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(Bitcoin, Ethereum, DeFi, Finance, Computer science)

@newbateni
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Imagine we have a custom factory contract. This contract has a method that takes a salt as input and deploys a contract using create2. The logic of the deployed contract includes a self-destruct method.

Now, the question is: Can we deploy a contract with the same address as the destructed contract by using the same salt in the factory?

#question
#research
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Hamid list
Imagine we have a custom factory contract. This contract has a method that takes a salt as input and deploys a contract using create2. The logic of the deployed contract includes a self-destruct method. Now, the question is: Can we deploy a contract with…
Consider the scenario where the answer is affirmative. Given the existence of TStore and TRead opcodes, what potential use cases can arise?

Is it possible to generate a temporary contract that remains valid for just a single transaction?

( In my thoughts I think we should adapt the T opcode mindset for the create2 opcode too)
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Report on USDT Phishing on Polygon network:

The attacker's strategy was based on obtaining approval for a contract address that hadn't been deployed yet.

Here's a step-by-step breakdown:

1- The attacker used a phishing technique to gain approval on the Tether (USDT) token.
2- They then invoked the Factory Contract to deploy a contract on the approved address.
3- Finally, they executed a function from the newly deployed child contract to transfer the USDT tokens.

The attacker utilized a vanity address for the External Owned Account (EOA) and the Contract to decrease gas costs. However, they transferred the stolen assets to a non-vanity address to avoid the risks associated with vanity addresses.

The core concept behind this attack was the use of Create2 and the ability to predict a contract address, thereby luring the user into granting approval on a contract that hasn't been deployed yet.

Users indeed have the option to verify the address they're planning to grant approval to on a blockchain explorer.

No legitimate decentralized finance (DeFi) application should ever ask you to give approval to an External Owned Account (EOA).

As a regular user, you should NEVER grant approval to unverified contracts. Always ensure that the contract you're interacting with is verified and trustworthy.


#dapp
#phising
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Hamid list
Report on USDT Phishing on Polygon network: The attacker's strategy was based on obtaining approval for a contract address that hadn't been deployed yet. Here's a step-by-step breakdown: 1- The attacker used a phishing technique to gain approval on the…
During This Investigation for a friend i saw weird approach on the polygon for charging user for the gas cost

https://polygonscan.com/address/0x0000000000000000000000000000000000001010#code

every polygon transaction contain event from this contract, because the polygon has pre-deployed contract on this address for Matic Token and in every transaction people pay their fee buy using the token transfer in polygon

feeTransfer

but this contract is pre-deployed contract and transferring through it doesn't make extra charge on the fee.

they call it MRC20 standard

https://www.reddit.com/r/0xPolygon/comments/sfx4o2/matic_as_a_mrc20_token_versus_just_matic_on_the/
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Combining Merkle Mountain Ranges with Validium πŸ€”

#reserach
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Forwarded from ABDul Rehman TradMod
CreateX? Whats that?
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Why not LevelDB