фрагмент интервью К. Скиннера:

There was a more important reason, however, why the intellectual scene looked unattractive to someone of my interests in the early 1960s. This was due to a widely held-view -- still held by a number of philosophers -- about the point of studying the history of philosophy, and intellectual history more generally. We were taught that there is a canon of classic texts in the history of moral, political, religious and other such modes of thought containing a ‘dateless wisdom’ in the form of ‘universal ideas’. We were further taught that we can hope to benefit directly from investigating these ‘timeless elements’, since they possess ‘a perennial relevance’. These assumptions in turn generated a widely accepted view about how the history of philosophy should be written. We were told to concentrate on the canonical texts, and more specifically on just those portions of the canonical texts in which it is clear that they really are addressing our questions in a ‘relevant’ way. The outcome was as anti-historical as possible. We were explicitly warned that, if we allow ourselves to become sidetracked into examining the social conditions or intellectual contexts out of which the classic texts arose, we shall lose sight of their dateless wisdom and thereby lose contact with the whole purpose of studying them.

I spent the opening years of my academic career in a state of frustrated rage against this particular world-order, and I eventually launched a terrorist attack on it in the form of my essay ‘Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas’, published in 1969. (I wrote it between 1966 and 1967, but I had a lot of difficulty getting it published.) I would never want to write like that now: much of the essay strikes me today as philosophically ill-judged as well as abusive, and when I recently had to revise it for republication I found myself cutting it to half its original length. But I mention it because it focused in turn on the two orthodoxies I have singled out -- the ‘canonical’ and the epiphenomenal approach -- and did its best to discredit or at least to ridicule them

I must add, however, that a related and far more important publication of 1969 was John Dunn’s The Political Thought of John Locke. The Introduction to that work offers a similar (though calmer) account of how the history of philosophy might be written as genuine history

оказывается в Ройомоне проводились и нормальные мероприятия:

H. Gouhier and Ferdinand Alquié at the Conference on Descartes,
Royaumont Cultural Center, 1957

[у кого бы была книжка Alquié про Мальбранша...]

Очередной эпизод про кантовские издевательства над современниками:

https://telegra.ph/CHto-Kant-delal-oprovergaya-Mendelsona-12-10

Идея для нового ГОСТа:

Оставшись один, Цинциннат принялся за суп; одновременно перелистывал каталог. Его основная часть была тщательно и красиво отпечатана; среди печатного текста было множество заглавий мелко, но четко вписано от руки красными чернилами. Не специалисту разобраться в каталоге было трудно из-за расположения названий книг — не по алфавиту, а по числу страниц в каждой, причем тут же отмечалось, сколько (во избежание совпадений) вклеено в ту или другую книгу лишних листов. Цинциннат поэтому искал без определенной цели, а так, что приглянется. Каталог содержался в образцовой чистоте; тем более удивительно было, что на белом обороте одной из первых страниц детская рука сделала карандашем серию рисунков, смысл коих Цинциннат не сразу разгадал (Набоков, Приглашение на казнь)

If, in conclusion, we try to compare the theoretical fruitfulness of the Hobbes-Gassendi story of the mind with that of the Cartesians, we must undoubtedly grant that the Cartesian story has been the more productive. We might describe their opposition in this picture. One company of a country’s defenders instals itself in a fortress. The soldiers of the second company notice that the moat is dry, the gates are missing and the walls are in collapse. Scorning the protection of such a rickety fort, yet still ridden by the idea that only from forts like this can the country be defended, they take up their stand in the most fort-like thing they can see, namely, the shadow of the decrepit fort. Neither position is defensible; and obviously the shadow-stronghold has all the vulnerability of the stone fort, with some extra vulnerabilities of its own. Yet in one respect the occupants of the shadow-fort have shown themselves the better soldiers, since they have seen the weaknesses of the stone fort, even if they are silly to fancy themselves secure in a fort made of no stones at all. The omens are not good for their victory, but they have given some evidence of teachability. They have exercised some vicarious strategic sense; they have realised that a stone fort whose walls are broken is not a stronghold. That the shadow of such a fort is not a stronghold either is the next lesson that they may come to learn (Ryle, The Concept of Mind, 302)

Then liv’d th’ eternal ONE: then deep-retir’d
In his unfathom’d essence, view’d at large
The uncreated images of things;
(Akenside, The Pleasures of Imagination)

https://poets.org/poem/pleasures-imagination-book-first

"Одна страница Локка содержит больше истины, чем все тома Мальбранша; но одна строка Мальбранша показывает больше тонкости, воображения, утонченности и гения чем, может быть, целая больша книга Локка"
- Д. Дидро в статье для "Энциклопедии" про Мальбранша

In 1663 the works of Descartes were placed on the Index Librorum Prohibitorum with the enigmatic proviso: donee corrigantur (until they are corrected). How the author was supposed to correct his works ten years after his death the Inquisitors did not explain

Some ages hence, it will perhaps be looked upon as a curious anecdote, that two Philosophers of the 18th century, of very distinguished rank, were led by a philosophical hypothesis; one, to disbelieve the existence of matter; and the other, to disbelieve the existence both of matter and of mind (Reid, Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man)

Товарищи! мы с Александром Мельниковым написали текст под названием "Дж. Локк и толерантность к атеистам".

В "Письме о толерантности" Локк отказывает в толерантности тем, "кто не признает существования божества", аргументируя это так:

«Они не имеют никакого права на терпимость, ибо для атеиста ни верность слову, ни договоры, ни клятвы, т. е. все, на чем держится человеческое общество, не могут быть чем-то обязательным и священным, а ведь если уничтожить Бога даже только в мыслях, то все это рухнет. И кроме того, разве может требовать для себя какой-то привилегии терпимости в делах религии тот, кто вообще своим атеизмом ниспровергает всякую религию?»

Мы с своей статье пытаемся показать, почему Локк мог так думать. При этом мы опираемся и на сами тексты Локка и погружаем их в исторический контекст.

Если кому-то из вас было бы интересно прочесть текст и высказать свои соображения по его поводу, пишите @hydrochoerus_isthmius

П.Ф. Стросон о Витгенштейне:

When, in the early 1950s, I first saw a typescript of Wittgenstein’s Blue Book I felt that I was, for the first time, seeing thought naked, as it were. And this sense of his quality stays with one - or stays with me - as one reads more of the work of his later period

typically Kantian straining towards the maximum of generality and abstractness at every stage of the inquiry (Strawson, The Bounds of Sense, 89)

Если перевод с иностранного языка не читается как хорошее русское произведение, — этот перевод или посредственный, или неудачный
(Заболоцкий, Заметки переводчика)