorance of its affairs (despite Cruz calling almost daily for war against it), and also embarrassed him over his loyalty to the state of Israel. Cruz continues to criticize Carlson on a daily basis.

Carlson and Candace Owens are the two greatest enemies of Israel in America today because of their effectiveness and because they do not belong to the left or to liberalism, but rather to the new right. Owens often goes too far in her rhetoric, and there are indications of emerging signs of hostility toward Jews in her discourse, but Carlson is careful in his speech to make distinctions.

He has admitted that, because of the genocide, he educated himself on the Palestinian cause and its history and has begun to argue in its defense. Israel accused him of being an agent of Qatar without any evidence. He is not weak when confronted with criticism or attacks by the Israeli lobby (unlike Jeremy Corbyn and Bernie Sanders).

This new trend within the American right (which is expanding among young Republicans and conservatives) constitutes the greatest threat to American policy aligned with Israel — even if only in the long run.

🔵Link to the article in Arabic

🖋@observer_5

🔴DP World: A Front for the Expansion of Israeli Geopolitical Influence?

By Dr. Jamal Wakim — December 16, 2025



Following normalization, DP World has been transformed into a regional–international platform for indirect Israeli influence over ports with high geopolitical sensitivity.

The growing role of DP World, owned by the emirates of Dubai and Abu Dhabi, has increasingly come to the fore. The company has become one of the world’s largest port operators, currently managing around 80 ports and terminals across more than forty countries. This expansion has coincided with a shift in the geopolitical role of the United Arab Emirates—from a state operating under Saudi tutelage to a player seeking a distinct regional role, particularly in the western basin of the Indian Ocean and the Red Sea.

Emirati–Israeli Cooperation After 2020

The significance of this role increased markedly after the normalization agreements with “Israel” in 2020. These agreements prompted observers to question DP World’s indirect role in enabling “Israel” to penetrate economically and security-wise into countries where DP World operates ports and facilities. This is especially the case given that normalization coincided with an expansion of logistical and security partnerships between the UAE and “Israel,” particularly in port management, maritime shipping security, surveillance technologies, and logistical data analysis.

After 2020, Israeli companies operating in maritime shipping—such as Dover Tower, ShipIn, and ZIM—signed agreements with Emirati companies affiliated with DP World that operate in shipping and maritime transport. These agreements included the operation of joint Emirati–Israeli shipping lines, the development of AI-based port monitoring technologies, the exchange of data on vessel and cargo movements, and undeclared cooperation in maritime security.

Western research centers such as RAND and INSS argue that the UAE has come to serve as a façade used by “Israel” as a secure transit point to expand its influence in sensitive ports in the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea, such as the ports of Djibouti, Eritrea, and Somalia, in addition to ports near the Bab al-Mandab Strait and others in the Eastern Mediterranean.

Access to Indian, Red Sea, and Yemeni Ports

In this context, “Israel” has come to use the UAE to access ports it cannot reach directly for several reasons, including the absence of political sensitivity among African and Arab states toward the UAE comparable to that toward “Israel,” as well as the UAE’s vast financial capabilities—capabilities that “Israel” lacks. This is in addition to the appealing slogans promoted by DP World, such as development and investment, alongside the absence of a declared Emirati political project, unlike the openly stated domination strategy pursued by “Israel.”

DP World has thus become a gateway for Israeli companies to access a large number of Indian ports managed by DP World, such as the Jawaharlal Nehru Port (Nhava Sheva), India’s largest port, and Mundra Port. It is worth noting that India’s Adani Group maintains strategic partnerships with “Israel” and operates the Port of Haifa following its privatization.

Accordingly, a trilateral partnership among “Israel,” the UAE, and India has emerged, consolidating an integrated relationship: the UAE provides capital and port networks; “Israel” provides technology and port security; and India provides a dominant geopolitical location deep within the Indian Ocean, one of the most important axes of global maritime transport. Consequently, Emirati expansion in Indian ports has become a bridge for expanding Israeli maritime influence in the Indian Ocean.

For a long time, “Israel” has set its sights on controlling Bab al-Mandab. Since 2015, the UAE has become the most influential actor in Yemeni ports, particularly Mukalla, Mocha, Balhaf, Socotra, Mayun, and even Aden before being forced out.

A Front for “Israel”?

DP World constitutes an ideal front for “Israel” because it possesses a global network of relationships that “Israel” itself cannot easily acquire due to many states’ diplomatic sensitivity toward the entity.

Moreover, the UAE’s position as a neutral financial–logistical hub facilitates the penetration of Israeli influence without raising suspicion in the states targeted by Tel Aviv for intelligence expansion. In addition, cooperation between “Israel” and DP World facilitates Israeli intelligence activities through artificial intelligence across a large number of states, while also benefiting from the UAE’s involvement in regional conflicts such as Yemen and the Horn of Africa in ways that serve Israeli strategic interests.

It is also noteworthy that there is strategic alignment between the objectives of “Israel” and those of the UAE. Abu Dhabi seeks to establish a ports empire, particularly in the western basin of the Indian Ocean, while “Israel” aims to control supply chains from Asia to the Mediterranean.

It can therefore be said that, following normalization, DP World has become a regional–international platform for indirect Israeli influence over ports of high geopolitical sensitivity.

This influence is not exercised through the raising of the “Israeli” flag or the direct presence of Israeli companies, but through port acquisitions, supply-chain management, the deployment of Israeli security technologies, and the exchange of maritime data. Taken together, these elements have granted “Israel,” for the first time in its history, a maritime geopolitical expansion stretching from the Strait of Hormuz in the east to East Africa and the Eastern Mediterranean in the west.


➡️Source (click here)


🔵Link to the article in Arabic

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