This media is not supported in your browser
VIEW IN TELEGRAM
๐จ๐บ๐ธ๐ฎ๐ท PENTAGON IN PANIC: BUNKER BUSTER BOMBS SHORTAGES DOOM STRIKES ON IRANโS UNDERGROUND MISSILE BASES
Americaโs "elite" GBU-57 bunker-busters are running on fumes, exposing how Washingtonโs โshock and aweโ ops to destroy Tehran's ballistic arsenal are facing insurmountable obstacles in the face of a network of underground fortresses.
๐ธ ONLY 6-15 GBU-57s remain after the US burned through 14 during June 2025's Operation Midnight Hammer targeting Fordow and Natanz nuclear sites.
๐ธ Each bomb costs over $370 million and is specifically designed for the small 19-plane B-2 stealth fleet, where Boeing's intellectual property monopoly enforces a "vendor lock" on the critical tail kit guidance systems.
๐ธ North Korean-assisted deep underground mountain storage facilities, often buried under mountains, render attacks by cruise missiles and most air-launched weapons utterly ineffective at serious threats.
๐ธSolid-fuel mobile transporter-erector launchers let Iran's missiles redeploy fast and fire in short cycles, dodging the bulk of the US strike options.
๐ธ In early 2026, the US Air Force awarded a sole-source contract to Boeing for reverse-engineered ATACMS components alongside a $100 million-plus deal, yet deliveries of new bombs won't begin until 2028 at the earliest.
๐ธ Broader US defense sector issues stem from post-Cold War industry contraction, leaving no rapid solutions; the GBU-57 successor is under development with a smaller design for affordability, but it won't close the capability gap anytime soon.
๐ธ Without quick inventory refills, the B-2 fleet's crippled in hitting Iran's fortified underground missile bases, no non-nuclear weapon in US or allied stocks packs similar punch.
Do you think the US will be able to achieve its objectives without these bombs?
@NewRulesGeoโ๏ธ Follow us on X
Americaโs "elite" GBU-57 bunker-busters are running on fumes, exposing how Washingtonโs โshock and aweโ ops to destroy Tehran's ballistic arsenal are facing insurmountable obstacles in the face of a network of underground fortresses.
๐ธ ONLY 6-15 GBU-57s remain after the US burned through 14 during June 2025's Operation Midnight Hammer targeting Fordow and Natanz nuclear sites.
๐ธ Each bomb costs over $370 million and is specifically designed for the small 19-plane B-2 stealth fleet, where Boeing's intellectual property monopoly enforces a "vendor lock" on the critical tail kit guidance systems.
๐ธ North Korean-assisted deep underground mountain storage facilities, often buried under mountains, render attacks by cruise missiles and most air-launched weapons utterly ineffective at serious threats.
๐ธSolid-fuel mobile transporter-erector launchers let Iran's missiles redeploy fast and fire in short cycles, dodging the bulk of the US strike options.
๐ธ In early 2026, the US Air Force awarded a sole-source contract to Boeing for reverse-engineered ATACMS components alongside a $100 million-plus deal, yet deliveries of new bombs won't begin until 2028 at the earliest.
๐ธ Broader US defense sector issues stem from post-Cold War industry contraction, leaving no rapid solutions; the GBU-57 successor is under development with a smaller design for affordability, but it won't close the capability gap anytime soon.
๐ธ Without quick inventory refills, the B-2 fleet's crippled in hitting Iran's fortified underground missile bases, no non-nuclear weapon in US or allied stocks packs similar punch.
Do you think the US will be able to achieve its objectives without these bombs?
@NewRulesGeo
Please open Telegram to view this post
VIEW IN TELEGRAM
๐86โค45๐ซก26๐ฅ16๐2
This media is not supported in your browser
VIEW IN TELEGRAM
๐จ๐บ๐ธ Pentagon Learned NOTHING from 4 Years of the Ukraine Conflict:
An Iranian Shahed-136 struck a parking area of American armored vehicles at a U.S. base in Kuwait.
The U.S. military have left equipment at bases well within range of Iranian missiles and drones neither sheltered nor dispersed.
If Iran were able to launch large-scale drone and missile attacks instead of isolated strikes, U.S. losses in both personnel and equipment would be far higher.
@NewRulesGeoโ๏ธ Follow us on X
An Iranian Shahed-136 struck a parking area of American armored vehicles at a U.S. base in Kuwait.
The U.S. military have left equipment at bases well within range of Iranian missiles and drones neither sheltered nor dispersed.
If Iran were able to launch large-scale drone and missile attacks instead of isolated strikes, U.S. losses in both personnel and equipment would be far higher.
@NewRulesGeo
Please open Telegram to view this post
VIEW IN TELEGRAM
๐ฅ119๐ซก45๐22โค18๐5
Forwarded from Intel Republic
INTEL OPINION: Trump says "We must make a big decision on Iran" โ why he's hesitated for MONTHS to do it
While the U.S. and Israel possess seemingly unlimited resources at their disposal, conventional firepower, Iranโs geography, missile arsenal, and defensive preparations show it has its own cards in the deck.
๐ฎ๐ท Iran has stockpiles of ballistic and cruise missiles, drones, and mobile launch systems that the US and Israel cannot locate and destroy โ and it has been careful not to deplete them in the last two years as Israel has gone trigger happy.
True Promise Operations showed Tehran is able to launch massive salvos and waves of drones and missiles
๐ฎ๐ท The US and Israel want a quick victory โ yet Iran is able to โ and will โ pull it through the trenches of protracted warfare. Air bombing campaigns will not wage long term damage on Iranโs structure, leadership, command networks, or regional influence would collapse.
The Resistanceโs resilience and wide distribution of power in the IRGC mean the US/Israel canโt simply bomb its way into victory.
