Forwarded from Фашик Донецький
В зв'язку з останніми втратами кількох машин, команди потребують якісного захисту від фпв. Парк оновлено, тепер з вашою допомогою спробуємо його дообладнати захистом на 3 діапазони
Всім зараз складно, але якісно виконувати завдання треба, максимально приклавши зусиль для захисту наших воїнів. Заздалегідь вдячні всім, хто долучається. Все буде Україна!
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Всім зараз складно, але якісно виконувати завдання треба, максимально приклавши зусиль для захисту наших воїнів. Заздалегідь вдячні всім, хто долучається. Все буде Україна!
🔗Посилання на банку
https://send.monobank.ua/jar/8xFXAGcrLo
💳Номер картки банки
4441 1111 2514 1733
send.monobank.ua
Безпечний переказ коштів
Надсилайте безкоштовно та безпечно кошти
Forwarded from Petrenko AndryiⒸ (Kyiv Ukraine)
Чому Німеччина боїться власної ракети: комплекс Вермахту, Taurus та параліч відповідальності.
https://youtu.be/YqwQAlofIcw?si=5H2D-ZQsZQO0uNl4
У новому відео — сатиричний розбір абсурду довкола ракет Taurus. Чому Україна досі без німецької далекобійної зброї? Як Кремль грає на історичній провині Німеччини? І чому кожен Taurus викликає у Берліна флешбеки з 1943 року?
Про політичну нерішучість, токсичну пам'ять та геополітичний театр, де німецький ракетофантом знову лякає самих німців більше, ніж росіян.
Гостро, з сарказмом і без жалю до політичної млявості.
"Мене знову вбила німецька ракета" — не просто фраза, а психотерапевтична зброя Кремля. Дивимось.
#Taurus #Німеччина #Україна #Ракети #Шольц #Мерц #Кремль #Сатира #Війна #Росія #Зброя #Геополітика
https://youtu.be/YqwQAlofIcw?si=5H2D-ZQsZQO0uNl4
У новому відео — сатиричний розбір абсурду довкола ракет Taurus. Чому Україна досі без німецької далекобійної зброї? Як Кремль грає на історичній провині Німеччини? І чому кожен Taurus викликає у Берліна флешбеки з 1943 року?
Про політичну нерішучість, токсичну пам'ять та геополітичний театр, де німецький ракетофантом знову лякає самих німців більше, ніж росіян.
Гостро, з сарказмом і без жалю до політичної млявості.
"Мене знову вбила німецька ракета" — не просто фраза, а психотерапевтична зброя Кремля. Дивимось.
#Taurus #Німеччина #Україна #Ракети #Шольц #Мерц #Кремль #Сатира #Війна #Росія #Зброя #Геополітика
YouTube
Taurus - на шляху до миру. Петренко Андрій
Чому Німеччина боїться власної ракети: комплекс Вермахту, Taurus і параліч відповідальності
У новому відео — сатиричний розбір абсурду навколо ракет Taurus. Чому Україна досі без німецької далекобійної зброї? Як Кремль грає на історичній провині Німеччини?…
У новому відео — сатиричний розбір абсурду навколо ракет Taurus. Чому Україна досі без німецької далекобійної зброї? Як Кремль грає на історичній провині Німеччини?…
Фашик Донецький
В итоге все в плюсе: немцы заработали, украинцы с ракетами, деньги в экономике Германии При чем тут отчетность? Ха!) в этом основная фишка удара в псину россиянам: За таурусы нужно отчитываться перед партнерам и перед каждым запуском, объяснять то, куда…
Читал и плакал)
P.s - томогавк, блять… ох и дебилы
P.s - томогавк, блять… ох и дебилы
Схоже шо починається нова фаза війни
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Побачимо шо воно у підсумку буде
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Forwarded from 49 ОШБ Карпатська Січ
Media is too big
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Як Тихий пройшов шлях від солдата до командира спецпідрозділу “Шквал” 49-го ОШБ “Карпатська Січ”.
🇺🇦 49 окремий штурмовий батальйон «Карпатська Січ»
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Blocking Tsargrad in Azerbaijan: Reasons, context and consequences
At the end of May 2025, access to the website of the Russian propaganda channel Tsargrad was blocked in Azerbaijan. The formal reason was accusations of disseminating false and provocative information against Azerbaijan.
