В зв'язку з останніми втратами кількох машин, команди потребують якісного захисту від фпв. Парк оновлено, тепер з вашою допомогою спробуємо його дообладнати захистом на 3 діапазони

Всім зараз складно, але якісно виконувати завдання треба, максимально приклавши зусиль для захисту наших воїнів. Заздалегідь вдячні всім, хто долучається. Все буде Україна!

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Чому Німеччина боїться власної ракети: комплекс Вермахту, Taurus та параліч відповідальності.
https://youtu.be/YqwQAlofIcw?si=5H2D-ZQsZQO0uNl4

У новому відео — сатиричний розбір абсурду довкола ракет Taurus. Чому Україна досі без німецької далекобійної зброї? Як Кремль грає на історичній провині Німеччини? І чому кожен Taurus викликає у Берліна флешбеки з 1943 року?
Про політичну нерішучість, токсичну пам'ять та геополітичний театр, де німецький ракетофантом знову лякає самих німців більше, ніж росіян.
Гостро, з сарказмом і без жалю до політичної млявості.
"Мене знову вбила німецька ракета" — не просто фраза, а психотерапевтична зброя Кремля. Дивимось.

#Taurus #Німеччина #Україна #Ракети #Шольц #Мерц #Кремль #Сатира #Війна #Росія #Зброя #Геополітика

Схоже шо починається нова фаза війни

Побачимо шо воно у підсумку буде

https://www.patreon.com/posts/130158373?utm_campaign=postshare_creator

Many signs point to the fact that the blockade of the "king city" was at least unofficially sanctioned by the administration of President Aliyev. In Azerbaijan, where much of the media is controlled or coordinated by the state, such steps are not usually taken independently by mid-level officials.

The publication that initiated the campaign against Tsargrad, Minval Politika, has a reputation as a pro-government resource, and its editor-in-chief is quite close to official circles. This, in turn, suggests that Mustafayev did not act alone, but at least with the understanding that an unofficial "order" had come from "above" to support this line. The synchronicity of the news items also indirectly indicates this - many have noted a kind of "mirror response" by Baku to the unfriendly rhetoric of the Russian media

In other words, when pro-Kremlin resources began to openly accuse Azerbaijan of playing against Russia, the Azerbaijani authorities responded by striking at one of the most odious such resources of the Russian special services. Given the potential consequences for bilateral relations, it is obvious that the decision to block the Russian channel would not have been made without the consent of Aliyev himself or his inner circle.

Next. "Tsargrad is not an ordinary Russian media outlet, but a significant element of the Kremlin's propaganda system. The channel was founded in 2015 by Russian oligarch and ultra-conservative figure Malofeev, who is closely associated with the Russian state-owned group GRU.

Malofeev is known for his openly monarchist Orthodox position and his closeness to the ideologues of the Russian world. His Tsargrad channel is positioned as a pro-Kremlin media outlet with a distinct Russian Orthodox ideology. Often, the channel's materials present events from an imperial-conservative point of view, promoting the ideas of "traditional values" and Moscow's geopolitical narratives.

Malofeev himself has close political ties to the Russian elite and financial and oligarchic circles. He has been called an "Orthodox oligarch" and has openly supported Russia's aggressive policy towards neighbouring states. In particular, Malofeev actively contributed to the annexation of Crimea and the war in Donbas, and financed pro-Russian militants in eastern Ukraine. For his activities, he, like the Tsargrad TV channel, was sanctioned by the US, EU, UK, Canada and a number of other countries.

Interestingly, even some post-Soviet states have distanced themselves from Malofeev: for example, Kazakhstan not only imposed sanctions against him, but also blocked the Tsargrad website in 2023, accusing the resource of extremist propaganda and hate speech.

Thus, Tsargrad acts as a kind of "mouthpiece" of the ultra-conservative wing of Russian propaganda, promoting narratives favourable to the Kremlin abroad, often through the prism of Orthodoxy and imperial ambitions.

In the system of Russian information expansion, this channel serves as a tool to influence audiences sympathetic to right-wing radical ideas, while simultaneously putting pressure on neighbouring countries by promoting Moscow's interpretation of conflicts and events, including semantic ones.

Undoubtedly, the blocking of the Russian propaganda website did not go unnoticed in Moscow. Although there has been no official reaction at the official level (through the Russian Foreign Ministry or other officials) as of the end of May 2025, it is safe to say that the Russian authorities will view this step as unfriendly.

Given that historically, Russia has been quite sensitive to restrictions on its media abroad, accusing other states of censorship and "harassment of the Russian-speaking audience". It is possible that the Russian Foreign Ministry will issue a statement of protest or hand over a note to the Azerbaijani ambassador in Moscow. Such actions could be accompanied by statements about "violations of freedom of speech" or "Russophobia" in Azerbaijan, a rhetoric that Russian diplomats use in similar cases.👇👇

Baku, aware of the possibility of a diplomatic demarche by the Russians, probably took into account the potential risks in advance. It is worth noting that this tension in relations has already manifested itself in other areas: in May 2025, Russia did not allow Azerbaijani MP Azad Badamov to enter the country without explanation, accusing him of "Russophobic statements". The Azerbaijani Foreign Ministry called this ban an "unfriendly step" and demanded explanations from Moscow. This case demonstrates that mutual distrust and readiness for tough gestures are already present - blocking the "Tsargrad" could become another piece of the puzzle of escalation.

In parallel with official channels, the Russian propaganda machine has already launched a retaliatory information attack. The same Tsargrad, despite being blocked in Azerbaijan, has begun to actively accuse Baku of bias through its Telegram channel and related resources. In particular, Russian commentators call the initiators of the blocking "Russophobes" and point to Azerbaijan's alleged double standards.