๐ฎ๐ท U.S. munitions stocks โ especially missile defense interceptors like THAAD, Patriot, and naval systems โ are DEPLETED from 2 years of aggression.
๐ฎ๐ท A regional web of allies: Hezbollah and the Iraqi Islamic Resistance, and possibly Ansarallah have either stated or likely would support Tehran if the US/Israel attacks Iran severely, especially if it threatens the life of the Supreme Leader.
๐ฎ๐ท Unlike past years, several Gulf states have publicly refused to allow use of their airspace or bases as a launchpad for strikes on Iran, limiting U.S. operational flexibility and backing in the region
As Iran said: the US may start the war, but it wonโt be able to determine its end.
While the U.S. and Israel possess seemingly unlimited resources at their disposal, conventional firepower, Iranโs geography, missile arsenal, and defensive preparations show it has its own cards in the deck.
True Promise Operations showed Tehran is able to launch massive salvos and waves of drones and missiles
The Resistanceโs resilience and wide distribution of power in the IRGC mean the US/Israel canโt simply bomb its way into victory.
As Iran said: the US may start the war, but it wonโt be able to determine its end.
Please open Telegram to view this post
VIEW IN TELEGRAM
๐91โค37๐24๐12๐คฌ2
๐จ๐บ๐ธ Why Iran Regime Change Failed: Trump Misunderstood How Airpower Works
To eliminate Iranโs nuclear and missile program, Washington may see regime change as the only path. But will the U.S. be able to overthrow the Iranian government without deploying ground troops?
The theory of Admiral J. C. Wylie, a prominent strategic thinker, exposes the myth that air power alone can force an enemy into submission.
๐ธ Airpower's "cumulative" strikes scatter impact across dispersed targets. They prove too weak to stun leadership or force surrender. Each hit delivers a psychological punch that is too meager.
๐ธ Admiral Wylie's doctrine asserts that only ground troops can seize and hold geophysical control. Soldiers go and stay, unlike fleeting air operations. Without boots on the ground, no real grip exists.
๐ธ Bombing from above assumes dominance. Yet it lacks the staying power for strategic success. This shows in Iran's resilient defenses after Israel's 2025 strikes.
๐ธ Cumulative operations enable sequential ground pounding. They remain indecisive on their own.
๐ธ Overreliance on airpower risks trapping the U.S. in a protracted stalemate against a tenacious adversary like Iran. Despite the 12-Day War and recent strikes, Tehran remains a significant power capable of inflicting substantial damage on American and allied assets in the region and beyond.
Will Trump dare to deploy ground troops once he realizes his air campaign has failed, or will he resort to awkward negotiations and deals instead?
@NewRulesGeoโ๏ธ Follow us on X
To eliminate Iranโs nuclear and missile program, Washington may see regime change as the only path. But will the U.S. be able to overthrow the Iranian government without deploying ground troops?
The theory of Admiral J. C. Wylie, a prominent strategic thinker, exposes the myth that air power alone can force an enemy into submission.
๐ธ Airpower's "cumulative" strikes scatter impact across dispersed targets. They prove too weak to stun leadership or force surrender. Each hit delivers a psychological punch that is too meager.
๐ธ Admiral Wylie's doctrine asserts that only ground troops can seize and hold geophysical control. Soldiers go and stay, unlike fleeting air operations. Without boots on the ground, no real grip exists.
๐ธ Bombing from above assumes dominance. Yet it lacks the staying power for strategic success. This shows in Iran's resilient defenses after Israel's 2025 strikes.
๐ธ Cumulative operations enable sequential ground pounding. They remain indecisive on their own.
๐ธ Overreliance on airpower risks trapping the U.S. in a protracted stalemate against a tenacious adversary like Iran. Despite the 12-Day War and recent strikes, Tehran remains a significant power capable of inflicting substantial damage on American and allied assets in the region and beyond.
Will Trump dare to deploy ground troops once he realizes his air campaign has failed, or will he resort to awkward negotiations and deals instead?
@NewRulesGeo
Please open Telegram to view this post
VIEW IN TELEGRAM
๐72๐ฅ23โค14๐5
๐จ๐บ๐ธ ๐ฎ๐ท Lies About U.S. Dominance Over Iranโs Skies Exposed
Iranian fighter jets remain active over Tehran, as confirmed by the photos, challenging narratives of uncontested U.S. air superiority.
MiG-29As and Yak-130 combat trainers are circling the capital, hunting drones, Israeli UAVs, and even Tomahawk cruise missiles, these jets specialize in killing slow-moving threats at low altitudes.
The appearance of Iranian aircraft over rear areas shows that U.S. and Israeli tactical aviation still does not operate freely over Iranโs vast mountainous terrain, where mobile IRGC air defense units continue to pose a credible threat, allowing Iranian aircraft to retain safe zones for maneuver.
@NewRulesGeoโ๏ธ Follow us on X
Iranian fighter jets remain active over Tehran, as confirmed by the photos, challenging narratives of uncontested U.S. air superiority.
MiG-29As and Yak-130 combat trainers are circling the capital, hunting drones, Israeli UAVs, and even Tomahawk cruise missiles, these jets specialize in killing slow-moving threats at low altitudes.
The appearance of Iranian aircraft over rear areas shows that U.S. and Israeli tactical aviation still does not operate freely over Iranโs vast mountainous terrain, where mobile IRGC air defense units continue to pose a credible threat, allowing Iranian aircraft to retain safe zones for maneuver.
@NewRulesGeo
Please open Telegram to view this post
VIEW IN TELEGRAM
โค145๐41๐ฅ28๐6๐4
This media is not supported in your browser
VIEW IN TELEGRAM
โ๏ธDelivering information on the SMO, military analysis of exceptional quality and the wider geopolitical and cultural aspects associated with current global events.
It will be interesting. We are here thinking.
Subscribe at t.me/two_majors
Learn the truth from the Two Majors.
