🔴 Entered by mistake

✍ Hassan Al-Nahwi

After the release of the new issue of the Iraqi Gazette, which included a disavowal of honorable figures, a timid new statement appeared claiming that what was published had (entered by mistake)!

For those unfamiliar with the Iraqi Gazette: it is the official newspaper that publishes laws only after they have been ratified by all authorities—executive, legislative, presidential, and judicial—passing through many layers of scrutiny. That is why some laws approved by parliament are delayed in implementation, awaiting their publication in this respected Gazette that does not accept “mistakes”!
What kind of mistake?
This is a law that may involve blood, money, or any other right.

Entered by mistake

Your excuse is uglier than your sin.

You wished it would pass quietly amid the distraction over who will take office after the elections, but God exposed you—the One to whom the party and its supporters belong with honor. They are His party and His supporters, and He will not abandon them.
“If you support God, He will support you” (Muhammad, verse 7).

Truly, as was said: Leadership is the proving ground of men.
And it has shown us that in your dictionary, it is honor itself that “entered by mistake.”

🔵Link to the article in Arabic

🖋@observer_5

🚨 Breaking – Traitor Yasser Abu Shabab Eliminated

🔴Multiple Hebrew sources confirm: The militia leader in Gaza’s eastern Rafah, Yasser Abu Shabab, who collaborated with the occupation in recent months and led a group calling itself the “Popular Forces,” fell into a well‑planned ambush and was executed by gunmen.

📡 Channel 12 (Hebrew): Authorities are investigating whether Hamas fighters infiltrated his area of control and carried out the assassination.
📡 Israeli Army Radio correspondent: Abu Shabab was shot dead, details under review.
📡 Channel 14 (Hebrew): His killing proves the occupation cannot rely on mercenaries.
📡 Israeli Army Radio: After his death, senior security officials opposed the idea of forming militias cooperating with Israel in Gaza, stressing their fate is inevitable—death—just as the failed South Lebanon experiment remains a clear reminder.

🔥 The natural end for every traitor… Abu Shabab consigned to the trash heap of history.

#WarMedia
#EnemyMedia


🔵Link to the article in Arabic

🖋@observer_5

If Lebanon is paralyzed, Israel must be paralyzed—this is the only form of deterrence the occupation understands.

Zionism seeks a South without its people and a people without their weapons. Yet history teaches a single lesson: peoples who resist—whether in Vietnam or Gaza—break every project, no matter how powerful.

🔵Link to the article in Arabic

🖋@observer_5

🔴An American Visit Amid Escalation: Washington Directly Intervenes in Iraqi Politics and Imposes Its Threats

On December 1, 2025, U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Michael Rigas arrived in Baghdad as part of a regional tour that included Turkey, Iraq, and Israel. A swift visit, but one loaded with clear messages:

Washington wants to seize control of the political game in Iraq and reset the balance of influence ahead of the 2025 Iraqi elections—even through direct pressure and open threats.

Iraq: The Primary Target of the Tour

From the moment Rigas landed in Baghdad, it was clear the visit was not merely ceremonial.
Leaks from Iraqi decision-making circles spoke of direct American warnings to political forces, especially resistance factions, echoing the threatening tone used by U.S. Ambassador Mark Savana just days earlier.

Washington’s goals:

• Influence the shape of the next government,
• Restrict the factions’ influence,
• Ensure the balances established since 2003 remain unchanged.


Notably, the tour came after a series of security incidents in Iraq and Kurdistan:
A rocket strike on the Kormor gas field halted production and sparked a fire, alongside rising tensions on the Iraq–Iran border.
All this gave Washington further justification to claim it is “closely monitoring the situation” and considers Iraq a regional arena that cannot be left outside its control.

What Did Rigas Want from Turkey?

Turkish diplomatic sources leaked information suggesting Washington was worried about:

• Increased Turkish–Iranian security coordination in northern Iraq,
• Resistance faction movements around Halabja and Kirkuk,
• Progress in economic negotiations between Baghdad and Ankara beyond U.S. influence.


Thus, Rigas focused in Ankara on:

1. Preventing Turkey from opening broader lines of cooperation with Iran inside Iraq.
2. Pressuring to tie energy projects and trade corridors to U.S. oversight.
3. Securing Turkish support to block “uncomfortable political shifts” in Baghdad.


In short: Washington does not want Ankara playing an independent game in Iraq.