The initiative to block this resource was taken by the editor-in-chief of the Azerbaijani publication Minval Politika, Emil Mustafayev. He officially appealed to the Ministry of Digital Development and Transport of Azerbaijan with a demand to restrict access to Tsargrad due to systematic disinformation against Baku. The fact of blocking was confirmed by the supervisory authorities: the site was included in the country's register of prohibited resources, as a result of which users saw a message about the impossibility of access when trying to enter.
One of the key arguments for the blocking was specific cases of information attacks by Tsargrad. In particular, on the eve of the blocking, this pro-Kremlin resource published an article titled "Aliyev is no longer hiding: Azerbaijan has sided with Ukraine against Russia". The article claimed that official Baku had openly sided with Kyiv in the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, a conclusion based on a visit by a Ukrainian official to Baku and other gestures by Azerbaijan in support of Ukraine.
The Azerbaijani side regarded these statements as openly provocative and untrue. According to Mustafayev, the Tsargrad website published materials that distorted historical facts and undermined the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan, especially in the context of the conflict over Karabakh. Thus, the resource was accused of deliberately spreading fakes that incite hatred and harm the state interests of Azerbaijan.
The Minval Politika initiative was not an accidental action of a single media outlet - it fits into the broader policy of the authorities to cleanse the information space of pro-Kremlin propaganda. Minval Politika is considered to be pro-regime and influential, so its public call to block Tsargrad carried considerable weight. It is also important to note that the Ministry of Digital Development and Transport promptly responded to Mustafayev's appeal, actually implementing his recommendation, which indicates official support for the initiative
According to Azerbaijani sources, the blocking of Tsargrad was part of the general state policy of countering Russian disinformation resources that pose a threat to national security
The political context of this step is trivial: the cooling of relations between Baku and Moscow amid recent events. At the end of 2024, an incident occurred when Russian forces mistakenly shot down an Azerbaijani passenger plane, which caused sharp discontent in Azerbaijan. The authorities in Baku began to react more harshly to the Russian presence in the information sphere. The blocking of Tsargrad is not the first such step: earlier, Azerbaijan reduced the staff of the Russian state agency Sputnik Azerbaijan to one person (!!!), effectively closing its editorial office, and also terminated the activities of the so-called Russian House in Baku.
All these actions are explained by the desire of the Azerbaijani authorities to reduce the influence of Russian propaganda and protect their information sovereignty. According to analysts, Baku has consistently demonstrated its determination to clear its information space of Russian disinformation.
A growing number of countries in the region are aware of the threats posed by Kremlin propaganda and are implementing tough policies to protect national security from external influence. Azerbaijan, having its own painful experience of conflicts, is particularly sensitive to attempts to destabilise the situation in the country with information, which motivates the authorities to take this step.
The question arises as to whether such a high-profile initiative could have been implemented without the knowledge and consent of Azerbaijan's top political leadership.
👇
At the end of May 2025, access to the website of the Russian propaganda channel Tsargrad was blocked in Azerbaijan. The formal reason was accusations of disseminating false and provocative information against Azerbaijan.
The initiative to block this resource was taken by the editor-in-chief of the Azerbaijani publication Minval Politika, Emil Mustafayev. He officially appealed to the Ministry of Digital Development and Transport of Azerbaijan with a demand to restrict access to Tsargrad due to systematic disinformation against Baku. The fact of blocking was confirmed by the supervisory authorities: the site was included in the country's register of prohibited resources, as a result of which users saw a message about the impossibility of access when trying to enter.
One of the key arguments for the blocking was specific cases of information attacks by Tsargrad. In particular, on the eve of the blocking, this pro-Kremlin resource published an article titled "Aliyev is no longer hiding: Azerbaijan has sided with Ukraine against Russia". The article claimed that official Baku had openly sided with Kyiv in the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, a conclusion based on a visit by a Ukrainian official to Baku and other gestures by Azerbaijan in support of Ukraine.
The Azerbaijani side regarded these statements as openly provocative and untrue. According to Mustafayev, the Tsargrad website published materials that distorted historical facts and undermined the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan, especially in the context of the conflict over Karabakh. Thus, the resource was accused of deliberately spreading fakes that incite hatred and harm the state interests of Azerbaijan.