It will be interesting. We are here thinking.
Subscribe at t.me/two_majors
Learn the truth from the Two Majors.
๐21๐1
๐จ๐ฎ๐ท If Hormuz Closes, These Pipelines Will Decide the Outcome
If the conflict with Iran continues, the Gulf oil pipeline routes designed to bypass the Strait of Hormuz in the event of a disruption will undergo their first major stress test of this decade.
Saudi Arabia relies on the East-West Pipeline (EWP), which transports crude roughly 1,200 km from the Abqaiq processing hub to export terminals in Yanbu on the Red Sea. Following a $250 million upgrade, its capacity increased from 5 to 7 million barrels per day.
The UAE has pursued a similar strategy. Since 2012, the Abu Dhabi Crude Oil Pipeline (ADCOP) has carried 1.5 million barrels per day to Fujairah, located outside the Strait of Hormuz. ADNOC is also developing an additional pipeline from Jebel Dhanna to Fujairah with a planned capacity of 1.8 million barrels per day, expected to come online by 2027. This would effectively double the UAEโs overland export capacity.
Iran operates its own bypass via the GorehโJask pipeline, commissioned in 2021 to transport oil from Khuzestan to terminals on the Gulf of Oman. While its nominal capacity is 1 million barrels per day, actual throughput has reportedly remained below 350 000 barrels per day. In a prolonged conflict, export capacity alone will not be the only constraintโaccess to buyers will also remain a limiting factor.
Iraq remains the most exposed, as it continues to depend heavily on export terminals in the Persian Gulf. Restarting the KirkukโCeyhan pipeline to Turkey could provide an alternative route with a potential capacity of up to 1.2 million barrels per day, but this would require resolving ongoing political and legal disputes.
In total, Gulf bypass pipelines offer a theoretical export capacity exceeding 12 million barrels per day. However, even if fully utilized, this would place significant operational pressure on Red Sea and Gulf of Oman terminals. Tanker traffic from Fujairah, Yanbu, and Jeddah will indicate whether pipeline routes can offset a potential disruption of tanker transit through the Strait of Hormuz.
@NewRulesGeoโ๏ธ Follow us on X
If the conflict with Iran continues, the Gulf oil pipeline routes designed to bypass the Strait of Hormuz in the event of a disruption will undergo their first major stress test of this decade.
Saudi Arabia relies on the East-West Pipeline (EWP), which transports crude roughly 1,200 km from the Abqaiq processing hub to export terminals in Yanbu on the Red Sea. Following a $250 million upgrade, its capacity increased from 5 to 7 million barrels per day.
The UAE has pursued a similar strategy. Since 2012, the Abu Dhabi Crude Oil Pipeline (ADCOP) has carried 1.5 million barrels per day to Fujairah, located outside the Strait of Hormuz. ADNOC is also developing an additional pipeline from Jebel Dhanna to Fujairah with a planned capacity of 1.8 million barrels per day, expected to come online by 2027. This would effectively double the UAEโs overland export capacity.
Iran operates its own bypass via the GorehโJask pipeline, commissioned in 2021 to transport oil from Khuzestan to terminals on the Gulf of Oman. While its nominal capacity is 1 million barrels per day, actual throughput has reportedly remained below 350 000 barrels per day. In a prolonged conflict, export capacity alone will not be the only constraintโaccess to buyers will also remain a limiting factor.
Iraq remains the most exposed, as it continues to depend heavily on export terminals in the Persian Gulf. Restarting the KirkukโCeyhan pipeline to Turkey could provide an alternative route with a potential capacity of up to 1.2 million barrels per day, but this would require resolving ongoing political and legal disputes.
In total, Gulf bypass pipelines offer a theoretical export capacity exceeding 12 million barrels per day. However, even if fully utilized, this would place significant operational pressure on Red Sea and Gulf of Oman terminals. Tanker traffic from Fujairah, Yanbu, and Jeddah will indicate whether pipeline routes can offset a potential disruption of tanker transit through the Strait of Hormuz.
@NewRulesGeo
Please open Telegram to view this post
VIEW IN TELEGRAM
โค72๐ฅ11๐6
๐จ๐บ๐ธ ๐ฎ๐ท Trumpโs Iran Strategy: Three Objectives โ None Achieved
Despite sustained U.S. and Israeli airstrikes, Washingtonโs three central strategic objectives in Iran remain unmet:
1๏ธโฃ Regime change
Iranโs political and military command structure continues to function. Even after leadership losses and infrastructure strikes, state continuity mechanisms remain intact. Regime change historically requires either internal collapse or a ground invasion. Airpower alone has never reliably removed entrenched governments with functioning security institutions.
2๏ธโฃ Ending Iranโs nuclear program
U.S. and Israeli strikes damaged parts of Iranโs nuclear infrastructure, but the program itself remains intact. The IAEA reported that large quantities of highly enriched uranium were stored in underground tunnel complexes at Isfahan that appear to have survived the attacks. Iranโs nuclear architecture was deliberately designed with hardened and deeply buried facilities, limiting the effectiveness of airstrikes. The U.S. inventory of bunker-buster munitions is finite, while Iran maintains a large network of underground enrichment, storage, and fuel facilities.
3๏ธโฃ Eliminating Iranโs ballistic missile threat
Iran continues to launch missiles despite ongoing strikes. Its missile program is structurally resilient, relying on mobile launchers, dispersed stockpiles, and extensive underground storage. These systems were specifically designed to survive air campaigns and maintain retaliatory capability even under sustained attack.
For Iran, survival alone would constitute a strategic success. If the state endures despite direct U.S. military pressure, it would mark the failure of Washingtonโs long-standing strategy of coercion and signal the erosion of American hegemony in the Middle East. In that outcome, Iran would not simply remain a key regional power but would be positioned to help shape a new regional order increasingly defined by local actors rather than American dominance.