His Visit to Israel… The Most Critical Episode

From Israel, the American escalation phase truly began.
According to Israeli media, Rigas’s agenda centered on two files:

• Supporting Israeli operations in Gaza and southern Lebanon,
• Controlling the “Iraq front” so it does not become an additional source of pressure on Tel Aviv.


Sources in Tel Aviv said Washington wants Israel to:

• Expand intelligence-sharing on Iraqi resistance factions,
• Coordinate positions to “prevent Iraq from becoming a direct support base for Hamas and Hezbollah.”


This explains why certain incidents inside Iraq escalated in parallel with Rigas’s tour.

Where Is Michael Rigas Now? Has He Really Returned to Washington?

At the time of writing, U.S. State Department sources confirmed Rigas had completed his tour and returned to Washington. But what followed the visit is more important than the visit itself.

All developments after his departure from Baghdad suggest the trip was part of a comprehensive pressure plan now being implemented on the ground.

Did His Visit Bring Real Changes Inside Iraq?

Yes, albeit unofficially. Immediately after the visit:

• U.S. rhetoric against the factions intensified,
• Suspicious security movements appeared in some provinces,
• Washington began exerting pressure through banking and financial channels,
• Signs of direct intervention in government formation talks emerged.


The message was clear:
“We are here… and we will not allow the rules of the game to change.”

The Central Bank’s “Unintentional Error”… Coincidence or Test?

Listing “Ansar Allah” and “Hezbollah” as terrorist entities by Iraq’s central bank—then retracting it—was not merely an administrative mistake.
Indicators point to two possibilities:

1. Direct U.S. pressure pushing Baghdad to adopt financial restrictions against the resistance axis.
2. A test of Iraqi public opinion: How would people react? With anger? Silence? What will the mood be after the elections?

The angry reactions forced the government to withdraw the decision, exposing the fragility of the balance Washington is trying to impose.

Where Did Mark Savana Disappear Amid This Scene?

Ambassador Mark Savana did not vanish.
On the contrary, Iraqi media reports indicate he:

• Manages intensive communication channels with multiple political parties,
• Monitors the government formation file hour by hour,
• Plays the role of “pressure coordinator” between Baghdad and Washington during and after Rigas’s visit.


In other words:
Savana is the executive hand inside Iraq, while Rigas was the public political cover.

Conclusion

Rigas’s visit was not a passing tour. It was a step within an American project to redraw Iraqi politics and prevent the resistance axis from strengthening its influence.
Turkey and Israel were part of the picture, but Iraq was the main testing ground.
What unfolded after the visit confirms Iraq is no longer a passive arena… and that every American move will be met with resistance—both popular and political.

🔵Link to the article in Arabic

🖋@observer_5

Review :



Grand Delusion : The Rise and Fall of the American Ambition in the Middle East

By : Steven Simon

The culmination of almost forty years at the highest levels of policymaking and scholarship, Grand Delusion is Steven Simon’s tour de force, offering a comprehensive and deeply informed account of U.S. engagement in the Middle East. Simon begins with the Reagan administration, when American perception of the region shifted from a cluster of faraway and frequently skirmishing nations to a shining, urgent opportunity for America to (in Reagan’s words) “serve the cause of world peace and the future of mankind.”

Reagan fired the starting gun on decades of deepening American involvement, but as the global economy grew, bringing an increasing reliance on oil, U.S. diplomatic and military energies were ever more fatefully absorbed by the Middle East. Grand Delusion explores the motivations, strategies, and shortcomings of each presidential administration from Reagan to today, exposing a web of intertwined events—from the history of the Israel-Palestine conflict amid Israeli domestic politics, Cold War rivalries, and Saudi Arabia’s quest for security, to 9/11 and the war on terror—managed by a Washington policy process frequently ruled by wishful thinking and partisan politics.

Simon’s sharp sense of irony and incisive writing brings complex history to life. He illuminates the motives behind America's commitment to Israel; explodes the popular narrative of Desert Storm as a “good war”; and calls out the devastating consequences of our mistakes, particularly for people of the region trapped by the onslaught of American military action and pitiless economic sanctions.

Grand Delusion reveals that this story, while episodically impressive, has too often been tragic and at times dishonorable. As we enter a new era in foreign policy, this is an essential book, a cautionary history that illuminates American's propensity for self-deception and misadventure at a moment when the nation is redefining its engagement with a world in crisis.