The Minval Politika initiative was not an accidental action of a single media outlet - it fits into the broader policy of the authorities to cleanse the information space of pro-Kremlin propaganda. Minval Politika is considered to be pro-regime and influential, so its public call to block Tsargrad carried considerable weight. It is also important to note that the Ministry of Digital Development and Transport promptly responded to Mustafayev's appeal, actually implementing his recommendation, which indicates official support for the initiative
According to Azerbaijani sources, the blocking of Tsargrad was part of the general state policy of countering Russian disinformation resources that pose a threat to national security
The political context of this step is trivial: the cooling of relations between Baku and Moscow amid recent events. At the end of 2024, an incident occurred when Russian forces mistakenly shot down an Azerbaijani passenger plane, which caused sharp discontent in Azerbaijan. The authorities in Baku began to react more harshly to the Russian presence in the information sphere. The blocking of Tsargrad is not the first such step: earlier, Azerbaijan reduced the staff of the Russian state agency Sputnik Azerbaijan to one person (!!!), effectively closing its editorial office, and also terminated the activities of the so-called Russian House in Baku.
All these actions are explained by the desire of the Azerbaijani authorities to reduce the influence of Russian propaganda and protect their information sovereignty. According to analysts, Baku has consistently demonstrated its determination to clear its information space of Russian disinformation.
A growing number of countries in the region are aware of the threats posed by Kremlin propaganda and are implementing tough policies to protect national security from external influence. Azerbaijan, having its own painful experience of conflicts, is particularly sensitive to attempts to destabilise the situation in the country with information, which motivates the authorities to take this step.
The question arises as to whether such a high-profile initiative could have been implemented without the knowledge and consent of Azerbaijan's top political leadership.
👇
Many signs point to the fact that the blockade of the "king city" was at least unofficially sanctioned by the administration of President Aliyev. In Azerbaijan, where much of the media is controlled or coordinated by the state, such steps are not usually taken independently by mid-level officials.
The publication that initiated the campaign against Tsargrad, Minval Politika, has a reputation as a pro-government resource, and its editor-in-chief is quite close to official circles. This, in turn, suggests that Mustafayev did not act alone, but at least with the understanding that an unofficial "order" had come from "above" to support this line. The synchronicity of the news items also indirectly indicates this - many have noted a kind of "mirror response" by Baku to the unfriendly rhetoric of the Russian media
In other words, when pro-Kremlin resources began to openly accuse Azerbaijan of playing against Russia, the Azerbaijani authorities responded by striking at one of the most odious such resources of the Russian special services. Given the potential consequences for bilateral relations, it is obvious that the decision to block the Russian channel would not have been made without the consent of Aliyev himself or his inner circle.
Next. "Tsargrad is not an ordinary Russian media outlet, but a significant element of the Kremlin's propaganda system. The channel was founded in 2015 by Russian oligarch and ultra-conservative figure Malofeev, who is closely associated with the Russian state-owned group GRU.
Malofeev is known for his openly monarchist Orthodox position and his closeness to the ideologues of the Russian world. His Tsargrad channel is positioned as a pro-Kremlin media outlet with a distinct Russian Orthodox ideology. Often, the channel's materials present events from an imperial-conservative point of view, promoting the ideas of "traditional values" and Moscow's geopolitical narratives.
Malofeev himself has close political ties to the Russian elite and financial and oligarchic circles. He has been called an "Orthodox oligarch" and has openly supported Russia's aggressive policy towards neighbouring states. In particular, Malofeev actively contributed to the annexation of Crimea and the war in Donbas, and financed pro-Russian militants in eastern Ukraine. For his activities, he, like the Tsargrad TV channel, was sanctioned by the US, EU, UK, Canada and a number of other countries.
Interestingly, even some post-Soviet states have distanced themselves from Malofeev: for example, Kazakhstan not only imposed sanctions against him, but also blocked the Tsargrad website in 2023, accusing the resource of extremist propaganda and hate speech.