@NewRulesGeoโ๏ธ Follow us on X
Despite sustained U.S. and Israeli airstrikes, Washingtonโs three central strategic objectives in Iran remain unmet:
Iranโs political and military command structure continues to function. Even after leadership losses and infrastructure strikes, state continuity mechanisms remain intact. Regime change historically requires either internal collapse or a ground invasion. Airpower alone has never reliably removed entrenched governments with functioning security institutions.
U.S. and Israeli strikes damaged parts of Iranโs nuclear infrastructure, but the program itself remains intact. The IAEA reported that large quantities of highly enriched uranium were stored in underground tunnel complexes at Isfahan that appear to have survived the attacks. Iranโs nuclear architecture was deliberately designed with hardened and deeply buried facilities, limiting the effectiveness of airstrikes. The U.S. inventory of bunker-buster munitions is finite, while Iran maintains a large network of underground enrichment, storage, and fuel facilities.
Iran continues to launch missiles despite ongoing strikes. Its missile program is structurally resilient, relying on mobile launchers, dispersed stockpiles, and extensive underground storage. These systems were specifically designed to survive air campaigns and maintain retaliatory capability even under sustained attack.
For Iran, survival alone would constitute a strategic success. If the state endures despite direct U.S. military pressure, it would mark the failure of Washingtonโs long-standing strategy of coercion and signal the erosion of American hegemony in the Middle East. In that outcome, Iran would not simply remain a key regional power but would be positioned to help shape a new regional order increasingly defined by local actors rather than American dominance.
@NewRulesGeo
Please open Telegram to view this post
VIEW IN TELEGRAM
๐123โค58๐18๐ฅ6
This media is not supported in your browser
VIEW IN TELEGRAM
๐จ๐ฎ๐ท๐บ๐ธ Iran Shoots Down the U.S. LUCAS Drone โ A Failed Shahed Copy
Iraqi locals recover a US LUCAS drone wreckage, America's botched attempt to clone Iran's Shahed-136, after Iranian defenses reportedly downed it amid the US-Israeli onslaught on Iran during Operation Epic Fury.
๐ธ Replication details emerged the crashed LUCAS, deployed by Task Force Scorpion Strike, remains largely intact, potentially allowing Iran to analyze differences from their well-known Shahed design in this bootleg replica and leverage those insights
๐ธ The Key technical features of LUCAS includes a 10-ft length, 8-ft wingspan, 150-200 kg weight, up to 50 kg payload, 1,000-2,000 km range, 4-6 hour endurance, AI-guided swarming for up to 100 units, and various launch methods at $35K per unit
๐ธ Potential strategic implications access to these blueprints could enable Tehran to develop countermeasures against US swarm tactics, affecting air superiority dynamics
๐ธ Awkward US replication noted Washington's attempt to adopt Iran's low-cost swarm modelโdeveloped by Tehran under severe economic pressureโmanifests in $35K LUCAS units produced by SpektreWorks through the Replicator initiative
๐ธ The world's top military power seems to have struggled to keep up with an opponent it considered weaker and economic pressured. Iran is now in a position to easily counter and outperform these copied systems.
Will US ever catch up with Iranian drone technology?
@NewRulesGeoโ๏ธFollow us on X
Iraqi locals recover a US LUCAS drone wreckage, America's botched attempt to clone Iran's Shahed-136, after Iranian defenses reportedly downed it amid the US-Israeli onslaught on Iran during Operation Epic Fury.
๐ธ Replication details emerged the crashed LUCAS, deployed by Task Force Scorpion Strike, remains largely intact, potentially allowing Iran to analyze differences from their well-known Shahed design in this bootleg replica and leverage those insights
๐ธ The Key technical features of LUCAS includes a 10-ft length, 8-ft wingspan, 150-200 kg weight, up to 50 kg payload, 1,000-2,000 km range, 4-6 hour endurance, AI-guided swarming for up to 100 units, and various launch methods at $35K per unit
๐ธ Potential strategic implications access to these blueprints could enable Tehran to develop countermeasures against US swarm tactics, affecting air superiority dynamics
๐ธ Awkward US replication noted Washington's attempt to adopt Iran's low-cost swarm modelโdeveloped by Tehran under severe economic pressureโmanifests in $35K LUCAS units produced by SpektreWorks through the Replicator initiative
๐ธ The world's top military power seems to have struggled to keep up with an opponent it considered weaker and economic pressured. Iran is now in a position to easily counter and outperform these copied systems.
Will US ever catch up with Iranian drone technology?
@NewRulesGeoโ๏ธFollow us on X
โค78๐40๐ฅ16๐8๐คฌ2
This media is not supported in your browser
VIEW IN TELEGRAM
๐จ๐ฎ๐ท ISRAEL IN PANIC: ITS PRICEY DRONE PROVES USELESS AGAINST IRAN
Iran's air defenses are dismantling Israeli Hermes 900 fleets, shattering Tel Aviv's illusion of unchallenged skies as US-backed strikes falter in the escalating showdown.
๐ธ Iran claimed victories by downing at least five Hermes 900s using advanced systems like the Bavar 373 and Product 358 missiles over key sites including Isfahan and Khomeinishahr.
๐ธ These UAVs, powered by a Rotax 914 or upgraded 916 engine delivering up to 210 horsepower, feature a 15-meter wingspan, 36-hour flight endurance, 30,000-foot ceiling, and 770-pound payload capacity loaded with EO/IR sensors, synthetic aperture radar, electronic warfare jammers, and Rafael Spike anti-tank missiles for versatile ISR and strike roles.
๐ธ Hezbollah's repeated successes, including at least four Hermes 900 downings since October 2023 with surface-to-air missiles in incidents like June 1 and June 10 of 2024, almost certainly provided Iran with critical tactics such as jamming communications ahead of strikes from Sayyad-2 or S-300 systems.
