Kali Linux Tutorials
HandleKatz : PIC Lsass Dumper Using Cloned Handles

HandleKatz tool was implemented as part of our Brucon2021 conference talk and demonstrates the usage of cloned handles to Lsass in order to create an obfuscated memory dump of the same.

It compiles down to an executable living fully in its text segment. Thus, the extracted .text segment of the PE file is fully position independent code (=PIC), meaning that it can be treated like any shellcode.

The execution of HandleKatz in memory has a very small footprint, as itself does not allocate any more executable memory and can therefore efficiently be combined with concepts such as (Phantom)DLL-Hollowing as described by @_ForrestOrr. This is in contrast to PIC PE loaders, such as Donut, SRDI or Reflective Loaders which, during PE loading, allocate more executable memory. Additionally, it makes use of a modified version of ReactOS MiniDumpWriteDumpA using direct system calls to write an obfuscated dump to disk.

For detailed information please refer to the PDF file PICYourMalware.pdf in this repository.

Usage

* make all to build HandleKatzPIC.exe, HandleKatz.bin and loader.exe

Please note that different compiler (versions) yield different results. This might produce a PE file with relocations.

All tests were carried out using x86_64-w64-mingw32-gcc mingw-gcc version 11.2.0 (GCC). The produced PIC was successfully tested on: Windows 10 Pro 10.0.17763. On other versions of windows, API hashes might differ.

To use the PIC, cast a pointer to the shellcode in executable memory and call it according to the definition:
DWORD handleKatz(BOOL b_only_recon, char* ptr_output_path, uint32_t pid, char* ptr_buf_output);
* b_only_recon If set, HandleKatz will only enumerate suitable handles without dumping
* ptr_output_path Determines where the obfuscated dump will be written to
* pid What PID to clone a handle from
* ptr_buf_output A char pointer to which HandleKatz writes its internal output

For deobfuscation of the dump file, the script Decoder.py can be used.

Loader implements a sample loader for HandleKatz:

loader.exe –pid:7331 –outfile:C:\Temp\dump.obfuscated
https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/a/AVvXsEilwBKv6Ob3eDjUPi3vbqmmegbYXYQm34nw_sXhM7H0gHFzpB-954SvW8krrOMBdU8FcrjQvnJScSw1smECX1yt326ENdffoTQhSn8zCpikWXnNEz3acTOS_ymRE8coa_htjof-Wiu7u3E7TQlNc5UljHnw2DGE1w4tZgre7Ls7H5om1PEscick9JVH=s699
Detection

As cloned handles are used along with modified ReactOS code, no ProcessAccess events can be observed on Lsass. However, ProcessAccess events on programs which hold a handle to Lsass can be observed.

Defenders can monitor for Process Access masks with set PROCESS_DUP_HANDLE (0x0040) to identify the usage of this tool.
Download

___________________________
@hacking_Attack
@Hacking_Video

Kali Linux Tutorials
aDLL : Adventure of Dynamic Link Library

aDLL is a binary analysis tool focused on the automatic discovery of DLL Hijacking vulnerabilities. The tool analyzes the image of the binary loaded in memory to search for DLLs loaded at load-time and makes use of the Microsoft Detours library to intercept calls to the Load Library/Load LibraryEx functions to analyze the DLLs loaded at run-time. The purpose is to obtain a list of DLLs that are not found by the executable in those folders where they are searched.

Getting Started

To start using aDLL a compiled executable is available in the Binaries folder. It is recommended to use the version whose architecture (32-bit or 64-bit) matches the version of the executable to be analyzed.

For the correct functioning of the tool, it is necessary that the DLLs “hook32”, “hook64”, “informer32” and “informer64” are located in the same directory as the executable aDLL.exe.

Prerequisites

aDLL has been developed and tested on Windows 10 systems. If the system is old and/or Visual Studio is not installed, it is possible that the tool will throw an error like “VCRUNTIME140.dll not found”. In this case the Visual C++ Redistributable update must be installed. Update can be found here: https://www.microsoft.com/es-ES/download/details.aspx?id=49984.

Compilation

To modify/recompile the tool it is recommended the use of Visual Studio 2015 or later. The Visual Studio solution consists of three projects: aDLL, Hook e Informer. _ -aDLL: must be compiled as an executable. If linking errors occur, it will be necessary to add the shlwapi.lib library using the Visual Studio linker as an additional dependency._ _ -Hook: must be compiled as a DLL with the same architecture as the executable to be analyzed. The resulting Hook file must be renamed to hook32.dll or hook64.dll as appropriate. If you wish to analyze executables of both architectures it will be necessary to have both DLLs in the same directory as aDLL.exe._ _ -Informer: same as Hook. Must be compiled as a DLL and renamed to informer32.dll or informer64.dll._

Usage

The tool has a -h option to print a brief description of the available options on the screen..

