The requirement of Article 22(1) that no person who is arrested shall be detained in custody without being informed, as soon as may be, of the grounds for such arrest indicates that the clause really contemplates an arrest without a warrant of court, for, as already noted, a person arrested under a court's warrant is made acquainted with the grounds of his arrest before the arrest is actually effected. (Para 20 of Punjab v. Ajaib Singh)
Regulation 41 reveals that the Examination Committee can initiate disciplinary proceedings in connection with the Examination. The language used therein is unequivocal, leaving no room for ambiguity that an action can be taken if a candidate behaves in a disorderly manner in or near an examination hall or has resorted to unfair means. (Para 57)https://www.indiclegal.com/post/hc-sets-aside-decision-of-icai-to-cancel-result-of-ca-student-for-questioning-exams-during-covid
The Pharmacy Council of India has granted approval to both the petitioners for capacity of 100 and 60 admissions/students respectively. The petitioners filed by the petitioners challenging the policy decision of the State Government has allowed by the High Court. The State Government in notification has granted conditional affiliation after considering the recommendations made by the Affiliation Committee.
In the present appeal, the court has re – appreciated the entire evidence on record, more particularly the depositions of PW1, PW2 and PW5. The witnesses were thoroughly cross examined and found they are trustworthy and reliable. The ballistic report shows that the bullet recovered does not match with the gun recovered, it is not possible to reject the credible and reliable deposition of PW1 & PW2. Injuries on different parts of the body which show the intention and conduct on the part of the accused A2 & A3. The presence and participation have been established and proved by the prosecution by examining PW1 & PW2 are found to be reliable and trustworthy witnesses. The prosecution has been successful in proving the motive.
We may hasten to add that we are not saying that no monetary condition can be imposed for grant of bail. We say so as there are cases of offences against property or otherwise but that cannot be a compensation to be deposited and disbursed as if that grant has to take place as a condition of the person being enlarged on bail (Para.17).
(i) The first proviso to Section 184(1) of the Finance Act, 2017, introduced by Section 12 of the Tribunals Reforms (Rationalisation and Conditions of Service) Ordinance, 2021 is hereby declared void and inoperative. Similarly, the second proviso to Section 184(1) of the Finance Act, 2017, introduced by Section 12 of the Tribunals Reforms (Rationalisation and Conditions of Service) Ordinance, 2021 is held to be void and inoperative. (ii) Section 184(7) of the Finance Act, 2017 introduced by Section 12 of the Tribunals Reforms (Rationalisation and Conditions of Service) Ordinance, 2021 is hereby declared void and inoperative. (iii) Section 184(11)(i) and (ii) introduced by Section 12 of the Tribunals (Reforms Rationalisation and Conditions of Service) Ordinance, 2021 are hereby declared as void and unconstitutional (Para.46).
Thus, we feel, it is time to reiterate that public officers should not be called to court unnecessarily. The dignity and majesty of the Court is not enhanced when an officer is called to court. Respect to the court has to be commanded and not demanded and the same is not enhanced by calling public officers. The presence of public officer comes at the cost of other official engagement demanding their attention. Sometimes, the officers even have to travel long distance. Therefore, summoning of the officer is against the public interest as many important tasks entrusted to him gets delayed, creating extra burden on the officer or delaying the decisions awaiting his opinion. The Court proceedings also take time, as there is no mechanism of fixed time hearing in Courts as of now (Para.20).https://www.indiclegal.com/post/public-officers-should-not-be-called-to-court-unnecessarily-sc-reiterated
“India cannot have two parallel legal systems, “one for the rich and the resourceful and those who wield political power and influence and the other for the small men without resources and capabilities to obtain justice or fight injustice.” The existence of a dual legal system will only chip away the legitimacy of the law. The duty also falls on the State machinery to be committed to the rule of law and demonstrate its ability and willingness to follow the rules it itself makes, for its actions to not transgress into the domain of “governmental lawlessness”.(Para 44)
The definition of “decree” in Section 2(2) “shall be deemed to include the rejection of a plaint”. Hence, the order of the Trial Court rejecting the plaint is subject to a first appeal under Section 96 of the CPC. The writ petition filed by the appellant was liable to be rejected on that ground. ,, (Para 12)https://www.indiclegal.com/post/the-apex-court-held-only-appeal-is-maintainable-under-section-96-cpc-sc
The judicial views before us leave little doubt over the proposition that an LoI merely indicates a party’s intention to enter into a contract with the other party in future. No binding relationship between the parties at this stage emerges and the totality of the circumstances have to be considered in each case. It is no doubt possible to construe a letter of intent as a binding contract if such an intention is evident from its terms. But then the intention to do so must be clear and unambiguous as it takes a deviation from how normally a letter of intent has to be understood. (Para 20)https://www.indiclegal.com/post/nit-the-formal-agreement-to-be-executed-between-the-parties-post-contractor-constitutes-a-contract