๐ธ Iran's layered defenses, integrating Ghadir early-warning radars, 48N6E2 interceptors, and even MiG-29 fighters armed with R-73 missiles for drone kills, indicate Tehran's rapid adaptation and resilience against ongoing Israeli aggression, debunking Western media narratives of complete Iranian helplessness.
Do you believe these drones still hold any real effectiveness against Iran?
@NewRulesGeoโ๏ธ Follow us on X
Iran's air defenses are dismantling Israeli Hermes 900 fleets, shattering Tel Aviv's illusion of unchallenged skies as US-backed strikes falter in the escalating showdown.
๐ธ Iran claimed victories by downing at least five Hermes 900s using advanced systems like the Bavar 373 and Product 358 missiles over key sites including Isfahan and Khomeinishahr.
๐ธ These UAVs, powered by a Rotax 914 or upgraded 916 engine delivering up to 210 horsepower, feature a 15-meter wingspan, 36-hour flight endurance, 30,000-foot ceiling, and 770-pound payload capacity loaded with EO/IR sensors, synthetic aperture radar, electronic warfare jammers, and Rafael Spike anti-tank missiles for versatile ISR and strike roles.
๐ธ Hezbollah's repeated successes, including at least four Hermes 900 downings since October 2023 with surface-to-air missiles in incidents like June 1 and June 10 of 2024, almost certainly provided Iran with critical tactics such as jamming communications ahead of strikes from Sayyad-2 or S-300 systems.
๐ธ Iran's layered defenses, integrating Ghadir early-warning radars, 48N6E2 interceptors, and even MiG-29 fighters armed with R-73 missiles for drone kills, indicate Tehran's rapid adaptation and resilience against ongoing Israeli aggression, debunking Western media narratives of complete Iranian helplessness.
Do you believe these drones still hold any real effectiveness against Iran?
@NewRulesGeo
Please open Telegram to view this post
VIEW IN TELEGRAM
โค98๐31๐ฅ18๐2
This media is not supported in your browser
VIEW IN TELEGRAM
The channel of the @rybar project is available and TRANSLATED in the following languages:
๐ฌ๐งEnglish
๐ซ๐ทFrench
๐ช๐ธSpanish
๐ฎ๐นItalian
๐ฉ๐ชGerman
๐ญ๐บHungarian
๐ฌ๐ทGreek
Subscribe to all here
Please open Telegram to view this post
VIEW IN TELEGRAM
๐10๐คฌ3โค2๐2๐ซก1
๐จ๐ฎ๐ท IRAN CONFLICT MATH: U.S. ATTRITION HORROR
If the US-Iran conflict drags on, it becomes an attrition nightmare for Washington.
Iran's low-cost arsenal, including Shahed drones (priced at around $20-50k each with production rates of 200-500 per month) and ballistic missiles ($1-2M each, produced at 50-100 per month), enables sustained, economical barrage attacks that could overwhelm defenses over time.
In contrast, U.S. systems like the PAC-3 MSE (costing ~$4-5M per unit, with current annual production around 600 units, equating to $2.4-3B in costs) and THAAD (~$12-15M per interceptor, produced at ~96 units yearly for $1.2-1.4B) are far more expensive to replenish. The overall U.S. missile defense budget hovers at $15-20B for FY26, though initiatives like Golden Dome consume over $13B for space and missile defense integration alone.
Consider the June 2025 12-day war escalation, where Iran launched over 1,000 drones and 550 missiles: repelling that required allies to expend an estimated $5-10B in interceptors. If Iran were to replicate such large-scale salvos roughly 10 times annually in a drawn-out conflict, U.S. and allied stockpiles could deplete within months unless production shifts to a full wartime footing. Ultimately, Tehran's cost-effective output gives it the edge in endurance.
@NewRulesGeoโ๏ธ Follow us on X
If the US-Iran conflict drags on, it becomes an attrition nightmare for Washington.
Iran's low-cost arsenal, including Shahed drones (priced at around $20-50k each with production rates of 200-500 per month) and ballistic missiles ($1-2M each, produced at 50-100 per month), enables sustained, economical barrage attacks that could overwhelm defenses over time.
In contrast, U.S. systems like the PAC-3 MSE (costing ~$4-5M per unit, with current annual production around 600 units, equating to $2.4-3B in costs) and THAAD (~$12-15M per interceptor, produced at ~96 units yearly for $1.2-1.4B) are far more expensive to replenish. The overall U.S. missile defense budget hovers at $15-20B for FY26, though initiatives like Golden Dome consume over $13B for space and missile defense integration alone.
Consider the June 2025 12-day war escalation, where Iran launched over 1,000 drones and 550 missiles: repelling that required allies to expend an estimated $5-10B in interceptors. If Iran were to replicate such large-scale salvos roughly 10 times annually in a drawn-out conflict, U.S. and allied stockpiles could deplete within months unless production shifts to a full wartime footing. Ultimately, Tehran's cost-effective output gives it the edge in endurance.
@NewRulesGeo
Please open Telegram to view this post
VIEW IN TELEGRAM
โค96๐34๐ฅ12๐9๐2
๐จ๐ฎ๐ท ๐บ๐ธ WHO BLINKS FIRST? THE IRAN-U.S. WAR OF EXHAUSTION
The hot phase may last until offensive potential is depleted or a strategic stalemate forces diplomacy. Russian experts weigh in on what is actually going on:
๐ Kirill Semyonov, Analyst on Middle Eastern conflicts:
Iran's "all-in" strategy has caught Washington by surprise. Tehran's strikes on U.S. bases and Gulf states' vital oil and gas infrastructure are calculated moves to raise the stakes, forcing the U.S. to confront an escalating cost โ both geopolitical and economic. The U.S. had not anticipated a long-term engagement, leading to two grim choices: a ground invasion, or accepting a continuous conflict, with Iran capable of reigniting hostilities at will.