Tsargrad's publications note that Azerbaijani state media often criticise Russia themselves, for example, accusing it of "occupying historical Azerbaijani territories" and accusing it of shooting down the AZAL plane before the investigation is completed. They also mention President Aliyev's statement at a forum in April 2025 about his full support for Ukraine's territorial integrity, which is in fact an indirect accusation of Russia's occupation of part of Ukrainian land. Russian propaganda presents these facts as evidence of Baku's "anti-Russian" position.

As a result, the rhetoric of the Kremlin media has become harsher: Azerbaijan is accused of hypocrisy and hostility. As Tsargrad bluntly stated, if Baku talks about "mutual respect in the media sphere", it should start with itself - otherwise, such actions by Azerbaijan will be regarded as "nothing more than a hypocritical attempt to justify its own aggressive rhetoric, or even as a crime". These words actually equate Baku's information policy with hostile, which is an alarming signal of further information warfare. It is possible that Russian state TV channels and officials will pick up this line, painting the image of Azerbaijan as another "unfriendly state".Thus, Moscow's reaction will most likely manifest itself in two dimensions: on the diplomatic front (in the form of statements or targeted actions against Baku) and in the media space (by increasing propaganda pressure and discrediting the Azerbaijani authorities).

Next. Consequences for Azerbaijan and the region and Azerbaijan's internal information security. Baku's decisive step to ban Tsargrad is generally perceived positively within the country as a step towards strengthening information sovereignty. Azerbaijan demonstrates that it will not tolerate foreign propaganda that undermines social harmony and national interests. The blocking of the Russian channel minimises the risk of destructive influence of external Russian narratives on the Azerbaijani audience.

Although, according to Mustafayev himself, the popularity of the Tsargrad resource among ordinary Azerbaijanis was negligible (it was read only by journalists and experts), the significance of this step is rather preventive and symbolic. The government is making it clear that information security is part of national security, and is therefore ready to act proactively.

For the Azerbaijani society, this is a signal of cohesion in the face of possible information provocations, especially against the backdrop of the fragile post-conflict situation in Karabakh.

Undoubtedly, such a demarche in the media sphere could have consequences for the political dialogue between Baku and Moscow. The blocking of the "Tsargrad" is added to the list of factors that have recently worsened the atmosphere of bilateral relations.

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Earlier, the aforementioned incident with the downed plane, President Aliyev's refusal to participate in the May 9 parade in Moscow, and the war of words between parliamentarians (mutual entry bans, accusations of Russophobia, etc.) were the reasons for tension.

Now the information front has also become an arena of confrontation. For the Kremlin, Baku's actions look like a challenge - even a traditionally close post-Soviet partner is ready to go against the grain if it considers Russia's activities harmful to itself. This could push Moscow to reconsider its policy towards Azerbaijan. On the one hand, Russia may try to pressure Baku to soften its stance - for example, through informal channels to press for the restoration of access to pro-Russian media or through allies (Iran or Armenia) to create problems for Azerbaijan. On the other hand, the Kremlin risks alienating Azerbaijan even further by doing so and pushing it towards deeper cooperation with Turkey, the West or Ukraine.

The current situation is indicative of growing distrust: every such incident, whether media or political, is perceived by the parties as a manifestation of hostility. If the trend continues, the Azerbaijani-Russian partnership may be reduced to a minimum, limited to dry pragmatism, while critical notes will prevail in the public sphere.

In addition, Azerbaijan's move sets a significant precedent in the post-Soviet space, especially for its neighbours in the South Caucasus. Experts are already noting a trend: states in the region are becoming less tolerant of aggressive Russian propaganda and are taking measures to protect their information space.

Back in 2023, Kazakhstan openly took action by blocking the Tsargrad website for inciting hatred. Now Azerbaijan has taken a similar step. This may intensify the debate in neighbouring countries.

In Georgia, although the Georgian authorities are balancing the pro-Western aspirations of society with caution towards Moscow, Baku's example could push Tbilisi to take more decisive action. Georgian civil society has long criticised the presence of Russian disinformation narratives in the country. It is possible that opposition forces in Georgia will use the Tsargrad case as an argument to demand the closure of pro-Russian publications and channels operating under the guise of local media.

If the political situation changes, Georgia may join the trend of strictly limiting Russian propaganda to protect its Euro-Atlantic course.

In Armenia, the situation is more complicated. Yerevan has traditionally been heavily dependent on Moscow for security and economic support, and Russian media dominate the Armenian media landscape.

The current Armenian government, headed by Nikol Pashinyan, has recently shown some frustration with the Kremlin (especially because of the CSTO's passivity during the war with Azerbaijan), but it is not yet ready to openly confront Russia. Blocking of pro-Kremlin resources in Armenia is unlikely at this time, as it could cause a harsh reaction from Moscow and a domestic backlash among the pro-Russian segment of the population.

At the same time, if the cooling trend in Russian-Armenian relations intensifies, Yerevan could theoretically take cautious steps: for example, restrict the most odious Russian channels under the pretext of legislative norms (hate speech, extremism, etc.) or support independent media that oppose the Kremlin's narratives.

For now, Armenia will rather watch the experience of Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan from the sidelines.

In conclusion, the blocking of Tsargrad in Azerbaijan was a landmark episode in the information confrontation in the post-Soviet space. It highlighted the depth of mistrust between Baku and Moscow and demonstrated the growing willingness of sovereign states to defend their information sovereignty even at the cost of aggravating relations with the former metropolis.

For Azerbaijan, this step is part of a broader strategy to protect its national interests from foreign propaganda.

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