Thus, Tsargrad acts as a kind of "mouthpiece" of the ultra-conservative wing of Russian propaganda, promoting narratives favourable to the Kremlin abroad, often through the prism of Orthodoxy and imperial ambitions.
In the system of Russian information expansion, this channel serves as a tool to influence audiences sympathetic to right-wing radical ideas, while simultaneously putting pressure on neighbouring countries by promoting Moscow's interpretation of conflicts and events, including semantic ones.
Undoubtedly, the blocking of the Russian propaganda website did not go unnoticed in Moscow. Although there has been no official reaction at the official level (through the Russian Foreign Ministry or other officials) as of the end of May 2025, it is safe to say that the Russian authorities will view this step as unfriendly.
Given that historically, Russia has been quite sensitive to restrictions on its media abroad, accusing other states of censorship and "harassment of the Russian-speaking audience". It is possible that the Russian Foreign Ministry will issue a statement of protest or hand over a note to the Azerbaijani ambassador in Moscow. Such actions could be accompanied by statements about "violations of freedom of speech" or "Russophobia" in Azerbaijan, a rhetoric that Russian diplomats use in similar cases.👇👇
The publication that initiated the campaign against Tsargrad, Minval Politika, has a reputation as a pro-government resource, and its editor-in-chief is quite close to official circles. This, in turn, suggests that Mustafayev did not act alone, but at least with the understanding that an unofficial "order" had come from "above" to support this line. The synchronicity of the news items also indirectly indicates this - many have noted a kind of "mirror response" by Baku to the unfriendly rhetoric of the Russian media
In other words, when pro-Kremlin resources began to openly accuse Azerbaijan of playing against Russia, the Azerbaijani authorities responded by striking at one of the most odious such resources of the Russian special services. Given the potential consequences for bilateral relations, it is obvious that the decision to block the Russian channel would not have been made without the consent of Aliyev himself or his inner circle.
Next. "Tsargrad is not an ordinary Russian media outlet, but a significant element of the Kremlin's propaganda system. The channel was founded in 2015 by Russian oligarch and ultra-conservative figure Malofeev, who is closely associated with the Russian state-owned group GRU.
Malofeev is known for his openly monarchist Orthodox position and his closeness to the ideologues of the Russian world. His Tsargrad channel is positioned as a pro-Kremlin media outlet with a distinct Russian Orthodox ideology. Often, the channel's materials present events from an imperial-conservative point of view, promoting the ideas of "traditional values" and Moscow's geopolitical narratives.
Malofeev himself has close political ties to the Russian elite and financial and oligarchic circles. He has been called an "Orthodox oligarch" and has openly supported Russia's aggressive policy towards neighbouring states. In particular, Malofeev actively contributed to the annexation of Crimea and the war in Donbas, and financed pro-Russian militants in eastern Ukraine. For his activities, he, like the Tsargrad TV channel, was sanctioned by the US, EU, UK, Canada and a number of other countries.
Interestingly, even some post-Soviet states have distanced themselves from Malofeev: for example, Kazakhstan not only imposed sanctions against him, but also blocked the Tsargrad website in 2023, accusing the resource of extremist propaganda and hate speech.
Thus, Tsargrad acts as a kind of "mouthpiece" of the ultra-conservative wing of Russian propaganda, promoting narratives favourable to the Kremlin abroad, often through the prism of Orthodoxy and imperial ambitions.
In the system of Russian information expansion, this channel serves as a tool to influence audiences sympathetic to right-wing radical ideas, while simultaneously putting pressure on neighbouring countries by promoting Moscow's interpretation of conflicts and events, including semantic ones.
Undoubtedly, the blocking of the Russian propaganda website did not go unnoticed in Moscow. Although there has been no official reaction at the official level (through the Russian Foreign Ministry or other officials) as of the end of May 2025, it is safe to say that the Russian authorities will view this step as unfriendly.
Given that historically, Russia has been quite sensitive to restrictions on its media abroad, accusing other states of censorship and "harassment of the Russian-speaking audience". It is possible that the Russian Foreign Ministry will issue a statement of protest or hand over a note to the Azerbaijani ambassador in Moscow. Such actions could be accompanied by statements about "violations of freedom of speech" or "Russophobia" in Azerbaijan, a rhetoric that Russian diplomats use in similar cases.👇👇
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