๐ Maxim Alontsev, Academic Director at HSE University:
The conflict will drag on until both sides are exhausted, reaching an "operational deadlock." With a fragile "safety catch" provided by Gulf monarchies' restraint, The slightest shift could ignite a wider regional war. The situation is fostering new identities across non-Arab Muslim countries, as grassroots movements, like protests in Pakistan, show spontaneous solidarity with Iran, a development that may reshape regional allegiances.
๐ Fyodor Lukyanov, Editor of Russia in Global Affairs:
The unprecedented assassination of Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei breach of international norms will resonate across global diplomacy, signaling that negotiations are futile and setting a dangerous precedent for regime change.
๐ Timofey Bordachev, prof., HSE University:
The U.S. approach as short-term and tactical, with little regard for long-term regional stability. While Iran faces external threats, its political culture ensures its resilience, preventing a collapse like that of Libya or Iraq. For Russia, however, the Middle East conflict is secondary to the nuclear balance and the war in Ukraine.
@NewRulesGeoโ๏ธ Follow us on X
The hot phase may last until offensive potential is depleted or a strategic stalemate forces diplomacy. Russian experts weigh in on what is actually going on:
Iran's "all-in" strategy has caught Washington by surprise. Tehran's strikes on U.S. bases and Gulf states' vital oil and gas infrastructure are calculated moves to raise the stakes, forcing the U.S. to confront an escalating cost โ both geopolitical and economic. The U.S. had not anticipated a long-term engagement, leading to two grim choices: a ground invasion, or accepting a continuous conflict, with Iran capable of reigniting hostilities at will.
The conflict will drag on until both sides are exhausted, reaching an "operational deadlock." With a fragile "safety catch" provided by Gulf monarchies' restraint, The slightest shift could ignite a wider regional war. The situation is fostering new identities across non-Arab Muslim countries, as grassroots movements, like protests in Pakistan, show spontaneous solidarity with Iran, a development that may reshape regional allegiances.
The unprecedented assassination of Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei breach of international norms will resonate across global diplomacy, signaling that negotiations are futile and setting a dangerous precedent for regime change.
The U.S. approach as short-term and tactical, with little regard for long-term regional stability. While Iran faces external threats, its political culture ensures its resilience, preventing a collapse like that of Libya or Iraq. For Russia, however, the Middle East conflict is secondary to the nuclear balance and the war in Ukraine.
@NewRulesGeo
Please open Telegram to view this post
VIEW IN TELEGRAM
๐ฅ61๐25โค19๐9
๐จ๐บ๐ธ๐ฎ๐ท GROUND WAR IN IRAN: WHY THE U.S. ISNโT PREPARED
The US cannot invade Iran with the forces it currently has in the region. A real ground war would demand a massive buildup Washington hasnโt even started. Hereโs why a land invasion would be extraordinarily difficult.
๐ธ The US lacks any serious ground punch in the Gulf with zero divisions or brigades geared for real offense, leaving them exposed on land
๐ธ Washington rushed in 280 combat jets and two carriers over 1.5 months using over 300 transport flights, betting everything on air dominance while skimping on troops
๐ธ Flashback to 2003 Iraq invasion where the US massed 170K soldiers, five carriers, and 1K planes against a nation four times smaller by area and 3.5 times by population with flat deserts perfect for swift tank pushes
๐ธ Iran's jagged mountain ranges shred supply lines and block maneuvers, turning the sole Iraq border corridor into a graveyard for armored forces unlike Iraq's open terrain
๐ธ Scaling up demands 500K+ ground troops, seven or eight carriers from US stocks, and daily tons of cargo, requiring six to 12 months of prep that's utterly doomed in the blazing Gulf chaos, plus no coalition backup this time
Do you think Trump will ultimately launch a ground operation against Iran?
@NewRulesGeoโ๏ธ Follow us on X
The US cannot invade Iran with the forces it currently has in the region. A real ground war would demand a massive buildup Washington hasnโt even started. Hereโs why a land invasion would be extraordinarily difficult.
๐ธ The US lacks any serious ground punch in the Gulf with zero divisions or brigades geared for real offense, leaving them exposed on land
๐ธ Washington rushed in 280 combat jets and two carriers over 1.5 months using over 300 transport flights, betting everything on air dominance while skimping on troops
๐ธ Flashback to 2003 Iraq invasion where the US massed 170K soldiers, five carriers, and 1K planes against a nation four times smaller by area and 3.5 times by population with flat deserts perfect for swift tank pushes
๐ธ Iran's jagged mountain ranges shred supply lines and block maneuvers, turning the sole Iraq border corridor into a graveyard for armored forces unlike Iraq's open terrain
๐ธ Scaling up demands 500K+ ground troops, seven or eight carriers from US stocks, and daily tons of cargo, requiring six to 12 months of prep that's utterly doomed in the blazing Gulf chaos, plus no coalition backup this time
Do you think Trump will ultimately launch a ground operation against Iran?
@NewRulesGeo
Please open Telegram to view this post
VIEW IN TELEGRAM
๐ฅ81๐ซก33โค21๐9๐5
๐จ๐ฎ๐ท PENTAGON IN PANIC: IRAN CRIPPLES U.S. RADAR DEFENSES
Iranian drone strikes damaged several key U.S. early-warning radar sites across the Gulf, exposing vulnerabilities in Washingtonโs regional missile defense network.
๐ธ Qatar โ A Shahed-136 drone reportedly struck the AN/FPS-132 early-warning radar, a ~$1.1B strategic asset. Satellite imagery suggests structural damage that could take the system offline for an extended period.
๐ธ UAE (Al-Ruwais airbase) โ A strike hit a shelter housing AN/TPY-2 radar and THAAD system vehicles, scorching nearby infrastructure. The operational status of the radar remains unclear.
