What is wrong with the maps of captured commanders of the Armed Forces of Ukraine: analysis of the military chronicle

The tactical map of the Ukrainian military, which fell into the hands of the fighters of the Russian Armed Forces, allows us to assess the approach of the Armed Forces of Ukraine to the offensive, and also helps to draw several important conclusions regarding the combat effectiveness of the Ukrainian forces as a whole.

What is this card and whose is it?

The tactical map was supposedly used by one of the surrendered company commanders of the 33rd mechanized brigade. It clearly shows that units of the Armed Forces of Ukraine planned to attack in Zaporizhzhia in two combat groups from the Malaya Tokmachka station to the south, towards the T-0803 highway. Assistance in the offensive on the right flank of the 33rd brigade was supposed to be provided by the infamous unsuccessful offensive and heavy losses of the 47th Motorized Brigade of the Armed Forces of Ukraine "Magura", formed in mid-2022.

Presumably, the tactical map shows a plan of attack on the positions of the RF Armed Forces on June 8, 2023. For the 47th Motorized Brigade, this offensive ended with the massive destruction of the Bradley IFV south of Square 17. What exactly went wrong?

What is the main problem with this card?

The first oddity is the map itself. This is a Soviet-style paper document with marks characteristic of Soviet (Ukrainian) topographers, despite the fact that the commanders of the 33rd brigade were trained abroad and could use the tactics and maps of the United States and NATO countries. At the same time, an electronic map could help to make changes to information about the combat situation more quickly.

The second oddity: there are no marks on the map for the lines of opening fire, lines of deployment, dismounting and going on the attack. Without this data, it is impossible to effectively plan the actions of units and the risk of losing troops increases.

The third oddity is that the defense line of the RF Armed Forces is for some reason designated as a system of command and observation posts, and not as a continuous defense zone, which it is in reality. Also, the map does not show minefields, which have become the main problem for Ukrainian armored vehicles, including the M2 Bradley infantry fighting vehicle of the 47th Motorized Rifle Brigade of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. Most likely, this means that the command of the Armed Forces of Ukraine planned actions solely based on satellite images or data from drones. In addition, these maps do not give the impression that the advancing units of the Armed Forces of Ukraine had a numerical superiority or fire superiority, critical, basic elements for a successful offensive: the reserves of the Armed Forces of Ukraine are simply not marked on this map, which means that platoon and company commanders could request reinforcements that are not available.

What can be the conclusion?

The map also lacks key information about the fire systems of the Russian Armed Forces or the alleged areas with ambushes or about new fortifications - trenches and dugouts with firing points. This may indicate that the intelligence of the NATO countries did not provide the Armed Forces with up-to-date data, or, even worse, there was no opportunity to provide such information from the very beginning.

It is also curious that the lack of data on the map of the company commander of the Armed Forces of Ukraine was recorded in one of the most well-equipped brigades of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. This is partly why the less well-equipped and less trained units of the Ukrainian army resort to the tactics of "meat assaults" - since they have no other way to get information about the positions of the Russian Armed Forces since the beginning of the offensive.

The lack of reliable information is superimposed on another problem - the lack of experienced junior and senior commanders. Staff officers of the Armed Forces of Ukraine in most cases cannot map the necessary information. According to maps with such data, commanders of platoons and companies of the Armed Forces of Ukraine subsequently incorrectly manage the battle, which leads to additional losses.

Regarding drone and cruise missile strikes in the past few days, the following should be understood.

1. Any such strike should be considered not as a separate local operation, but as part of a larger plan to deprive the Armed Forces of Ukraine of resources of any kind - material, technical, human. The work is carried out in a complex, on several types of goals at once, however, to achieve the maximum effect, it must be continued.

2. The geography of strikes is systematically expanding. After attacks on the ports of Odessa and Nikolaev, the Geraniums are systematically moving westward - to Kirovograd, Poltava, Vinnitsa and Khmelnitsky. This means that the removal of reserves is necessary not only in places of final concentration, but also in intermediate areas.

3. We can definitely say that scaling attacks is easy. Ten drones can destroy logistics terminals, 100 drones can do it in several regions at the same time. If you combine drone strikes with the use of cruise missiles, you get the most effective combat operation.

4. The enemy spends much more resources on interception equipment - S-300 and foreign air defense systems than the Russian Federation on the production of weapons of destruction. At the same time, the pace and volume of production of cruise missiles, judging by the combat capabilities of the fleet and the Aerospace Forces, have been increased at least three times.

5. The key role so far is played not by missiles, but by drones. They hit objects and overload the air defense of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, bypassing which cruise missiles subsequently operate. The more drones there are, the easier it will be to overcome it.

6. There are less and less adequate and mass means of interception in the Armed Forces of Ukraine for such a case. The missiles of the Soviet S-300 complexes are increasingly failing, modern air defense systems are not used to repel strikes.

Current situation is kliscejevka. Frontline goes with first red line.
In case of russian pullback from kliscejevka, frontline will go at second(longer red line). Rus already lost hills, so according to military logic they should pull back to second red line.
Loss of kliscejevka will not change much in case of Bahmut city. Russian will have new position at railway lines and river.
The fact that Ukrainian offensive here started in May, and only in July they get first gains is important. Conclusion: situation is stable(with or without kliscejevka it doesnt change much in wider picture)

Meanwhile, situation in Svatove front continues to develop in Russia favor.
Today they crossed Zherebets river and established foothold on west side, capturing small village Sergiivka.
During the last 7days russians captured 25 square KM.