The historians of philosophy, abetted, it must be confessed, by those who set examination papers in philosophy to students, love to allocate philosophers to ‘schools of thought’, and Locke has suffered more than most from this facile pigeon-holing. He is generally written off not merely as an Empiricist but as the founder of the School of English Empiricism.
It is not quite clear what an Empiricist is, but it is quite clear that most of the doctrines which an Empiricist (as ordinarily defined) should hold are strenuously denied by Locke. That the evidence of particular perceptions can never be a foundation for true knowledge, that true knowledge is both completely general and completely certain and is of the type of pure mathematics, that inductive generalisations from collected observations can never yield better than probable generalisations giving us opinion but not knowledge, are doctrines which Locke’s whole Essay is intended to establish. He even goes so far with the rationalist metaphysicians as to hold that the existence of God is demonstrable, and he is at one with the Cambridge Platonists in arguing that the principles of morality are demonstrable by the same methods and with the same certainty as any of the propositions of geometry (Ryle, John Locke on the Human Understanding)

It is difficult to judge how coherent Locke's thinking really is, whether at a single point in time or over a protracted span of time, and whether within a single text or across a range of texts which were in any sense intended to address one another, even for someone disposed to concentrate principally upon that question. What makes it so is partly the fact that coherence is a somewhat equivocal idea in the first place, and partly that the range of relevant interpretive considerations is potentially so wide, and the process of interrogation itself necessarily always somewhat inexplicit. The presumption of coherence in any thinker is neither gratuitous nor self-supporting: better seen as an issue to raise with vigor inside a sequence of interpretation than as either a safe starting point or a necessarily appropriate destination (Dunn, What History Can Show: Jeremy Waldron's Reading of Locke's Christian Politics)

Известно, что вопрос о статусе армейских образований играл большую роль в политической мысли нового времени.
Вот, например, карикатура одного из Тори на регулярные армии.

Рукопись статьи П. Стросона «Проблема реализма и a priori”

You then whose judgment the right course would steer,
Know well each ANCIENT'S proper character;
His fable, subject, scope in ev'ry page;
Religion, country, genius of his age:
Without all these at once before your eyes,
Cavil you may, but never criticise.
(Pope, An Essay on Criticism)

Generations of German philosophy students were taught early on that they face a stark, ineluctable, existentially defining choice: “Kant, oder Hegel?” The thought was not that one needed to pick one or the other of these seminal, difficult, multifarious philosophers to concentrate on and master. It was that, struggle as one might, one would inevitably find oneself allied with one or the other—conceptually, methodologically, and even temperamentally—and that the difference would resonate throughout one’s thought, beyond one’s conscious control, affecting the topics one found it important to address, the tools one used to do so, the manner in which one proceeded, and the standards to which one held oneself. If they got a bit further, the students would learn to line this question up with the more focused one: “Verstand oder Vernunft?” (Brandom, Pragmatism and Idealism)

10.01: https://youtu.be/5dVLtEilCuc?si=m31LQJa5_cjWF8vP

Французский переводчик эссе о языке Михаэлиса, переведенный на английский:

It is proper even to take notice that M. de Prémontval having shewn that the falsity of the demonstra­tion becomes manifest, on thinking, or on translating into French, whereas in the Latin and German expression, it remains strangely en­veloped and intricate; and this it was which gave rise to the important question, on the influence of language on opinions, and of opinions on language. Never had the bulk of the German nation been misled by the Wolffian philosophy, had not the two languages, which are most familiar to them, the German and Latin, been more accommo­dated than the French, to the sophism, on which the whole is founded. This, perhaps, is one of the most remarkable passages in the history of the human mind