🔵Link to the article in Arabic

🖋@observer_5

Merz’s visit reinforces that both the ruling coalition and the opposition share an almost identical stance: unwavering support for Israel, limited criticism, and an unwillingness to acknowledge Palestinian rights in meaningful policy terms.



4. Points of Disagreement: The Palestinian Issue and the Two-State Illusion

a. Differences on the Palestinian Question

Germany and Israel diverge rhetorically on the long-term political solution:
• Germany still publicly supports a “revived peace process” and some form of Palestinian self-governance.
• Israel under Netanyahu rejects any discussion of sovereignty for Palestinians.

Yet these “differences” are mostly cosmetic. Germany does not impose pressure, conditions, or consequences.

b. The Two-State Solution Gap

Germany’s political class continues to repeat its official line in support of a two-state solution, even though Israeli leaders openly and repeatedly reject it.

This has turned Berlin’s position into diplomatic theater: a slogan repeated for the sake of appearances, without policy to back it.



5. The So-Called Arms-Export Pause: A Symbolic, One-Time Gesture

Germany briefly paused some arms export approvals in late 2023—but the pause:
• Did not affect ongoing contracts
• Did not include major weapons systems
• Was quietly reversed in early 2024

The measure was purely symbolic, meant to soften domestic criticism without changing Germany’s military support for Israel.



6. Why Germany Has So Little Influence Over Israel

Despite its massive economic and military contributions, Germany has almost no real leverage over Israeli policy. Several factors explain this:

a. Historical Guilt

Germany’s political elite remains deeply shaped by post-Holocaust moral responsibility. This often translates into unconditional support for Israel, regardless of circumstance.

The result:
Germany treats moral debt as a permanent foreign-policy doctrine rather than a historical lesson balanced with contemporary ethics.

b. Strategic Dependence

Germany values:
• Israeli intelligence
• Israeli military technology
• Israel’s role as a Western outpost in the Middle East

These interests limit Berlin’s willingness to confront Israeli actions.

c. Domestic Political Consensus

German mainstream parties all support Israel; any criticism is marginalized as politically dangerous.

Thus, even when Germany privately disagrees with Israeli decisions, it rarely dares to challenge them publicly.



7. Ethical Contradictions: Germany’s Weapons and Gaza’s Reality

Germany asserts that it upholds “humanitarian principles.” Yet it continues to supply weapons knowingly used in a war causing immense civilian suffering.

The ethical contradictions are stark:
• How can Germany claim moral responsibility for its past while enabling modern-day civilian harm?
• How can Berlin lecture world democracies on human rights while refusing accountability for weapons exported to an active conflict zone?
• How can Germany insist on “international law” while ignoring the legal concerns raised by humanitarian organizations regarding Israel’s conduct?

This gap between moral rhetoric and real-world actions is the core of Germany’s credibility crisis in the Middle East.



Conclusion

Merz’s visit is not an isolated event—it is part of a long-term pattern. Germany continues to support Israel politically, militarily, and financially, even as global opinion shifts and the humanitarian catastrophe in Gaza deepens. While Berlin speaks of peace and human rights, its policies empower a government that rejects both.

Germany’s inability—or unwillingness—to influence Israeli strategy exposes the limits of its foreign policy and the contradictions at the heart of its alliance with Israel. As the Middle East changes, Berlin risks finding itself on the wrong side of history once again.

🔵Link to the article in Arabic

🖋@observer_5

🔴Hebrew report sparks controversy over the incoming Mossad chief

🤔Channel 13 (Hebrew) aired a video report about Roman Gofman, chosen by Benjamin Netanyahu on December 4, 2025, to head the Mossad. The footage, dated October 7, shows him near the Sha’ar HaNegev area carrying his weapon.
According to the report, he engaged in clashes with armed men and was injured while withdrawing from the site.

This appointment has triggered a wave of criticism within Israeli security circles, since Gofman is a military figure from outside the Mossad and closely tied to Netanyahu — raising concerns about politicization of the agency, especially given the current sensitive security situation.

Meanwhile, official bodies have not issued detailed confirmations regarding the circumstances shown in the video.


🔵Link to the article in Arabic

🖋@observer_5

🔴We have worked and continue to work to strengthen cohesion between the PMF and the rest of the armed forces and security services, for this is the secret of victory. The coming days will witness important steps in this direction, including the payment of fighters’ salaries through electronic bank cards.