๐ธ Jordan (Muwaffaq Salti airbase) โ Explosions were recorded near the AN/TPY-2 radar and THAAD deployment site, with satellite images showing fires and debris around the installation.
๐ธ Saudi Arabia (Prince Sultan airbase) โ Similar strikes appear to have impacted facilities linked to AN/TPY-2 radar and THAAD systems, leaving burn marks and visible damage.
If the strikes against U.S. missile-defense radar systems proved successful, the effectiveness of Washingtonโs regional missile shield could be significantly degraded, increasing the likelihood of Iranian missiles penetrating defenses and reaching their targets.
Could Iran overwhelm U.S. missile defenses across the region and how?
@NewRulesGeoโ๏ธ Follow us on X
Iranian drone strikes damaged several key U.S. early-warning radar sites across the Gulf, exposing vulnerabilities in Washingtonโs regional missile defense network.
๐ธ Qatar โ A Shahed-136 drone reportedly struck the AN/FPS-132 early-warning radar, a ~$1.1B strategic asset. Satellite imagery suggests structural damage that could take the system offline for an extended period.
๐ธ UAE (Al-Ruwais airbase) โ A strike hit a shelter housing AN/TPY-2 radar and THAAD system vehicles, scorching nearby infrastructure. The operational status of the radar remains unclear.
๐ธ Jordan (Muwaffaq Salti airbase) โ Explosions were recorded near the AN/TPY-2 radar and THAAD deployment site, with satellite images showing fires and debris around the installation.
๐ธ Saudi Arabia (Prince Sultan airbase) โ Similar strikes appear to have impacted facilities linked to AN/TPY-2 radar and THAAD systems, leaving burn marks and visible damage.
If the strikes against U.S. missile-defense radar systems proved successful, the effectiveness of Washingtonโs regional missile shield could be significantly degraded, increasing the likelihood of Iranian missiles penetrating defenses and reaching their targets.
Could Iran overwhelm U.S. missile defenses across the region and how?
@NewRulesGeo
Please open Telegram to view this post
VIEW IN TELEGRAM
Please open Telegram to view this post
VIEW IN TELEGRAM
๐ฅ91๐37โค15๐5๐2
Media is too big
VIEW IN TELEGRAM
๐จ๐ฎ๐ท IRANโS DRONE HUNTERS: A NIGHTMARE FOR U.S. AND ISRAELI UAVs
Even under constant U.S. and Israeli airstrikes, Iran still intercepts enemy drones. The reason lies in a set of mobile, radar-silent air defense systems that are far harder to detect and destroy:
๐ธ Missile 358 โ a loitering anti-drone interceptor operating in autonomous โfree huntโ mode.
Flying at ~0.6 Mach with up to 100 km range and 8.5 km interception altitude, it can patrol airspace and engage targets like MQ-9 Reaper or Hermes-900 UAVs. Radio correction can improve accuracy but risks exposing the control node to enemy electronic surveillance.
๐ธ AD-08 Majid โ a mobile short-range air defense system using optical and thermal sensors instead of radar.
Its IR-guided missiles reach ~2 Mach, with 8 km range and 6 km altitude, making the system difficult to detect for aircraft relying on radar warning receivers.
๐ธ Repurposed R-73 / R-27T missiles โ infrared air-to-air missiles adapted for ground launch from mobile platforms equipped with thermal sights.
Similar improvised systems have previously downed UAVs and even aircraft โ including a Saudi F-15S shot down by the Houthis in 2018.
Unlike radar-based systems that can be quickly targeted by anti-radiation missiles, these mobile defenses are harder to detect and eliminate, allowing Iran to keep enemy UAV operations under constant pressure.
Do you think radar-silent air defenses could really help Iran counter Western drones and aircraft?
@NewRulesGeoโ๏ธ Follow us on X
Even under constant U.S. and Israeli airstrikes, Iran still intercepts enemy drones. The reason lies in a set of mobile, radar-silent air defense systems that are far harder to detect and destroy:
๐ธ Missile 358 โ a loitering anti-drone interceptor operating in autonomous โfree huntโ mode.
Flying at ~0.6 Mach with up to 100 km range and 8.5 km interception altitude, it can patrol airspace and engage targets like MQ-9 Reaper or Hermes-900 UAVs. Radio correction can improve accuracy but risks exposing the control node to enemy electronic surveillance.
๐ธ AD-08 Majid โ a mobile short-range air defense system using optical and thermal sensors instead of radar.
Its IR-guided missiles reach ~2 Mach, with 8 km range and 6 km altitude, making the system difficult to detect for aircraft relying on radar warning receivers.
๐ธ Repurposed R-73 / R-27T missiles โ infrared air-to-air missiles adapted for ground launch from mobile platforms equipped with thermal sights.
Similar improvised systems have previously downed UAVs and even aircraft โ including a Saudi F-15S shot down by the Houthis in 2018.
Unlike radar-based systems that can be quickly targeted by anti-radiation missiles, these mobile defenses are harder to detect and eliminate, allowing Iran to keep enemy UAV operations under constant pressure.
Do you think radar-silent air defenses could really help Iran counter Western drones and aircraft?
@NewRulesGeo
Please open Telegram to view this post
VIEW IN TELEGRAM
โค109๐28๐ฅ16๐5
This media is not supported in your browser
VIEW IN TELEGRAM
๐จ๐บ๐ธ๐ฎ๐ท PATRIOT AIR DEFENSE FAILS: IRAN HITS AMERICAโS LARGEST OVERSEAS AIRBASE
Iran struck Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar with ballistic missiles, causing significant damage to the largest U.S. military airbase outside the United States. Satellite imagery now confirms structural destruction across parts of the facility after the February 28 strike.
The attack followed the killing of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and formed part of the largest coordinated Iranian strike on U.S. bases in the region to date, directly challenging the resilience of Washingtonโs forward airpower architecture in the Middle East.
