🎁 Advanced Abuse of Referral SystemsContinue reading on Bug Bounty Hunting: A Comprehensive Guide in English and french » (https://medium.com/bug-bounty-hunting-a-comprehensive-guide-in/advanced-abuse-of-referral-systems-c97cc17f705f?source=rss------bug_bounty-5)
How a Simple “Resend” Button Led to an MFA Fatigue Vulnerability
Most people think security vulnerabilities are complex.Continue reading on Medium »
Read more...
Most people think security vulnerabilities are complex.Continue reading on Medium »
Read more...
Medium
How a Simple “Resend” Button Led to an MFA Fatigue Vulnerability
Most people think security vulnerabilities are complex.
React2Shell — CVE-2025–55182: Practical Exploitation of the Vulnerability
Exploiting Northport Ledger application with RSC componentContinue reading on Medium »
Read more...
Exploiting Northport Ledger application with RSC componentContinue reading on Medium »
Read more...
Medium
React2Shell — CVE-2025–55182: Practical Exploitation of the Vulnerability
Exploiting Northport Ledger application with RSC component
The Art of Finding Bugs No Scanner Will Detect
What your Burp Suite report is not telling you.Continue reading on OSINT Team »
Read more...
What your Burp Suite report is not telling you.Continue reading on OSINT Team »
Read more...
Medium
The Art of Finding Bugs No Scanner Will Detect
What your Burp Suite report is not telling you.
Escaping the Sandbox: How a Simple Python Path Flaw Led to Host RCE
The culprit? A classic logic flaw in Python’s os.path.join() function.Continue reading on Medium »
Read more...
The culprit? A classic logic flaw in Python’s os.path.join() function.Continue reading on Medium »
Read more...
Medium
Escaping the Sandbox: How a Simple Python Path Flaw Led to Host RCE
The culprit? A classic logic flaw in Python’s os.path.join() function.
How a Simple “Resend” Feature Enabled MFA Prompt Flooding
https://medium.com/@Rahul.Masal/how-a-simple-resend-button-led-to-an-mfa-fatigue-vulnerability-6a638edf54ff?source=rss------bug_bounty-5
https://medium.com/@Rahul.Masal/how-a-simple-resend-button-led-to-an-mfa-fatigue-vulnerability-6a638edf54ff?source=rss------bug_bounty-5
Most people think security vulnerabilities are complex.Continue reading on Medium » (https://medium.com/@Rahul.Masal/how-a-simple-resend-button-led-to-an-mfa-fatigue-vulnerability-6a638edf54ff?source=rss------bug_bounty-5)
React2Shell — CVE-2025–55182: Practical Exploitation of the Vulnerability
https://snehbavarva.medium.com/react2shell-cve-2025-55182-practical-exploitation-of-the-vulnerability-2581a65da695?source=rss------bug_bounty-5
https://snehbavarva.medium.com/react2shell-cve-2025-55182-practical-exploitation-of-the-vulnerability-2581a65da695?source=rss------bug_bounty-5
Exploiting Northport Ledger application with RSC componentContinue reading on Medium » (https://snehbavarva.medium.com/react2shell-cve-2025-55182-practical-exploitation-of-the-vulnerability-2581a65da695?source=rss------bug_bounty-5)
The Art of Finding Bugs No Scanner Will Detect
https://osintteam.blog/the-art-of-finding-bugs-no-scanner-will-detect-bea747fbce71?source=rss------bug_bounty-5
https://osintteam.blog/the-art-of-finding-bugs-no-scanner-will-detect-bea747fbce71?source=rss------bug_bounty-5
What your Burp Suite report is not telling you.Continue reading on OSINT Team » (https://osintteam.blog/the-art-of-finding-bugs-no-scanner-will-detect-bea747fbce71?source=rss------bug_bounty-5)
Escaping the Sandbox: How a Simple Python Path Flaw Led to Host RCE
https://medium.com/@HackerMD/escaping-the-sandbox-how-a-simple-python-path-flaw-led-to-host-rce-817d39c95f86?source=rss------bug_bounty-5
https://medium.com/@HackerMD/escaping-the-sandbox-how-a-simple-python-path-flaw-led-to-host-rce-817d39c95f86?source=rss------bug_bounty-5
The culprit? A classic logic flaw in Python’s os.path.join() function.Continue reading on Medium » (https://medium.com/@HackerMD/escaping-the-sandbox-how-a-simple-python-path-flaw-led-to-host-rce-817d39c95f86?source=rss------bug_bounty-5)
How a Small Validation Bypass Enabled Invisible Identities
الحمد لله والصلاة والسلام على رسول الله وعلى آله وصحبه أما بعدContinue reading on Medium »
Read more...
الحمد لله والصلاة والسلام على رسول الله وعلى آله وصحبه أما بعدContinue reading on Medium »
Read more...