🔵Link to the article in Arabic

🖋@observer_5

🔴Remembering Victory: Iraq’s Defeat of Daesh and its Lasting Consequences

On December 9, 2017, Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi declared that Iraq had achieved final victory over the Islamic State (Daesh), after a brutal three-year campaign that saw the extremist group seize and then lose vast swathes of Iraqi territory. That declaration marked the end of Daesh’s claim to govern a large territorial “caliphate” inside Iraq, but it also closed a dramatic chapter that reshaped Iraqi politics, security, society, and regional alignments.

1. Timeline: rise, expansion, and defeat

Daesh’s rapid rise in Iraq began in earnest in 2014. The group captured Mosul — Iraq’s second largest city — in a swift offensive that culminated on June 10, 2014, exposing the collapse of Iraqi defenses in several provinces and providing Daesh a strategic base for further expansion across Nineveh, Salah al-Din, and Anbar. The fall of Mosul had immediate symbolic and practical consequences: it freed fighters, captured weapons, and prompted mass civilian flight from the city.

A decisive turning point came three days later, when Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani issued a religious call on June 13, 2014 for a defensive (kifāʾī) jihad to repel the extremists — a mobilizing order that prompted tens of thousands of volunteers and paved the way for the institutionalization of volunteer militias under state supervision. That religious legitimation helped convert grassroots energy into coordinated paramilitary structures.

From 2014 through 2017 the fight unfolded in waves: the recapture of Tikrit (2015), the bitter campaigns in Ramadi (2015) and Fallujah (2016), and the grinding, urban battle for Mosul (2016–2017). By 2017 operations extended to Tal Afar, Al-Qaim and Rawa; by December of that year Iraqi forces announced that Daesh had been driven from its last major footholds.

2. The actors: Iraqi state forces and the Axis of Resistance

Iraq’s formal military institutions — the Iraqi Army, the Counter-Terrorism Service (CTS), and Federal Police — bore the central responsibility for retaking urban centers and conducting clearance operations. Parallel to them, however, the Popular Mobilization Forces (al-Hashd al-Shaʿbi, PMF) emerged from volunteers and local militias into a decisive force on the ground. PMF formations, many organized around preexisting groups, played leading roles in operations across central and northern Iraq.

A crucial leadership figure within the PMF was Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, who served as a senior PMF commander and helped coordinate militia efforts during the anti-Daesh campaigns. His role exemplified how veteran militia leaders shaped battlefield tactics, logistics, and local governance in liberated areas. The PMF’s cooperation with Iran’s IRGC advisors and with allied groups — including operational coordination informed by figures such as Qassem Soleimani — enhanced capabilities in intelligence, planning, and close-quarters operations.

3. The human and material cost

The fight against Daesh exacted a heavy toll. Millions of Iraqis were displaced at different periods of the conflict; humanitarian planning documents estimated that by 2017 up to 4.2 million internally displaced people might require assistance as military operations, sieges, and sectarian cleavages produced mass movement. Entire neighborhoods in Mosul, Ramadi and Fallujah were left in ruins, producing long-term reconstruction needs.

Civilian casualty figures remain contested and politically fraught, but independent monitoring and rights groups documented significant civilian deaths during coalition air campaigns and intense urban fighting; these losses deepened social trauma and complicated reconciliation and return efforts. (Different tallies exist; the scale of destruction and civilian suffering is undisputed.)

4. Regional and international context

The anti-Daesh campaign unfolded within a complex international environment. The U.S.

-led coalition provided airpower, training and support to Iraqi government forces and Kurdish units, yet the coalition’s operations were criticized for civilian harm and for at times failing to coordinate effectively with local ground actors. Meanwhile, actors associated with the Axis of Resistance — notably Iran and allied militias — framed the fight as part of a broader confrontation with U.S. and Israeli influence in the region, and they leveraged their battlefield presence to deepen ties with Baghdad.

Daesh’s defeat had the political effect of pushing Baghdad and Tehran into closer security cooperation. Iran’s advisory and material support, and the battlefield prominence of Iran-aligned militias, gave Tehran enhanced leverage in Iraqi affairs and altered the post-2017 balance of regional influence.

