Все, что нужно знать о противостоянии "школ" в истории философии:


If the ambition to write a section on morals is authentically Cartesian, the content of this section is not: a good part of its pages are in fact a transcription of the French translation of Hobbes’s De cive, a text that had been integrated into the Cartesian encyclopedia by Philosophy Divided into All Its Parts (La philosophie divisée en toutes ses parties) of Jacques Du Roure, which appeared in 1654. In relation to this work, the novelty of the System consisted in the fact that it embraced all disciplines and explicated them by linking principles and their consequences in a coherent whole (Régis 1691a: I.preface, n.p.)

Если честно, это, наверное, самая стильная оценка чужой работы из все, что я видел. Остин о "Понятии ума" Райла:

Even to the undergraduate, plain thinking and plain living as the work of the past fifty years has made him, Professor Ryle's first book, long awaited, will seem one that he cannot afford not to possess and that he can afford to possess. This is a very considerable achievement on the part of both author and publisher. Not only is the book stimulating, enjoyable and original, but a quite unusually high percentage of it is true, the remainder at least false. In short, it stands head and shoulders above its contemporaries; it will deservedly enjoy a success, and even a vogue. Because this is so certain, and after emphasizing that it is to be welcomed most warmly as a voice which speaks, where too many are mute, for the genuine work being done at present in philosophy, the risk may be taken of referring freely to points of criticism

The historians of philosophy, abetted, it must be confessed, by those who set examination papers in philosophy to students, love to allocate philosophers to ‘schools of thought’, and Locke has suffered more than most from this facile pigeon-holing. He is generally written off not merely as an Empiricist but as the founder of the School of English Empiricism.
It is not quite clear what an Empiricist is, but it is quite clear that most of the doctrines which an Empiricist (as ordinarily defined) should hold are strenuously denied by Locke. That the evidence of particular perceptions can never be a foundation for true knowledge, that true knowledge is both completely general and completely certain and is of the type of pure mathematics, that inductive generalisations from collected observations can never yield better than probable generalisations giving us opinion but not knowledge, are doctrines which Locke’s whole Essay is intended to establish. He even goes so far with the rationalist metaphysicians as to hold that the existence of God is demonstrable, and he is at one with the Cambridge Platonists in arguing that the principles of morality are demonstrable by the same methods and with the same certainty as any of the propositions of geometry (Ryle, John Locke on the Human Understanding)

It is difficult to judge how coherent Locke's thinking really is, whether at a single point in time or over a protracted span of time, and whether within a single text or across a range of texts which were in any sense intended to address one another, even for someone disposed to concentrate principally upon that question. What makes it so is partly the fact that coherence is a somewhat equivocal idea in the first place, and partly that the range of relevant interpretive considerations is potentially so wide, and the process of interrogation itself necessarily always somewhat inexplicit. The presumption of coherence in any thinker is neither gratuitous nor self-supporting: better seen as an issue to raise with vigor inside a sequence of interpretation than as either a safe starting point or a necessarily appropriate destination (Dunn, What History Can Show: Jeremy Waldron's Reading of Locke's Christian Politics)

Известно, что вопрос о статусе армейских образований играл большую роль в политической мысли нового времени.
Вот, например, карикатура одного из Тори на регулярные армии.

Рукопись статьи П. Стросона «Проблема реализма и a priori”

You then whose judgment the right course would steer,
Know well each ANCIENT'S proper character;
His fable, subject, scope in ev'ry page;
Religion, country, genius of his age:
Without all these at once before your eyes,
Cavil you may, but never criticise.
(Pope, An Essay on Criticism)

Generations of German philosophy students were taught early on that they face a stark, ineluctable, existentially defining choice: “Kant, oder Hegel?” The thought was not that one needed to pick one or the other of these seminal, difficult, multifarious philosophers to concentrate on and master. It was that, struggle as one might, one would inevitably find oneself allied with one or the other—conceptually, methodologically, and even temperamentally—and that the difference would resonate throughout one’s thought, beyond one’s conscious control, affecting the topics one found it important to address, the tools one used to do so, the manner in which one proceeded, and the standards to which one held oneself. If they got a bit further, the students would learn to line this question up with the more focused one: “Verstand oder Vernunft?” (Brandom, Pragmatism and Idealism)

10.01: https://youtu.be/5dVLtEilCuc?si=m31LQJa5_cjWF8vP