Medium
How a Small Validation Bypass Enabled Invisible Identities
الحمد لله والصلاة والسلام على رسول الله وعلى آله وصحبه أما بعد
The Unpopular Opinion: Are We Making Pentesters Irrelevant by Playing by the Rules?
https://www.reddit.com/r/Pentesting/comments/1rbiq9x/the_unpopular_opinion_are_we_making_pentesters/
<!-- SC_OFF -->I've been seeing a recurring argument on here, and it's been stuck in my head. The gist is that companies don't really hire pentesters for genuine security. They do it for compliance, for a checkbox to satisfy auditors, or to get government contracts. The idea is that the "report" is the real product, not actual security. If that's true, and I'm starting to think it might be, then we have a fundamental problem. Think about it from a company's perspective. Why spend real money on deep, meaningful security when a superficial, once-a-year pentest that generates a 50-page PDF is enough to keep the auditors happy? It's cheaper. It's easier. And if a real breach happens, they can point to the report and say, "We did our due diligence." This creates a market where the pentester's job isn't to find the worst vulnerabilities, but to find the right kind of vulnerabilities that look good on a report. It incentivizes a race to the bottom, where low-cost, checklist-style "pentesting" wins over deep, adversarial testing. So here's the controversial part of my thinking: if the legitimate, sanctioned path to proving a company's insecurity is systematically ignored or treated as a bureaucratic nuisance, what other option is left to make them listen? It feels like the only thing that truly forces a company to take security seriously is a real-world, painful breach. A hack. The kind of incident that makes headlines, costs them millions, and destroys customer trust. Suddenly, that "unnecessary" security budget gets approved overnight. The CISO who was asking for more resources is no longer seen as a cost center, but as a prophet. This isn't a call to illegal action. It's a frustration with the system. It feels like we're telling companies, "Hey, your front door is unlocked," and they're replying, "That's nice, please put that in writing for our insurance file." The only time they actually lock the door is after someone has already walked in and stolen the TV. Are we, as a community of security professionals, failing? Is our entire model of ethical disclosure broken if it's so easily ignored? Or is this just the way things have to be—waiting for the inevitable disaster to force change? What do you all think? Is this reality, or am I just being cynical? Is there a better way to make them listen before the real hackers do? <!-- SC_ON --> submitted by /u/KamaleshSelvakumarR (https://www.reddit.com/user/KamaleshSelvakumarR)
[link] (https://www.reddit.com/r/Pentesting/comments/1rbiq9x/the_unpopular_opinion_are_we_making_pentesters/) [comments] (https://www.reddit.com/r/Pentesting/comments/1rbiq9x/the_unpopular_opinion_are_we_making_pentesters/)
https://www.reddit.com/r/Pentesting/comments/1rbiq9x/the_unpopular_opinion_are_we_making_pentesters/
<!-- SC_OFF -->I've been seeing a recurring argument on here, and it's been stuck in my head. The gist is that companies don't really hire pentesters for genuine security. They do it for compliance, for a checkbox to satisfy auditors, or to get government contracts. The idea is that the "report" is the real product, not actual security. If that's true, and I'm starting to think it might be, then we have a fundamental problem. Think about it from a company's perspective. Why spend real money on deep, meaningful security when a superficial, once-a-year pentest that generates a 50-page PDF is enough to keep the auditors happy? It's cheaper. It's easier. And if a real breach happens, they can point to the report and say, "We did our due diligence." This creates a market where the pentester's job isn't to find the worst vulnerabilities, but to find the right kind of vulnerabilities that look good on a report. It incentivizes a race to the bottom, where low-cost, checklist-style "pentesting" wins over deep, adversarial testing. So here's the controversial part of my thinking: if the legitimate, sanctioned path to proving a company's insecurity is systematically ignored or treated as a bureaucratic nuisance, what other option is left to make them listen? It feels like the only thing that truly forces a company to take security seriously is a real-world, painful breach. A hack. The kind of incident that makes headlines, costs them millions, and destroys customer trust. Suddenly, that "unnecessary" security budget gets approved overnight. The CISO who was asking for more resources is no longer seen as a cost center, but as a prophet. This isn't a call to illegal action. It's a frustration with the system. It feels like we're telling companies, "Hey, your front door is unlocked," and they're replying, "That's nice, please put that in writing for our insurance file." The only time they actually lock the door is after someone has already walked in and stolen the TV. Are we, as a community of security professionals, failing? Is our entire model of ethical disclosure broken if it's so easily ignored? Or is this just the way things have to be—waiting for the inevitable disaster to force change? What do you all think? Is this reality, or am I just being cynical? Is there a better way to make them listen before the real hackers do? <!-- SC_ON --> submitted by /u/KamaleshSelvakumarR (https://www.reddit.com/user/KamaleshSelvakumarR)
[link] (https://www.reddit.com/r/Pentesting/comments/1rbiq9x/the_unpopular_opinion_are_we_making_pentesters/) [comments] (https://www.reddit.com/r/Pentesting/comments/1rbiq9x/the_unpopular_opinion_are_we_making_pentesters/)