5. Post-victory challenges

Military victory did not mean the end of insecurity. Daesh transformed from a proto-state into an underground insurgency: sleeper cells and small-unit attacks persisted in Diyala, Kirkuk and desert border regions. Reconstruction proved daunting: housing, utilities, heritage sites, and entire urban infrastructures required massive investment. Political tensions also mounted over the PMF’s legal status, integration into the state, and accountability for abuses — issues that remain central to Iraq’s domestic politics. Lastly, the continued presence of U.S. troops and negotiations over force posture kept Iraq at the intersection of competing foreign agendas.

6. How Iraq commemorates the victory

Anniversaries of the 2017 declaration are marked by official ceremonies, tributes to martyrs, and public remembrance of those who fought and died. The PMF and its constituent formations are publicly commemorated in many parts of the country, and narratives about resistance and liberation shape local memory. At the same time, competing media frames — Western, Gulf, and regional — debate the PMF’s role, with some outlets downplaying militia contributions and others emphasizing their centrality; these contestations echo larger arguments over sovereignty, justice, and Iraq’s political future.

7. Reflection: sovereignty, alignment, and the balance of power

The victory over Daesh reshaped Iraq in three connected ways. First, it restored Iraq’s territorial integrity in practical terms — it removed the immediate territorial threat posed by Daesh — yet it left open questions about the monopoly of force and the relationship between state institutions and armed non-state actors. Second, the war accelerated Baghdad’s alignment with Tehran in security and political spheres, producing new dependencies and domestic tensions over foreign influence. Third, the struggle against Daesh transformed the regional balance by demonstrating that state and non-state actors operating in tandem could expel a major extremist threat — but also that doing so can complicate postwar governance, accountability, and reconstruction.

The anniversary of the victory should therefore be a moment for sober remembrance: to honor the sacrifices made, to measure the unresolved costs, and to press for policies that convert military success into durable security, inclusive governance, and genuine reconstruction — lest the conditions that gave rise to Daesh return in another guise.

🔵Link to the article in Arabic

🖋@observer_5

🔴UAE-backed forces seize South Yemen, raising possibility of independence

The Southern Transitional Council (STC), backed by the United Arab Emirates, has now taken control of all eight southern provinces — a major setback for the UAE’s regional rival, Saudi Arabia.

The UAE-backed military leadership in South Yemen announced that it had seized the entire south — a shift that opens the possibility of declaring independence, potentially restoring Yemen to two states for the first time since 1990.

According to the report, around 10,000 STC fighters entered the oil-rich Hadramawt province last week, followed by Al-Mahra — the sparsely populated province on the border with Oman that had not previously been under STC control.

These victories mark the first time the STC has achieved full control over all provinces that historically constituted “South Yemen.”

In response, the Riyadh-led coalition — previously the most prominent external actor in Yemen — withdrew its forces from the presidential palace in the southern capital Aden, as well as from the airport. This shift indicates that the forces supporting the internationally recognized government have been defeated, at least temporarily.

However, an immediate declaration of statehood by the STC would be a risky step, given the experiences of other regions that pursued secession but later struggled with diplomatic recognition, such as Western Sahara.

It is therefore more likely that the STC will, in the medium term, seek a referendum on separation from the north rather than an immediate declaration of independence. The future of this path depends heavily on the decision of its patron — the UAE.

Since the Houthis seized the capital Sana’a in 2015, the south has been governed by a fragile political alliance that included the Saudi-backed Islah Party (led by President Rashad al-Alimi) and the UAE-backed STC (led by STC chief Aidarous al-Zubaidi).

Despite their partnership under the “Presidential Leadership Council,” the STC maintained stronger military forces. After the Saudi withdrawal to Riyadh, President al-Alimi met with diplomats from France, Britain, and the United States, urging the STC to return to barracks. Yet the STC appears to have subsequently taken control of Yemen’s largest oil company, PetroMasila — a move that strengthens its position in determining the country’s future.

Western diplomats and the United Nations have long opposed dividing Yemen into two states, instead advocating a federal solution that would include both the Houthis and southern forces.

There are indications that the STC may offer two provinces outside traditional South Yemen — Taiz and Marib — a “protected” status to ensure they do not fall into Houthi hands, should they not explicitly join the “southern state.”