.\aDLL -h

As a common example of usage aDLL should receive at least the path to the executable to be analyzed.

.\aDLL -e “C:\System32\notepad.exe”

OPTIONS:

-h Displays the tool’s help with a brief description of each option.
-e Specifies the path to the executable to be analyzed by aDLL.
-t Specifies a path to a text file with a list of executable paths.
-o Specifies a path to a directory in which a report will be stored for each executable scanned.
-m Searches for the executable’s manifest and displays it on the screen. aDLL searches for the manifest embedded in the binary, it will not find the manifest if it exists as an external file.
-w Defines the number of seconds the executable process will be kept open while searching for DLLs loaded at runtime. The default time is 20 seconds.
-aDLL will automatically test if a malicious DLL is executed by impersonating the legitimate DLL in the search order if a candidate DLL has been found.
-d Used in conjunction with the -a option, this option allows you to select a path to a DLL that will be used as the malicious DLL.
-r Each DLL imported by the executable can in turn import other DLLs as dependencies. A search “n” times recursive will be made on all those DLLs found by aDLL that are not redirected (ApiSetSchema or WinSxS) and do not belong to the list of Known DLL of the system.
Download

___________________________
@hacking_Attack
@Hacking_Video

Hacking on Medium
WHAT IS DARK WEB?

https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1037/1*1FzwCYF5QKWyRTGvBxhAPQ.jpeg
Ever hear of the “dark web”? If so, it may sound rather mysterious. Your instincts were right – it is. But we can make it much less so.

Continue reading on Medium »

___________________________
@hacking_Attack
@Hacking_Video

Hacking on Medium
bossplayersCTF 1: Vulnhub Walkthrough

https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/661/0*sDFSTsDvTxqAl2Rj.png
Makineyi indirebilirsiniz.

Continue reading on Medium »

___________________________
@hacking_Attack
@Hacking_Video

Hacking on Medium
TryHackMe Write-up: USTOUN.

https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1200/0*BlDWP-eTfMni1dgU.png
Dificultad: Media.

Continue reading on Medium »

___________________________
@hacking_Attack
@Hacking_Video

Hacking on Medium
Hackers norcoreanos encontrados detrás de una variedad de campañas de robo de credenciales

https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1476/0*gj4MMyRq2xpM7bQd
PUBLICADO EN 22 NOVIEMBRE, 2021POR DPAB

Continue reading on Medium »

___________________________
@hacking_Attack
@Hacking_Video

Hacking on Medium
Supply Chain Attacks: What You Should Know

https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/800/1*-Fg1Ps55rz-YEDoyJtJz1w.png
Supply-chain attacks may not grab the headlines in the same way as ransomware or data breaches, but these sneaky cyberattacks are just as…

Continue reading on Medium »

___________________________
@hacking_Attack
@Hacking_Video

Hacking on Medium
Publican detalles internos del grupo de ransomware Conti

https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1521/0*ywyah-JWbUXyzLUf
PUBLICADO EN 22 NOVIEMBRE, 2021POR DPAB

Continue reading on Medium »

___________________________
@hacking_Attack
@Hacking_Video

Hacking on Medium
Getting to Know Compliance in Software Development

https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/2600/0*nhCnW3004rbYrXcJ
A developer’s introduction to compliance standards like PCI-DSS, HIPAA, and GDPR.

Continue reading on ShiftLeft Blog »

___________________________
@hacking_Attack
@Hacking_Video

hacking: security in practice
When a usb wifi card says it supports "monitor mode", does it also mean it supports "packet injection"?

I have the TP-link WN-823n V3 and on the driver website it lists an option for Beta linux driver which supports "monitor mode". Now if i try to use this driver, i want to do it in a Virtual Machine Kali linux. So if it says it supports "Monitor mode", is packet injection also included with that? And is it possible to use this driver through a VM?

submitted by /u/Walid_Fakhfakh
[link] [comments]

___________________________
@hacking_Attack
@Hacking_Video

hacking: security in practice
GoDaddy Security Breach

submitted by /u/Zohrah_Masoom
[link] [comments]

___________________________
@hacking_Attack
@Hacking_Video

ThreatBox - A Standard And Controlled Linux Based Attack Platform
http://www.kitploit.com/2021/11/threatbox-standard-and-controlled-linux.html

___________________________
@hacking_Attack
@Hacking_Video