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CONFIG_X86_IOPL_IOPERM | is not set | clipos | cut_attack_surface | OK: not found
CONFIG_ACPI_TABLE_UPGRADE | is not set | clipos | cut_attack_surface | FAIL: "y"
CONFIG_EFI_CUSTOM_SSDT_OVERLAYS | is not set | clipos | cut_attack_surface | OK: not found
CONFIG_LDISC_AUTOLOAD | is not set | clipos | cut_attack_surface | FAIL: "y"
CONFIG_X86_INTEL_TSX_MODE_OFF | y | clipos | cut_attack_surface | OK
CONFIG_EFI_TEST | is not set | lockdown | cut_attack_surface | FAIL: "m"
CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL | is not set | lockdown | cut_attack_surface | FAIL: "y"
CONFIG_MMIOTRACE_TEST | is not set | lockdown | cut_attack_surface | OK
CONFIG_TRIM_UNUSED_KSYMS | y | my | cut_attack_surface | FAIL: not found
CONFIG_MMIOTRACE | is not set | my | cut_attack_surface | FAIL: "y"
CONFIG_LIVEPATCH | is not set | my | cut_attack_surface | FAIL: "y"
CONFIG_IP_DCCP | is not set | my | cut_attack_surface | FAIL: "m"
CONFIG_IP_SCTP | is not set | my | cut_attack_surface | FAIL: "m"
CONFIG_FTRACE | is not set | my | cut_attack_surface | FAIL: "y"
CONFIG_VIDEO_VIVID | is not set | my | cut_attack_surface | FAIL: "m"
CONFIG_INPUT_EVBUG | is not set | my | cut_attack_surface | FAIL: "m"
CONFIG_INTEGRITY | y |defconfig |userspace_hardening | OK
CONFIG_ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS | 32 | clipos |userspace_hardening | FAIL: "28"
[+] Config check is finished: 'OK' - 58 / 'FAIL' - 82

kconfig-hardened-check versioning
I usually update the kernel hardening recommendations after each Linux kernel release. So the version of kconfig-hardened-check is associated with the corresponding version of the kernel. The version format is: [major_number].[kernel_version].[kernel_patchlevel]
Questions and answers
Q: How disabling CONFIG_USER_NS cuts the attack surface? It's needed for containers! A: Yes, the CONFIG_USER_NS option provides some isolation between the userspace programs, but the tool recommends disabling it to cut the attack surface of the kernel. The rationale: A nice LWN article about the corresponding LKML discussion: https://lwn.net/Articles/673597/ A twitter thread about CONFIG_USER_NS and security: https://twitter.com/robertswiecki/status/1095447678949953541 A good overview of the trade-off between having user namespaces enabled, disabled and available only for root: https://github.com/NixOS/nixpkgs/pull/84522#issuecomment-614640601
Q: Why CONFIG_GCC_PLUGINS is automatically disabled during the kernel compilation? A: It means that your gcc doesn't support plugins. For example, if you have gcc-7 on Ubuntu, try to install gcc-7-plugin-dev package, it should help.
Q: KSPP and CLIP OS recommend CONFIG_PANIC_ON_OOPS=y. Why doesn't this tool do the same? A: I personally don't support this recommendation because it provides easy denial-of-service attacks for the whole system (kernel oops is not a rare situation). I think having CONFIG_BUG is enough here -- if we have a kernel oops in the process context, the offending/attacking process is killed.
Q: What about performance impact of these kernel hardening options? A: Ike Devolder @BlackIkeEagle (https://github.com/BlackIkeEagle) made some performance tests and described the results in this article (https://blog.herecura.eu/blog/2020-05-30-kconfig-hardening-tests/).

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Q: Why enabling CONFIG_STATIC_USERMODEHELPER breaks various things in my GNU/Linux system? Do I really need that feature? A: Linux kernel usermode helpers can be used for privilege escalation (https://www.kitploit.com/search/label/Privilege%20Escalation) in kernel exploits (example 1 (https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2018/09/a-cache-invalidation-bug-in-linux.html), example 2 (https://a13xp0p0v.github.io/2020/02/15/CVE-2019-18683.html)). CONFIG_STATIC_USERMODEHELPER prevents that method. But it requires the corresponding support in the userspace: see the example implementation (https://github.com/tych0/huldufolk) by Tycho Andersen @tych0 (https://github.com/tych0).
Q: Does my kernel have all those mitigations of Transient Execution Vulnerabilities in my hardware? A: Checking the kernel config is not enough to answer this question. I highly recommend using spectre-meltdown-checker (https://github.com/speed47/spectre-meltdown-checker) tool maintained by Stéphane Lesimple @speed47 (https://github.com/speed47).

Download Kconfig-Hardened-Check (https://github.com/a13xp0p0v/kconfig-hardened-check)

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CSRF on Password Reset

My name is Filipe Azevedo and in this post, I’m going to talk about a CSRF that I recently found on a private program on HackerOne.Continue reading on Medium »
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hacking: security in practice
Ransomware attack!!!

This morning, I received a call from my sister, who informed me that her computer had been attacked by ransomware, and that a payment of $700/$490 (within 72 hours) was needed for the key. I was able to trace down the .exe malware that was used to spread the virus, through analysis I was able to remove it all, but the files were still encrypted with the extension IQLL. I've tried a few things (Safe mode, Photorec, Reset PC, Emsisoft, and so on), but none of them have worked so far. Is there anyone who knows how to decrypt these files legitimately?

submitted by /u/Mace_Killer
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