A researcher at the Sana’a Center for Strategic Studies said: “This may be the most important turning point in Yemen’s history since Sana’a fell to the Houthis in 2015. It has the potential to reshape local and regional alliances, and could even draw the UAE into conflict with Saudi Arabia.” She added that the STC would be in a strong position to demand southern autonomy if negotiations begin, while Saudi Arabia would face serious concerns over its border security, especially given past Houthi attacks on its territory.

Finally, the report notes that some observers suspect the STC is acting on a “signal” from the UAE — possibly in response to Riyadh’s move to ask the former U.S. president to intervene in the war in Sudan, which angered the UAE and prompted it to reshuffle its cards in Yemen.

A Saudi delegation remains in Hadramawt, attempting to contain the fallout, amid intense pressure from Riyadh to halt what it has described as chaos.

➡️Link to the article (click here)


🔵Link to the article in Arabic

🖋@observer_5

🔴Palmyra, Syria

An unidentified gunman opened fire on a patrol involving U.S. forces and local security personnel near the central Syrian city of Palmyra on Tuesday, wounding several members of the patrol, according to sources familiar with the incident.

The patrol was conducting a field mission when it came under fire, triggering a security alert in the area. The attacker’s identity and motive remain unclear, and no group has claimed responsibility for the incident.

Further details were not immediately available.

🔵Link to the article in Arabic

🖋@observer_5

🔴Tom Barrack’s statements at the Doha Forum:

“Look, everything is in process, and let’s begin from America’s point of view. America fought in one of the fiercest battles in history, called the Civil War. Now, all of us in the Western world don’t like to talk about minorities, but the Civil War was a majority in the Union against a minority of Confederates. And we spent a hundred years trying to define what the Union is. Is it a federal union? Is it a republic? Is it a union? How do you integrate communities that have different cultural aspects, different desires, different religions, different educational systems, and hundreds of years of their own history?

In a country like America that started anew, how do you do that in a civilization with thousands of years of history, where survival depended first on the tribe, then the family, then evolved into community, from community to religion, from religion to sectors, and finally we invented nation-states. There was no such thing until the beginning of the 20th century.

So, in integrating these very difficult issues, America took the view of untangling problems that lead to solutions. And we are trying to do the same with Lebanon. We have wonderful new leadership everywhere. Wonderful new leadership in Syria. Wonderful new leadership with the new Prime Minister and President Aoun in Lebanon. Wonderful new leadership here, and thank you for hosting us. I think what we all feel is that this is one of the most important forums where we can have these discussions in Qatar with Sheikh Tamim, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE. We have a new set of opportunities.

The first thing that must happen is to allow Syria to define itself without Western expectations saying ‘we want democracy within 12 months.’ We have never seen democracy here before, and I see that Israel can claim it is a democracy, but in this region, what has really worked—whether you like it or not—is benevolent monarchy. That is the style that has succeeded.

So we are inventing something different. And every time the West intervenes and says ‘well, this is the kind of parliamentary dialogue we want,’ every time we intervene—whether in Libya or Iraq or anywhere we tried to impose a colonial mandate—it has not been successful. We end up in paralysis. So our view is: provide guidance. We all need to contribute, not criticize, not say we need more foreign fighters released faster, not say we need to find more missing people faster, not say communities are being punished unfairly until they take their small steps to get there. They have just taken over leadership and control. They first need stability. We must give them the chance to integrate all viewpoints. But ultimately, all viewpoints do not create a state. They must define what creates a state. Is it centralization? Is it federalism? Is it a mixed system? What will it be?

From America’s point of view, what we have learned is that we are not good at imposing those expectations, especially in the Middle East, on others. Israel is a confusing case. What I think this President, Jared Kushner, and Steve Wit did together with Qatar—and by the way, I am here to tell you as a soldier on the ground—none of this would have happened without Qatar’s intervention. Whatever our view of what happened in Israel, the greatest thing that happened is that we got a ceasefire and hostages returned, and it simply would not have happened without Qatar’s intervention. One of the most frustrating things—and I heard it was a great discussion between Tucker Carlson and Sheikh Mohammed—I tell you, as someone at the heart of it, Sheikh Mohammed under the Emir’s supervision was the most important person to maintain dialogue with Hamas. Whatever the West’s view, they were wrong. If we did not have that, and if Turkey had not intervened alongside him—Turkey was also criticized for holding dialogue with Hamas—we would not be where we are today.

So we must look at that as we look at Syria and Israel. These are small steps, it is a process, not a single event.