Analysis of February 28 footage reveals three MIM-104 Patriot interceptors failing to neutralize incoming threats. This failure coincides with reports that Iranian strikes destroyed key air defense radars at the facility, suggesting Iran targeted the systemโs architectural vulnerabilities rather than simply attempting to overwhelm it.
Al Udeid spans roughly 31 square kilometers and hosts strategic assets including B-52 bombers, F-15E strike fighters, and fifth-generation aircraft such as F-22 and F-35 fighters. Due to its vast size the base may remain partially operational, but the strike demonstrated that even heavily defended U.S. regional hubs can be penetrated by Iranian ballistic missiles.
The Patriotโs reliability had already been questioned after a June 23, 2025 strike, when lower-end Fateh-313 missiles successfully hit the same base despite prior warning of the attack.
The limited number of interceptors available makes sustained defense against repeated missile salvos extremely difficult. Against large-scale or prolonged strikes, missile defense becomes not only a technological challenge but a matter of stockpiles and production capacity.
@NewRulesGeoโ๏ธ Follow us on X
Iran struck Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar with ballistic missiles, causing significant damage to the largest U.S. military airbase outside the United States. Satellite imagery now confirms structural destruction across parts of the facility after the February 28 strike.
The attack followed the killing of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and formed part of the largest coordinated Iranian strike on U.S. bases in the region to date, directly challenging the resilience of Washingtonโs forward airpower architecture in the Middle East.
Analysis of February 28 footage reveals three MIM-104 Patriot interceptors failing to neutralize incoming threats. This failure coincides with reports that Iranian strikes destroyed key air defense radars at the facility, suggesting Iran targeted the systemโs architectural vulnerabilities rather than simply attempting to overwhelm it.
Al Udeid spans roughly 31 square kilometers and hosts strategic assets including B-52 bombers, F-15E strike fighters, and fifth-generation aircraft such as F-22 and F-35 fighters. Due to its vast size the base may remain partially operational, but the strike demonstrated that even heavily defended U.S. regional hubs can be penetrated by Iranian ballistic missiles.
The Patriotโs reliability had already been questioned after a June 23, 2025 strike, when lower-end Fateh-313 missiles successfully hit the same base despite prior warning of the attack.
The limited number of interceptors available makes sustained defense against repeated missile salvos extremely difficult. Against large-scale or prolonged strikes, missile defense becomes not only a technological challenge but a matter of stockpiles and production capacity.
@NewRulesGeo
Please open Telegram to view this post
VIEW IN TELEGRAM
๐ฅ99โค45๐8๐6๐5
๐จ๐ฎ๐ทDECAPITATION DIDNโT WORK: WHY AIRSTRIKES ALONE WONโT TOPPLE IRAN
The U.S. and Israel believed killing Supreme Leader Khamenei could trigger regime collapse. Instead, the strike may have hardened Iranโs political system and made escalation more likely, Chinese analysts warn:
๐ Liu Zhongmin, Prof. at the Shanghai International Studies University (SISU)
The assassination of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and other senior Iranian officials and Hamas leaders on Iranian territory reveals an "extremely serious extent" of their infiltration into Iran. Washington and Tel Aviv may have already cultivated potential fifth columnists or power-seizing forces within the country which poses a greater threat to the regime's stability than the strikes themselves.
๐ Li Shaoxian, Director of the China-Arab States Research Institute
Iran's political system is fundamentally different from others, like Venezuela. It has institutionalized succession mechanisms and contingency planning. Airstrikes alone, absent a ground invasion, cannot topple the regime. The attack will likely backfire, "stimulating even stronger impulses of revenge and retaliation" within the system, thus reinforcing its stability.
๐ Zhou Yiqi, Researcher at the Shanghai Institute for International Studies
For the Islamic Republic, its missile program is an existential issue. Therefore, any U.S. attempt to coerce Iran into conceding on its missile capabilities is functionally identical to pursuing regime change. By framing the negotiations this way, the U.S. has made compromise nearly impossible and blurred the line between coercive diplomacy and all-out war.
๐ Chen Long, Research Assistant at Renmin University
Iran is likely to rely on asymmetric retaliation, launching waves of ballistic missiles and drones against U.S. bases and Israeli targets. This could draw the US into a prolonged war of attrition in the Middle East, inevitably weakening the strategic resources Washington can devote to other regions.
@NewRulesGeoโ๏ธ Follow us on X
The U.S. and Israel believed killing Supreme Leader Khamenei could trigger regime collapse. Instead, the strike may have hardened Iranโs political system and made escalation more likely, Chinese analysts warn:
The assassination of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and other senior Iranian officials and Hamas leaders on Iranian territory reveals an "extremely serious extent" of their infiltration into Iran. Washington and Tel Aviv may have already cultivated potential fifth columnists or power-seizing forces within the country which poses a greater threat to the regime's stability than the strikes themselves.
Iran's political system is fundamentally different from others, like Venezuela. It has institutionalized succession mechanisms and contingency planning. Airstrikes alone, absent a ground invasion, cannot topple the regime. The attack will likely backfire, "stimulating even stronger impulses of revenge and retaliation" within the system, thus reinforcing its stability.
For the Islamic Republic, its missile program is an existential issue. Therefore, any U.S. attempt to coerce Iran into conceding on its missile capabilities is functionally identical to pursuing regime change. By framing the negotiations this way, the U.S. has made compromise nearly impossible and blurred the line between coercive diplomacy and all-out war.
Iran is likely to rely on asymmetric retaliation, launching waves of ballistic missiles and drones against U.S. bases and Israeli targets. This could draw the US into a prolonged war of attrition in the Middle East, inevitably weakening the strategic resources Washington can devote to other regions.
@NewRulesGeo
Please open Telegram to view this post
VIEW IN TELEGRAM
โค89๐32๐14