It is evident that Section 24A does not stipulate that the consent of SEBI is necessary for the SAT or the Court before which such proceedings are pending to compound an offence. Where Parliament intended that a recommendation by SEBI is necessary, it has made specific provisions in that regard in the same statute…. (Para 84)https://www.indiclegal.com/post/section-24a-does-not-stipulate-that-the-consent-of-sebi-is-necessary-sc
Order XXXII, Rule 3, is found in the First Schedule to the Code. Under Section 121 of the Code, the Rules in the First Schedule shall have effect as if enacted in the body of the Code until annulled or altered in accordance with the provisions of Part X, which comprises of Sections 121 to 131. The High Courts are empowered under Section 122 of the Code to annul/alter or add to all or any of the Rules in the First Schedule, for regulating the procedure of the civil courts subject to their superintendence…; (Para 15)https://www.indiclegal.com/post/the-apex-court-nullified-a-decree-as-failure-to-appoint-a-guardian-for-the-minor-defendant
Quite obviously if one were to include the power to modify an award in Section 34, one would be crossing the Lakshman Rekha and doing what, according to the justice of a case, ought to be done. In interpreting a statutory provision, a Judge must put himself in the shoes of Parliament and then ask whether Parliament intended this result. Parliament very clearly intended that no power of modification of an award exists in Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, 1996. It is only for Parliament to amend the aforesaid provision in the light of the experience of the courts in the working of the Arbitration Act, 1996, and bring it in line with other legislations the world over (Para 46)https://www.indiclegal.com/post/parliament-intended-that-no-power-of-modification-of-an-award-exists-in-s-34-of-arbitration-act-1996
This court is of the opinion that the per se bar to the relief of interest on refund, enunciated by the decision in Raje Ram (supra) which was applied in Wg. Commander Arifur Rehman (supra) cannot be considered good law. The nature and extent of relief, to which a subsequent purchaser can be entitled to, would be fact dependent. (Para 31)https://www.indiclegal.com/post/that-the-per-se-bar-to-the-relief-of-interest-on-refund-cannot-be-considered-good-law-sc
That on a conjoint reading of the aforesaid rules, it can be seen that services rendered as ad hoc cannot be considered as “substantive appointments” and on regularisation of their services under the 1979 Rules/1989 Rules after they were selected by the Selection Committee under the 1979 Rules, their appointment can be said to be “substantive appointments” and therefore their seniority is to be counted only from the date of their substantive appointments, i.e., regularisation under the 1979 Rules/1989 Rules.(Para.3.2 ix)https://www.indiclegal.com/post/ad-hoc-appointments-cannot-be-deemed-to-be-substantive-appointments-sc
It has been held that an Arbitral Tribunal is not a Court of law. Its orders are not judicial orders. Its functions are not judicial functions. It cannot exercise its powers ex debito justitiae. It has been held that the jurisdiction of the arbitrator being confined to the four corners of the agreement, he can only pass such an order which may be the subject matter of reference (Para 87).https://www.indiclegal.com/post/an-arbitral-tribunal-is-not-a-court-of-law-sc
The aforesaid analysis of Part IXB of the Constitution leads to the result that though Article 246(3) and Entry 32, List II of the 7th Schedule have not been ‘changed’ in letter, yet the impact upon the aforesaid articles cannot be said to be insignificant. On the contrary, it is clear that by curtailing the width of Entry 32, List II of the 7th Schedule, Part IXB seeks to effect a significant change in Article 246(3) read with Entry 32 List II of the 7th Schedule inasmuch as the State’s exclusive power to make laws with regard to the subject of co-operative societies is significantly curtailed thereby directly impacting the quasi-federal principle contained therein. (Para 67)https://www.indiclegal.com/post/multistate-co-operative-societies-attracts-neither-a-246-3-nor-entry-32-list-ii-of-the-7th-schedule
In the facts and circumstances of the case, no error has been committed by the courts below for convicting the accused under Section 323 of Indian Penal Code, 1860. The prosecution have examined the independent witnesses and injured witnesses and proved that the accused person was present and participated and committed the offences. The accused were the members of the unlawful assembly and common intention to snatch the voters list and to cast bogus voting; they are punishable under section 147 of Indian Penal Code, 1860.https://www.indiclegal.com/post/the-statement-of-injured-witnesses-has-greater-evidentiary-value-unless-compelling-reasons-exist-sc
The freedoms granted to MLAs are necessary for the functioning of democracy and are subject to the powers of the Speaker or the criminal courts with the sanction of the Speaker. The continuance of the trial of the MLAs absent the sanction of the Speaker lowers the dignity of the Assembly amongst citizens, thereby affecting public interest; (Para 4)https://www.indiclegal.com/post/act-of-vandalism-is-against-public-interest-and-unacceptable-sc
The High Court, in granting anticipatory bail under Section 438 in the first two appeals and following that order in disposing of the challenge to the order of the Sessions Judge in the companion appeals, has evidently lost sight of the nature and gravity of the alleged offence. (Para 22)https://www.indiclegal.com/post/hc-in-granting-anticipatory-bail-u-s-438-should-look-into-the-nature-gravity-of-the-offence-sc